Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09DHAKA950
2009-10-06 09:54:00
UNCLASSIFIED
Embassy Dhaka
Cable title:  

FRAUD SUMMARY - DHAKA

Tags:  KFRD CVIS CPAS CMGT ASEC BG 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO8117
RR RUEHAST RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHLH RUEHNEH RUEHPW
DE RUEHKA #0950/01 2790954
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 060954Z OCT 09 ZDS
FM AMEMBASSY DHAKA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9515
INFO RUEHPNH/NVC PORTSMOUTH 2762
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 DHAKA 000950 

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (PARA 1 & 19)

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR CA/FPP
DEPT PASS TO KCC WILLIAMSBURG KY
POSTS FOR FRAUD PREVENTION MANAGERS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KFRD CVIS CPAS CMGT ASEC BG
SUBJECT: FRAUD SUMMARY - DHAKA

REF: (A) 08 STATE 74840 (B) DHAKA 765 (C) DHAKA 799

DHAKA 00000950 001.3 OF 006


-----------------------

A. COUNTRY CONDITIONS:
-----------------------

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 DHAKA 000950

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (PARA 1 & 19)

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR CA/FPP
DEPT PASS TO KCC WILLIAMSBURG KY
POSTS FOR FRAUD PREVENTION MANAGERS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KFRD CVIS CPAS CMGT ASEC BG
SUBJECT: FRAUD SUMMARY - DHAKA

REF: (A) 08 STATE 74840 (B) DHAKA 765 (C) DHAKA 799

DHAKA 00000950 001.3 OF 006


--------------

A. COUNTRY CONDITIONS:
--------------


1. Dhaka is a high fraud post. In FY 2009, Dhaka's FPU conducted
FPU verifications (mostly site visits) for 488 cases, not/not
counting cases referred for DNA analysis. Many of these cases
required several site visits to complete. Infrastructure,
especially road infrastructure, is poor outside of main cities and
towns. This circumstance, combined with wide-spread seasonal
flooding and frequent natural disasters, makes scheduling and
execution of fraud field verifications and site visits challenging.


2. Bangladesh is a developing country of more than 150 million
people living in an area roughly the size of Wisconsin. The areas
around the capital city, Dhaka, and around Comilla are the most
densely populated. More than a third of the population lives below
the poverty line, and the current per capita income is about $621
per year. More than 50% of the population is involved in
agriculture which accounts for about 22% of GDP. The annual GDP
growth rate of about five percent for the past decade has not been
sufficient to reduce the level of poverty for the majority of
Bangladeshis.


3. The vast majority of Bangladeshis are culturally Bengali,
although there are also non-Bengali ethnic groups among the tribal
groups. 88.3 percent of the population is Muslim, 10.5 percent are
Hindu, and the remaining 1.2 percent include Christians, Buddhists,
and other religions.


4. Bangladesh is a parliamentary democracy. On December 29, 2008,
the Awami league (AL),led by Sheikh Hasina Wazed, won 230 of 299
parliamentary seats in elections considered by international and
domestic observers to be both free, fair, and credible. The
elections and the peaceful transfer of power that followed ended two
years of rule by a caretaker government under a state of emergency.

--------------

B. NIV FRAUD:
--------------


5. Although Dhaka is a high-fraud Post, window fraud on the NIV
line is generally unsophisticated, obvious, and properly frustrated

with a 214(b) refusal. Given that almost all documents are
considered unreliable, officers rely on effective lines of
questioning during interviews rather than on documentation. In
order to cut down on cases referred to the Fraud Prevention Unit
(FPU),line officers generally refer a case only when it contains
traits of a possible new fraud trend or indication of visa fraud
ring involvement.


6. We occasionally see walk-in individuals who want to verify that
their visas are genuine. These applicants have similar stories of
being contacted by visa agents with stories of visas available for a
steep price to travel to the U.S. for employment as "fisherman" or
something similar. Most of the walk-ins have produced what appears
to be a computer manipulated color printout of a visa foil with
mismatched data from a number of posts (i.e., foil number from
Cairo/issuing post on foil is Cotonou). The visa classification is
either B1/2 or H1B. Section L of this cable contains additional
information regarding our coordination of efforts with local
authorities on these cases. One notable exception to this pattern
was detected by Singapore Airlines. A Bangladeshi passenger was
offloaded in Singapore when airline authorities noticed
irregularities with his visa. This is the first known successful
usage of one of these fake visas for travel. The scam originated in
Nigeria utilizing a Bangladeshi travel agency as the middle man.
The passport was seized and local authorities interviewed the
passenger. Dhaka's ARSO-I has opened a DS investigation targeted
against the alleged conspirators for producing a counterfeit visa.


