SAUDI BORDER CONFLICT WITH YEMEN RAISES FEAR OF SECTARIAN

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 DHAHRAN 000295

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/ARP JOSHUA HARRIS AND JEREMY BERNDT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2019
TAGS: PGOV KIRF PREL SA YM PINR PHUM
SUBJECT: SAUDI BORDER CONFLICT WITH YEMEN RAISES FEAR OF SECTARIAN
BACKLASH AGAINST SHIAS

REF: A. A. DHAHRAN 222

B. B. DHAHRAN 217

C. C. DHAHRAN 258

D. D. RIYADH 270

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CLASSIFIED BY: Joseph Kenny, Dhahran Consul General, Department
of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)
SUMMARY

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1. (C) Prominent members of the Eastern Province (EP) Shia
community are growing increasingly worried that the conflict in
Yemen will spur a backlash against their community. The
attitude is prevalent among Shia youth as well. Statements by a
Yemeni official, as well as a recent circular issued by
conservative Saudi clerics, have charged Shia in the Middle East
region with supporting the Houthi rebels of northern Yemen.
Prominent Saudi Shia have come out to unequivocally declare
their allegiance to the SAG. However, from observations in the
Eastern Province all the way to Najran, the feared backlash has
not occurred. Sentiment is mixed, with the Shia leadership
expressing unequivocal support of the SAG versus the everyday
Shia who maintains a more nuanced view. END SUMMARY.



Growing Concerns of a Backlash

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2. (S) On November 23, PolOff traveled to the predominantly Shia
city of Qatif and met with Sheikh Mohammed al-Mahfoodh
(protect),a respected Shia with a political and scholarly
orientation and a moderate commentator on Islamic affairs (Note:
al-Mahfoodh was also one of a number of politically active Shia
who went into exile during the early 1980's and returned after a
deal was struck with King Fahd in 1993 which allowed politically
exiled Shias to return to KSA. End Note.) Also, in attendance
was Mohammed al-Shayookh (protect),a Shia political commentator
and activist with strong ties to the Qatif area; and Hussein
al-Alak (protect),the managing editor for Rasid.com online news
site (ref a). Al-Mahfoodh expressed deep concern over a recent
circular issued by Wahhabi clerics (with 42 signatories) that
called for all Muslims to be aware of Shia plots, and accused
Iran of being responsible for the Houthi uprising in Yemen.
(Note: PolOff has not seen a copy of the circular, though
rasid.com claims to have received a copy. End Note.)
Al-Shayookh echoed his concerns, noting that the longer the
conflict lasts, the greater the chance for a sectarian backlash
against the Shia. (Comment: To date, there are no reported
cases of reprisals against Shia for alleged association or
support of Houthis in Yemen. End comment.)



Shia Pledge Allegiance to the King

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3. (C) Prominent members of the Shia community have publicly
voiced support for the SAG. In mid-November, Sheikh Hassan
al-Saffar, a moderate and influential Saudi Shia scholar, issued
a statement condemning the "violations of Yemeni infiltrators"
and affirmed his loyalty to the Kingdom. He objected to
involving Saudi Arabia (and the region) in a war in which they
have no interest. He went on to state that "We are all partners
in this nation and we must have present a unified stance with
the leadership against any outside aggression." (Note: PolOff
received the statement via email from Jafar al-Shayab (protect),
a writer, advocate, and Chairman of the Qatif Municipal Council.
The statement was also featured on Rasid.com. End Note.)
Sheikh al-Saffar also called on Muslim world media to stop using
inflammatory sectarian language.




4. (C) Other prominent figures of the Shia community spoke out
in mid-November against the Yemeni Foreign Minister, Abu Bakr
al-Qurbi, who accused Shia in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and
Bahrain of providing financial, political, and sectarian support
to Houthi rebels. Dr. Tawfiq al-Saif, a well-regarded
researcher who specializes in Shia political jurisprudence, and
Najeeb al-Khunaizi, a public Shia figure and political activist,
condemned the statement and voiced unwavering support for the
SAG. Dr. al-Saif added: "Safety of our country's soil is the

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responsibility of the government and the nation and the Shia are
part of the nation . . . Support to Houthi rebels just because
they are Shia is not true and the distinction between sectarian
position and the patriotism is firm and clear."



