RE-ENGAGING SYRIA: TOWARD A SIX-MONTH PLAN

S E C R E T DAMASCUS 000671

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/FO, ELA, NEA/IZ
NSC FOR SHAPIRO/MCDERMOTT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/10/2029
TAGS: PGOV PREL PMIL IZ SY
SUBJECT: RE-ENGAGING SYRIA: TOWARD A SIX-MONTH PLAN

REF: DAMASCUS 669

Classified By: CDA Chuck Hunter for reasons 1.5 b and d.


1. (S/NF) Summary: March 2010 will mark the end of the
first year of U.S.-Syrian engagement. As reported reftel,
this period poses a series of formidable challenges. Syrian
policies continue to impede government formation in Lebanon,
support foreign fighters going into Iraq, maintain close ties
with Iran, Hizballah, and Hamas, and reject calls from the
IAEA to cooperate. Our engagement efforts have established
relationships that will enable us to discuss these subjects,
but Syrian officials remain less willing to accept their
responsibility in addressing core issues.


2. (S/NF) With the trilateral border assessment
initiative now all but dead, we need a replacement to
demonstrate the ability of both sides to work together
constructively. Beyond our focus on national security
issues, we should be considering how to expand our contacts
in other technical areas in which initial U.S.-Syrian
contacts could lead to more routine interaction. Syrian
interest in judicial and law enforcement reforms, expanding
educational contacts, water management issues, urban
planning, and NGO development provide just a few examples of
areas in which U.S. government and private sector contacts
could dramatically expand our access and influence. We need
to frame these initiatives in broader terms of choices facing
the Syrian regime and the need for concrete Syrian actions on
Lebanon and Iraq for our engagement to continue. We also
need to dangle what the Syrians really want -- relaxation of
sanctions and visits by high ranking officials to expand our
dialogue on core issues -- as a payoff once Syria has
demonstrated its intent to utilize these contacts to build a
more solid foundation. If we can advance these ideas over
the next six months, we may increase our ability to persuade
senior Syrian leaders that their country's interests is
better served by more constructive policies that would bring
even closer U.S.-Syrian ties. End Summary.


3. (S/NF) This cable is the second of a two-part series on
engaging Syria over the next six months. It presents a few
ideas on how to refine and our engagement strategy in the
national security area and other fields. It should be read in
conjunction with an overview of Syrian views of recent events
in the region.

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Engaging Syria: Happy Six-Month Anniversary
--------------


4. (S/NF) September 7 marked the six-month anniversary of
the opening of the Administration's engagement policy by the
visit to Damascus of NEA A/S Jeffrey Feltman and NSC Senior
Director Dan Shapiro. In those six months, as noted in
reftel, we have seen both positive and negative movement by
the SARG. On core issues -- Iran, Hizballah, Hamas, Iraq,
the IAEA, and Lebanon -- the current SARG position has
hardened and poses a variety of challenges. At the same
time, we have seen some progress in the normalization of our
dialogue between capitals and embassies, and we have the
sense Damascus is keen to continue the dialogue.


5. (S/NF) The next six months pose a series of challenges
for managing our relations with Syria. Government formation
in Lebanon, defusing Iraqi-Syrian tensions while getting at
the core issue of foreign fighters, winning Syrian
cooperation for our efforts to promote the Palestinian and
Syrian tracks, and finding a resolution to Syria's lack of
cooperation with the IAEA represent the major tasks that lie
ahead. Our engagement efforts have established relationships
that will enable us to discuss these subjects, but Syrian
officials remain less willing to accept their responsibility
in addressing core issues.

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What is The Objective?
--------------


6. (S/NF) From our vantage, the goal of engagement remains
reaching a point at which the U.S. can constructively frame
what it assesses to be the strategic choices facing the U.S.
and Syria and how those choices bode for U.S.-Syrian
relations. Syrian policymakers certainly do not view
regional issues exclusively through the lens of bilateral
relations with the U.S., but a better understanding of
Washington's vision for better relations, and where positive
choices by both countries could lead, might affect the Syrian
calculus about what it stands to gain and/or lose. In this
context, we would be able to explain to President Asad and
others why continuing Syrian support for foreign fighters
going into Iraq and Syria's interference in Lebanese affairs
would make it politically impossible for the U.S. to continue
engaging Syria unless we saw an end to these activities. It
might also provide an opening to express our hope and
expectation that Syria would support (or at least not oppose)
U.S. efforts to create more favorable conditions for the
resumption of Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations.
Sometime during in this heart-to-heart dialogue, we need to
find a moment to discuss Syria's ongoing problems with the
IAEA as well.

