Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09DOHA329
2009-05-20 12:09:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Doha
Cable title:  

SYNCHRONIZING USG ENGAGEMENT WITH QATAR ON

Tags:  PTER PREL PGOV ECON ETTC EAID EFIN EAGR ASEC 
pdf how-to read a cable
David A Fabrycky 05/26/2009 08:00:39 AM From DB/Inbox: PE

Cable 
Text: 
 
 
S E C R E T DOHA 00329
CXDOHA:
 ACTION: AMB
 INFO: RSO RAO P/E PAO DAO DCM

DISSEMINATION: AMB /1
CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: AMB:JLEBARON
DRAFTED: DCM:MRATNEY
CLEARED: OMC:MDISHMAN P/E:SRICE RSO:FTHEUS

VZCZCDOI943
RR RUEHC RHMFISS RUEAIIA RULSSGG RHMFISS RHEFDIA
RHMFISS
DE RUEHDO #0329/01 1401209
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 201209Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY DOHA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9066
INFO RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RULSSGG/COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 DOHA 000329 

NOFORN

S/CT FOR SHARRI CLARK AND BRUCE AVERILL
NEA/ARP FOR MATTHEW BLONG
DOE/NNSA FOR OFFICE OF THE SECOND LINE OF DEFENSE
U.S. COAST GUARD FOR ASSISTANT COMMANDANT FOR MARINE
SAFETY, SECURITY, AND STEWARDSHIP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/20/2019
TAGS: PTER PREL PGOV ECON ETTC EAID EFIN EAGR ASEC
KCIP, ENRG, QA
SUBJECT: SYNCHRONIZING USG ENGAGEMENT WITH QATAR ON
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION

REF: DOHA 214

Classified By: Amb. Joseph LeBaron, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 DOHA 000329

NOFORN

S/CT FOR SHARRI CLARK AND BRUCE AVERILL
NEA/ARP FOR MATTHEW BLONG
DOE/NNSA FOR OFFICE OF THE SECOND LINE OF DEFENSE
U.S. COAST GUARD FOR ASSISTANT COMMANDANT FOR MARINE
SAFETY, SECURITY, AND STEWARDSHIP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/20/2019
TAGS: PTER PREL PGOV ECON ETTC EAID EFIN EAGR ASEC
KCIP, ENRG, QA
SUBJECT: SYNCHRONIZING USG ENGAGEMENT WITH QATAR ON
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION

REF: DOHA 214

Classified By: Amb. Joseph LeBaron, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Reftel is Post's review of the critical infrastructure
in Qatar, which if destroyed, disrupted or exploited might
have an immediate and deleterious effect on the United
States. The following report is a description of Embassy
Doha's interagency approach to engage GOQ entities in a
synchronized fashion on this issue.

--------------
The Stakes
--------------


2. (C) Qatar shares with Iran the largest non-associated gas
field in the world. Qatar's portion contains an estimated 900
trillion cubic feet of recoverable natural gas, the
third-largest gas reserves in the world. Qatar is also a
modest, though growing, oil producer, with exports now
approaching 800,000 barrels per day. U.S. energy companies
have tens of billions of dollars invested in Qatar's oil and
gas sector, which has helped make Qatar the largest exporter
of liquefied natural gas (LNG) in the world, providing
significant LNG supplies to Japan, Korea, India, and Europe.
In 2010, LNG exports to the U.S. will begin to a facility in
south Texas, at which point Qatar will likely become the
largest supplier of imported LNG to the United States.


3. (C) Qatar's increasingly important role as a world
producer in the oil and LNG sectors and its concomitant high
value as a potential terrorism target suggests a strong USG
imperative to work with Qatari authorities to ensure the
security of these energy installations.


--------------
The Facilities
--------------


4. (C) Reftel describes the principal pieces of Qatar's
energy infrastructure in greater detail. Briefly, there are
three main energy-related industrial facilities in Qatar:

-- Ras Laffan Industrial City (RLIC): Ras Laffan is
primarily focused on the production of Liquefied Natural Gas
(LNG),gas-to-liquids (GTL) fuel, and petrochemicals. The
scale of each aspect of the production process, including the
LNG liquefaction "trains" and the tankers, is among the
largest in the world.

-- Dukhan Industrial City: Dukhan industrial city accounts
for the majority of Qatar's oil production. Oil is pumped
from both on-shore and off-shore wells in the Dukhan area.
It is piped across Qatar to the port of Messaied for loading
onto tanker ships.

-- Messaied Industrial City and port complex: Messaied is
the main shipping point for oil from Dukhan to the
international market. U.S. and Coalition military equipment,
munitions and bulk aviation fuel delivery to U.S. military in
Qatar pass through Messaied. Messaied is also the location
of most of Qatar's petrochemical facilities, producing
fertilizer, fuel additives, lubricants, plastics and vinyl
for domestic consumption and export. Construction has begun
on what will be the world's largest aluminum production
facility. Plans are also underway to construct the world's
largest chemical derivatives plant and a major new oil
refinery.

