DAMASCUS MORE SINNED AGAINST THAN SINNING IN SPAT

S E C R E T DAMASCUS 000647

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA, NEA/I, IO
NSC FOR SHAPIRO/TALWAR/PHEE/MCDERMOTT
PARIS FOR NOBLES
LONDON FOR LORD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/02/2019
TAGS: PREL PTER UNGA IZ SY
SUBJECT: DAMASCUS MORE SINNED AGAINST THAN SINNING IN SPAT
WITH BAGHDAD, MIQDAD MAINTAINS

REF: A. BAGHDAD 2363

B. DAMASCUS 627

Classified By: CDA Charles Hunter per 1.5 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Syria remains ready to take appropriate
action once presented with "concrete evidence" from Baghdad
that individuals resident in Syria were behind the recent
bombings of the Iraqi Foreign and Finance Ministries, Vice
Foreign Minister Faisal Miqdad told diplomats September 2.
Repeatedly stressing that destabilizing Iraq would contradict
Syria,s commitment to its neighbor's unity, security and
territorial integrity and the duty to support over one
million Iraqi refugees on Syrian soil, Miqdad touted the
SARG's restrained reaction to Iraqi accusations and opined
that "internal factors" were likely driving intemperate
statements by PM al-Maliki and his spokesman (although a role
by "foreign interests" wanting to damage Syrian-Iraqi
relations "could not be ruled out"). Visits in recent days
by the foreign ministers of Iran and Turkey had confirmed
Iraq's insistence on baseless accusations, he said, but not
really mooted any new prospects for reconciliation or
provided data relevant to the specific incident under
discussion.


2. (C) Summary continued: Miqdad's remarks were temperate,
eschewing the charges of "immoral" accusations that President
al-Asad had leveled only two days before. While there may be
greater willingness to let the past week's media duels
subside, however, the briefing showed the SARG's irritation
with Baghdad's handling of "Bloody Wednesday" has not been
salved. Nor has there been any lessening of the SARG's
stubborn insistence that it does not harbor terrorists.
Amidst disingenuous calls for former regime elements in
Damascus to be incorporated into Iraqi politics, and despite
claims of disappointment over lost goodwill, Miqdad held out
little hope that bilateral tensions could be eased by
anything short of an Iraqi retraction or the presentation of
incontrovertible evidence for the SARG to act upon -- the
latter a step we may find ourselves compelled to make in time
as well. End Summary.


3. (SBU) Syrian Vice Foreign Minister Faisal Miqdad convoked
diplomats to the ministry's brand-new building in Kafar
Sousseh on September 2 for three separate briefings for Arab,
American, and European embassies to lay out Syria's version
of events since the August 19 bombing of Iraq's Foreign and
Finance Ministries. Reading from a prepared text, he walked
listeners through a chronology that began with FM Walid
Muallem's condolence call to his Iraqi counterpart
immediately after hearing of the attack, and ended with the
September 1 visit to Damascus of Turkish FM Ahmet Davutoglu.
He then took a few questions before drawing the exchange to a
close.

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SYRIA SURPRISED AT CONTENT AND VEHEMENCE OF IRAQ ACCUSATIONS
-------------- --------------


4. (C) The SARG had "not been expecting," according to
Miqdad, the allegations that individuals residing in Syria
were culprits in a tragedy that claimed so many innocent
lives -- including fellow diplomats, he pointedly noted -- so
soon after hopes had soared that the Syrian-Iraqi
relationship was turning a corner. Syria had welcomed over
two million Iraqi refugees at one point, he asserted, and its
solidarity with Iraq, to which Syrian "hearts and doors"
remained unconditionally open, informed its immediate and
firm condemnation of the August 19 attack. A call to FM
Muallem from Iraqi spokesman Ali Dabbagh a week after the
bombing was when matters veered off course. Demanding that

Syria turn over Mohammed Younis Al-Ahmad and Sattam Farhan,
Dabbagh also informed Muallem that Iraq would go to the
United Nations to request an international tribunal and would
withdraw its recently arrived ambassador from Damascus.
Neither Dabbagh nor FM Zebari, in Muallem's follow-up call
with him, would listen to the Syrian view that such a course
of action would be a regrettable mistake, and that Baghdad
should send a delegation with proof about which to have a
discussion. Zebari had rejoined that Iraq would take its
case to the UN and to the media too, and "minutes later"
Dabbagh issued a statement that the Syrians took as a
political decision to deal a "heavy blow" to the two
countries' ties.

--------------
"SHOW US THE EVIDENCE"
--------------


5. (C) Since then, according to Miqdad, contradictory Iraqi
statements had abounded. Some emphasized internal political
tensions, with the approach of elections, as the catalyst for
the bombings. Others indiscriminately accused neighboring
countries, while still others fingered Al-Qaeda (which itself
had claimed responsibility). Throughout this period, Syria
exercised "self-control," not wanting the situation to
escalate. The lack of any tangible evidence to substantiate
the allegations proved to Miqdad and his compatriots that the
GOI was trying to use these "heinous explosions" simply as an
excuse to demand the hand-over of former regime elements
(FREs) resident in Syria. Maliki himself had lived in
Damascus during Saddam's era, Miqdad observed; then as now
Syria had refused to deliver dissidents back to the regime in
Baghdad knowing that the door was closed to their political
participation. But of course if evidence were produced, the
SARG would take action: any FREs shown to be more than simply
political opponents of the Maliki government "would not be
allowed to stay one second" in Syria. In that case, taking
decisive action would be not just Syria's responsibility but
its obligation in "helping combat terrorism wherever it
occurs."


