Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09DILI18
2009-01-13 03:45:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Dili
Cable title:  

SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT TO TIMOR-LESTE BY VADM JOHN M.

Tags:  PREL PGOV PMIL OTRA TT 
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FM AMEMBASSY DILI
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INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4199
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0924
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 1252
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON 1095
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RHHMUNA/USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEHDT/AMEMBASSY DILI 3702
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 DILI 000018 

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

FOR VADM BIRD FROM AMBASSADOR KLEMM

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL PGOV PMIL OTRA TT
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT TO TIMOR-LESTE BY VADM JOHN M.
BIRD

DILI 00000018 001.2 OF 004


Summary
------------

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 DILI 000018

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

FOR VADM BIRD FROM AMBASSADOR KLEMM

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL PGOV PMIL OTRA TT
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT TO TIMOR-LESTE BY VADM JOHN M.
BIRD

DILI 00000018 001.2 OF 004


Summary
--------------


1. (SBU) The visit of Vice Admiral Bird to Dili comes at a
perfect time as we seek to encourage the Government of
Timor-Leste's active leadership over the reform of its security
sector. VADM Bird will be the highest ranking foreign official
to visit Dili in 2009 from any nation and will underline the
U.S. commitment to Timor-Leste's stability and to regional
security. While still facing enormous challenges of poverty,
there are hopeful signs of increasing stability with the country
now in its twelfth consecutive month without a serious incident
of political violence or instability. The country's leadership
appears increasingly aware that it must begin to act to hasten
reform of the country's police and military to sustain this
stability, an awareness prompted in significant part due to the
September 2008 national security policy development workshop
supported by PACOM. Admiral Bird's meetings with the Timorese
leadership will allow us to emphasize our continued commitment
to support reform, especially the professionalization of
Timor-Leste's defense force; and to explore possible avenues of
future engagement, in particular towards the development of
Timor-Leste's maritime security capabilities. End summary.

Economic and Social Setting
--------------


2. (U) Timor-Leste is Asia's poorest country, with half of its
population living on less than a dollar a day, 85% of its labor
force engaged in subsistence agriculture, illiteracy running at
well over 50%, and more than half the population stunted from
malnutrition. Timor's poverty is correlated with enormous gaps
in social infrastructure, distinguished by a poor national road
network; inadequate telecommunications (less than 1% of
households has a landline telephone); a single, increasingly
congested seaport; an electricity grid that supplies power to
only a third of the country's households and then only for short
segments of the day; a health services infrastructure barely
able to cope with one of the world's highest rates of maternal
and child mortality; an education system in which less than a
fifth of schoolchildren has a chair or desk, and more than half

without textbooks; poor water and sanitation facilities
(two-thirds of adults fetch water at least once a week); and a
single international airport that can handle planes no larger
than a 737. Timor-Leste is not without resources, however. It
has more than $3.8 billion in a sovereign wealth fund due to
accruals from modest oil deposits, and zero international debt.
It also benefits from the generosity of the international
community, with the government forecasting receipts of more than
$220 million from bilateral and multilateral donors in 2009.
The IMF estimates the economy grew by a real 10% in 2008 due
almost solely to increased government spending.

Political Context
--------------


3. (SBU) Since acquiring independence in 2002, Timor-Leste has
established a pattern of periodic violence or instability, with
large-scale disturbances occurring almost yearly. The most
serious crisis occurred in 2006, when a mutiny of army regulars
precipitated open combat between the police and military, the
collapse of the central government, widespread property damage,
and the displacement of 150,000 persons from their homes and
into large and wretched camps around Dili. To restore order in
2006, an Australian-led International Stabilization Force (ISF)
intervened and a renewed United Nations mandate established a
large police presence. Both forces remain in Timor in
considerable strength. They were unable to prevent, however,
the most recent incident of political violence when, on February
11, 2008, the President was critically wounded and the Prime
Minister also came under gunfire.