--------------
Engaging the Qatari Government
--------------


5. (C) The magnitude of Qatar's energy infrastructure and its
economic and strategic importance to the U.S., suggests that
energy infrastructure security should be a priority for the
USG. The GOQ, however, has long been reluctant to cooperate
fully with the USG on this issue. There are a variety of
reasons: the Qataris' proclivity for secrecy on sensitive
issues of national security; their relative comfort dealing
with private, commercial, security consultants who are bound
by contractual relationships; and the lack of managerial
capacity within Qatar Petroleum and the GOQ's various
security agencies.


6. (C) Embassy Doha, however, now assesses that there is
greater scope for cooperation with the GOQ on this issue -
more than at any time over the past three years. To this
end, Post has formed a DCM-led working group comprising
Pol/Econ, DAO, GRPO, OMC Qatar, FCS, and RSO to lay the
ground work for, and synchronize, engagement with the GOQ on
critical infrastructure protection. Consistent with post's
broader efforts to synchronize programs and activities across
the interagency in Qatar, we call this the "Critical Energy
Infrastructure Synchronization Group." CEIP is a subset of
Critical Infrastructure Protection. All U.S.-Qatar
engagement on this issue will be reviewed by this group,
which will have responsibility for vetting USG proposals,
ensuring consistency with other USG activities, and making
recommendations to the Ambassador on particular initiatives.


7. (C) Post has identified the following four objectives for
our engagement:

-- (C) Increase the security of Qatar's energy installations:
An attack on Qatar's energy infrastructure could have an
impact on global energy market stability disproportionate to
any actual damage to Qatar's oil and gas export capacity, as
well as an impact on the risk calculations and investment
decisions of energy companies. An attack could also have a
substantial financial impact on the operations of major U.S.
energy companies in Qatar. And, because Qatar is soon likely
to become a supplier of LNG to the U.S., an attack could have
a direct impact on U.S. energy security.

-- (C) Deepen U.S.-Qatar security cooperation: Substantial
cooperation on protection of energy infrastructure creates
opportunities for the U.S. and Qatar to deepen our security
cooperation, both military and law enforcement. This raises
interoperability between U.S. and Qatari forces, increases
the ability of Qatari forces to participate in regional
exercises, and creates the potential for Qatari contributions
to Coalition military activities.

-- (S/NF) Gather intelligence: Cooperation on critical
infrastructure protection brings with it opportunities to
learn more about Qatari intentions and actions or inactions
on counterterrorism efforts, relations with and perceptions
of Iran, and internal GOQ decision-making.

-- (C) Exploit commercial opportunities: An expansion of
Qatari efforts to protect their critical infrastructure
brings with it commercial opportunities, and we have a strong
interest in ensuring that U.S. companies can pursue those
opportunities.

--------------
A Synchronized Approach
--------------


8. (C) Post is pursing a multifaceted effort that leverages
the various agencies of the Country Team to engage Qatari
officials and energy-related agencies. This will proceed on
three tracks:


9. (C) Political/economic engagement, including cooperation
between civilian USG agencies, including State, DOE, and DHS
(Coast Guard).

-- Numerous pieces of the USG play a role in developing CIP
cooperation overseas. This includes the State-S/CT led CEIP
program, Department of Energy National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA) Megaports initative nuclear detection
and monitoring program, U.S. Coast Guard visits under the
International Shipping and Port Security (ISPS) program, and
Department of State Bureau of Diplomatic Security
Anti-terrorism Training Assistance (ATA) program.

-- Embassy Doha assesses that the GOQ continues to have a
limited capacity to absorb all of the various initiatives or
to accommodate the numerous USG officials seeking to visit
Qatari energy installations.

-- Embassy Doha also assesses that the GOQ will continue to
rely upon private security consultants for advice and
hardware as the CIP programs expand. Likewise, post believes
the GOQ will not agree to cooperate exclusively with the USG
on this issue.
-- However, we believe the GOQ will be increasingly open to
cooperation with the USG on certain aspects of their CIP
efforts. For example, an "a la carte" approach to U.S.
resources under the CEIP program would further each of the
objectives described above.


10. (C) Military to military training and assistance with the
Qatari Armed Forces and Ministry of Interior.

-- The Qatar Armed Forces is actively considering
implementation of a layered missile defense, a major
objective of which is the protection of their energy
infrastructure. There have been discussions of both the
possibility of Qatari acquisition of Patriot PAC-3 missiles
(as well as other systems),and a Qatari request for CENTCOM
to deploy additional Patriot assets specifically to protect
installations at Ras Laffan.

-- Cooperation and training provided by the U.S. military and
State/DS ATA to Ministry of Interior Coasts and Border
Security Department and other uniformed security personnel.


11. (C) Development of commercial contacts with Qatar
Petroleum and the Ministry of Energy.

-- Many of the efforts to advise Qatar on infrastructure
protection include specification of particular types of
equipment and services. While the GOQ will resist efforts to
explicitly link this advice to U.S. suppliers, Embassy Doha's
Foreign Commercial Service office will nonetheless remain
alert to opportunities for U.S. companies. In addition, the
Embassy can offer to provide assistance on export controlled
items and advocacy to U.S. suppliers.
LeBaron