SCENESETTER FOR SE GRATION'S APRIL 27-29 VISIT TO

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 DOHA 000271

SIPDIS

FOR SPECIAL ENVOY GRATION FROM AMBASSADOR LEBARON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/22/2019
TAGS: PREL PHUM QA SU
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR SE GRATION'S APRIL 27-29 VISIT TO
QATAR

Classified By: Ambassador Joseph E. LeBaron, for reasons 1.4 (b, d).


1. (C) Embassy Doha welcomes your visit to Qatar. You have a
confirmed appointment with the Minister of State for Foreign
Affairs (and principal point man on Qatar's Darfur
initiative) Ahmed Al-Mahmoud. France's Special Envoy on
Darfur, Issa Maraut, has been posted to the French Embassy in
Doha since October and is eager to meet with you during your
stay. We are also coordinating with your staff and other
posts in the region on possible meetings with the various
Darfur groups who may be in Doha during your stay.


2. (C) We know that your focus is Sudan, thus we start
immediately below with our assessment of State Minister
Al-Mahmoud and Qatar's policies towards Sudan (paras. 3-6).
After that, we present our broader views on Qatar. We also
discuss the key strategic trends in this country over the
coming three years.

--------------
Qatar and Darfur
--------------


3. (C) Al-Mahmoud is an able diplomat, and he is committed to
forging a peace agreement in Darfur. As you know from your
recent telephone conversation with him, he views the
situation there as a humanitarian catastrophe, and he
genuinely wants to do what he can to help. Al-Mahmoud
appears to be working closely with UN and African Union Envoy
Djibril Bassole, speaking with him by phone almost daily. He
understands the suspicions that the Fur, the rebel groups,
and others have of Qatar's role in mediating the conflict on
Darfur, especially after the Doha-hosted Arab League summit,
which featured the attendance of indicted President
al-Bashir. He appreciates the tools and experience that
Bassole brings to the effort. He also recognizes that
support from the United States, France, and the U.K. are
essential, especially in bringing rebel leaders such as Abdul
Wahid to the negotiating table.


4. (C) Qatar is increasingly suspicious of Egypt, which is
diverging increasingly with Qatar over Darfur mediation. It
is possible that Al-Mahmoud will ask that the USG convey to
Egypt its support for Qatar's efforts in Darfur. If so, it
will not be the first such request. So far, Qatar's leaders
have not seen evidence that Washington has supported Qatar's
Darfur mediation in USG discussions with Egypt.


5. (C) The Qataris believe it is important that Libya have a
visible role on Darfur. Of late, they have not expressed any
reservations, to us at least, about Libya's lead on
Chad-Sudan mediation. It is not entirely clear to us the
extent to which Libya is fully on board with Qatar's efforts
on Darfur.


6. (C) I look forward to your visit and supporting your
efforts to advance U.S. aims in Darfur. We should have the
opportunity before your meetings here to strategize on the
steps ahead. While the military, commercial and educational
relationships the U.S. maintains with Qatar are excellent,
the political relationship will take a concerted effort to
improve. But the opportunity for that is clearly there, and
Qatar's role in bringing peace to Darfur will help shape the
future of the people of Darfur as well as the bilateral road
ahead between the U.S. and Qatar.

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THE U.S.-QATAR RELATIONSHIP
--------------


7. (C) The breadth and depth of Qatar's relationship with the
U.S. is impressive, especially for a country the size of
Connecticut, with about two million inhabitants, of whom only
about 225,000 are actually Qatari citizens.

-- Because it is so small and its energy resources so large,
Qatar now has an annual per capita income of over $60,000
(the highest in the world). Qatar's national revenues will
continue growing despite the global economic crisis, although
their upward trajectory will be moderated by a drop in
commodity prices.

-- This wealth has helped bolster the country's regional
policies that too often have been at odds with U.S.
objectives. Examples include Qatar's relations with Hamas,
Hezbollah, Iran, and Syria. (Their Darfur effort is a
notable exception.)


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-- Until recently, Qatar was not fully cooperative in
intelligence sharing and combating terrorism financing, which
also led to tensions with Washington.

