GAUGING SYRIAN VIEWS OF RISING REGIONAL TENSIONS

S E C R E T DAMASCUS 000669

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/FO, ELA, NEA/IZ
NSC FOR SHAPIRO/MCDERMOTT/PHEE/VROOMAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/10/2029
TAGS: PGOV PREL PMIL IZ SY
SUBJECT: GAUGING SYRIAN VIEWS OF RISING REGIONAL TENSIONS

REF: DAMASCUS 456

Classified By: CDA Chuck Hunter for reasons 1.5 b and d.


1. (S/NF) Summary: After briefly showing signs of more
constructive policies towards its neighbors earlier this
summer, Syrians are expressing shock over rising tensions in
the region and perceive "anti-Syrian forces" at work. The
Syrian Government's response has been to harden its position
toward Lebanon, Iraq, and Israel. Asad's recent visit to
Tehran and his hosting of Venezuelan President Chavez evoked
the language of resistance, criticism of Western
interference, and images of Syria's days in isolation. At
the same time, Syrian contacts welcomed recent gestures from
Washington to ease the application of some sanctions and
advance the goals of comprehensive peace, and they hope
U.S.-Syrian relations do not suffer because of regional
trends. They nonetheless perceive mixed signals in
statements by U.S. officials, see a lack of progress toward
rejuvenating the Golan or Palestinian tracks, note the
absence of high-level official visits to Damascus, and wonder
why there has been no visible action on the U.S. promise to
return an ambassador. Syrian officials believe they
demonstrated an intent to participate in the trilateral
border assessment initiative; now, they might insist, it is
Washington that is reneging. End Summary.


2. (S/NF) This cable is the first of a two-part series on
engaging Syria over the next six months that focuses on
assessing Syrian views of recent regional developments and
U.S.-Syrian relations. It should be read in conjunction with
a second cable on developing a six-month engagement plan.

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Syrian Policy Toughens
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3. (S/NF) Only six weeks ago, in late July, most of our
Syrian contacts were upbeat about regional trends. The
government was actively pursuing better relations with Iraq,
and it was engaging Saudi Arabia on the prospects of a new
majority-led government in Lebanon. While the prospects of
renewing negotiations with Israel on the Golan track appeared
dim, Syrians could take some comfort in U.S. efforts to push
Israel to implement a settlement freeze and with Washington's
commitment to achieving comprehensive peace. The month of
August, however, witnessed a series of events that exposed
continuing tensions in Syria's relations with its neighbors.
Syrian officials adopted a defensive posture that did not
acknowledge Syria's role in stirring the problems escalating
in the region.

-- Lebanon: Syrian officials made public statements
recognizing the June 7 election results and expressed a
willingness to work with the Lebanese government. The SARG
then retreated into a huff after Mustaqbal Party leader Saad
Hariri and Saudi King Abdullah decided it would be better to
hold off any visits to Damascus until after the Lebanese
majority formed a government. Signs of Syrian interference
soon followed. On August 5, Syrian VP Shara hosted Lebanese
Tawheed leader Wiam Wahhab, a strong pro-Syrian proxy inside
Lebanon, for a three-hour meeting. Wahhab returned to
Lebanon and leaked to the pro-Syrian daily al-Ahkbar that
Shara had declared Democratic Gathering bloc leader Walid
Jumblatt to be welcome in Syria. Three days earlier,
Jumblatt had announced his departure from the March 14
coalition, effectively undermining Hariri's efforts to form a
government. Syrian officials continued to claim Syria had no
role in internal Lebanese politics, but Saudi envoys stopped
coming to Damascus and Washington officials began hinting at
a Syrian hand behind the delay in government formation.
Syrian frustration flared, with the government-controlled
media unhelpfully suggesting on August 21 that the inability
of Lebanese political players to form a government could
create a security vacuum that might require a return to the
Doha process that had (temporarily) resolved Lebanon's
political crisis in May 2008. Subsequently, Syrian President
Bashar al-Asad continued to insist to a steady stream of
European visitors -- notwithstanding the inferences that
could be drawn from his ambassador to Lebanon's making his
first public appearance after meeting in late August with
former President Lahoud -- that Syria was not interfering in
Lebanon's internal affairs and that the Lebanese "needed
time" to reach a deal "by themselves."

