Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09DILI37
2009-02-11 15:19:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Dili
Cable title:  

JOSE RAMOS-HORTA VISITS WASHINGTON

pdf how-to read a cable
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4224
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEPINS/DIR INTEL WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHJA/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA 1031
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 1259
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON 1102
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1098
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEHDT/AMEMBASSY DILI 3730
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DILI 000037 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP DAS MARCIEL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/11/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV OVIP RAMOS HORTA JOSE
SUBJECT: JOSE RAMOS-HORTA VISITS WASHINGTON

CLASSIFIED BY: Hans Klemm, Ambassador, EXEC, State.
REASON: 1.4 (d)




C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DILI 000037

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP DAS MARCIEL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/11/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV OVIP RAMOS HORTA JOSE
SUBJECT: JOSE RAMOS-HORTA VISITS WASHINGTON

CLASSIFIED BY: Hans Klemm, Ambassador, EXEC, State.
REASON: 1.4 (d)





1. (SBU) Summary. On February 24-26, 2009, Jose Ramos-Horta
will make his first visit to Washington as President of
Timor-Leste. The Nobel Peace Prize laureate hopes to acquaint
himself with leaders of the new Obama Administration and renew
old friendships among members of the U.S. Congress. He will
make one or two public addresses to strengthen the profile of
Timor-Leste in America. President Ramos-Horta broadly will seek
to reaffirm the U.S.-Timor-Leste partnership, express gratitude
for past assistance including that granted in the immediate
aftermath of the attempt on his life one year ago, and explore
new avenues of cooperation. Always outspoken, Ramos-Horta can
also be expected to fault the recent decision not to make
Timor-Leste eligible for a Millennium Challenge Cooperation
compact. As the leader of a young, vulnerable and fragile
Southeast Asian democracy, we should affirm American's
commitment and encourage Ramos-Horta to continue his efforts to
stabilize and pull his country out of poverty on the basis of
sound economic policy, the rule of law and national
reconciliation. End Summary.


2. (SBU) Elected to a five year term in May 2007 as
Timor-Leste's second president, Jose Ramos-Horta knows the U.S.
well, having resided in American for fifteen years during the
Indonesian occupation of Timor (during which time he doggedly
lobbied at the UN for Timor-Leste's recognition and
independence, eventually earning the Nobel Peace Prize in 1996)
and as a regular participant in UN gatherings or other events.
This will be his first visit to Washington as his country's
President, however, and he will be seeking to meet with leaders
of the Obama Administration as the head of state of a fragile,
hopefully stabilizing, but still impoverished Southeast Asian
democracy. Within Timor-Leste, Ramos-Horta is one of the
strongest advocates of a robust partnership with the U.S., and
has publicly advocated for more U.S. engagement in the
development of his country's national security capabilities. He
personally has directed his government to closely align itself
with the U.S., for example, on UN votes supporting human rights

and democracy in countries such as North Korea and Iran.


3. (U) Ramos-Horta campaigned for president in 2007 on the
themes of national reconciliation and fighting poverty. Once in
office, however, the self-styled "President of the Poor" quickly
became frustrated by the lack of executive authority granted his
office by Timor's constitution. Although bereft of financial
resources or policy tools to direct antipoverty programs of his
own, Ramos-Horta uses his bully pulpit, traveling the back roads
of Timor-Leste more often than any other senior politician and
scolding government ministers in public consultations for their
ineffectiveness. He's imaginative in finding leverage in
unexpected ways, encouraging both the U.S. and Australian
militaries to station engineering units in Timor-Leste to repair
schools and clinics to improve service delivery to the
underprivileged, in addition to training with Timor-Leste's
military.


