Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09DOHA210
2009-03-25 13:29:00
SECRET
Embassy Doha
Cable title:  

SCENESETTER FOR LIEUTENANT GENERAL BURGESS'S MARCH

Tags:  PREL MOPS PGOV QA 
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VZCZCXRO9432
PP RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDIR
DE RUEHDO #0210/01 0841329
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 251329Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY DOHA
TO RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8897
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0272
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 DOHA 000210 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/25/2019
TAGS: PREL MOPS PGOV QA
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR LIEUTENANT GENERAL BURGESS'S MARCH
30 VISIT TO QATAR

Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOSEPH E. LEBARON FOR REASONS 1.4 (b and d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 DOHA 000210

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/25/2019
TAGS: PREL MOPS PGOV QA
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR LIEUTENANT GENERAL BURGESS'S MARCH
30 VISIT TO QATAR

Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOSEPH E. LEBARON FOR REASONS 1.4 (b and d).


1. (SBU) Lieutenant General Burgess, Embassy Doha welcomes
your visit to Qatar. I personally very much look forward to
meeting you and joining you for meetings with the Qatari
leadership.


2. (SBU) We have requested the following meetings for the
morning of March 30:

-- The Crown Prince, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani, who has
overall responsibility for Qatar's military and security
services;

-- The Chief of Staff of the Qatar Armed Forces, Major
General Hamad bin Ali al-Attiyeh;

-- The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence and Security
(effectively your counterpart),Colonel Ahmed bin Nasser
al-Thani.


3. (C) Meeting times will become clearer as your visit draws
near. I am also planning a meeting at my residence with the
Defense Attache prior to the requested office calls.This will
allow us to meet and further discuss items relevant to the
day's agenda.


4. (C) Relationship-building is clearly a major objective for
your visit. But I want to accomplish even more - to advance
our cooperation and sharing of information, both withthe
Government of Qatar and the Qatar Armed Forces. The Defense
Intelligence Agency is an ideal vehicle for that.


5. (C) Below are four sections of information that, in their
entirety, present the Country Team's views on how your visit
can best advance the U.S. Government's strategic objectives
in Qatar. We start with a brief review of the bilateral
relationship, then we discuss several key trends through 2011
that the U.S. Mission has identified. Finally, we provide
our analysis on how to advance our military engagement with
Qatar, including talking points for your meetings with Qatari
officials. Warm regards,
Joseph LeBaron, Ambassador

--------------
THE U.S.-QATAR RELATIONSHIP
--------------


6. (C) The breadth and depth of Qatar's relationship with the
U.S. is impressive, especially for a small country of only
1.7 million inhabitants, of whom only about 225,000 are
actually Qatari citizens.

-- (C) The U.S.-Qatar military relationship is, of course,

extremely important. Qatar provides the U.S. military
exceptional access to two major Qatari military
installations, Al Udeid Airbase and Camp As-Sayliah - perhaps
CENTCOM's most important operating installationin the Middle
East outside of military use.

-- (C) Until recently, the U.S. had never made a major
defense sale to Qatar. In July 2008 Qatar signed contracts
with Boeing for two C-17s with an option for two more, and
with Lockheed-Martin for four C-130Js also with an option for
two more. The C-17 and C-130 sales are a signal Qatar is
beginning to invest in its own defensive capabilities - with
a preference for U.S.-origin equipment -- expressing interest
in many other systems, most notably integrated air defense.

-- (U) The broader economic relationship between Qatar and
the United States is vital. U.S. energy companies have
invested tens of billions of dollars in the oil and gas
industry here. Qatar, which holds the third largest natural
gas reserves in the world after Iran and Russia, is expected
to become in 2009 one of the most important suppliers of
imported liquefied natural gas to the U.S.

-- (U) Because it is so small and its energy resources so
large, Qatar now has an annual per capita income of over
$60,000. Even with the current global financial crisis,
Qatar's national revenues continue to grow,and Qatar now
has, according to the IMF, the higest per capita income in
the world.

