Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09DAMASCUS697
2009-09-27 11:42:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Damascus
Cable title:  

BASHAR'S SURPRISE TRIP TO SAUDI ARABIA: SETTING

Tags:  PGOV PREL LE IZ SY 
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FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6873
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0720
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0835
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0680
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0964
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM PRIORITY 0112
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0714
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 DAMASCUS 000697 

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA
NSC FOR SHAPIRO/MCDERMOTT
PARIS FOR NOBLES
LONDON FOR LORD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/26/2029
TAGS: PGOV PREL LE IZ SY
SUBJECT: BASHAR'S SURPRISE TRIP TO SAUDI ARABIA: SETTING
STAGE FOR A DEAL ON LEBANON'S GOVERNMENT?

Classified By: CDA Charles Hunter, Reasons 1.4 b and d.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 DAMASCUS 000697

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA
NSC FOR SHAPIRO/MCDERMOTT
PARIS FOR NOBLES
LONDON FOR LORD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/26/2029
TAGS: PGOV PREL LE IZ SY
SUBJECT: BASHAR'S SURPRISE TRIP TO SAUDI ARABIA: SETTING
STAGE FOR A DEAL ON LEBANON'S GOVERNMENT?

Classified By: CDA Charles Hunter, Reasons 1.4 b and d.


1. (S/NF) Summary: President Bashar al-Asad's surprise
September 23 trip to attend the opening of the King Abdullah
University for Science and Technology (KAUST) resulted from
heavy lobbying by Turkey and Qatar, according to Embassy
contacts. Asad's Advisor or Media and Political Affairs
Bouthaina Shaaban had told journalists days earlier the
Syrian President would not be attending the event and had
designated the Minister for Higher Education, Ghaith Barakat,
to represent him. Asad and King Abdullah reportedly held a
two-hour tour d'horizon discussion of regional issues,
including but not limited to Lebanon. According to media
reports, King Abdullah agreed to visit Damascus in the coming
days. Sources here are hearing conflicting messages whether
Abdullah's visit is contingent on formation of a government
in Lebanon. End Summary.


--------------
Turkey Prevails on Asad
--------------


2. (S/NF) With little advance media notice, Syrian
President Bashar al-Asad traveled September 23 to Jeddah to
attend the opening ceremony at KAUST. According to al-Hayat
Bureau Chief Ibrahim Hamidi (strictly protect),Asad had
resisted pressure from Syrian FM Muallim, Turkish PM Erdogan,
and Qatari Emir Sheikh al Hamad al Thani to attend the KAUST
ceremony. Erdogan, Hamidi said, had suggested during Asad's
mid-September visit to Istanbul the idea of using the KAUST
event as a venue to hold a Syrian-Saudi-Turkish-Lebanese
meeting on the future of Lebanon. Asad reportedly rejected
this idea because he did not want to be perceived as being
involved, or blamed for interfering, in Lebanon's internal
affairs, commented Hamidi. Asad was instead telling his
advisors he had decided not to attend KAUST opening because
King Abdullah had not yet reciprocated his visit to Saudi
Arabia earlier in the year. Hamidi said Presidential Advisor
for Media and Political Affairs Bouthaina Shabaan had told
journalists Minister for Higher Education, Ghaith Barakat,

would attend the KAUST event.


3. (S/NF) A last-ditch message from Erdogan, however,
convinced the Syrian President to reconsider, Hamidi
maintained. Apparrently, Turkish PM Erdogan pushed Asad to
consider the amount of time, money, and effort King Abdullah
had personally invested in the KAUST project, arguing the
King would view Asad's presence at the opening ceremony as a
significant personal gesture. Asad's presence would not only
heal personal differences between the two Arab leaders, but
it would improve bilateral ties as well as set the stage for
a breakthrough in Lebanon's tense discussions over government
formation, Erdogan reportedly told Asad.

