MILITIA LEADER CASE ROILS DOMESTIC POLITICS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DILI 000254

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/22/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM TT
SUBJECT: MILITIA LEADER CASE ROILS DOMESTIC POLITICS

REF: DILI 233

CLASSIFIED BY: Hans Klemm, Ambassador.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)

1. (C) SUMMARY: The National Parliament could vote as early as
this week on a no-confidence motion against the government
related to Prime Minister Gusmao's release of an indicted
Indonesian militia leader on August 30. The no-confidence
motion is not expected to pass but opposition leaders have
threatened to boycott parliament in protest, potentially causing
a constitutional crisis. Relations among Timor-Leste's
senior-most political leaders (Gusmao, President Ramos-Horta and
former PM Mari Alkatiri) have soured noticeably, rekindling the
same elite-level rivalries that have sparked violent conflict in
the past. On the militia leader's case itself, Timor-Leste has
reached out to Indonesia at senior levels to find a resolution,
perhaps including some form of extradition to Indonesia. Post
has engaged senior leaders from across the political spectrum to
emphasize the need for stability and national unity as the
domestic political process moves forward. END SUMMARY.



No-Confidence Vote Next Week




2. (U) The National Parliament is expected to debate a
no-confidence motion against the government the week of
September 21. The opposition Fretilin party proposed the
no-confidence motion in response to Prime Minister Xanana
Gusmao's release of indicted Indonesian military leader Martenus
Bere on August 30. (NOTE: Under Sections 111 and 112 of the
Timorese constitution, one-quarter of the parliament's members
can force the consideration of a no-confidence motion --
sometimes translated from Portuguese as "censure motion"; an
absolute majority of all members must vote in favor of a
non-confidence motion for it to pass; if a no-confidence motion
passes, the President shall dismiss the Prime Minister and the
Government. END NOTE.)




3. (C) Fretilin leader and former Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri
told the Ambassador that he had "no choice" but to introduce the
non-confidence motion since Gusmao had "admitted he committed a
crime" in ordering the release of Bere. Alkatiri does not
expect the motion to pass but threatens to lead a mass boycott
by opposition MPs in protest, so as not to condone Gusmao's
"unconstitutional acts." The government could still produce a
legal quorum of MPs if a mass boycott occurs but if Alkatiri
decides to attempt to lead a walk-out, he hopes the pressure
would force Gusmao to call early elections. Alkatiri claimed,
however, that he would not take the dispute to the streets. He
also told the Ambassador that he would support any
constitutional act that would resolve the situation, including
an extradition. As time passes, however, he predicted the odds
of finding such a solution would decline. Nevertheless, he
agreed that maintaining stability in Timor-Leste was the
overriding concern.



Relations Between Big Three Take a Hit




4. (C) Long-standing personal animosities between Gusmao,
Alkatiri and Ramos-Horta have flared up again because of the
Bere case. Alkatiri claims not to have been consulted before
the decision to release Bere was taken, although Vice Prime
Minister Jose Luis Guterres insists Gusmao did inform Alkatiri.
Ramos-Horta usually plays the role of peacemaker but his central
role in the decision and his subsequent anger at being lectured
by domestic critics and the international community have left
him silent this time. (He will also leave the country on
September 19 for three weeks of international travel, including
to the UN General Assembly.) Gusmao resents the pressure he
received from Indonesia but defends what he sees as his
legitimate right as prime minister to determine what is in
Timor-Leste's best interests. (Gusmao says if he is found to
have acted illegally, he will accept full responsibility and
that he "knows the way to Becora prison," the jail where he was
held briefly during the Indonesian occupation.) The Chief
Justice of the Court of Appeal, considered to be an ally of
Fretilin, worsened the situation by releasing on September 11 a
statement condemning Bere's release, an intervention the
Prosecutor General described as unfortunate and "inappropriate."



What to Do with Bere?



DILI 00000254 002 OF 002




5. (C) Martenus Bere remains in the safe-keeping of the
Indonesian embassy in Dili. Gusmao has telephoned a senior
advisor to Indonesian President Yudhoyono and dispatched senior
Timorese officials to Jakarta to discuss ways to resolve the
case. These efforts are complicated by the fact that
Timor-Leste and Indonesia do not have an extradition treaty,
which may necessitate a one-time case-specific action by
National Parliament. Certain aspects of the case continue to
receive legal scrutiny, such as the validity of the detention
order issued by a district judge for Bere. As such, the
possibility remains, although small, that a technicality may
alter the situation and release the enormous political and
institutional strains the Bere case has generated.



COMMENT




6. (C) The Bere case is now operating on two distinct levels.
The first is Timorese domestic politics. Gusmao's decision to
authorize the release of Bere has permitted Alkatiri and
Fretilin to take political advantage by accusing him of illegal
acts and of weakly defending Timor-Leste in the face of
Indonesian pressure. Alkatiri was forced to resign as Prime
Minister in 2006 in large part because of pressure from
then-President Gusmao, and Alkatiri seems to be relishing the
potential role reversal this time around. Regardless of whether
the no-confidence motion passes or Fretilin MPs all walk out of
parliament, the in-fighting of political elites over the Bere
case has disrupted the relative calm and grudging cooperation
that had prevailed since the violent attacks on Ramos-Horta and
Gusmao in February 2008. The second level is the determination
of Bere's legal fate, which may now be an active matter of
discussion between Timor-Leste and Indonesia. The evidence
suggests that a channel at least is open, although it is unclear
how accommodating Jakarta intends to be. Should Indonesia
insist on Bere's unconditional release, it would further
exacerbate inflamed domestic tensions in Timor-Leste by closing
off the best option the government has for a face-saving exit
from the situation -- a promise of prosecution in Indonesia.




7. (C) We are maintaining frequent contact with all the key
players, offering our support and good offices, and urging all
parties to act in ways to preserve domestic stability and
national unity. We are also cooperating closely with the UN,
whose effectiveness is somewhat constrained by the appropriately
strong position it has taken on the case, and with other key
partners. We have learned from our Portuguese and Australian
counterparts that while they are monitoring the situation
closely, neither has intervened strongly here, in Jakarta, or in
their respective home capitals.
KLEMM