Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09DOHA281
2009-04-30 05:14:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Doha
Cable title:  

SPECIAL ENVOY GRATION'S POSITIVE MEETINGS ON

Tags:  PREL PHUM SU QA 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DOHA 000281 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/30/2019
TAGS: PREL PHUM SU QA
SUBJECT: SPECIAL ENVOY GRATION'S POSITIVE MEETINGS ON
DARFUR WITH PM, MINISTER OF STATE

REF: 2008 DOHA 854

Classified By: Ambassador Joseph E. LeBaron, for reasons 1.4 (b, d).

--------------
(C) KEY POINTS
--------------

-- Special Envoy for Darfur Scott Gration and Qatar's PM
Hamad bin Jassim agreed that the sooner an agreement on
Darfur is reached the better for all of Sudan. Shaykh
Hamad said an agreement on Darfur might serve as a model
elsewhere in Sudan.

-- They pledged to work together on SE Gration's
priorities: establishing a cease-fire, bringing back NGO
capability, and providing long-term economic development.

-- The PM welcomed SE Gration's offer to weigh in with
Egypt on Qatar's behalf in mediating Darfur and encouraged
discussions that would stop the bleeding along Sudan's
border with Chad.

------------
(C) COMMENTS
------------

-- Despite continuing to ail as he recuperates from recent
surgery in the United States, the PM was as enthusiastic as
we have seen him in some time.

-- SE Gration's offering to give Doha a helping hand in
Cairo, and his willingness to take good news about Qatar to
the White House, had a positive effect.

End Key Points and Comments.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DOHA 000281

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/30/2019
TAGS: PREL PHUM SU QA
SUBJECT: SPECIAL ENVOY GRATION'S POSITIVE MEETINGS ON
DARFUR WITH PM, MINISTER OF STATE

REF: 2008 DOHA 854

Classified By: Ambassador Joseph E. LeBaron, for reasons 1.4 (b, d).

--------------
(C) KEY POINTS
--------------

-- Special Envoy for Darfur Scott Gration and Qatar's PM
Hamad bin Jassim agreed that the sooner an agreement on
Darfur is reached the better for all of Sudan. Shaykh
Hamad said an agreement on Darfur might serve as a model
elsewhere in Sudan.

-- They pledged to work together on SE Gration's
priorities: establishing a cease-fire, bringing back NGO
capability, and providing long-term economic development.

-- The PM welcomed SE Gration's offer to weigh in with
Egypt on Qatar's behalf in mediating Darfur and encouraged
discussions that would stop the bleeding along Sudan's
border with Chad.

--------------
(C) COMMENTS
--------------

-- Despite continuing to ail as he recuperates from recent
surgery in the United States, the PM was as enthusiastic as
we have seen him in some time.

-- SE Gration's offering to give Doha a helping hand in
Cairo, and his willingness to take good news about Qatar to
the White House, had a positive effect.

End Key Points and Comments.


1. (C) Special Envoy for Sudan Scott Gration (joined by
Ambassador, Senior Representative for Sudan Tim Shortley
and P/E Chief Rice) expressed his appreciation to PM Hamad
bin Jassim Al Thani April 28 for Qatar's work to bring
peace to Darfur and Sudan. He also stressed that President
Obama is aware of Qatar's efforts and hopes to report back
to him soon that Qatar helped broker a cease-fire on
Darfur.


2. (C) The PM thanked SE Gration for briefing the President
on Qatar's role and pledged to work closely with the United
States and the international community as full partners.
Sometimes this will require taking turns playing "good
cop/bad cop" but we want this mediation to be successful.
Qatar has no political or economic stake in Darfur other
than helping the Sudanese people achieve a normal life.


3. (C) Shaykh Hamad said the heart of the problem in
mediating the Darfur conflict is that there are "too many
cooks" in the kitchen. Each group wants to be THE
opposition group and desires a monopoly on discussions.

Khalil Ibrahim of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM),
for example, threatens to leave if "so and so comes" to
Doha for discussions. This is not the way to make
progress. We need inclusivity and the support of both
Khartoum and the rebel groups to make forward progress.


4. (C) ROAD AHEAD: Qatar, said the PM, hopes for an
agreement on Darfur by summer. To make this happen, an
agreement between Sudan and Chad is vital. The Libyans are
taking lead on this; any signing ceremony would be held in
Tripoli between these parties consistent with Libya's
long-standing role on this even though the discussions are
taking place in Doha.


5. (C) SE Gration responded by saying he sees three things
that need to happen quickly. First, he underscored the
sense of urgency in bringing back NGO capability. This is
happening. Second, providing long-term development
assistance is vital. Third, but coming first and most
urgent in sequence, is establishing a cease-fire and an end
of hostilities.


6. (C) On development assistance, the PM responded that the
March Arab League Summit in Doha set aside an 8 million USD
donation for this purpose. "Send me a letter" in Qatar's
capacity as Arab League President, and I will work to get
you the money, requested Shaykh Hamad.


7. (C) SE Gration offered to take the PM up on his offer
and began outlining the next steps he envisions on Sudan.
To show support for Qatar's initiative on Darfur, SE
Gration told the PM he would stop in Cairo and give Qatar

DOHA 00000281 002 OF 003


full U.S. backing. The PM said this is very important,
since Egypt alone cannot solve the problems of Darfur but
can act as a spoiler, adding that one enticement to the
Egyptians could be that success in Darfur could serve as a
model for making progress elsewhere in Sudan.


