ZANZIBAR: OPPOSITION CUF THINKING IN A POST-RECONCILIATION

UNCLAS DAR ES SALAAM 000123

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

FOR AF/E JLIDDLE, INR/RAA FEHRENREICH

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EAID PGOV PREL TZ
SUBJECT: ZANZIBAR: OPPOSITION CUF THINKING IN A POST-RECONCILIATION
WORLD

REFS: (A) Dar es Salaam 75 (B) Dar es Salaam 09 and previous


1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Once supportive of President Kikwete because of
his stated desire for reconciliation, opposition party Civic United
Front (CUF) is now disappointed that he failed to fulfill his
commitment to Zanzibar. CUF has concluded that the upcoming 2010
elections in Zanzibar will not be different from the previous,
failed ones. CUF Foreign Affairs Advisor Ismail Jusa[f1] claimed he
and Zanzibar SYG Seif Hamad are the only moderates left in a party
that is growing frustrated with ruling party CCM perceived
duplicity. Jusa said he was sympathetic to solving the ongoing CUF
and CCM stalemate in the near term through some kind of power
sharing deal. The trick to make that happen was to create some kind
of mechanism to make government officials assume a neutral role.
For now, CUF focus will be on the upcoming by-election in Magogoni,
expected in May. END SUMMARY.


2. (U) In early February, the Zanzibar Affairs Office and Washington
analysts met with Ismail Jusa, CUF Foreign Affairs Advisor at the
USG Zanzibar residence "Pettersen House." Jusa, a U.S.
International Visitor Program alumnus, began by saying that at the
outset of the current national administration, "CUF had great
confidence in Kikwete, especially when he admitted polarization on
Zanzibar and promised that he would work towards finding the
solution." (COMMENT: President Kikwete promised to resolve the
CUF-CCM conflict when he delivered his maiden speech at the Union
Parliament in December 2005. END COMMENT).


3. (SBU) Jusa said that recently Kikwete has changed his tune. Jusa
cited speeches Kikwete made in January 2009 while on Pemba -- not
just on Revolution Day when he gave short shrift to the subject of
reconciliation -- but especially during CCM rallies around the
island in the days afterward. In speeches at those rallies, Jusa
claimed that Kikwete deliberately used inflammatory rhetoric that
"recalled the hardline era." According to Jusa, when Kikwete said
lines like "the revolution must be upheld," he was echoing the
battle cry of those revolutionaries who carried out violent punitive
actions on Pemba like rape and murder in retaliation for the Pemban
Party's support of the first Independent Sultanate government of
Zanzibar. When Kikwete said lines like "I can't even imagine a CUF
government in 2010 - nor in 2015 for that matter," he was echoing
President Karume's first international press conference in 1964,
well known to Zanzibaris, when he called for a "50-year Revolution."



4. (SBU) Jusa expressed disappointment that Kikwete had failed to
fulfill his commitment to Zanzibar. He concluded that the upcoming
2010 elections in Zanzibar would not be different from the previous
ones (i.e. violent, oppressive and not credible). Jusa claimed that
the present delay in voter registration (septel) was because CCM
couldn't duplicate the numbers it had invented in 2005, so it was
having a hard time getting started. The population was more
numerous across the whole archipelago, so it would embarrass CCM if
it couldn't even muster the same numbers it fudged five years
earlier.


5. (SBU) Commenting on reconciliation between CCM and CUF, Jusa
admitted there were hardliners within CUF who wanted to take a
radical approach in dealing with CCM. Jusa said the "only real
moderates" left in CUF were himself and SYG Seif Hamad. With a
series of lost elections behind them-and failure of the Muafaka
(reconciliation) talks, twice - he said the two of them were on the
last shreds of credibility. "There are different people in CUF who
have different views on the directions that CUF should take," he
said. Jusa mentioned Juma Duni, the CUF Deputy Secretary General,
as non-compromising and one who would have CUF take a more radical
approach. He said one ascendant view within CUF was to opt out of
the political system altogether since it was "illegitimate."
Another, majority view, was that CCM was irredeemable. Therefore,
CUF's interlocutor should not be the government but the
international community instead. There needed to be an
international commission of some sort that would guarantee a CUF
victory after a free and fair election. After attaining power, CUF
would "clean house."


6. (SBU) Jusa said he supported the views of Ambassador Green in his
valedictory speech of early January (ref B). Jusa said he was
sympathetic to the idea of solving the ongoing CUF and CCM stalemate
in the near term through some kind of power sharing deal. The trick

to make that happen was to create some kind of mechanism to make
government forces assume a neutral role. Without that as a starting
point, CCM couldn't be trusted to uphold its end of the bargain.


7. (SBU) On the Union, Jusa said a "three-government-system would be
the best way to govern Tanzania" (i.e. a Government of Tanganyika,
of Zanzibar, and a Union Government of Tanzania to deal with shared
interests). He said the status quo was that "Tanganyika" also
claimed to be Tanzania. He pointed fingers at mainlanders whom he
said "were working towards dividing Zanzibar to be able to get away
with everything they want."


8. (SBU) For now, CUF focus will be on the upcoming by-election in
Magogoni, expected in May. Jusa doubted it would be free and fair.
He said "there were rumors about planting illegal voters to be
brought from mainland Tanzania and the nearby areas." To build up
the confidence of the electorate, he wanted the U.S. government to
play a leading role in managing the Magogoni bi-election and beyond.
He rejected the idea that the Zanzibar Electoral Commission was
impartial.

COMMENT:


9. (SBU) Jusa, like most Zanzibari political observers, takes U.S.
participation in an international election observer mission as a
given. We have served that role - and more-in 2000 and 2005. We
continue to have expectations that we will have a sufficient budget
for a 2010 [f2]observation effort. In the meantime, we will
continue to encourage CUF to work within the system and to keep
trying to engage with CCM.

Andre


[f1]Isn't he Ismail Jussa?
[f2]Suggest clearing with USAID, since I think it would ordinarily
be their funds.