Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09DAMASCUS620
2009-08-25 10:03:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Damascus
Cable title:  

SIX MONTH CHECK-UP: KURDS AILING BUT POLITICALLY

Tags:  PGOV PHUM PREL ECON SCUL SENV SOCI SMIG SY TU 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0000
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DE RUEHDM #0620/01 2371003
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 251003Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6760
INFO RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 5832
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0683
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0645
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL PRIORITY 0424
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0062
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 0708
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0689
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L DAMASCUS 000620 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ELA, DRL/NESCA, NEA/PI
LONDON FOR LORD, PARIS FOR NOBLES

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/25/2019
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL ECON SCUL SENV SOCI SMIG SY TU
SUBJECT: SIX MONTH CHECK-UP: KURDS AILING BUT POLITICALLY
MOTIVATED

REF: A. 08 DAMASCUS 00203

B. 08 DAMASCUS 00788

C. DAMASCUS 00343

D. DAMASCUS 00432

Classified By: CDA Charles Hunter for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L DAMASCUS 000620

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ELA, DRL/NESCA, NEA/PI
LONDON FOR LORD, PARIS FOR NOBLES

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/25/2019
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL ECON SCUL SENV SOCI SMIG SY TU
SUBJECT: SIX MONTH CHECK-UP: KURDS AILING BUT POLITICALLY
MOTIVATED

REF: A. 08 DAMASCUS 00203

B. 08 DAMASCUS 00788

C. DAMASCUS 00343

D. DAMASCUS 00432

Classified By: CDA Charles Hunter for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: Drought, unemployment, economic & cultural
discrimination, political repression, arbitrary arrest,
unexplainable deaths, and statelessness contributed to a
miserable first six months of the Kurdish New Year (Nowruz)
in Syria -- making this year, so far, very much like last
year. The one notable difference was that SARG forces did
not kill any Kurds during Nowruz celebrations, as they did in
2008 (ref A). In a lengthy August 24 conversation with Luqman
Osso (strictly protect),a member of the Kurdish Azadi
Party's political leadership, we learned these economic and
political pressures have motivated Kurdish leaders across the
political spectrum to pool their energies into the formation
of a single Kurdish council that would speak with one voice,
both to the regime and to the international community. Osso
reported the council's formation was moving quickly as it was
widely perceived Kurds must take some action to alleviate the
current conditions under which they suffer. End Summary.

--------------
Kurds Seek Political Unity
--------------


2. (C) Luqman Osso, a member of the Kurdish Azadi Party's
political leadership, explained on August 24 how nine Kurdish
political parties had begun a series of meetings aimed at
forming a unified political council. The idea, he said, was
to create a single, unified voice to speak on Kurdish issues.
The formation of such a council had been discussed
informally as far back as 2007, but in May, the parties began
cooperating with a greater sense of urgency. Osso emphasized
the parties had moved forward vigorously and he hoped the

council would officially establish itself by the end of 2009.



3. (C) Osso claimed the first tasks of a political council
would be (1) to shape a Kurdish message on the current
political and economic situation for international
consumption; (2) to do economic studies on the al-Jazeera
region to illustrate the Kurds' plight; (3) to seek to engage
domestic and international interlocutors in aid projects for
the al-Jazeera region; (4) to push back against ongoing SARG
economic discrimination against Kurds, especially Decree 49
(ref B); and (5) to continue planning demonstrations and
other political advocacy projects.


4. (C) One of the stumbling blocks slowing the formation of
the political council, Osso elaborated, was that the Yeketi,
Azadi, and Future Movement parties wished to preserve
individual parties' rights to independent action, which they
did not believe contradicted the principle of speaking with a
single voice. The second problem was that the Kurdish
Progressive Democratic Party in Syria (backbone of the
Kurdish Democratic Alliance),led by Hamid Darwish, and the
Kurdish Democratic Unity Party (an offshoot of the Yeketi
Party),led by Ismael Omar, refused to join the "council of
nine" unless everyone agreed to form concomitantly a separate
"national council" of Kurdish citizens who would support and
advise the political council in a parliamentary-type manner.
Osso argued the political council should first be convened,
after which it could focus on how to develop an attendant
national council. He added the "council of nine" would form
their political council with or without the participation of
Darwish's and Omar's parties.


5. (C) The political parties involved in the "council of
nine" are: (1) the Democratic Party branch led by Hakim Abdul
Bashar and (2) the Democratic Party branch led by Nasradeen
Ibrahim; (3) the Democratic National Party led by Taher
Sfouka; (4) the Equality Party (al-Musawat) led by Aziz
Dawud; (5) the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Party led by Jamal
Sheikh Mahmud; (6) the Azadi Party, led by Khaer Dimarat; (7)

the Yeketi Party, led by Fuad Aliko; (8) the Future Movement
Party, led by Meshaal Tammo (currently in prison, ref C); and
(9) the Leftist Kurdish Party, a Marxist party led by Hamad
Musa.