4. (SBU) Major causes of Timor's instability include a highly
contentious political elite; weak, politicized, poorly motivated
or poorly directed security institutions; poor access to justice
and a culture of impunity, especially among the elite; and the
disillusionment and disempowerment that has accompanied Timor's
failure to raise its people out of grinding poverty. The
government of Prime Minister Gusmao, installed in August 2007,
set out to tackle the primary consequences of the 2006 crisis,
and to some extent its causes, and recorded significant success

DILI 00000018 002.2 OF 004


in 2008. It largely has closed the many internally displaced
persons camps that were stubbornly scattered across Dili until
just months ago. The government also resolved remaining
grievances held by the "petitioners," the soldiers that left the
defense force in early 2006, and introduced a pension system for
veterans, the elderly and the infirm (a daunting logistical
challenge in a rugged country without a postal system or banking
network). The prime minister designated 2009 as the year of
infrastructure and rural development as a means of signaling his
government's intent to speed economic growth and tackle the
scourges of poverty and unemployment. In recognition of the
signs of increasing stability in Timor - the country is now in
its twelfth consecutive month without a major incident of
political unrest - the Department of State lifted its travel
advisory in September 2008.

Security Sector: Reform Needed
--------------


5. (SBU) To transform themselves into protectors of the people
and sources of stability, both Timor-Leste's national police
(PNTL) and defense force (F-FDTL) require substantial reform.
The poorly-led, unmotivated, under-resourced and ill-trained
police force is also tainted by its historical antecedents with
the Indonesian police force and a recent history of severe
politicization. Consequently, UNPOL retains full operational
command of police responsibilities throughout Timor-Leste,
although a phased process of resumption of Timorese control is
to begin in March 2009. The military largely represents the
rump of the armed resistance to the Indonesian occupation, one
that is justly proud of its legacy as a guerrilla force in the
mountains of Timor, but wholly lacking in command, discipline,
training and logistics capabilities that feature in a modern,
professional army. The roles and responsibilities of the PNTL
and F-FDTL are ill-defined in law or regulation, and civilian
command often has been wanting at best, contributing to their
frequent mutual conflict.


6. (SBU) Reassuringly, the need for reform is recognized across
the Timorese leadership spectrum and the donor community,
especially the UN and Timor-Leste's key democratic partners, has
signaled strong readiness to assist reform. A significant
positive development occurred after the February 11, 2008,
assassination attempts when the army and the police were placed
together under a joint command to bring the perpetrators to
justice. They did so successfully and peacefully, restoring a
good deal of trust and confidence between the two forces. Their
performance was tarnished, however, by many cases of abuse of
human rights and authority. Sadly, such incidents continue to
occur on a regular basis.

U.S. Support of Reform
--------------


7. (SBU) Since mid-2007, the U.S. has substantially increased
its engagement with the Timorese government towards reform of
its military. Our core objective has been to enhance the
ability of the government to provide stability and security for
its citizens, for without stability there can be no realistic
hope for sustained, long term economic and social development.
To do so, we've focused on the goals of reforming and
strengthening the country's security institutions; enhancing
civilian command, including through the development of the
country's legal infrastructure; and supporting the
professionalization of the F-FDTL and PNTL.


8. (SBU) Support from and engagement by the U.S. Pacific
Command has been essential and generous. In the past eighteen
months, PACOM Commander Admiral Keating, PACFLT Commander
Admiral Willard and MARFORPAC Commander Lt. General Goodman have
all visited Timor-Leste. The USNS Mercy completed a 15 day
deployment here in July 2008 and the USS Port Royal received a
warm welcome in December 2007. A company from the 31st MEU
spent a very productive two weeks in April 2008 interoperating
with the ISF and supporting several community relations
projects. A delegation led by the Defense Institute of
International Legal Studies conducted an analysis of the legal
infrastructure supporting Timor's security sector in August

2008. A high-level USN, U.S. Coast Guard and U.S. Marines
assessment team in November 2008 surveyed the prospects for
future engagement. And with full PACOM support, the Asia

DILI 00000018 003.2 OF 004


Pacific Center for Security Studies hosted a historic workshop
in September 2008 to facilitate the drafting of Timor-Leste's
first national security policy. This investment, which brought
together seventeen Timorese leaders from government, parliament,
military, police and civil society, has done more than any other
in recent years to emphasize for those who participated and
other Timorese leaders the strength and authenticity of the U.S.
commitment to Timor's reform and development.

