SCENESETTER FOR ADMIRAL OLSON'S MARCH 15-16 VISIT

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 DOHA 000180

SIPDIS

FOR ADMIRAL ERIC OLSON FROM AMBASSADOR LEBARON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/11/2019
TAGS: PREL MOPS PGOV QA
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR ADMIRAL OLSON'S MARCH 15-16 VISIT
TO QATAR

REF: A. DOHA 56

B. DOHA 54

C. DOHA 45

Classified By: Classified By: Amb. Joseph LeBaron, reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).


1. (SBU) Admiral Olson, Embassy Doha welcomes your visit to
Qatar. I personally very much look forward to seeing you
again and to joining you for meetings with the Qatari
leadership. You are the highest ranking military officer to
visit Qatar since General David Petraeus visited February
13-16.


2. (SBU) We have requested the following meetings for the
morning of March 16:

-- The Crown Prince, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani, who has
overall responsibility for Qatar's military and security
services;

-- The Chief of Staff of the Qatar Armed Forces, Major
General Hamad bin Ali Al-Attiyeh .


3. (C) Meeting times will become clearer as your visit draws
near. I am also planning a dinner for you as the guest of
honor. I am optimistic that not only MG Al-Attiyeh , but
also Sheikh Abdulla bin Nasser Al-Thani, who serves as both
de facto Minister of Interior and Commander of the Internal
Security Force (ISF),will attend. If they do, this will be
a singular opportunity to discuss the Special Operations
relationship with Qatar.


4. (C) Relationship-building is clearly a major objective for
your visit. But I want to accomplish even more: to advance
our training and cooperation both with the Qatar Armed Forces
and the ISF, and Special Operations cooperation is an ideal
vehicle for that. A meeting with the Crown Prince may also
be an opportunity to help improve the troubled U.S.-Qatar
political relationship.


5. (C) Below are four sections of information that, in their
entirety, present the Country Team's views on how your visit
can best advance the U.S. Government's strategic objectives
in Qatar. We start with a brief review of the bilateral
relationship, then we discuss several key trends through 2011
that the U.S. Mission has identified. Finally, we provide
our analysis on how to advance our military engagement with
Qatar, including talking points for your meetings with Qatari
officials. Warm regards, Joseph LeBaron, Ambassador

--------------
THE U.S.-QATAR RELATIONSHIP
--------------


6. (C) The breadth and depth of Qatar's relationship with the
U.S. is impressive, especially for a small country of only
1.7 million inhabitants, of whom only about 225,000 are
actually Qatari citizens.

-- (C) The U.S.-Qatar military relationship is, of course,
extremely important. Qatar provides the U.S. military
exceptional access to two major Qatari military
installations, Al Udaid Airbase and Camp As-Sayliah )-
perhaps SOCOM's and SOCCENT's most important operating
installations in the Middle East outside of military use.

-- (C) Until recently, the U.S. had never made a major
defense sale to Qatar. In July 2008 Qatar signed contracts
with Boeing for two C-17s with an option for two more, and
with Lockheed-Martin for four C-130Js also with an option for
two more. The C-17 and C-130 sales are a signal Qatar is
beginning to invest in its own defensive capabilities )-
with a preference for U.S.-origin equipment -- expressing
interest in many other systems, most notably integrated air
defense.

-- (U) The broader economic relationship between Qatar and
the United States is vital. U.S. energy companies have
invested tens of billions of dollars in the oil and gas
industry here. Qatar, which holds the third largest natural
gas reserves in the world after Iran and Russia, is expected
to become in 2009 one of the most important suppliers of
imported liquefied natural gas to the U.S.

DOHA 00000180 002 OF 004



-- (U) Because it is so small and its energy resources so
large, Qatar now has an annual per capita income of over
$60,000. Even with the current global financial crisis,
Qatar's national revenues continue to grow, and Qatar now
has, according to the IMF, the highest per capita income in
the world.

-- (U) Vast wealth has bolstered political ambitions, leading
to Qatari foreign policy initiatives that are often at odds
with U.S. objectives, notably Qatar's relationships with
Hamas and Syria. One exception is Qatar's initiative on
Darfur, which has U.S. support. Qatar, working with UN and
African Union Mediator Djibril Bassole, aims to reduce the
gaps between rival Sudanese factions with the eventual goal
of convening a peace conference in Doha that would bring an
end to the misery in Darfur.