--------------
Political Plight
--------------


6. (C) Part of the "council of nine's" sense of urgency
stemmed from the tremendous pressure brought to bear, both
politically and economically, against Kurds in the al-Jazeera
region in the last few years, Osso said. Since March 2004,
the Kurdish situation had steadily degenerated to the point
where immediate action was necessary.


7. (U) In the weeks before and after the celebration of the
2009 Kurdish New Year (Nowruz),SARG security elements
harassed, arrested, and in some cases convicted many of the
hundreds of Kurds who participated in political and cultural
events throughout the month of March. In addition to the
March 21 Nowruz celebrations, which resulted in a wave of
arrests across the Aleppo and Hasaka provinces, many Kurds
were detained for public commemorations of the March 12,
2004, "Kurdish Uprising," expressions of Kurdish culture
through music and literature, and for publishing political
material in Kurdish language newspapers. (Note: Three members
of the Azadi Party are currently on trial for publishing
political commentary in an illegal Kurdish language
newspaper.)

--------------
Mysterious "Suicides"
--------------


8. (C) Coupled with the SARG's crackdown has been a spate of
inexplicable "suicides" by young Kurds completing their
obligatory military service. Since 2004, between 18 and 24
Kurdish youth have killed themselves under what Kurdish
contacts and human rights organizations insisted were
mysterious circumstances. According to a May 2009
International War and Peace Reporting article, in 2008 eight
Kurds died in this manner. Through additional reports and
contact meetings, Post has counted eight Kurds who had
already died this year under similar circumstances.

--------------
The Drought
--------------


9. (C) Severe drought throughout the country, especially in
the al-Jazeera region, has devastated the agricultural sector
and increased the already heavy pattern of outmigration from
the region toward cities in the country's western corridor --
mainly, Damascus, Aleppo, Homs, Hama, and Latakia (ref D).
Osso argued SARG policy toward the region in general, but
Kurds in particular, had exacerbated the problem. Only the
increased Kurdish population in urban centers, and the
potential threat its discontent might pose, he asserted, had
produced enough concern to compel the SARG to address the
problem.


10. (C) Osso cited the refusal of the SARG to issue 1,900 new
well-digging permits over the last ten years in and around
the city of Ra's al-Ayn, which abuts Syria's border with
Turkey, as evidence the SARG had deliberately sought to
disenfranchise Kurds in the region. In the area affected,
Osso claimed, over 100,000 Kurds had once lived. Without
water, he said, many of them eventually migrated from the
region. The situation now, he continuted, was even worse.
"Syria should be like Turkey," Osso complained, noting how
the Turkish government granted Turkish Kurds living just
across the border well-digging permits and small subsidies.
These actions allowed Kurds to remain on their land, Osso
argued, and the same should be done for Syrian Kurds.

--------------
Osso's Profile

--------------


11. (C) Luqman Osso is a man without a nation despite having
been born in Qamishli. As one of the 150,000 to 300,000
stateless Kurds living in Syria, he lacks national
identification papers; he is unable to work legally without
yearly requesting a foreigner's work permit; his marriage (to
a Russian) remains unregistered; his three children were
refused citizenship and registered as "foreigners" as well.


12. (C) The crippling economic strain on Syria in the 1980s
was particularly acute in al-Jazeera, so in 1985, Osso left
Qamishli at the age of 24 for Damascus in search of work. In
1991, he gained employment with a commercial company -- the
same one he works for today -- that agreed to pay him under
the table and never pressed him to apply for a work permit.
Only once, in 1997, did security agents force him to apply.
Since then, he remarked wryly, "when the agents come by the
office to ask if there are any foreigners working here, I
say, 'no.'"


13. (C) Comment: An organized council of Kurdish parties able
to speak with one voice might seriously shift the
Arab-Kurdish political landscape in Syria. The Kurds are the
only group in Syria who have time and again proven they can
mobilize the street and stage large-scale demonstrations,
even when the threat of violent reprisal was guaranteed. Two
obstacles, however, will continue to plague efforts to
galvanize a formal political council. First, Kurdish parties
face persistent divisions based on personality and
ideological differences. Second, even if such a council
managed to form, its ability to withstand SARG
countermeasures, given the determination with which the
government attacks opposition figures, would be limited at
best. End Comment.
HUNTER