Contrasting Views from Shia on the Street

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5. (S) The leadership's pronouncements stand in contrast to the
view on the street. On November 22, PolOff met with Isa
al-Muzel (protect),Qatif Municipality Council Member, to
discuss the growing concerns of a sectarian backlash against the
Shia community. Al-Muzel expressed concern regarding the strong
show of support by some Shia leaders on behalf of the SAG.
Although he recognized the need to respond to questions of Shia
loyalty to the SAG, he deemed it politically dangerous for them
to do so in such an unequivocal manner. The average Shia, said
al-Muzel, is not in favor of such open and vocal support of the
SAG, especially when religious discrimination against Shia of
the EP continues unabated.




6. (C) Such views were echoed by a small group of up-and-coming
young Qatifi activists (ages ranging from 18 to 25) with whom
PolOff met in a meeting arranged by Hussein al-Alak (protect) on
November 23. The group was led by Mohammad al-Sadiq (protect),
a young writer employed as a Human Resources Administrative
Coordinator for the SaudiReadyMix Company. Although the group
expressed support for the SAG, they preferred an immediate
cessation of hostilities. They expressed deep frustration of
constantly having to reassert their loyalty to a government that
continues to close down their mosques and discriminates against
them based on religious orientation. (Note: In predominantly
Shia Qatif, Shia mosques remain open and have not suffered from
the government crackdown in towns and neighborhoods where
Shiites do not make up the majority of the population, such as
Al-Hasa, Dammam, and al-Khobar (ref b). End note.)



Najran: Closer to the Conflict

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7. (S) On December 13, PolOff met with Ali Borman Al-Yami
(protect),an influential Ismaili businessman originally from
Najran. Al-Yami has direct access to the Governor of Najran,
Prince Mishal bin Abdullah bin Abdulaziz, and is working with
him to establish a Najran-based holding company (ref C). He
travels to Najran often, most recently in late November.
Al-Yami expressed little concern that sectarianism will affect
the predominantly Ismaili Shia province of Najran, going so far
as to say that even the longtime Houthi residents of Najran are
detached from the conflict and have not been targeted, even as
the border conflict has intensified.



Al-Yami also spoke of Sheikh Hassan al-Saffar's attempts in
recent weeks to reach out to the Shia in the Najran region and
to have Al-Yami assist in reaching out to them. Al-Yami
remarked that he dissuaded Al-Saffar from making the trip, and
expressed his wishes not to get involved in religious matters.
Al-Yami was unclear as to Al-Saffar's motives, other than a
desire to reach out to Shia in Najran. Al-Yami was not aware
that Al-Saffar ever made the trip to Najran.



Comment

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8. (C) The Shia of the Eastern Province (EP) have little in
common culturally or ideologically with the Shia of northern
Yemen. Thus, Shia-based sympathy in the EP should not be
assumed. The statements issued by leaders of the Shia community
are a concerted reaction to allegations that they are not loyal
to the SAG. They are fearful that as the conflict draws on,

DHAHRAN 00000295 003.2 OF 003


accusations of sympathizing with the Shia of northern Yemen will
increase. As a result, they have sought to emphasize their
support of the SAG in the media. To date, Post is unaware of
any instances of a backlash against the Shia here. Should this
occur, it will contribute further to the discrimination already
experienced by Eastern Province Shia and hence raise sectarian
tensions considerably, especially among the Shia youth (ref D).




9. (C) Najranis, on the other hand, do have deep cultural,
religious, and tribal ties to the Shia of northern Yemen (ref
C). However, the cordial relationship between the Governor of
Najran, Prince Mishal bin Abdullah bin Abdulaziz, and the
majority Suleimani Shias of Najran is an important incentive to
dissuading Najranis from involvement in the conflict. Should a
crackdown against the Shia of Najran occur, it would tarnish the
reportedly good relations between the Governor and populace. To
date, Post is not aware of any instances of a backlash against
the Najran region Shia on the grounds that they support the
Houthis in Yemen. End comment.
CG: JKENNY