-- (U) Qatar's location, wide-ranging foreign relations,
fast-growing economy, and expanding transportation links have
made counterterrorism cooperation, including counterterrorist
financing, a key aspect of our relationship. Qatar's wealth,
in particular, means its citizens are potential sources of
money for violent extremists and cooperative efforts to
target and prevent these financial flows are central to our
bilateral agenda.

-- (U) Qatar has committed itself like few other Arab states
to modernizing its educational system, and has turned
decisively to the Unites States for help. Qatar has imported
branch campuses of six U.S. universities, including Texas
A&M, Carnegie-Mellon, Weill-Cornell Medical School,
Georgetown, Virginia Commonwealth, and Northwestern. It is
instituting a U.S. model of charter schools at the elementary
and secondary levels.

-------------- --------------
THE MILITARY RELATIONSHIP: KEY TRENDS THROUGH 2011
-------------- --------------


7. (S) Following are the key trends over the next three years
that we believe will have the greatest impact on our military
relationship:

-- (C) Qatar will continue to modernize its military through
the purchase of U.S. weapons systems, though competition will
continue from the French, British, and others. Despite
Qatar's wealth, defense purchases will be made in the context
of a frugal military budget, made worse by the global
economic crisis. Economic development will remain Qatar's
top spending priority and we have already heard signals that
military purchases will be on a slower track.

-- (U) Qatar will continue to face a formidable challenge
staffing its military with Qataris because there are so few
of them, and because more attractive opportunities exist
elsewhere in the government and the private sector. The
continued dependence on foreign nationals, particularly in
the enlisted ranks, will continue to present concerns about
transfers of sensitive U.S. technology.

-- (U) Qatari leadership will seek to increase the prestige
of its military within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and
the international arena but has no clearly defined strategy
for doing so. Likewise, Qatar is attracted to the latest
military systems, even while its military modernization is
not guided by a national security strategy, at least not one
we're aware of.

-- (U) Irritating customs and immigration issues stemming
from Qatar's need to demonstrate sovereignty over Al Udaid
Airbase will continue to plague the mil-mil relationship for
some time to come, although the Crown Prince, Sheikh Tamim,
and the Qatar Armed Force Chief of Staff, Major General
Al-Attiyeh , in February pledged to work with U.S.
counterparts to put in place reliable procedures and enforce
them.

-- (C) We expect that the biggest factor in our engagement in
the near-term will be Qatar's sensitivity to the large,
enduring U.S. military presence. While Qatar's leadership
regards our presence as a permanent and necessary deterrent
to the aggression of surrounding states, principally Iran and
Saudi Arabia, it does expose it to regional criticism and,

DOHA 00000180 003 OF 004


potentially, to terrorist attack.

-- (C) We expect, therefore, that Qatar will continue to
pursue a policy of strengthening and deepening the military
relationship through increased combined planning, training,
exercises, and operations -- along the lines of the
relationship that exists between the U.S. Forces in Korea and
the Republic of Korea Armed Forces.

-------------- --------------
MILITARY ENGAGEMENT: SUGGESTED POINTS FOR OUR DINNER
-------------- --------------


8. (C) Your visit provides a unique opportunity to deepen our
strategic, operational and tactical cooperation with the
Government of Qatar. Your visit also provides us with an
opportunity that is rare )- an intimate dinner between MG
Al-Attiyeh and Sheikh Abdulla. There will be no more than
10 at the dinner, including four on the Qatari side.
Although the Qatar Armed Forces has a special operations
unit, the best funded and best resourced special operations
unit resides within the ISF, which Sheikh Abdulla commands.
Here's how our dinner on Sunday night at my residence can
best move forward U.S. efforts on this front:


9. (S) PROMOTE COUNTER-TERRORISM EFFORTS BETWEEN OUR TWO
COUNTRIES: As this is the only time you will see Sheikh
Abdulla of the Ministry of Interior on your visit, we think
it is important that you stress a few key points:

-- (S) You should note that through SOCCENT J3, teams from
5th Special Forces Group performed a JCET with the ISF in
February and had high praise for the level of competency and
professionalism of their ISF counterparts. (JCET included
advanced marksmanship, close quarters battle instruction,
basic medical instruction, long range interdiction, fast rope
insertions, mounted and maritime infiltration with assets
organic to the ISF, specifically the SWAT element.) You
might also add that the teams coming out for a second JCET in
April are looking forward to another opportunity to train
with the ISF.

