Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09DHAHRAN40
2009-03-22 08:19:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Consulate Dhahran
Cable title:  

SAUDI HEZBOLLAH LEADER WARNS OF SECTARIAN VIOLENCE

Tags:  SA LE IR PGOV PTER PHUM KIRF KISL KDEM 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO6378
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK
DE RUEHDH #0040/01 0810819
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 220819Z MAR 09
FM AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0046
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY 0003
RUEHDH/AMCONSUL DHAHRAN 0061
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DHAHRAN 000040 

NOFORN
SIPDIS

PASS TO NEA/ARP JOSHUA HARRIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/22/2019
TAGS: SA LE IR PGOV PTER PHUM KIRF KISL KDEM
SUBJECT: SAUDI HEZBOLLAH LEADER WARNS OF SECTARIAN VIOLENCE

REF: 06 RIYADH 4914, 09 RIYADH 1868, 08 RIYADH 270, 09 DHAHRAN 8, 08 RIYADH 1321, 09 RIYADH 346, 09 DHAHRAN 14

DHAHRAN 00000040 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Julie Stineheart, Acting Consul General, EXEC,
DOS.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DHAHRAN 000040

NOFORN
SIPDIS

PASS TO NEA/ARP JOSHUA HARRIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/22/2019
TAGS: SA LE IR PGOV PTER PHUM KIRF KISL KDEM
SUBJECT: SAUDI HEZBOLLAH LEADER WARNS OF SECTARIAN VIOLENCE

REF: 06 RIYADH 4914, 09 RIYADH 1868, 08 RIYADH 270, 09 DHAHRAN 8, 08 RIYADH 1321, 09 RIYADH 346, 09 DHAHRAN 14

DHAHRAN 00000040 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Julie Stineheart, Acting Consul General, EXEC,
DOS.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)

1. (C/NF) Key Points:

--------------

-- XXXXXXXXXXXX (strictly protect),a popular Shi'a
cleric and alleged leader of Saudi Hezbollah, met with PolOff
after years of refusing to meet with USG officials (ref A).

-- XXXXXXXXXXXX declared that the USG could persuade the SAG to adopt
serious reforms for religious freedom and human rights, but
chooses not to and is therefore an "enemy" of the Saudi Shi'a.

-- XXXXXXXXXXXX believes that the SAG must take substantive and
public steps toward fostering religious and national unity among
Saudi citizens.

-- Echoing other Shi'a leaders, XXXXXXXXXXXX warned that sectarian
violence may erupt if the SAG does not address Shi'a concerns
and that it will be worse than Iraq.


2. (C/NF) Comment:

--------------

-- XXXXXXXXXXXX's warning of possible sectarian violence echoes the
sentiments of a diverse set of sections of the Shi'a community.
On December 21, a group of young Shi'a voiced their
dissatisfaction with the SAG, making no attempt to hide three
rifles and a picture of Hassan Nasrallah on display in the room
(ref B). On February 7, XXXXXXXXXXXX (protect),an
influential Shi'a political activist, warned of an increasingly
"frustrated and impatient" Shi'a youth (ref C). In late
February, XXXXXXXXXXXX (protect),an elected municipal council
member, said that "the root for trouble" is present in the Shi'a
community and feared sectarian violence (ref D). In early
March, XXXXXXXXXXXX (protect),a vocal Saudi human
rights activist, raised fears of the Shi'a youth resorting to
violence unless the SAG takes action (ref D). Most recently,
XXXXXXXXXXXX (protect),a well-respected manager and

journalist XXXXXXXXXXXX, communicated similar concerns about
sectarian tensions escalating into violence.

End key points and comment.


3. (C/NF) A LONG TIME COMING. XXXXXXXXXXXX, a vocal
Saudi human rights activist, facilitated a meeting with XXXXXXXXXXXXupon PolOff's request. Past attempts by Dhahran
PolOffs to meet with XXXXXXXXXXXX were unsuccessful, with the sheikh
unwilling to risk "losing the respect of people on the street"
by meeting with USG officials (ref A). The meeting took place
in the late evening of March 7 at XXXXXXXXXXXX's home in Dammam, and
was attended by the sheikh's three adolescent sons, nephew, and
his older brother, XXXXXXXXXXXX, who acted as interpreter when
necessary. No other Consulate personnel were present.
(Comment: Post is not entirely certain why XXXXXXXXXXXX suddenly
agreed to meet with a USG official. One possibility is that the
intermediary, XXXXXXXXXXXX, as a trusted and respected friend,
persuaded XXXXXXXXXXXX to meet with PolOff. Another possibility is
that XXXXXXXXXXXX truly believes that sectarian violence is imminent
and views the USG as the only entity able to pressure the SAG
into taking quick and bold action to prevent hostility. End
comment.)


