MUALLIM SUPPORTS TRILATERAL BORDER INITIATIVE,

C O N F I D E N T I A L DAMASCUS 000577

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ELA, NEA/IZ
NSC FOR SHAPIRO/MCDERMOTT/VROOMAN
LONDON FOR LORD, PARIS FOR MILLER/NOBLES

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/12/2019
TAGS: PREL PBTS PINR PTER MARR MCAP MOPS SY IZ
SUBJECT: MUALLIM SUPPORTS TRILATERAL BORDER INITIATIVE,
ASKS FOR DELAY TO HOST AUGUST 18 PM MALIKI VISIT

REF: A. DAMASCUS 574

B. DAMASCUS 426

Classified By: CDA Charles Hunter for Reasons 1.4 b and d.


1. (C) Special Coordinator for Regional Affairs Fred Hof
met FM Muallim August 13 to follow up on the previous day's
meetings between the Centcom-led and Syrian delegations on
the trilateral border security assessment initiative (ref a).
Hof stressed our desire to include the Iraqis in the
assessments and told Muallim we would be urging PM Maliki to
give his approval. The assessments themselves would be
technical in nature, conducted by 6-8 member military teams
led by a lieutenant colonel. Muallim said he supported the
initiative but preferred a trilateral approach. Since the
Iraqis were now openly opposed to U.S.-Syrian-Iraqi border
security cooperation, Muallim asked for more time to discuss
the issue with PM Maliki during his August 18 visit to
Damascus and urged the U.S. also to convince Maliki to
reconsider. End Summary.



2. (C) Special Coordinator Hof told Muallim the previous
day's meetings between the U.S. and Syrian delegations had
gone positively. Washington, he said, would be pleased that
Syria was willing to move forward on the trilateral border
assessment initiative. The U.S. still preferred a trilateral
approach and would be seeking to convince PM Maliki that such
an initiative would promote everyone's interests. He asked
for Muallim's approval to tell Maliki prior to his trip to
Damascus that:

-- the Syrian side posed no objection to the proposed dates
or locations of the assessments and was ready to proceed with
beginning of logistical preparations. Indeed, Muallim
authorized the U.S. to tell the Iraqi side that Syria was
prepared to begin on August 18-19 at Yarubiyeh-Rabiyaha, with
the understanding that a delay of a "few days" might be
needed to accommodate August 18 Syrian-Iraqi discussions in
Damascus.
-- if Maliki still opposed Iraqi participation, we would
urge him to consent to a U.S.-Syrian bilateral assessment on
the Syrian side of the border. Because there were
U.S.-Syrian bilateral issues that hinged on the successful
outcome of the border security assessments, we wanted to move
forward as soon as possible, preferably with a trilateral
format, but bilaterally if Iraq would not agree to the
trilateral proposal.

-- there did not appear from our vantage to be a need to have
another pre-assessment meeting that included the Iraqis. If
the Iraqis agreed to participate, it would possible to bring
them up to operational speed quickly. If they continued to
resist the concept, then Syria and the U.S. would both try to
persuade PM Maliki to assent to their decision to move
forward on a bilateral basis.


3. (C) Muallim replied he had no problem with this message
to Maliki. He agreed the trilateral approach was preferable
and said Syria would present this position during PM Maliki's
August 18 visit to Damascus. Muallim noted he and Secretary
Clinton had discussed undertaking a trilateral initiative in
May; this had also been the term of reference for Senator
Mitchell's most recent discussions with President Asad. PM
Maliki had voiced objection to Iraq's participation in this
undertaking since the very beginning; now Iraq was opposed to
a bilateral U.S.-Syrian joint border assessment.


4. (C) Muallim urged the U.S. to try to convince PM Maliki
that the trilateral initiative served everyone's mutual
interests and to participate. Syria wanted to move forward,
but in the interest of not offending the Iraqis, it would be
better to wait "a few days" beyond the proposed August 18-19
assessment until the SARG had a chance to try persuade PM
Maliki on the merits of trilateral cooperation. Hof agreed
this approach made sense, but reiterated our case would be
more persuasive if we could tell PM Maliki that Syria was
agreeable to the proposed dates. Muallim agreed,
reemphasizing the seriousness of Syria's desire to move

forward with the U.S., and hopefully with Iraq, in
implementing this initiative.


5. (C) Hof took pains to reiterate to Muallim the technical
nature of the undertaking. The U.S. side would consist of
military specialists with expertise in personnel, training,
and equipment matters relevant to border security; the team
would be headed by a lieutenant colonel (muqaddam). Muallim
acknowledged this point and responded positively to Hof,s
observation that the American specialists might learn
something from their Syrian counterparts. Muallim emphasized
that, if the trilateral approach is accepted by Iraq, the
assessment should cover the Iraqi border posts as well as
those on the Syrian side.


6. (C) Comment: President Asad has been personally working
to persuade PM Maliki to visit Damascus to address mutual
frustrations that have prevented bilateral Syrian-Iraqi
relations from progressing. Publicly sensitive to the rise
of attacks on Shia in Iraq and aware of Baghdad's open
opposition to Washington's proposed trilateral initiative,
Muallim's emphasis on finding a way to reassure PM Maliki
makes good sense. At the same time, FM Muallim, who openly
opposed the idea of a trilateral border assessment in May
because of doubts about U.S. intentions, now is enthusiastic
about undertaking the initiative as a means of building
confidence with Washington. Going forward with the
trilateral initiative makes sense only if Baghdad is willing
to participate. Also acceptable (though less desirable)
would be a green light from Baghdad for moving forward on a
bilateral U.S.-Syrian border assessment. It is a good sign
that Muallim is willing to help support our efforts by making
a pitch to PM Maliki to reconsider.


HUNTER