QATAR'S UNBALANCED POSITION ON GAZA SETS BACK ITS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DOHA 000024

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2019
TAGS: PREL KPAL KWBG QA
SUBJECT: QATAR'S UNBALANCED POSITION ON GAZA SETS BACK ITS
EMERGING ROLE AS A REGIONAL MEDIATOR

REF: MUSCAT 16

Classified By: Ambassador Joseph E. LeBaron, for reasons 1.4 (b, d).

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(C) KEY POINTS
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-- For reasons of political ideology and strategic
positioning, Qatar has adopted a posture on the fighting in
Gaza that will seriously undermine its effort to become an
influential regional player.

-- Ideologically, Qatar's Amir believes actions to
undermine the democratically-elected Hamas government are
wrong and to be actively opposed. (See paras. 5-8.)

-- Strategically, the Amir is trying to position himself in
the Gaza issue as a champion of Arab public opinion, even
as the Al Thani ruling family shapes that opinion
(indirectly) through its financial support and informal
guidance to al-Jazeera.

-- The Amir no doubt believes that Qatar has the strategic
space to take the unhelpful, oppositional position it has
in support of Hamas. Qatar hosts critically important U.S.
military operations. It is the world's largest exporter of
LNG. And it has, at least for now, overt relations with
Israel (see septel).

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(C) COMMENTS
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-- In a later cable, we will send our suggestions on how we
might get Qatar to change its regional approach. In short,
we believe the USG will have to find a way to get to the
Amir ideologically or strategically -- or both.

-- We already know that, in the longer term, U.S. Special
Envoy for Sudan Williamson's engagement of Minister of
State for Foreign Affairs Al-Mahmoud on Darfur could be a
model for engagement with Qatar. In the case of
these two officials' sustained dialogue, the United States
has
had success shaping Qatar's approach on its mediation in
Sudan.

-- Meanwhile, Embassy Doha will continue telling our Qatari
interlocutors that, if Qatar insists on maintaining its
political relationship with Hamas, then Qatar's message to
Hamas leaders should focus squarely on the need to adopt
the Quartet conditions.

End Key Points and Comments.


1. (C) Embassy Muscat's very useful cable (reftel) reports
the Egyptian allegation that Qatar mounted a determined
effort at the recent GCC summit in Muscat to get the GCC to
formally endorse an emergency Arab League Summit to address
the Gaza crisis. That allegation is almost certainly
correct. In fact, as the Gaza crisis continues, Qatar's
opposition to the position of the moderate Arab states on
Gaza appears to be growing.

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WHAT IS DRIVING QATAR'S BEHAVIOR?
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2. (C) Until recently, we could count on Qatar to seek good
relations with virtually everyone. That was part of
Qatar's strategy to become a regional diplomatic player
uniquely postured to work with everyone across the
ideological spectrum of the broader Middle East.


3. (C) Qatar maintained contact with states and non-state
actors opposed by the moderate end of the Arab spectrum of
ideology and policy. But it also maintained relationships
with moderate regional groups and parties, with whom the
USG and others share important interests. These include
the parties to the Darfur crisis, with whom Qatar is
actively involved in mediation. Now, however, Qatar
appears to be losing its balance over the issue of Gaza.
That will set back its goal of becoming an influential
regional player.


4. (C) It is the Amir himself who is responsible for this
change. Ideologically, he views Hamas through a very
different lens than does Saudi Arabia or Egypt. He
believes efforts to undermine or exclude a
democratically-elected Hamas government are wrong and to be

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actively opposed. Perhaps equally important, in a regional
strategic sense, he knows where Arab public opinion is on
Gaza, and he is trying to position himself in the forefront
of it.

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AMIR PRESAGED POSITION IN NOVEMBER MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR
-------------- --------------


5. (C) In a November 3 meeting with the Ambassador,
Ambassador urged the Amir to stop Qatar's support for
Hamas. In response, the Amir acknowledged the U.S.
position, but he pointed out that Hamas came to power in
elections that were deemed free and fair.


6. (C) Maybe, the Amir continued, the elections should
never have been held. But they were. "How can I now turn
my back on an elected government," he asked? Washington
"knew Hamas would win and went forward with the elections
all the same. This is not Qatar's fault."