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After the Trilat, Now What?
--------------


7. (S/NF) The trilateral initiative represented an
important stepping stone to establishing a relationship that
would sustain such a conversation. Now that the trilat has
fallen victim to Syria's dispute with Iraq, we need to find a
suitable alternative and persuade the Syrians to go along
with it. Part of the challenge will be to convince the
Syrians the U.S. is not acting in bad faith by proposing
another option for Syria and the U.S. to demonstrate their
ability to cooperate. Syria believes it met this requirement
and the U.S. should deliver on its part of the bargain.
Overcoming this challenge will be difficult, particularly if
Syrian officials perceive other indicators that the U.S. has
weakened its commitment to engagement.


8. (S/NF) One approach might involve an effort to cast the
trilat's unfortunate but unavoidable demise as an opportunity
to develop a plan to navigate the difficult challenges that
will face Syrian-U.S. relations during the next six months.
The trilateral initiative succeeded as a concept not just
because it triggered high-level governmental contacts, but
also because it represented a true effort to expand bilateral
U.S.-Syrian relations in an area in which there had been very
little previous contact. Syrians might be persuaded by the
argument that, in addition to maintaining a dialogue on
priority issues for both sides, the U.S. attaches a high
value to deepening relations in the security realm. While
Syrian receptivity to this idea would probably depend to a
large degree on who was conveying it, they may be willing to
listen if we proposed it as a first step in a six-month trial
that, if successful in the eyes of both sides, would yield
some of the U.S. deliverables (visits, easing of sanctions,
positive rhetoric, and closer bilateral coordination) the
Syrians say they seek. At the end of this six-month period,
the sides could each assess their progress and determine how
to proceed.


9. (S/NF) Post views all of the ideas currently under
discussion in Washington as tenable alternatives, including a
counterterrorism dialogue and consultation on port security.
Indeed, assuming the interagency supports these ideas, we
would suggest that there would be merit in pursuing these
options and others, to include assessments of airport
security, infrastructure security, and eventually, if
conditions ever permit, border security.

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Additional Areas Ripe for Exploration
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10. (S/NF) The next six months offer an opportunity not just
to develop an alternative set of national security-related
discussions with the SARG, but also to expand our contacts in
other technical areas in which initial U.S.-Syrian contacts
could lead to more routine interaction. If we can
demonstrate our interest in expanding bilateral contacts, the
Syrians might view our engagement more favorably. Syrian
efforts to advance judicial and law enforcement
administration, educational reforms, water management issues,
urban planning, and NGO development provide just a few
examples of areas in which U.S. government and private-sector
contacts with Syrian counterparts could dramatically expand
our access and influence. Some of these projects could by
covered by International Visitor, Fullbright, or expert
speaker programs. Others might require more coordination and
funding that could draw at least in part on the FY 2009 $2.5
million ESF allocation for promoting civil society
development and democracy in Syria. A few ideas:

-- Joint study on alternative futures: One method to
underscore the potential benefits of a Syria at peace with
Israel and working constructively with its neighbors is to
commission a study by RAND or another appropriate think tank
that would examine how Syria would fare under different
future scenarios, e.g., the status quo, achieving peace with
Israel, or a regional war involving Syria and Israel. Syrian
participation would be desirable to encourage buy-in.

-- An interagency team to explain sanctions: Recent
announcements regarding an easing of the application of some
U.S. trade sanctions have generated widespread interest in
the business community about pursuing business with U.S.
companies. An interagency team of experts from Commerce,
Treasury, State, and other appropriate agencies could meet
with official Syrian counterparts, business groups, and other
audiences to explain the revised policy guidelines and how
they affect Syrian businesses. Such a group might also
explain other reforms under consideration. This step, like
the previous suggestion, would constitute a tangible response
to President Asad's request for a blueprint for improving the
bilateral relationship. It could also be a logical follow-on
to discussions that may take place during a hoped-for visit
by Vice FM Miqdad to Washington in the coming weeks.

-- Youth education: The Syrian First Lady has established
an umbrella for a number of NGOs that focus on youth
education issues. She and her staff have worked closely with
the Harvard Business School. We might consider proposing the
visit of a team of public- and private-sector experts that
could develop a plan of coordination and action with the
First Lady's organizations and relevant ministries. As a
reciprocal step, the U.S. side might consider inviting the
Syrian First Lady to the U.S. to develop ties to U.S.
organizations and expand potential cooperation.