-- Israel: Syria's confrontational position has hardened
considerably since PM Netanyahu's government made clear its
preference for direct negotiations on the Golan without
preconditions. Syrian officials have shared their
frustrations publicly and privately over the Israeli tendency
to ignore the commitments of previous governments on the
Golan. Asad has made clear Syria will not move to direct
negotiations without Israeli agreement to six geographical
references along the June 6, 1967 border. Privately, we have
heard Asad has expressed his doubts that negotiations with
Israel can resume with the current Israeli government.
Publicly, Syrian officials have described Israel as an
"obstacle" to peace. Israel's recent announcement of a
decision to authorize the construction of some 450 units in
the West Bank has prompted Syrian observers to doubt whether
the U.S. can achieve its regional policy goals.

-- Palestinians: Syria's relationships with various
Palestinian factions continue to emphasize balance and the
need for consensus. The SARG hosted a positive visit by
Palestinian Authority (PA) Mahmoud Abbas in early July,
encouraged other Palestinian groups not to protest Abbas's
presence as they had done during previous visits, and
persuaded Hamas Politburo Chief Khaled Meshaal to delay and
moderate a speech in response to PM Netanyahu's elaboration
of controversial conditions upon which Israel would pursue a
two-state solution. The SARG also reportedly encouraged
Fatah delegates from Syria and Lebanon to attend the August
Fatah Congress in Bethlehem, while unsuccessfully lobbying
Hamas to allow delegates from Gaza to attend. Syria has
rejected, however, international calls for Hamas to agree to
Quartet principles calling for recognition of Israel,
acceptance of previous PA peace commitments, and renunciation
of violence.

-- Iraq: Showing signs of progress after PM Maliki's August
18 visit to Damascus, Syrian-Iraqi relations took a nosedive
after the August 19 bombings in Baghdad and subsequent Iraqi
allegations that former Iraqi Baathist regime elements,
acting with Syrian support, were responsible for the attacks.
After Iraq recalled its ambassador "for consultations,"
Syria followed suit but without any "for consultations"
qualifier. President Asad termed the GOI accusations
"immoral" and demanded proof. SARG officials dismissed Iraqi
information regarding foreign fighters and former regime
elements (FREs) in Syria as a subject of past discussions.
Asad is reportedly focused on discrediting the Maliki
government's allegations of SARG involvement in the August 19
attacks. Taking the set-to very personally, Asad would not
mind at all if Maliki lost his job in the January 2010 Iraqi
elections. Meanwhile, Syria continues to support selected FF
networks and defend Iraqi FREs in Syria as "political
exiles." Syrian officials have taken note of Washington's
emphasis on dialogue as a means of resolving the standoff
between Baghdad and Damascus, but they remain suspicious that
Iraq is using the spat to drive a wedge in Syrian-U.S. ties.

-- Lebanese Special Tribunal (STL): Syrian legal experts and
a British law firm have reportedly worked up a long list of
grievances against the UN International Independent
Investigation Commission (UNIIIC) and the STL for review by
the UN Security Council. We understand this report focuses
on allegations based on the testimony of discredited
witnesses claiming Syria's involvement in the assassination
of former Lebanese PM Rafiq Hariri and other Lebanese
officials. FM Muallim has publicly criticized the legitimacy
of the STL's proceedings.

-- Asad visits Tehran and receives Chavez: On the day of the
August 19 bombings in Baghdad, Asad visited Tehran to
congratulate President Ahmedinejad on his electoral victory
and inauguration. In meetings with Grand Ayatollah Khamanei,
Asad criticized Western interference in Iran's political
affairs and reaffirmed the depth of Syrian-Iranian ties.
Most of Asad's remarks, however, were not published in the
Syrian press. Two weeks later, Asad received Venezuelan
President Hugo Chavez in Damascus on September 4 to initial
trade agreements, criticize Israel, and denounce "imperialist
intervention" in the region.

-- Syria continues to ignore the IAEA: Syrian officials
appear to believe they can best manage the IAEA's
dissatisfaction by ignoring Vienna's latest report
documenting their lack of cooperation in resolving questions
about al-Kibar.