4. (C) Ramos-Horta has a distinctly mixed record on his second
major objective, fostering national reconciliation. Coming into
the presidency a year after the 2006 crisis, he concluded that
the best way to achieve reconciliation was to issue a blanket
amnesty for the perpetrators of violence, and forego the
establishment of truth and accountability, or the provision of
compensation for victims. He managed to get an amnesty bill
passed by Parliament in 2007, but it was later thrown out on
constitutional grounds. In May 2008 Ramos-Horta pardoned the
sole significant member of the former government to be tried and
found guilty for actions in the 2006 crisis, again dismissing
concerns that he might be contributing to a culture of impunity.
In October 2009, Ramos-Horta used the occasion of the release
of the Indonesia-Timorese Truth and Friendship Commission report
on the events of 1999 to again promote a general amnesty, but
was firmly rebuked by key members of the National Parliament.


5. (C) Also in the spirit of reconciliation, Ramos-Horta has
tried repeatedly to serve as a bridge between the governing
coalition and the main opposition party, Fretilin. Symbolic of
the contentiousness and oft inflammatory nature of Timorese
politics, Fretilin, although participating fully (and largely

DILI 00000037 002 OF 003


constructively) as opposition in the National Parliament, still
maintains that the current government is illegal,
unconstitutional and illegitimate. Ramos-Horta has sought to
find ways to engage Fretilin on issues of national importance,
arguing that in a post-conflict environment major parties cannot
be excluded from key decisions and instead must be engaged in
dialogue and consensus building. One mediation effort in early
2008 seemed about to yield fruit, but then stuttered to a stop
with the president's shooting. Ramos-Horta on February 9, 2009,
launched another attempt, this time with the help of the
Swiss-based Center for Humanitarian Dialogue, to create a
mechanism to encourage cross-party and inter-generational
dialogue. He asked for donor financing for this effort,
including from the U.S., although the strength of commitment
from either the opposition or the governing coalition to this
project remains uncertain.


6. (C) Once he recovered from his wounds, Ramos-Horta fairly
quickly resumed an active international travel schedule to
advocate for his country -- and himself. Already in 2009, he
will have visited Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore
and New Zealand before arriving in New York on February 17,

2009. Never shy regarding his ambitions for the world stage, he
touted himself as a candidate for UN Secretary General several
years ago and he was tempted by the open position of UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights in 2008. His eagerness to be seen
and taken seriously as an international player has led him to
make strong and occasionally rash pronouncements on far-flung
issues, sometimes counter to Timorese interests. His outspoken
views on Burma, condemning the regime's behavior while promoting
the removal of economic sanctions and increased engagement, led
Rangoon to place a veto on any consideration within ASEAN of
Timor-Leste becoming its next member (Timor's highest foreign
policy priority). A year ago, he seriously irritated Timor's
two neighbors, Australia and Indonesia, with ill-founded and
reckless remarks regarding events surrounding his shooting. He
regularly chastises the U.S. for its embargo of Cuba.


7. (C) Issues that President Ramos-Horta will likely raise
during his conversations with USG principals include the
following.

-- Peace Corps: A very successful and locally renowned Peace
Corps Volunteer program was suspended in 2006 at the height of
Timor's crisis. President Ramos-Horta will invite its
resumption. Embassy Dili strongly supports a return to
Timor-Leste by the Peace Corps and will submit a security
assessment concluding that local conditions well exceed those
necessary to ensure the safety of volunteers.

-- U.S.-Timor partnership: Both sides should be ready to
reaffirm the health and vibrancy of U.S.-Timor-Leste bilateral
relations. We should be ready to thank Ramos-Horta for the
strong bilateral alignment that exists in international fora in
support of democracy and human rights, and applaud his personal
experience and long standing commitment to these principles.
Upon the election of President Obama, he issued a warm public
note of congratulation and was grateful for President Bush's
sharp condemnation of the attack on his life in February 2008.