-- At the political level, the bilateral relationship has
been cold, but it is improving. Prime Minister Hamad bin
Jasim has told us Qatar wants to "close the chapter" of poor
political relations with Washington, and he recently visited
Washington for a series of meetings with senior
Administration officials.

-- In contrast to the political relationship, the U.S.-Qatar
military relationship is solid. Qatar provides the U.S.
military exceptional access to two major Qatari military
installations, Al Udaid Air Base and Camp As-Saliyeh -- two
of CENTCOM's most important operating installations outside
of Iraq. Qatar charges us no rent, and in fact is funding
over $700 million in construction projects for the exclusive
use of the U.S. military.

-- The U.S.-Qatar economic relationship is vital. U.S.
energy companies have invested tens of billions of dollars in
the oil and gas industry here. Qatar, which holds the third
largest natural gas reserves in the world after Iran and
Russia, is expected to become in 2010 one of the most
important suppliers of imported liquefied natural gas (LNG)
to the U.S. market.

-- Our educational and cultural relationship with Qatar is
strong and growing. Qatar has committed itself like few
other Arab states to modernizing its educational system, and
has turned decisively to the United States for help. Qatar
has imported branch campuses of six U.S. universities,
including Texas A&M, Carnegie-Mellon, Weill-Cornell Medical
School, Georgetown, Virginia Commonwealth, and Northwestern.
At the elementary and secondary levels it is instituting a
U.S. model of charter schools.

-- Al Jazeera, the television network with an Arabic-speaking
audience of some 60 million, is based in Qatar and funded by
the State of Qatar. The network's coverage, particularly by
its Arabic service on issues important to the United States,
has long been an irritant in our bilateral relationship. We
nevertheless recognize the value of USG officials appearing
on Al Jazeera in order to ensure that official U.S. voices
are heard in the Arab world. Because it is funded by the
State of Qatar, Al Jazeera avoids reporting critical of
Qatar. In any event, Al Jazeera remains an important source
of outreach in Arabic -- and increasingly in English on a
separate network -- to viewers around the world.


8. (C) We are happy to arrange interviews on Al Jazeera for
you if you have interest and your time on the ground in Doha
permits.

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QATAR'S STRATEGY OF BALANCING COMPETING INTERESTS
-------------- --------------


9. (C) SAUDI ARABIA: The Amir's family, the Al Thanis, have
ruled Qatar for more than 140 years. Given the small size of
Qatar and a desire to stay in power, the Al Thani family does
its best to stay on good terms with larger regional players,
such as Iran and Saudi Arabia. The relationship with Riyadh
had been strained following perceptions in the Kingdom that
Al Jazeera's coverage of the Saudi royal family was
unflattering, leading the Saudis a few years ago to pull
their ambassador. However, a Saudi ambassador returned to
Doha a little over a year ago, and relations are generally
improving.


10. (S) IRAN: The Qataris deeply distrust Iran and oppose
that neighbor's nuclear weapons program. But sharing the
third largest non-associated gas reserves in the world with
Iran obliges the Qatari leadership to maintain a "working
relationship" with Tehran. As an example of the balancing
act Qatar plays with Iran -- and elsewhere -- Qatar will not
close the one Iranian bank serving Qatar, as we have asked.
Nor, however, will Qatar allow Iran to open additional banks,
as we expect the Iranians would like. Instead, in classic
Qatari fashion, the government announced it had granted
permission to the sole operating Iranian bank to open a
second branch -- on the same day former Treasury Secretary
Paulson visited Doha in June. Such behavior does not satisfy
either the U.S. or Iran, but it exemplifies how the Al Thani
leadership tries to maintain balance between competing
interests. (Think also of Qatar's relations with Iran
juxtaposed to the considerable U.S. military presence in

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Qatar.)


11. (S) RELATIONS WITH BAD ACTORS: Qatar's contacts with
Hamas are consistent with the current Amir's stated desire to
have good relations and contacts with everyone, and his
belief that Hamas won in free-and-fair elections for the
Palestinian Legislative Council in January 2006. The Qatari
leadership also appears to calculate that maintaining
relations with bad actors such as Hezbollah and the Iranians
helps ensure Qatar's security by serving as an insurance
policy against attack -- a real concern given Qatar's hosting
of U.S. military personnel and the perception of this by
extremist elements in the region.