6. (C) Continuing his rhetorical flourishes, Miqdad
repeatedly asked "what is Syria,s interest" in standing
behind the Baghdad attacks and thereby going against its
"principles and traditions?" Syria, after all, had been "the
first among Arabs" to open an embassy in the Iraqi capital
and exchange ambassadors. It had sent its Prime Minister to
visit Iraq, had signed a strategic agreement with Maliki, and
had encouraged the proposed trilateral military cooperation
to assess border security. But border security was
"impossible without cooperation on both sides of the border."
Despite all this, Syria would continue to work for the
preservation of Iraqi unity, security and territorial
integrity and -- though President al-Asad had said this
should be regarded as a duty and nothing out of the ordinary
-- maintain its support for the million-plus Iraqi refugees
within its borders. Syria's self-control was the best proof
of its intention to preserve good relations, Miqdad said in
conclusion.

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NO CLEAR WAY FORWARD
--------------


7. (C) After the group had sat in (perhaps stunned) silence
for a long moment, Charge ventured a question on whether the
consultations in Baghdad and Damascus by Iranian FM Mottaki
and Turkish FM Davutoglu had helped identify any further
steps to move things beyond the current impasse. Miqdad
replied that the two officials brought word that the Iraqis
insisted that Al-Ahmed and Farhan be turned over, and that an

appeal to the UN Security Council for a tribunal remained a
possibility. Apart from confirming those facts, the visits,
while welcome, had not clarified a way forward. Miqdad cited
as very positive, however, a statement he had seen attributed
a short time earlier to Davutoglu recommending against the
involvement of any international organizations in solving
differences between the parties. Later in the
question-and-answer period, Miqdad allowed that he personally
viewed internal Iraqi politics as the catalyst for the attack
and its aftermath, though a role by "foreign interests"
wanting to damage Syrian-Iraqi relations "could not be ruled
out."


8. (C) The Foreign Ministry later issued a press release
through the official SANA agency recapping the main points of
Miqdad's briefing. The statement's penultimate sentence, in
an apparent reference to the information-sharing reported in
ref A, reads "As for claims of Iraqi officials that they
provided the evidence available to them through the Turkish
Foreign Minister, the Ministry affirmed that the evidence
provided is unrelated to the recent bombings, but was rather
a subject of discussion between Syria and Iraq in the past."
Miqdad may have conveyed this information to Arab
ambassadors, whom he had briefed earlier in the day, but he
did not discuss it with the group in which Charge was
included.

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COMMENT
--------------


9. (S/NF) In the first MFA briefing for diplomats since the
alleged October 26, 2008 Abu Kemal raid, Miqdad's
presentation signaled the SARG's desire to sway international
opinion and perhaps reflected lingering concern that Iraqi
actions might put Syria on the defensive at the upcoming UN
General Assembly. Miqdad's even tone, as he painted his
country as the aggrieved party, betrayed no acknowledgment of
the irony his audience may have sensed listening to a someone
who only days earlier had actively participated in the verbal
jousting between Baghdad and Damascus (though never going as
far in his word choice as Bashar al-Asad's charge of
"immoral" accusations). Syrian officials appear to have
taken the decision to exercise greater self-control in their
public handling of the rift with Iraq over the Baghdad
bombings. The SARG is showing no signs, however, of backing
away from the contention that Syria would not knowingly have
allowed such a grievous act to be prepared or launched from
its territory.


10. (S/NF) Miqdad's narrow focus on Iraq's inability to
present evidence specifically linking FREs or Syria to the
August 19 attacks defines the terms upon which Syria is
seeking to have this debate. The Syrian News Agency's terse
dismissal of information the Iraqis reportedly provided
through the Turks is a strong indicator that Syria seeks to
avoid a broader discussion on the SARG's relations with
foreign fighters and former regime elements. Though we
understand the Turks are working hard to convene an FM-level
meeting between Iraqi, Syrian, and Turkish officials in
Turkey as a first step, we've also heard Syria might seek to
involve the Arab League. Whatever the venue, Miqdad's
briefing held out little hope that bilateral tensions could
be eased by anything short of an Iraqi retraction or the
presentation of incontrovertible evidence upon which the SARG
could act.


11. (S/NF) As we contemplate our own way forward with Syria
on the issue of Iraqi security and foreign fighters, a tough,
honest, evidence-based conversation appears inevitable.
Keeping the discussions out of the public eye and addressing

our concerns with the government's only fully enabled
decision-maker (President Bashar al-Asad) offer the most
direct and effective way to present sensitive information
that contradicts the SARG's public statements and involves
the subterranean activities of the Syrian security services.
Convincing senior SARG officials that better relations with
the U.S. and Iraq offer more benefits for Syria than
continuing to harbor foreign fighters, however, will require
more than solid evidence of destructive Syrian behavior. It
will also necessitate a positive vision that would result
from the SARG's willingness to make the right choice, as well
as a review of the potential consequences that would follow
if Syrian behavior did not change. The present bilateral
dispute between Syria and Iraq may in fact offer the best
opportunity in years for the U.S. to pose a clear choice to
Syrian leaders that they have done everything in their power
to avoid.
HUNTER