-------------- -
Syrians Perceive Mixed Signals From Washington
-------------- -


4. (S/NF) In defense of the SARG's sterner policies, Syrian
contacts expressed shock at the coincidence of ill-fated
developments that have confronted the country with a series
of unexpected challenges. While hopeful Syria's relationship
with Washington will not fall victim to regional events, some
Syrian contacts are suggesting a plot by "anti-Syrian forces"
in the U.S. and elsewhere to undermine rapprochement between
Damascus and Washington. Very much desiring that Washington
continue its engagement policy, some Embassy contacts have
registered concerns about what they perceive as mixed signals
coming from Washington:

-- Statements by the Secretary and other officials: A number
of Embassy contacts commented that the Secretary's remarks on
Syria reported by the Wall Street Journal on August 14
suggested a new tone in U.S. policy. In particular, many
Syrians interpreted the statement that "The U.S. wants Syria
to help secure the Iraqi border, cease meddling in Lebanon,
make peace with Israel, and break with Iran" as a list of
accusations and demands rather than as an invitation to
dialogue. A Department spokesman's erroneous assertion that
a U.S. military delegation discussed Iraqi internal security
during an August 12 meeting in Damascus infuriated the Iraqis
and, despite a correction and clarification the next day,
detracted from our apparent desire to reach agreement quickly
on getting to work on a border assessment.

-- Perception of no movement on U.S. ambassador: Syrian
contacts reacted in a similar manner when Lebanese daily
an-Nahar ran an August 11 article citing a U.S. official as
saying "No ambassador (to Syria) would be named before
September." Though not usually raised in official exchanges,
virtually all of our conversation with Syrians begin with the
question, "So when is the new ambassador arriving?" Some
contacts wonder whether Washington has decided to delay the
selection process to register its displeasure with Syrian
behavior.

-- Perceived lack of movement on the Palestinian and Golan
Tracks: Syrian officials have characterized U.S. policy to
achieve comprehensive peace in positive terms, but they are
sharing their pessimism with European and other visitors over
whether the U.S. will achieve its objectives. Some Syrians
view the recent Israeli decision to authorize construction of
new buildings in Jerusalem as the beginning of the end of
U.S. efforts to achieve a comprehensive peace agreement.

-- Lack of high-level USG contacts: Bashar's July 4 Sky TV
invitation to President Obama revealed what he truly wants
from U.S. engagement: prestige and international recognition
of his legitimacy. Bashar and other Syrian officials have
issued public invitations to CENTCOM Commander General
Petraeus and other senior U.S. officials. A
recently-departed French Embassy colleague confided Syrian FM
Muallim remarked that meaningful U.S.-Syrian engagement could
begin only after the U.S. signaled its seriousness by sending
high-level visitors.

-- Whither the Trilat: Syrian officials believe they
demonstrated an intent to participate in U.S.-proposed
trilateral border assessment initiative, reportedly even
sending members of its team to the border in anticipation of
a suggested August 20 start date before we confirmed the
assessment would be postponed. Despite acknowledging how the
climate has changed in the wake of the August 19 bombings,
the Syrians might now insist that it is Washington that is
reneging on the gambit it broached.

--------------
Comment
--------------


5. (S/NF) September 7 marked the six-month anniversary of
the visit to Damascus by NEA A/S Jeffrey Feltman and NSC
Senior Director Dan Shapiro, the opening of the
Administration's engagement policy with Syria. In those six
months, we have seen both positive and negative movement by
the SARG. On core issues -- Iran, Hizballah, Hamas, Iraq,
the IAEA, and Lebanon -- the SARG position appears to have
hardened. At the same time, we have seen some progress in
the normalization of our dialogue between capitals and
embassies, and we sense Damascus is keen to continue the
dialogue in order to establish ties at higher levels. As
noted in reftel, it will take patience, persistence and focus
to develop a useful dialogue with Syria. We would suggest
that Washington consider the development of six-month plan
that would take us to the end of a full year of engagement
and provide an opportunity to take stock of our policy in
March 2010. Post has developed some preliminary ideas it
will submit septel.
HUNTER