-- (U) Vat wealth has bolstered political ambitions, leading
to Qatari foreign policy initiatives that are ofen at odds
with U.S. objectives, notably Qatar'srelationships with
Hamas and Syria. One exceptin is Qatar's initiative on
Darfur, which has U.S support. Qatar, working with UN and

DOHA 00000210 002 OF 004


African Union Mediator Djibril Bassole, aims to reduce the
gaps between rival Sudanese factions with the eventual goal
of bringing an end to the misery in Darfur. Before the
Sudanese President expelled non-governmental organizations
from Sudan in retaliation for the International Criminal
Court indictment against him, the results of Qatar's
mediation were encouraging. The Government of Sudan and the
main opposition group signed a framework agreement for
further negotiations at a conference held in Doha in
February, and since then the main Qatari negotiator concluded
an agreement for the participation of other opposition groups
earlier this month in Tripoli.

-- (U) Qatar's location, wide-ranging foreign relations,
fast-growing economy, and expanding transportation links have
made counterterrorism cooperation, including counterterrorist
financing, a key aspect of our relationship. Qatar's wealth,
in particular, means its citizens are potential sources of
money for violent extremists and cooperative efforts to
target and prevent these financial flows are central to our
bilateral agenda.

-- (U) Qatar has committed itself like few other Arab states
to modernizing its educational system, and has turned
decisively to the United States for help. Qatar has imported
branch campuses of six U.S. universities, including Texas
A&M, Carnegie-Mellon, Weill-Cornell Medical School,
Georgetown, Virginia Commonwealth, and Northwestern. It is
instituting a U.S. model of charter schools at the elementary
and secondary levels.

-------------- --------------
THE MILITARY RELATIONSHIP: KEY TRENDS THROUGH 2011
-------------- --------------


7. (S) Following are the key trends over the next three years
that we believe will have the greatest impact on our military
relationship:

-- (C) Qatar will continue to modernize its military through
the purchase of U.S. weapons systems, though competition will
continue from the French, British, and others. Despite
Qatar's wealth, defense purchases will be made in the context
of a frugal military budget, made worse by the global
economic crisis. Economic development will remain Qatar's
top spending priority and we have already heard signals that
military purchases will be on a slower track.

-- (U) Qatar will continue to face a formidable challenge
staffing its military with Qataris because there are so few
of them, and because more attractive opportunities exist
elsewhere in the government and the private sector. The
continued dependence on foreign nationals, particularly in
the enlisted ranks, will continue to present concerns about
transfers of sensitive U.S. technology.

-- (U) Qatari leadership will seek to increase the prestige
of its military within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and
the international arena but has no clearly defined strategy
for doing so. Likewise, Qatar is attracted to the latest
military systems, even while its military modernization is
not guided by a national security strategy, at least not one
we are aware of.

-- (U) Irritating customs and immigration issues stemming
from Qatar's need to demonstrate sovereignty over al-Udeid
Airbase will continue to plague the mil-mil relationship for
some time to come, although the Crown Prince, Sheikh Tamim,
and the Qatar Armed Force Chief of Staff, Major General
al-Attiyeh, pledged in February to work with U.S.
counterparts to put in place reliable procedures and enforce
them.

-- (C) We expect that the biggest factor in our engagement in
the near-term will be Qatar's sensitivity to the large,
enduring U.S. military presence. While Qatar's leadership
regards our presence as a permanent and necessary deterrent
to the aggression of surrounding states, principally Iran and
Saudi Arabia, it does expose it to regional criticism and,
potentially, to terrorist attack.

-- (C) We expect, therefore, that Qatar will continue to
pursue a policy of strengthening and deepening the military
relationship through increased combined planning, training,
exercises, and operations - along the lines of the
relationship that exists between the U.S. Forces in Korea and
the Republic of Korea Armed Forces.