4. (C/NF) A SOFT HARDLINER. Many respected Shi'a contacts have
described XXXXXXXXXXXXas an outspoken, somewhat radical Shi'a
religious leader with a large and diverse following. XXXXXXXXXXXX
wears a black turban and goes by the title "Sayyid" as opposed
to "Sheikh," indicating that he is a direct descendent of
Prophet Mohammed. Though many Shi'a religious leaders
criticized this bold claim, he continues to maintain a large and
loyal following. Though previous reporting (refs A, E) suggests
that XXXXXXXXXXXXis a leadership figure in Saudi Hezbollah, several
Shi'a contacts play down these claims and believe that he has
become more moderate, citing his participation in the National
Dialogue with King Abdullah in 2005. (Note: Most credible
contacts believe that Saudi Hezbollah is a largely inactive
movement with minimal foreign contact and limited organizational
capacity. End note.)


5. (C/NF) AMERICA IS THE ENEMY. During the two-hour long
meeting, XXXXXXXXXXXX remained cordial but strongly critical of the
USG and the SAG. He told PolOff that the Saudi Shi'a have three
enemies: the Wahabbis, the royal family, and the USG. He
explained that the Al Saud family has failed to improve the
religious freedom and basic rights of Shi'a citizens, and
continue to placate the intolerant views of the Wahabbi (Sunni)
extremists. Moreover, he continued, the USG supports the SAG
without question and has not pressured the government to improve
the situation of the Shi'a. Due to its inaction, XXXXXXXXXXXXviews
the USG as an accomplice to the SAG's discrimination of the
Shi'a. He dismissed PolOff's citation of the USG's annual Human
Rights and International Religious Freedom reports by saying
that the SAG has taken no action based on those reports.
XXXXXXXXXXXX distinguished between the USG and the general U.S.
population, noting that he did not view the latter as an enemy
and on the contrary enjoyed his experience in the U.S. in the
1990s. (Note: He did not elaborate on his visit to the U.S.
End note.)


6. (C/NF) THE SAG HAS NOT DONE ENOUGH. XXXXXXXXXXXX declared with
frustration that the Shi'a would not wait any more for the SAG
to bring about real change. He explained that the Medina
incident (ref F) is just the latest example of Saudi
discrimination of the Shi'a. He was particularly concerned with
the random stabbing of a Shi'a sheikh by Wahabbi extremists in
Medina (ref D) and its implications for his community's basic
sense of security. XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that it has been nearly four
years since he participated in the National Dialogue with King
Abdullah and he still has not seen any results. He also noted
that the municipal council elections have provided few benefits,
citing the minimal authority that the elected officials hold.
He has dismissed symbolic gestures such as King Abdullah's
recent meeting with Shi'a leaders as "not enough" (ref G).


7. (C/NF) PROUD TO BE SAUDI. Despite his overt criticism of the
SAG and the royal family, on several occasions XXXXXXXXXXXX noted his
desire for national unity among his countrymen. He told PolOff
that it should be illegal for one Saudi to call another "Shi'a"
or "Sunni." He said, "we are all Saudis" and should not
differentiate, with all being treated as equal citizens.


8. (C/NF) IRAN, HEZBOLLAH. XXXXXXXXXXXX accused the USG of having
"double standards" by its support of Israel, and its criticism
of Iran and Hezbollah. When PolOff asked him a follow up
question specifically on Iran, XXXXXXXXXXXX carefully side-stepped
it. (Comment: The measured and politically savvy XXXXXXXXXXXX was
deliberate in painting a blurry picture of his relationship to
and views on Iran and Hezbollah. However, a few days later
XXXXXXXXXXXX gave an interview on Al-Manaar TV, a satellite station
viewed by the USG as a propaganda arm of Hezbollah. End
comment.)


9. (C/NF) ANOTHER WARNING ABOUT SECTARIAN VIOLENCE. Echoing
several other mainstream Shi'a leadership figures, XXXXXXXXXXXX
warned PolOff, "Don't be surprised if it comes to violence." He
went on to say that the violence would be "double" of that in
Iraq and that the Shi'a would be "slaughtered" by the SAG. He
then said that he recently called on his congregation at last
Friday's prayers to not demonstrate in the streets, for which he
received criticism from some of his followers. He also told
PolOff that it is not only the Saudi youth that are growing
frustrated, but also "regular people on the street."


10. (C/NF) WHAT THE SAG NEEDS TO DO. XXXXXXXXXXXX repeated several
times the need for the SAG to publicly guarantee religious
freedoms and equal treatment of all Saudi citizens, while justly
punishing those who violate these rights. XXXXXXXXXXXX did not lay
out specific steps the SAG must take in order to avoid conflict.
However, he noted some examples of lingering problems that the
SAG alone can address: the routine closure of Shi'a mosques and
husseiniyyas in Dammam, Khobar, and al-Ahsa; the religious
police regularly harassing Shi'a; random arrests of Shi'a
without due process; no Shi'a graveyards in Dammam and Khobar;
and under-representation in government, religious, and education
institutions.
STINEHART