7. Though Dhaka is a low-volume H1-B post, most of our serious NIV
fraud is found in the H1-B category. Frequently we find our
applicants are qualified but the petitioning company is "benching"
applicants. However, we are seeing an increase in applicants who
are not qualified. The most sophisticated cases involve IT
companies petitioning for Bangladeshi workers who are server
administrators or database administrators but the position
descriptions are for application developers. Usually these
positions require extensive code development knowledge, working with
customers to identify application requirements, and defect tracking
- skills which the applicants do not have. We suspect the offending
companies are attempting to bench lower level IT workers.


8. In the past, applicants in the R-1 category were chronically
problematic due to nebulous qualifications and employment histories.

DHAKA 00000950 002.3 OF 006


The implementation of the petition requirement for R-1 applications
has drastically reduced the total number of applicants under this
category with no new cases referred to FPU for the second straight
fraud summary reporting period.

--------------

C. IV FRAUD:
--------------


9. IV fraud consumes the majority of available FPU resources.
Petitioners and applicants are well aware of our efforts to combat
fraud, including our methods and limitations. Consequently, we see
many instances where a petitioner petitions for multiple family
preference applicants but holds one or more of these cases at NVC by
not paying fees. This is done in order to enable fraudulent cases
involving fake spouses or over-aged children to clear post first
before legitimate cases are processed. Our aggressive investigation
policy involving all cross-reference cases usually pays dividends.
We continue to uncover marital status fraud on current cases and
those still pending at NVC (being held through non-payment of
fees).


10. We see a significant amount of age fraud among applicants in
age dependent visa categories (especially F2A applicants and F4
derivatives). With the almost complete lack of security of most
Bangladeshi civil documents, it is very easy for applicants to
obtain legitimate documents with false information to support their
relationship claims. FPU field verifications have uncovered many
instances where responsible officials were aware that the documents
they were issuing contained fraudulent information. Since birth
certificates are generally not reliable and most birth registrations
occur only a few months before a petition is filed, we generally
rely on secondary documents, such as school certificates, to
corroborate the applicant's claimed date of birth. The local school
system is the most accurate record keeping entity in Bangladesh with
respect to dates of birth. The FPU is very successful on site
visits initiated to uncover age fraud, either in the form of forged
certificates or certificates with fraudulent information not
supported by the school's records. Often, a school administrator
issues an official document with falsified data, either as a favor
to the applicant, or as a result of heavy pressure from an outside
entity, e.g. family in the U.S.


11. In IV cases, marital status fraud is common in F2A and F2B
cases. Recent numbers indicate a fifty percent fraud rate where an
applicant hid an existing spouse in order to remain eligible as the
son/daughter of an LPR. FPU makes neighborhood site visits to verify
marital status. Although both time and labor intensive, they are
almost the only way to uncover or confirm fraud.


12. The tradition of arranged marriages also poses difficulties
for adjudicators in CR1 and K visa cases. Since it is not unusual
for a new spouse to know almost nothing about their partner, we rely
heavily on secondary evidence to establish the bona fides of the
marriage. We ask for photos, videos, invitations, cards, etc., to
prove the relationship is valid. The lack of secondary evidence can
be a strong indicator that the applicants are perpetrating marriage
fraud.


13. During this summary period, the Fraud Prevention Manager (FPM)
and adjudicating officers jointly developed standardized criteria
for referring CR1 and K visa cases to the FPU. This was a difficult
task as the case facts and documentation of a marriage for
immigration purposes and a legitimately arranged marriage are
sometimes very similar. The new criteria are based on supporting
statistics from FPU verifications which showed a low fraud confirmed
rate in such cases. Highlights of our standardized criteria for
referring CR1 and K visa cases include more targeted questioning and
identifying a clear aspect of the case to investigate rather than a
generically worded reason for referral.


14. Post receives a number of requests each year from the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for document and field
verifications, either from United States Citizenship and Immigration
Services (USCIS) adjudicators or Fraud Detection and National
Security (FDNS) investigators. In 2009, we completed 13
investigations for DHS. 24 DHS cases are still pending.