8. (C) After Cairo, SE Gration said he plans to visit Chad
and give President Deby confidence to reach out to Sudan
and cut support for JEM. He added that he would urge
Khalil Ibrahim to participate in the Qatar Initiative and
travel to Doha for talks. This U.S. pressure pleased the
PM, who shared that he had already offered Ibrahim economic
incentives to participate.


9. (C) NEED FOR TARGET DATES: SE Gration hoped that Khalil
and representatives of other groups could meet in Doha May
4-5 to work out a cease-fire. The PM said he did not know
if the dates would work, but stressed that he and Minister
of State for Foreign Affairs Ahmed Al-Mahmoud were "in a
hurry" to bring the negotiations to the end. Al-Mahmoud
"is tired but very much wants to succeed. We need to lock
people in a hotel and force them to finish an agreement.
We will need your help and that of other parties. I will
encourage" Al-Mahmoud to work out the best dates with you.


10. (C) SE Gration thanked the PM and offered to give the
Minister of State some words of encouragement in their
follow-on meeting. The Special Envoy stressed the need for
targets to keep progress from slipping. This is not about
seeking credit, added SE Gration, but about ending the
suffering and focusing on the approximately 450 days we
have before there is a referendum on southern Sudan's
future. The U.S. "wants Qatar to succeed. We want to be
your partner."

--------------
AL-MAHMOUD MEETING
--------------


11. (C) At the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, SE Gration
shared with Minister of State Ahmed Al-Mahmoud the
highlights of his meeting with the PM, emphasizing the idea
of convening groups in Doha May 4-5 and U.S. determination
to widen participation among rebel groups.


12. (C) Al-Mahmoud responded by recounting how Qatar became
involved in Darfur mediation (see reftel) and concluded by
presenting the main challenges he sees now. First, there
are too many groups with competing agendas. Second, the
groups are increasingly fragmented and splintering.
Third, there is an urgent need to find a mechanism to
implement a cease-fire. Finally, there is the challenge of
broadening civil society. After listing the challenges,
Al-Mahmoud asked SE Gration for his views on the Darfur
Peace Agreement (DPA) and whether it is a sound basis for
moving forward today.


13. (C) SE Gration said 80 percent of the DPA is "pretty
good." Perhaps, he said, we should create a new "Darfur
Security Agreement (DSA)" that would include a cease-fire
provision. At any rate, he advised Al-Mahmoud to change
the name of the agreement, even if Qatar and UN/African
Union Mediator Djibril Bassole keep many of the DPA's
concepts.


14. (C) On security arrangements, SE Gration said UNAMID is
vital to monitoring any cease-fire, and the groups
themselves must also take part in enforcement monitoring.
SE Gration voiced the need to incentivize development
assistance to supporters of the cease-fire, all the while
giving groups discretion on spending money within broad
guidelines.


15. (C) The longer the cease-fire lasts, the more money the
group would receive to help its constituents. SE Gration
pointed out that the international community would likely
spend this money on developmental assistance anyway, but by
linking it to security "we get something more out of it."
He closed by noting the need for "fair and equitable"
disarmament following a cease-fire. Once there is security
in Darfur, its residents will be able to prosper
economically, said SE Gration. Al-Mahmoud agreed and said
he had passed the same message to opposition groups.


16. (C) MAKING FORWARD PROGRESS: What we need to do, said
SE Gration, is "get people on the train and start it
moving." Even an interim cease-fire would help generate
momentum, he added. JEM is a challenge because it does not
want to go forward with even a partial exchange of
prisoners with the Government of Sudan. It's all or

DOHA 00000281 003 OF 003


nothing, and that is not acceptable to the other side.
Pushing for a cessation of hostilities along Sudan's border
with Chad is also greatly needed.


17. (C) SE Gration closed the meeting by noting that
"Darfur could look like a holiday if we can't prevent" the
bigger problems that could lie ahead for the rest of
Sudan. It is "easier to prevent than fix" problems. The
referendum in the south looms large, as it is only 450 or
so days ahead. Al-Mahmoud agreed that time is of the
essence, noting that groups must take advantage of this
window of opportunity. The challenge is getting them to
think "not of themselves but of the poor people on the
ground in Darfur."


18. (C) CHAD/SUDAN: Over lunch, UN/African Union Mediator
Bassole warned that President Deby cannot unilaterally take
decisions on behalf of Chad, which is a problem in pushing
forward on a Sudan-Chad agreement. Bassole made a pitch
for UNSC endorsement of any agreement to make international
monitoring and compliance easier. Senior Representative
for Sudan Tim Shortley liked the idea, noting that such a
requirement could be included in the June UNAMID rollover.


19. (C) Asked for the purpose of the upcoming meeting
between delegations from Chad and Sudan, Al-Mahmoud
described the encounter as a "preparatory meeting" designed
to figure out "what is missing" in the relationship between
Chad and Sudan that prevents us from moving forward.
Bassole said he had concluded that both countries have so
many issues of internal dialogue that they can't reach a
cross-border agreement. Still, he agreed with Al-Mahmoud
that something more was involved, and Al-Mahmoud
underscored that there was a time not so long ago when Chad
and Sudan maintained excellent relations.
LeBaron