12. (S) RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL: Up until January, Israel
maintained a quasi-diplomatic presence in Doha. Qatar's
"freezing" of Israel's Trade Office presence occurred in the
wake of the failure by Qatar to achieve a quorum of Arab
leaders for an Arab League Summit aimed at addressing the
crisis in Gaza. The subsequent Doha Summit on Gaza, attended
by a large Arab and Palestinian contingent from the
rejectionist camp, voted to break off ties with Israel as a
protest over Gaza. Qatar acted immediately; Mauritania later.


13. (S) The January Summit, held days before President Obama
took office, got the Qataris off on the wrong foot with the
new Administration. Senior Qatari officials have since made
clear their strong commitment to a continued strategic
relationship with the United States. We predict that Qatar,
which continues to tell the Israelis that bilateral contacts
are welcome, will look for an opportunity to reopen the
Israeli Trade Office. Having jettisoned their own policy of
maintaining overt good relations with Israel, however, Qatari
officials are no doubt hoping for a gesture by the Israelis
vis--vis the Palestinians that would allow Qatar to reverse
itself with dignity.

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THE TREND FOR INCREASED DIPLOMATIC ACTIVISM BY QATAR
-------------- --------------


14. (C) LESSONS FROM LEBANON: Qatar, led by the Amir and
Prime Minister, successfully mediated among competing
Lebanese factions in June, to much acclaim in many parts of
the region. In doing so, the Qatari leadership reaffirmed
its belief that Qatar's policy of having open doors across
the ideological spectrum in the region was important to
promoting stability in the region. The parties to the
Lebanese conflict were brought to Doha and lodged in the
Sheraton Hotel. Senior Qatari officials, including the Prime
Minister and Amir, shuttled back and forth between various
hotel rooms in a
coordinated effort to narrow the gaps between the parties.
The Amir, failing to convince Hezbollah to sign on to the
draft agreement that the other parties, in some cases
begrudgingly had accepted, called the Presidents of Syria and
Iran to ask for their help with Hezbollah's leadership. They
did, and we think Qatar's leaders drew three important
conclusions:

(a) A small state getting along with everyone can accomplish
what larger states (Jordan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia in the
Lebanese example) cannot;

(b) Good relations with bad actors (in this case Syria and
Iran) can lead to tangible and beneficial results for the
region and the world; and

(c) Resolving the Lebanese conflict increased regional
stability and paid dividends for Qatar's own security and
global standing.


15. (C) EGYPT AND SUDAN: Qatar's success on Lebanon may have
encouraged its leaders to take issue publicly with Egypt on
its mediation of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict during the
Gaza crisis. It is clear that President Mubarak remains
furious with the Qataris over their behavior in December, and
Egypt's bitterness is endangering Qatar's current
high-profile mediation initiative on Darfur, which has been
supported by the U.S. since your predecessor, Richard
Williamson, visited Doha in November.


16. (C) MEDIATION, NOT MILITARY MIGHT: Considering Qatar's
wealth, its growing confidence in mediating disputes, and the
prestige that such involvement brings, we expect Qatar will
continue to carve out a regional diplomatic role for itself
in the coming years. A few of Qatar's initiatives have
foundered, including an effort to mediate a ceasefire between

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the Yemeni government and the Shi'a Houthi rebels in the
north. A half-hearted attempt to bring Hamas and Fatah
rivals together also yielded nothing. Closer to Sudan, in
recent days the press has reported that Qatar has been asked
to mediate with parties in Somalia, including those
affiliated with off-shore pirates.


17. (C) Qatar, with a population of fewer than 250,000
citizens, will never be a military power. Having its sites
set on regional diplomacy and mediation is quite realistic,
however. Also, despite the global economic crisis, Qatar's
ample natural gas reserves should provide sufficient money to
invest in the global good. Improving stability through
mediation in a turbulent region where Qatar's military
resources are meager makes inherent sense. What resources
Qatar is putting into its military are aimed at providing
airlift capacity for humanitarian interventions. Qatar in
the coming months will take possession of U.S.-origin C-17
aircraft, and it is well possible that Qatar may seek to use
those aircraft to bolster tangibly its diplomatic
initiatives, such as by supplying humanitarian needs in
Africa (including Sudan).

LeBaron