Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09DOHA316
2009-05-14 05:15:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Doha
Cable title:  

QATAR: REGIONAL ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY FOR

Tags:  PGOV PREL IZ QA 
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VZCZCXRO3898
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHDO #0316/01 1340515
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 140515Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY DOHA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9053
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DOHA 000316 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/14/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ QA
SUBJECT: QATAR: REGIONAL ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY FOR
IRAQ/VIABILITY OF NEW REGIONAL NETWORKS

REF: A. SECSTATE 48144

B. DOHA 311

C. DOHA 159

D. DOHA 268

Classified By: CDA Michael A. Ratney for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

--------------
(C) KEY POINTS
--------------

-- In response to Ref A, Embassy Doha assesses that Qatar
will remain disinterested in most multilateral mechanisms for
engaging on policy issues which include Iraq (e.g., the GCC
plus 3).

-- Judging from its recent engagement with Iraq, however,
Qatar could play a more constructive role in regional
functional cooperation, and would serve as a natural leader
in social/educational issues and as host of secretariats or
conferences.

-- Qatar has an outsized view of its own importance and will
almost certainly want a leading role in any new
institutions/groups, in order to justify its participation.

-- Qatar could be expected to welcome a muted U.S. role in
such regional cooperation. It is less sensitive to ties with
Iran or Israel than many of its Arab neighbors, though the
potential for cooperation depends on each issue and the
political climate at the time of engagement.

End Key Points.

Areas for Functional Cooperation
--------------------------------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DOHA 000316

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/14/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ QA
SUBJECT: QATAR: REGIONAL ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY FOR
IRAQ/VIABILITY OF NEW REGIONAL NETWORKS

REF: A. SECSTATE 48144

B. DOHA 311

C. DOHA 159

D. DOHA 268

Classified By: CDA Michael A. Ratney for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

--------------
(C) KEY POINTS
--------------

-- In response to Ref A, Embassy Doha assesses that Qatar
will remain disinterested in most multilateral mechanisms for
engaging on policy issues which include Iraq (e.g., the GCC
plus 3).

-- Judging from its recent engagement with Iraq, however,
Qatar could play a more constructive role in regional
functional cooperation, and would serve as a natural leader
in social/educational issues and as host of secretariats or
conferences.

-- Qatar has an outsized view of its own importance and will
almost certainly want a leading role in any new
institutions/groups, in order to justify its participation.

-- Qatar could be expected to welcome a muted U.S. role in
such regional cooperation. It is less sensitive to ties with
Iran or Israel than many of its Arab neighbors, though the
potential for cooperation depends on each issue and the
political climate at the time of engagement.

End Key Points.

Areas for Functional Cooperation
--------------


1. (C) Most of Qatar's multilateral discussions on functional
issues take place within established organizations such as
the 6-member Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and 22-member
Arab League. Qatar's multilateral and functional
participation outside of these institutions tends to be in
the social and educational fields.


2. (C) In particular, the Amir's Consort, Shaykha Mozah Bint
Nasser Al-Misned, controls a host of well-funded
organizations which are steadily expanding their regional
reach and are natural platforms for functional cooperation
by regional states. See Ref B for further background on
Mozah's recent visit to Iraq and her intent to expand support
for education there.

-- Post has previously highlighted the new "Silatech" youth
employment initiative/organization founded by Shaykha Mozah
with USD 100 million of seed money (Ref C). The organization
is still in an embryonic stage but is launching pilot
projects in six Arab countries, a list that could expand to

include Iraq in the future.

-- Reach Out to Asia (ROTA),a development/humanitarian
assistance organization works in several regional areas,
including Iraq.

-- Qatar is trying to position itself as a leading platform
and promoter of Science and Technology, primarily through the
newly inaugurated Qatar Science and Technology Park (QSTP),
Qatar National Research Fund (QNRF),and the GOQ's new
practice of setting aside 2.8 percent of its GDP for
research. These organizations are staffed in part by Iraqi
and other Arab expatriates, and the Qatari leadership would
surely welcome seeing these institutions become a regional
hub or take on leadership within these fields.


3. (C) Qatar enjoys playing host to conferences and has built
a formidable capacity for doing so, with major multilateral
events taking place regularly throughout the temperate
Oct-May timeframe each year. This past year, Qatar hosted
the UN Financing for Development Conference, the
Ozone/Montreal Protocol Conference, the Extractive Industries
Transparency Initiative (EITI) Conference, and many others.


4. (C) Qatar has also sought or allowed itself to be used as
a regional hub for secretariats. For example, the Gas
Exporting Countries Forum will soon establish offices in
Doha, and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime and UNESCO both
have regional offices in Doha. Qatar has good air transport
links to the rest of the region and an increasing commercial
and hotel capacity. When Qatar supports a policy or
functional idea, it opens its wallet to facilitate the
necessary support structure. For example, its
facilitation/mediation efforts in Lebanon and now
Sudan/Darfur have provided a crucial meeting place and

DOHA 00000316 002 OF 002


funding source to allow negotiations to proceed in a positive
climate.

U.S. Role
--------------


5. (C) Post assesses that Qatar would welcome a U.S. public
and/or private role in regional functional cooperative
efforts, as long as the U.S. role was not dominant (i.e.,
Qatar still wants to be the leader of its own projects and a
major player within regional networks outside of its
control). Such cooperation is already happening in some
instances (e.g., ROTA has a partnership with Mercy Corps for
educational projects in Iraq).


6. (C) What will usually not work with Qatar is approaching
the leadership with a "tin cup", asking for money for an
organization or process that has already been established
without Qatar's input or participation.

-- As an example of efforts that would be welcomed by the
GOQ, Post has recently advocated for forging a
development/humanitarian assistance partnership with Qatar.
Such a partnership builds on an expressed Qatari interest and
a proven U.S. capability. Qatar's Minister of State for
Foreign Affairs has proposed (Ref D) project-level
development coordination with the USG and such an approach
should be assumed as the preferred Qatari method for
functional issues. That is, high-level engagement that
discusses common areas of interest and paves the way for
joint projects utilizing Qatari money and relationships. To
that end, post believes high-level consultations with USAID
would be fruitful.

Other Stakeholders/Members
--------------


7. (C) Qatar is less sensitive to ties with Iran and Israel
than many of its Arab neighbors, but involving either state
in functional cooperation would be dependent on a variety of
factors, including the current political climate at the time
of engagement and the specific issue under consideration.

-- Qatar's relationship with Iran is based on Doha's security
fears and the fact that Qatar's current and future wealth
depends on successful exploitation of the two countries'
shared natural gas field (the largest in the world). This
geo-strategic reality, coupled with Qatar's stated desire to
maintain good relations with all parties, means that Doha may
attempt to include Iran in its regional
initiatives/conferences. Qatar suffered strong Arab blowback
from its efforts to include Iran at the December 2007 GCC
summit in Doha and at a February 2009 Gaza conference.

-- Qatar hosted for years an Israeli trade office (de facto
embassy) until closing it in February 2009 during the
regional turmoil over the conflict in Gaza. Qatari leaders
still maintain lines of communication with Israel, though
Qatar would probably follow the Arab consensus on whether or
not to include Israel in any functional cooperative endeavors.

Ratney