--------------

D. DV FRAUD:
--------------


15. Bangladeshis are enthusiastic participants in the Diversity
Visa (DV) program. For DV 2009, 4.3 million Bangladeshis submitted
entries out of a worldwide total of 13.6 million, and Bangladesh
perennially ranks in the top five for DV winners. Corrupt agents and
cyber cafe operators (hereafter referred to as DV agents) are
equally enthusiastic about the DV program. Many Bangladeshis do not

DHAKA 00000950 003.3 OF 006


have access to the Internet or have limited English language skills,
necessitating the use of cyber cafes and agents for online data
entry. DV agents manipulate the entries by substituting an address
under their control and frequently change the applicant's marital
status to single instead of married. Once the address is changed,
the applicant is effectively under the control of the DV agent.
Once received, winning letters are held for ransom by the agent.
The applicant is informed that he/she may receive the letter for a
very large cash payment or, in lieu of payment, by adding a fake
spouse to the application. Every year, post conducts outreach to
educate potential applicants of the pitfalls of DV agents and
encourages the applicants to take control of their application
process as much as possible. DV 2009 experienced an increase in the
number of applicants who were married but submitted an online
application indicating they were unmarried. Based on applicant
interviews we know this is usually attributed to poor preparation on
the part of the applicant at the time of data entry (usually at a
cyber cafe) or DV agent involvement.


16. As previously discussed, the tradition of arranged marriages
makes it extremely difficult to distinguish between legitimate
arranged marriages and marriages solely for immigration purposes.
Again, we rely on the usual array of secondary evidence. If the
submitted evidence fails to establish that a genuine marriage
exists, we coQuct resource intensive field verifications. DV 2009
saw an unprecedented number of false addresses given by applicants
in order to hide both sham marriages and their true marital status.


17. Occupational qualification fraud is the easiest DV fraud to
detect. Using the O-Net standards, adjudicators ask detailed
questions about the applicant's usual work and can usually quickly
separate those who qualify from those with inflated their
qualifications.


18. Counterfeit, improvidently issued, and/or altered school
certificates are also commonplace. Post has extensive exemplar
files of genuine and fake Secondary School Certificates (SSC) and
Higher Secondary Certificates (HSC) from all the regional Boards of
Education. These are available in both hard copy and electronic
soft copy to all members of the Consular staff.


19. In October 2005, the Ministry of Education established a
website for on-line verification of educational certificates. This
website allows nationwide verification of certificates issued after
the computerization of Board records, generally from the mid-1990s.
This has proved to be an important anti-fraud resource for DV
adjudicators. During DV 2009, Dhaka saw a dramatic increase in the
number of fraudulent Technical Board certificates. Unlike HSC
certificates, Technical Board certificates cannot be validated
online. Unqualified applicants and/or their corrupt agents sought
to exploit this as a weak point in our ability to verify
information. Fortunately, Dhaka's FPU has an excellent relationship
with the Technical Board Controller and we are able to hand deliver
and verify on-site all questionable Technical Board documents.

--------------

E. ACS and PASSPORT FRAUD:
--------------


20. We have extremely low incidence of fraud in these areas. Most
suspect cases involve Consular Reports of Birth Abroad and are
investigated through the use of DNA.


21. During a recent routine review of an A1 visa application for
the spouse of a Bangladeshi diplomat in Washington, reported in
reftel C, the interviewing officer noticed that she listed her son
on her application but did not submit a visa application for him.
Further questioning revealed that he had been born in the United-States
in 2008 and had been issued a U.S. passport.

The applicant was asked about the circumstances surrounding the
issuance of her son's passport and she confirmed her signature on
the Application for U.S. Passport. According to passport records,
the applicant presented a Maryland state identification card instead
of her Bangladesh passport or diplomatic carnet, concealing her
diplomatic status in the United States. With Department
concurrence, we revoked the passport. The Chief of Mission has
recommended the withdrawal of the Bangladeshi diplomat from the
United States.

--------------

F. ADOPTION FRAUD:
--------------


22. Bangladesh civil law makes no provision for adoption. Islamic
and Hindu practices either forbid or strictly limit almost all
adoptions. The only legal adoption recourse is for Bangladeshi
adults to apply for an order of guardianship under the 1890 Guards

DHAKA 00000950 004.3 OF 006


and Wards Act. Only Bangladeshi natives and citizens may become
guardians in this manner. In some cases, the guardianship can form
the basis of an IR-4 petition. Most of our fraud involves direct
transfers between family members where a relative in the U.S. seeks
to adopt a cousin or nephew/niece in order to give the child a
better life in the US. The family in Bangladesh generally tries to
fraudulently conceal their standard of living in order to qualify
the child as an eligible orphan. Because of the prohibition of
adoptions and lack of reputable orphanages, it is also common for
prospective adoptive parents to rely on family and friends in
Bangladesh to informally arrange adoptions directly with the
biological parents. These families also try to conceal the direct
transfer in order to fraudulently qualify the child as an orphan.