-- Expanded business-to-business contacts: Building on
previous visiting speaker programs, we believe Syrian
entrepreneurs would respond positively to a visit by a group
of visiting CEOs from high tech and other cutting edge firms
to explain their vision of the future economy and the
opportunities they envision for a developing country like
Syria. Syrian officials and private-sector leaders are
increasingly keen on attracting foreign investment, and such
a visit would allow them to hear firsthand from American
counterparts on how to develop viable strategies to achieve
their objectives. We have also heard a great deal of
interest in organizing a trip for Syrian businessmen to the
U.S. This type of program could expose Syrians to a wide
array of private and government organizations, establish
personal and institutional ties, and stimulate advocacy for
political and economic reforms in Syria.

-- Urban planning exchanges: Our contacts in the President's
urban planning have responded enthusiastically to PD efforts
to organize a special International Visitor trip. They have
not only used their access to help obtain the necessary
government approvals, but have also established a precedent
for other government advisors to participate. They express a
deep desire for access to their American counterparts.
Building upon this desire and their upcoming trip, we could
organize a visit by a U.S. team of experts for consultations
on water and waste management, public transportation, and
urban development planning.

-- Management reform experts: Many Syrian ministries are in
the throes of efforts to streamline their organization and
improve their ability to provide public services. Syrian
businesses, moreover, are struggling to adapt their
organizations to changes in the global economy. A team of
government- and private-sector management experts would
provide welcome expertise at a time when many Syrian
organizations are desperate for outside guidance.

-- Drought and water management expertise: Syria's four-year
drought has caused widespread dislocation and led the SARG to
work with the UN on a $50 million request for international
assistance.

-- Justice system reforms: Syria's justice system suffers
from rampant corruption, insufficient information management
capabilities, and inadequately trained personnel. Supporting
a UN project to improve customer service might pave the way
for more cooperation in the law enforcement field.


11. (S/NF) We recognize this list is far from
comprehensive, and many of the ideas will require refinement.
If we can initiate even a modest effort to engage Syria
organizations in some of these areas, however, our ability to
understand and influence Syrian thinking will increase.
Without a clear signal of approval from their government,
Syrians will react reluctantly at first to our proposals.
But if we persevere and are able to advance a more systematic
approach to bilateral engagement, we can dramatically expand
our base of contacts and slowly coax Syrian counterparts away
from their preferred approach of limiting discussions to a
small group of diplomats and the Syrian President. For
bilateral relations to advance and endure, especially in
times when political contacts are strained, investing in a
more robust approach will increase U.S. access and
potentially its influence.

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Giving Engagement Six More Months
--------------


12. (S/NF) We also fully acknowledged some may see little
utility in seeking to expand our bilateral contacts at a time
when there remain strong doubts whether engaging Syria can
produce concrete results in the first place. Suspending our
engagement or even returning to a policy of confrontation and
isolation are always tempting options in reaction to the
frustrating, stubborn, and sometimes disingenuous tactics of
the Syrian regime. But we would argue that the policy of
isolation ultimately failed because other countries,
including Israel, France, Turkey, the UK, and others, saw
value in engaging Syria as a way to provide alternatives to
Syria's reliance on Iran and to offer positive incentives for
Syria to behave constructively. Walking away from our policy
of engagement after making a substantial investment in
developing a relationship would not advance our goals of
comprehensive peace, an independent Lebanon, and a stable
Iraq. To be sure, engaging Syria provides no guarantee of
success in reaching these goals. But if we are serious about
giving our current policy a chance, we should give fair
consideration to trying it in earnest and make an assessment
after a reasonable period has passed. Convincing the Syrians
will be difficult, but patience and persistence have achieved
modest results since March. March 2010 will mark a year
milestone in our new policy and would represent an
opportunity for us and the Syrians to take stock.

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Emphasize Stronger Bilateral Relations
--------------


13. (S/NF) In the interest of full transparency, we also
need to be sensitive to how our policy would play in Iraq,
Lebanon, and Israel. We defer to our colleagues in Embassies
Baghdad, Beirut and Tel Aviv on reading how U.S. engagement
of Syria will affect our bilateral relations in these
capitals. We recognize our shared concern with these
countries about Syrian-Iranian relations, Syria's support of
Hizballah and Hamas, its interference in Lebanon, and its
continuing tolerance of foreign elements supporting and, in
some cases, committing violence against U.S. and Iraqi
targets. At the same time, if we are to resolve differences
with Syria on these and other issues, we need to take
advantage of the opening created by our engagement policy to
develop a more robust bilateral relationship not defined
simply by these regional problems alone. Showing Syrians
that we also value the pursuit of that more robust bilateral
relationship may increase our leverage in addressing other,
more intractable core issues.
HUNTER