7. (C) Ambassador reminded the Amir that Hamas, failure to
renounce violence and to stand by commitments of previous
Palestinian leaders were central to Washington's position.
The Amir discounted this, noting that Hamas leader Khaled
Mesha'al had told him Hamas would accept the 1967 borders
with Israel, although not in the absence of an overall
agreement. Mesha'al, said the Amir, worries that he will
suffer the same fate as Arafat, if he makes such an
announcement earlier.


8. (C) Referring back to the elections that brought Hamas
to power, the Amir told the Ambassador, "We must find a way
to have good relations (with the United States),but not at
the price of our dignity. If Qatar is wrong and makes
mistakes, we will deal those mistakes, but the mistakes
must be ours to correct."

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STRATEGIC AIMS
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9. (C) Qatar's current approach to events in Gaza reflects
a strategic dimension closely associated with Qatar's
national interest; or, to be more specific, with the ruling
Al Thanis' interests.


10. (C) Strategically, the Amir appears to consider Qatar,
including al-Jazeera, to be a champion of Arab public
opinion. By extension, Qatar -- and, again, al-Jazeera --
is a representative to the world of the Arab point of
view. Given Arab public opinion on Gaza, the Amir believes
that his position on the fighting will increase Qatar's
popularity and visibility on the Arab street. That, in
turn, will contribute to domestic support for the ruling
family and to more security in terms of regional threats.
For Qatar and its ruling family, that is not just politics,
it's survival.


11. (C) The Amir also appears to be frustrated by the
reluctance of other Arab leaders to exercise leadership in
finding a solution to the present crisis in Gaza.
Especially when Arab public opinion, which the Al Thanis
help shape indirectly through al-Jazeera, is so clear on
the issue. While Palestinians are dying in Gaza, the Amir
seems to believe, the Arabs are once again waiting for
others -- notably the UN Security Council and the Quartet
-- to take action.


12. (C) Beyond simple grandstanding, his desire to hold an
Arab League Summit stems in part, we believe, from his
calculation that, if the Arabs forge a common position,
then they would have more leverage with Israel and the
international community in securing significant, positive
change for the Palestinians.


13. (C) Whatever the motivations for his actions, the Amir
doubtlessly believes he has the strategic space to support
the Syrian and Hamas version of the Palestinian cause in
times of Palestinian-Israeli violence:

-- Qatar is host to the U.S. military, in the thousands, at
two Qatari bases critical to the U.S. war effort in
Afghanistan and Iraq. He knows we will be loathe to
seriously rupture our military relationship with Qatar and
deny Qatar its strategic defense against Iran, Qatar's
existential threat.

-- Qatar is now the world's largest exporter of LNG, with
growing revenues from that commodity. That positions the
Al Thanis well during a global economic downturn that will

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severely affect Qatar's neighbors.

-- The financial independence that comes from Qatar's
energy wealth gives the Amir the capacity and freedom to
use money amounting to billions as an international tool
and lever.

-- Qatar has overt relations with Israel. This allows the
Amir to argue that his relationship with Hamas and Syria
is, like his relationship with Israel, just part of a
policy of talking to everyone.

-- Qatar is host to, and funds, the Al-Jazeera Network.
That allows Qatar to help shape Arab public opinion through
a hot medium more graphic and vocal, and with greater
regional reach, than anything its neighbors have.

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THE IRANIAN DIMENSION
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14. (C) Qatar's detractors in the region often point to
Doha's relationship with Tehran as lying behind Qatar's
support for Hamas. We agree with them, at least in part.
At its core, Qatar's relationship with Iran is rooted in
Qatar's fear of Iran.


15. (C) We do not know the precise nature and extent of the
Qatari-Iranian relationship. But we think Qatar believes
it simply must maintain a peaceable, outwardly friendly
relationship with Iran, if Qatar is to continue its
exploitation -- at Iran's economic expense -- of the North
Field. Qatar's North Field and Iran's South Pars field are
part of the same mammoth reservoir of non-associated gas.
Right now, Qatar extracts far, far more gas from that
common field than does Iran, and Iran knows it.
LeBaron