-------------- --------------

DOHA 00000210 003 OF 004


MILITARY ENGAGEMENT: SUGGESTED POINTS FOR OFFICE CALLS
-------------- --------------


8. (C) Your visit is an opportunity to deepen our strategic,
operational and tactical cooperation with the Government of
Qatar. Your visit also provides us with an opportunity that
is rare - meetings and discussion foQatar military and
civilian leadership with the senior U.S.official in the field
of military intelligence. Here's how we can best move
forward U.S. efforts on this front:


9. (S) PROMOTE INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION SHARING EFFORTS
BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES:

-- (S) The ILiAD, comprising the Combined Media Processing
Center-Qatar, the Open Source Center, and the National
Virtual Translation Center, has become a valued and vital
asset in theregion. The products, information and training
allow not only the military, but all government entities in
the region, to benefit from the capabilities provided by all
three organizations. If you agree, efforts should be made to
explore ways to share this information with our Host Nation
allies.

-- (S) You should be prepared to explore with both Chief of
Staff Al-Attiyah and Assistant Chief of Staff Sheikh Ahmed
ways to expand information and intelligence exchanges with
Qatar. The current SWEEPTIDE Intelligence Exchange agreement
allows for two exchanges and two seminars per year. An
expansion of these efforts could include the use of CENTCOM
and NAVCENT assets currently located in theater, willing to
work with the Qatar Armed forces, and coordinated through
USDAO Doha.


10. (S) PROTECTION OF CRITICAL ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE:

-- (S) Security of Qatar's oil and natural gas
infrastructure, especially the North Field off the northern
tip of the country, and the on-shore gas liquefaction
facilities at Ras Laffan, are of high interest to the U.S.
We recommend you solicit Qatari views on their plans for
security of this critical national asset and explore ways
that intelligence and information exchanges might assist.
Recent USDAO reporting outlines a picture of little
capability in defending Qatar's economic well-being. Armed
smuggling, piracy, and potential terrorist activity in the
North Field would be felt around the world.

-- (S) You should mention that maritime security around Ras
Laffan, Halul Islands, and the North Field should be an
important agenda item for the Qataris at the next SWEEPTIDE
Intelligence Exchange. Because we assess cooperation and the
sharing of intelligence within the Qatar Armed Forces and
between all Ministries to be poor, we should look for
opportunities to encourage greater Qatari interagency
coordination as well as to discuss energy infrastructure
security with key USG officials.


11. (S) DEVELOPMENT OF A NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY:

-- (S) We have long believed that Qatar lacks an overarching
national military strategy. During GEN Petraeus' visit last
month, MG Al-Attiyah said they had developed one, but we have
never seen it and have no way to judge its quality or
sophistication. GEN Petraeus offered CENTCOM assistance in
development of such a strategy, something the Crown Prince
accepted. (Qatari military officials were less
enthusiastic.) GEN Petraeus assigned coordination with Qatar
to his J-5 planners.

-- (S) You should reference GEN Petraeus' discussion with the
Crown Prince and note that a small team from CENTCOM J5 will
be travelling to Qatar in the near future to begin
discussions on the way-ahead in preparing a national military
strategy. You might add that that the Defense Intelligence
Agency is willing to assist in any way possible to ensure the
success of this planning effort.

--------------
SUGGESTED POINTS FOR THE CROWN PRINCE
--------------


12. (C) Most major military decisions, especially those that
affect both the Qatar Armed Forces and the Internal Security
Force, are made by Sheikh Tamim and his father, the Amir.
Major weapons sales and interagency coordination among the
various arms of Qatar's security apparatus fall within Sheikh
Tamim's portfolio. To that end you will want to reiterate
not only the points mentioned above, but also the following:

DOHA 00000210 004 OF 004



-- (C) Describe briefly for Sheikh Tamim your role within the
Department of Defense, and the contribution that the DIA can
make to our strategic objectives in the region.

-- (C) As stated earlier, a team from CENTCOM is prepared to
visit Qatar in the near future to begin working with the
Qataris in developing a national military strategy.
LeBaron