--------------
Asad Focus on Bilateral Ties, Not Lebanon
--------------


4. (S/NF) The Editor-in-Chief of Syria's only
privately-owned daily, Wadah Abd Rabbo (strictly protect),
reported he had heard that Asad's decision to attend had been
a surprise to many SARG officials and reflected the Syrian
President's desire to address long-standing problems in
Syrian-Saudi relations. A decision by Lebanese President
Michel Sleiman to travel the UN General Assembly in New York
made it easier for Asad to contemplate the trip to Saudi
Arabia, as the linkage to Lebanese politics would be less
obvious. Asad reportedly met for two hours with the Saudi
King and discussed a wide range of regional issues including,
but not limited to, government formation in Lebanon. (Note:
Asad also reportedly had a brief, four-minute conversation
with Lebanese PM Siniora, which was limited to an exchange of

DAMASCUS 00000697 002 OF 003


Eid greetings, according to Abd Rabbo.) Hamidi and Abd Rabbo
both insisted Asad's gesture produced a positive reaction
from King Abdullah, who reportedly accepted Asad's invitation
to visit Damascus in the coming days.

--------------
Is the Visit Linked to a Lebanese Government?
--------------


5. (S/NF) Press reports of King Abdullah's pending visit to
Damascus have sparked a flurry of speculation over when such
a visit would occur and whether it would be linked to the
formation of a Lebanese government. Hamidi claims his
sources told him the King's visit would most probably not
occur until after there was a new Lebanese government. Citing
Lebanese media reports, Hamidi said Saudi Minister of
Information and Culture Minister Abdel Aziz Khoja would visit
Lebanon soon. Hamidi said the Asad-Abdullah meeting would
send a strong signal to Lebanese actors to be more flexible;
both March 14 and March 8 would react positively to the
meeting without necessarily involving direct intervention by
either Syrian or Saudi officials, he maintained. Hamidi
reported, however, that Lebanese PM-designate Saad Hariri
would probably not be part of a visit by King Abdullah to
Damascus.


6. (S/NF) By contrast, Abd Rabbo told us (and his newspaper
reported September 27) there would be no linkage between the
King's visit and the formation of a government in Lebanon.
Asad, Abd Rabbo told us, wanted the King's visit to focus on
bilateral relations, of which Lebanon represented only one
part. According to Abd Rabo, the King accepted Asad's
request to focus the King's trip on a broader agenda of
bilateral and regional issues. Abd Rabo also reported that
King Abdullah had agreed with Asad that all Lebanese parties
needed to demonstrate more flexibility in the government
formation negotiations.


7. (S/NF) Comment: Many Syrians, from plugged-in policy
watchers to shopkeepers who closely follow the news, are
reacting positively to President Asad's decision to travel to
Saudi Arabia in an effort to improve bilateral relations. A
random sampling of Embassy contacts credits Asad with
pursuing better relations with Saudi Arabia since the April
2009 Arab Economic Forum in Kuwait. Some sources also
suggest Asad has put aside personal considerations to heal
what many see as an unnatural rift with a country that has
strong cultural, religious, and economic ties to Syria. A
few observers are even arguing that Asad's decision to travel
to Saudi Arabia reflects Turkish influence in addition to
Asad's growing maturity as a leader.


8. (S/NF) Comment continued: What the Asad trip to Saudi
Arabia means for Lebanese-Syrian relations is less clear. We
don't know whether King Abdullah conditioned his visit to
Damascus on the formation of a Lebanese government. We do
know Asad's stated approach to Lebanese politics has thus far
called on the Lebanese parties to achieve an agreement on
their own. We also have heard that Asad refuses to support
or oppose individual candidates for cabinet positions. Asad
may be willing to urge Syria's allies to be more flexible,
but it would uncharacteristic for him to do so without
extracting a price -- perhaps related to the Special Tribunal
for Lebanon and/or for an explicit expression of Hariri's
desire for better relations with Syria. By making a personal
gesture to the Saudi King, Asad appears to be betting that
engaging the Saudis will result in better Saudi-Syrian
bilateral relations without necessarily requiring Syria to
push Hizballah or Michel Aoun to soften their demands. If
King Abdullah made his visit contingent on the formation of a
Lebanese government, the positive buzz resulting from the
Asad-Abdullah meeting may be short-lived. On the other hand,
Asad's desire for better relations with Saudi Arabia and his

DAMASCUS 00000697 003 OF 003


willingness to trust and listen to PM Erdogan may provide
important levers to influence Syria not just on the formation
of a Lebanese government, but also on how Syria deals with
such a government if and when it takes office.
HUNTER