-- Security sector reform: As supreme commandar of
Timor-Leste's defense force, Ramos-Horta has long been a
proponent of increased U.S. contributions to Timor-Leste's
security, including professionalization of its military and
police. There is no stronger advocate within Timor-Leste of
U.S. ship visits, light joint military exercises or community
relations activities by U.S. forces. In a November 2008 speech
in Darwin, he welcomed greater involvement by the U.S. and
Australia in Timor's security, especially in the area of
maritime security. He has even gone so far as to invite the
U.S. military to make full use of Timorese facilities, including
the large airfield outside of Baucau. Ramos-Horta is grateful
for the recent expansion of the U.S. Pacific Command's
engagement in Timor-Leste and will welcome indications that it
will continue.

-- Recent developments in Timor-Leste: President Ramos-Horta
will want to share his positive assessment of the performance of
PM Gusmao's government. Its achievements include resolving
several major consequences of the 2006 crisis (resettling
internally displaced refugees and resolving the grievances of
the "petitioners," those that mutinied against the military and
precipitated the collapse of the government) and extending a

DILI 00000037 003 OF 003


basic social safety net. Timor-Leste's government is now
focusing on infrastructure, rural development and education.
Timor-Leste has enjoyed a rare, year-long period of stability
and Ramos-Horta is committed to extending it, encourging for
example a more serious commitment from PM Gusmao's government to
the reform of Timor-Leste's security sector.

-- U.S. contribution to Timor-Leste's social and economic
development: Timor-Leste is Asia's poorest country and its
social development indicators resemble those of the most
impoverished countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. President
Ramos-Horta has been an occasional skeptic of U.S. and other
donor aid programs, asserting they overly benefit international
consultants and deliver relatively little to Timor-Leste's poor.
He sharply criticized both the Millennium Challenge
Corporation's recent decision to find Timor-Leste ineligible for
a compact and its organizing concept, stating the U.S. should be
generous with poor countries in need, not when they reach a
state of policy perfection. In response to recent Embssy Dili
efforts to better inform him of the size and composition of our
local aid programs (70 percent of which goes to agriculture and
rural development),Ramos-Horta has become a stronger proponent
of our projects.

-- Justice and Reconciliation: As discussed above, Ramos-Horta
consistently has promoted amnesty to heal the nation's wounds
rather than accountability. He asserts that Timor's
institutions of justice are inadequate and the country's
political culture insufficiently mature to accommodate a full
application of the law for serious crimes in either 1999 or

2006. His stance arguably has encouraged a sense of impunity
and undermined the full commitment of the Timorese to the rule
of law. We should remind Ramos-Horta of the importance of
justice and the rule of law to Timor-Leste's stability and
democratic development -- and of the importance of his personal
commitment to these principles.

-- Intelligence Services Support: Timor-Leste has little
effective intelligence gathering or analytical capability. Not
only did the events of February 11, 2008, come as a complete
surprise to Timor-Leste's leadership, but the government's lack
of intelligence capabilities and dependence on an archaic,
clandestine network of informants seriously eroded its ability
to capture the perpetrators. The threat from international
traffickers and crime syndicates to Timor-Leste's stability is
compounded by weak law enforcement and intelligence
capabilities. The Gusmao government hopes soon to establish an
International Crisis Management Center to coordinate
Timor-Leste's intelligence functions and has asked for USG
support. Ramos-Horta may explore the extension of such
assistance.


8. (C) Comment. Ramos-Horta repeatedly sought to meet
Secretary Rice during his attendance at recent UN General
Assemblies, but failed to do so. He is conscious of the absence
of civilian ministerial-level visitors to Timor-Leste in recent
years, and recently shared with the Ambassador his
disappointment and sense of being overlooked by the U.S.
Ramos-Horta, despite his blemishes, has been a positive,
constructive force in the democratic development of Timor-Leste.
By nature and conviction he is a very strong friend of the U.S.
A warm opening by Administration principals to Timor-Leste's
President will go a very long way to assuage his bruised
feelings and ensure the viability of our mutual committment to
the success of democracy in Timor-Leste.
KLEMM