Importance to Timor of Maritime Security
-------------- --------------


9. (SBU) There is a strong and broad consensus among the
Timorese leadership that the country must strengthen its
maritime security capabilities. This came out clearly in the
Honolulu workshop and in a subsequent September 2009 meeting
with Admiral Willard. Accordingly, it is viewed as a priority
that Timor's security forces raise their ability to defend the
country's maritime domain to protect its fishery and petroleum
resources, prevent sea-based incursions by traffickers or other
criminals, and contribute to regional maritime security. There
are disagreements on the means, however, with even members of
the governing coalition vocally opposed to the decision to
purchase two patrol boats from China. Many look to the U.S. for
assistance, including a prominent member of the opposition who
flatly states that the U.S. should have the lead in assisting
the development of Timor's navy. President Ramos Horta
repeatedly and publicly urges closer defense cooperation with
the U.S. and Australia, including on the development of Timor's
maritime capabilities.

Donor coordination
--------------


10. (SBU) The coordination of military or police assistance to
Timor-Leste is at best ad hoc, with the Timorese government
unable or reluctant to provide leadership. Early in 2008 at our
initiative, ambassadors to Dili from Australia, Japan, Portugal,
New Zealand and the U.S. began to meet periodically to improve
information sharing, especially regarding maritime security
assistance, supplementing regular contact among local defense
attachis. In effort in 2008 to include security sector reform
as part of a government-led national priorities process with
full donor participation failed largely due to lack of
engagement by key Timor defense actors. During Admiral
Willard's July 2008 visit, Secretary of State for Defense Pinto
openly shared his concerns of having many generous partners
ready with assistance to meet Timor's many needs, while knowing
that the aid is often competitive, conflicting or incoherent.
He openly confessed his inability to effectively coordinate and
optimize foreign assistance. Donors with current maritime
security programs in Timor, or those that have expressed
interest in aiding Timor's maritime sector include Portugal,
Australia, China, Japan, Indonesia, Canada, India, New Zealand,
Britain, Germany, Korea and the United Nations. Secretary Pinto
subsequently asked for U.S. support to convene a conference and
help him enhance the coordination of assistance to Timor's
maritime security sector. Embassy Dili continues to explore
means of possible facilitation.

Your Visit to Timor
--------------


11. (SBU) Your visit to Dili comes at a perfect time. The
Honolulu APCSS workshop spurred recognition among Timorese
leaders of the necessity of moving forward on reform of the
security sector. Not surprisingly, reform is a highly sensitive
and political subject in Timor-Leste, and while there has been a
general awareness that the police and military must be
overhauled, particularly given their tragic contribution to the
2006 crisis, there has been scant action. The UN in particular
has a long record of failure in initiating reform. But,
following the September workshop the Prime Minister told me he
will turn his attention to security sector reform early in 2009
- his attention and commitment will be critical to its success.
Last month, the President hosted a seminar on the topic to
prompt action, and his advisors subsequently consulted with me
on options for the sequencing of reform and how the U.S. can
assist. Your encouragement will ensure this momentum is
maintained.


DILI 00000018 004.2 OF 004



12. (SBU) We hope to secure meetings for you with the Prime
Minister, Foreign Minister, Secretary of State for Defense, and
the relevant commanders of the F-FDTL. A meeting with the
President of the Parliament would also be useful. (Note: the
Parliament will be in session during your stay to debate the
government's 2009 budget; these debates are the major event on
the Timor legislative calendar and may tie down one or more of
our target ministers. End note.) Each of these meetings will
offer an opportunity to discuss the following themes.


A. The U.S., including PACOM and the Pacific Fleet, is
committed to assisting the government of Timor-Leste provide
stability and contribute to regional security.


B. The U.S. is ready to explore how we might best support
Timor-Leste's implementation of the results of the Honolulu
workshop; how can the U.S. further support the development of a
national security policy or law, and the reform of your security
institutions?


C. The U.S. Pacific Command is analyzing the findings of the
November assessment mission and will soon propose avenues of
future U.S. engagement in Timor-Leste.


D. We are always eager, however, to receive your suggestions on
how the U.S. might best support the professionalization of
Timor-Leste's military, especially the development of your naval
capabilities.


E. The U.S. Navy is grateful for Timor-Leste's warm welcome of
the USNS Mercy in 2008 and the USS Port Royal in 2007. We look
forward to the successful visit of the USS Lassen during the
week of January 26, 2009.

(If raised by Secretary Pinto)


F. We strongly recognize the importance of effective donor
coordination. As we design our future engagement in
Timor-Leste, the U.S. will follow your leadership and be as
transparent as possible with your partners. The U.S. Embassy is
exploring possible mechanisms to assist your goal of enhancing
donor coordination.
KLEMM