23. There is also a tradition of "social adoptions" in Bangladesh,
in which families take in orphans of relatives or foundlings and
raise them as their own. Social adoptions also include parents who
have many children giving one of their children to a sibling who is
childless and not able to conceive. In both of these cases, the
parents rarely regularize the child's status and the child may not
be aware of his or her actual parentage. This often comes to light
when DNA testing reveals that one or another child may not be
eligible to receive a visa in family preference cases.

--------------

G. Use of DNA Testing:
--------------


24. Post's adjudicating officers allow applicants ample opportunity
to provide sufficient evidence of relationship (EOR) during an
initial interview and subsequent return interviews. However, many
applicants are unable to provide adequate EOR required to establish
a petitionable relationship and are requested to complete DNA
testing. Post provides a letter that explicitly states any AABB
certified lab that the petitioner or applicants choose can conduct
the testing. The vast majority of genetic relationships are
affirmed for those applicants that show up for testing. Not
infrequently, a principal applicant advises us that one of the
derivatives in the case has recently "died" - an indication that the
derivative was most likely not an immediate family member. Post
views DNA testing as a valuable fraud deterrent.


25. Recent 9 FAM changes regarding DNA collection are being
implemented in Dhaka. Post procedures already incorporated many of
the new procedures.

--------------

H. ASYLUM and other DHS BENEFIT FRAUD:
--------------


26. Dhaka handles both VISAS 92 follow-To-Join (FTJ) cases and
requests for investigation in ongoing political asylum cases. Since
the arrival of the current FPM in August of 2008, there have been no
VISAS 92 cases referred to FPU and only two requests from DRL for
follow-up investigations of asylum cases. Historically, post has
had several file drawers dedicated to pending asylum and
follow-to-join case investigations; however, this workload has
recently abated. Most likely this reduction is a direct result of
FPU investigations proving a great number of these claims were
bogus. We are concerned about our ability to manage an
investigation backlog if asylum cases reach prior year volumes.

--------------

I. Alien Smuggling, Trafficking,
Organized Crime, Terrorist Level:
--------------


27. Reports from various sources in 2008 indicating Bangladeshi
nationals may be probing for paths of lesser resistance into the
U.S. via South America. Sources include the Human Smuggling and
Trafficking Center (HSTC) and our British counterparts. It appears
Bangladeshis are exploiting lax visa issuances and, in some cases,
the lack of a visa requirement, to facilitate travel to South
American countries with a probable final destination of the U.S. or
Canada.


28. South American travel by our applicants is almost non-existent,
but adjudicating officers are aware of the reports. Any such travel
could be an indication of a facilitator and our officers are
instructed to alert the FPM or ARSO-I if an applicant's passport
indicates travel in that region.

--------------

J. DS Criminal Fraud Investigations:
--------------


29. Dhaka's ARSO-I and FPM have a strong working relationship and
are jointly defining strategies and areas of focus for combating

DHAKA 00000950 005.3 OF 006


visa fraud. As reported in reftel B, the A/RSO-I function is an
element of Mission Dhaka's effort to combat pervasive high fraud.
Lagging GOB law enforcement, slow judicial follow through and
exigent post security requirements will continue to challenge
A/RSO-I operations.

-------------- -

K. Host Country Passport, Identity Documents,
and Civil Registry:
-------------- -


30. The lack of secure identity and relationship documentation in
Bangladesh is one of the biggest contributors to the number of cases
referred to FPU for investigation. Neighborhood checks are usually
the only way for FPU to establish whether or not information
presented at the window is legitimate. Non-qualified individuals can
obtain authentic (albeit improvidently issued) passports, birth
certificates, driver's licenses, national IDs, marriage and divorce
certificates, and any other issuable document from legitimate
sources in Bangladesh. The current national passport is poorly made
and easily manipulated. There is very little control over
biographic information contained in issued passports. Genuine
passports containing totally false identity data are easily
obtained. Bangladesh hopes to start producing machine readable
passports in 2010.