-- (S) You should, if you agree, be prepared to explore with
both Chief of Staff Al-Attiyeh and with Sheikh Abdulla of
the Ministry of Interior ways to expand the Special
Operations relationship with Qatar. The expanded
relationship could include both the ISF of the Ministry of
Interior and the separate entity of the Qatar Armed Forces.
(As you might expect, there is some rivalry between these two
Qatari security and defense elements.) A Special Operations
expanded relationship could involve, for example, police
training and more FID programs, including critical
infrastructure protection training and assistance, as
described immediately below.


10. (S) PROTECTION OF CRITICAL ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE:

-- (S) Security of Qatar's oil and natural gas
infrastructure, especially the North Field off the northern
tip of the country, and the on-shore gas liquefaction
facilities at Ras Laffan are of high interest to the U.S. We
recommend you solicit Qatari views on their plans for
security of this critical national asset and explore ways
that Special Operators might assist. Recent USDAO reporting
outlines a picture of little capability in defending Qatar's
economic well-being. Armed smuggling, piracy, and potential
terrorist activity in the North Field would be felt around
the world.

-- (S) You should mention that maritime security around Ras
Laffan, Halul Islands, and the North Field should be an
important agenda item for the Qataris at the April 2009
Military Consultative Committee (MCC). Because we assess
cooperation between the Qatar Armed Forces and the Interior
Ministry to be poor, we should look for opportunities to
encourage greater Qatari interagency coordination as well as
to discuss energy infrastructure security with key USG
officials.


11. (S) DEVELOPMENT OF A NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY:

-- (S) We have long believed that Qatar lacks an overarching
national military strategy. During GEN Petraeus' visit last
month, MG Al-Attiyeh said they had developed one, but we

DOHA 00000180 004 OF 004


have never seen it and have no way to judge its quality or
sophistication. GEN Petraeus offered CENTCOM assistance in
development of such a strategy, something the Crown Prince
accepted. (Qatari military officials were less
enthusiastic.) GEN Petraeus assigned coordination with Qatar
to his J-5 planners.

-- (S) You should reference GEN Petraeus' discussion with the
Crown Prince and note that a small team from CENTCOM J5 would
like to travel to Qatar at the end of March to begin
discussions on the way-ahead in preparing a national military
strategy. You might add that SOCOM and SOCCENT are willing
to assist in any way possible to ensure the success of this
planning effort.

--------------
SUGGESTED POINTS FOR THE CROWN PRINCE
--------------


12. (C) Most major military decisions, especially those that
affect both the Qatar Armed Forces and the Internal Security
Force, are made by Sheikh Tamim and his father, the Amir.
Major weapons sales and interagency coordination among the
various arms of Qatar's security apparatus fall within Sheikh
Tamim's portfolio. To that end you will want to reiterate
not only the many points mentioned above at the dinner, but
also the following:

-- (C) Describe briefly for Sheikh Tamim your role within the
Department of Defense, and the contribution special operators
make to our strategic objectives in the region.

-- (C) Acknowledge that you understand the proprietary nature
of the Qatar Armed Forces and the Internal Security Force as
it pertains to special operations, but you believe that there
are many benefits to be realized with a closer working
relationship between the two entities. Perhaps in the near
future both government agencies can train together with U.S.
forces to foster closer ties.

-- (C) Note Qatar's desire to develop expertise in
international humanitarian missions. In addition to
deployment of Qatari forces in Africa, they have also served
in Lebanon and most recently (January/February) sent a team
to Sinai for three weeks to assist -- unsuccessfully, it
turns out -- with the humanitarian effort in Gaza.

-- (C) As stated earlier, a team from CENTCOM is prepared to
visit Qatar at the end of the month to begin working with the
Qataris in developing a national military strategy.

LeBaron