31. Due to the inherent poor control of civil documentation, many
applicants have difficulty providing credible ID. Many applicants
provide nothing more than a passport and an old school ID that
consists of a piece of paper with a stapled photograph. Many
documents show signs of mold and severe weathering.


32. Muslim marriage and divorces are required by law to be
registered at the local "Kazi" office. The registration books are
simple, ordinary registry books with hand-written pages. The
registry books are usually housed in locked wall lockers with no
additional physical security. Civil Government control over the
Kazis is negligible. It is not uncommon for FPU investigators to
find books out of sequence, pages glued in, and marriages added to
the end of the registration books for any given year. These
manipulations are reliable indicators of fraud.

-------------- ---

L. COOPERATION WITH HOST GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES:
-------------- ---


33. We receive cooperation from most local government offices
regarding verification of school certificates, marriage and divorce
certificates, and passports. However, the court system and local
police are usually uninterested in aggressively pursuing legal
action against visa fraud perpetrators and corrupt visa agents.
Witnesses generally fear extortion by local police and quickly lose
interest in pursuing a complaint, especially when a case stagnates
due to lack of police action. In one case where the ARSO-I was
successful in having witnesses make a formal complaint against visa
brokers, police inaction led to the perpetrators going unpunished.

--------------

M. AREAS OF CONCERN:
--------------


34. Due to the steady increase in numbers of IV cases processed at
post and the continued participation of Bangladesh in the DV
program, we expect that the number of cases referred to FPU will
continue at the same increasing rate. In order to maintain the
integrity of FPU operations and to protect our LES investigators
from accusations of malfeasance, Dhaka sends an American FSO or EFM
on all field investigations. The FPM or the EFM Consular Assistant
conduct most of the investigations with occasional assistance from
other FSOs from the IV or NIV units. Staffing levels are becoming a
major area of concern. We have requested additional positions, one
officer, and one Locally Engaged Staff (LES),to bolster consular
and FPU resources. The current FPM has overhauled FPU operations to
make them more efficient and to optimize use of available resources,
but the number of cases pending investigation continues to outpace
the number of cases completed despite the fact that our Consular
Assistant or FPM are away from the office over 50 percent of the
time completing field verifications and site visits.


35. The Dhaka Anti Fraud Group (AFG),a collection of mostly
English-speaking foreign mission anti-fraud counterparts who met
regularly to share and disseminate anti-fraud information, is in the
early stages of being reconstituted. For the previous year it had
been defunct. Recently, Dhaka's FPM and British High Commission
counterparts have reignited interest in this information sharing
group and have scheduled its first meeting in over a year. At least
five diplomatic missions will be represented and we hope to grow the
number during the next year.

DHAKA 00000950 006.3 OF 006




36. Due to the high incidence of fraud in past year DV visa
issuances; post is seeing a number of cases involving petitioners
who may have received their immigration status through fraudulent
circumstances. The FPM will continue to aggressively research and
return these cases to NVC and CA/VO/L/A for referral to DHS. Dhaka
firmly believes that the number of fraudulent IV cases will diminish
if the Department and DHS pursue these types of cases. Loss of LPR
or Citizenship status for past immigration fraud would go a long way
to deter petitioner fraud as word will spread quickly that we mean
business.

--------------

N. STAFFING AND TRAINING:
--------------


37. Miller, Glenn - FPM
Fraud Prevention for Managers - FSI

Vaagan, Nate - Consular Assistant

Azahar, Mohammad - Senior FPU LES
PC-542 FSN Fraud Prevention Workshop FSI
PC-544 Detecting Fraudulent Documents Online
PC-128 Detecting Imposters Online

Khan, Jahan - FSN Investigator
PC-542 FSN Fraud Prevention Workshop FSI
PC-544 Detecting Fraudulent Documents Online
PC-128 Detecting Imposters Online
PC-545 Examining US Passports Online

D' Costa, John - FSN Investigator
PC-542 FSN Fraud Prevention Workshop FSI
PC-544 Detecting Fraudulent Documents Online

Akter, Sheuly - FSN Investigator
PC-544 Detecting Fraudulent Documents Online
PC-128 Detecting Imposters Online

Huda, Nazmul - FSN Investigator
PC-544 Detecting Fraudulent Documents Online
PC-128 Detecting Imposters Online
PC-545 Examining US Passports Online

DEAN