Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09DAMASCUS48
2009-01-14 10:04:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Damascus
Cable title:  

SYRIA SUCCEEDS IN CONVOKING EMERGENCY AL SUMMIT,

Tags:  PGOV PREL SY LE 
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DE RUEHDM #0048/01 0141004
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 141004Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5814
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0515
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 000048 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA, NEA/IPA
NSC FOR ABRAMS
LONDON FOR TSOU, PARIS FOR WALLER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/13/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL SY LE
SUBJECT: SYRIA SUCCEEDS IN CONVOKING EMERGENCY AL SUMMIT,
HOPES TO BROKER BETTER DEAL FOR HAMAS

REF: A. DAMASCUS 32

B. DAMASCUS 42

Classified By: CDA George Novinger, American Embassy Damascus, Reasons
1.4 b and d.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 000048

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA, NEA/IPA
NSC FOR ABRAMS
LONDON FOR TSOU, PARIS FOR WALLER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/13/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL SY LE
SUBJECT: SYRIA SUCCEEDS IN CONVOKING EMERGENCY AL SUMMIT,
HOPES TO BROKER BETTER DEAL FOR HAMAS

REF: A. DAMASCUS 32

B. DAMASCUS 42

Classified By: CDA George Novinger, American Embassy Damascus, Reasons
1.4 b and d.


1. (C) Summary: Media sources in contact with Hamas
representatives in Cairo and with the Syrian MFA told us late
December 13 that "Hamas is done with talks in Cairo." Though
Hamas leaders have not formally rejected further dialogue
with EGIS director Omar Soleiman, today's headline of Syria's
only privately-owned daily "al-Watan" reads, "The Resistance
Rejects Egyptian Surrender and Defies Death." Syria and
Qatar have apparrently succeeded in obtaining the requisite
15-member state quorum to convoke an emergency Arab League
Summit in Doha, now scheduled for January 16. End Summary.


2. (C) Waddah abd al-Rabo (strictly protect),
Editor-in-Chief of Syria's only privately-owned daily
"al-Watan," told us late January 13 that Hamas would not cave
on key demands for an end to the Israeli siege and opening
border crossings as conditions for a renewed cease-fire. Abd
al-Rabo reported he had spoken via telephone several times
during the day with FM Muallim and Hamas leadership in
Damascus about Hamas's decision to reject the Egyptian
proposal. For now, however, Hamas had refrained from making
a public statement to this effect.


3. (C) Al-Rabo told us Syrian President Bashar al-Asad
continued consultations with Turkey and Qatar on two fronts:
(1) introducing Turkish mediation between Israel and Hamas;
and (2) urging Arab countries to support an Arab League
summit in Doha prior to the January 19-20 Arab Economic Forum
in Kuwait. Abd al-Rabo thought it was important that Turkish
PM Advisor Ahmet Davutoglu had returned again to Damascus
January 13 for consultations with the SARG and Hamas. Abd
al-Rabo claimed that he had heard from FM Muallim that 12
Arab countries had notified Arab League Secretary General
Amre Moussa of their willingness to attend, and Bahrain and
Morocco were voicing support but had not sent formal written
notification. (Note: Bahrain and Morocco subsequently
agreed to the emergency summit. The UAE, after an afternoon

January 13 trip by the Emir of Dubai to Damascus, announced
its support for the meeting. At 0945 local, al-Jazeera
reported that the necessary 2/3 quorum had been achieved and
that the emergency AL summit would occur January 16.)


4. (C) Asked what Hamas would need in order to accept the
Egyptian plan, Abd al-Rabo replied that Egypt had "played the
role of Israel's representative rather than an honest
broker." Al Watan journalist Ziad Haidar (strictly protect),
who has been in regular contact with the Hamas delegation in
Cairo, told us that "Soleiman told Hamas, 'the Israeli
government needs to be able to present a victory to the
Knesset before it can stop the fighting.'" Hearing these
words convinced Hamas that the Egyptian Government was acting
in bad faith. Though Hamas agreed to return to Cairo after
consultations in Damascus, "the decision had already been
made to look for another mediator." Hamas did not want to be
blamed for blocking agreement, Haidar added, and would
probably not reject Eygpt's proposal outright.


5. (C) Responding to arguments that Hamas's decision and
Syrian efforts to create alternative diplomatic channels
would only prolong the fighting, Abd al-Rabo said Hamas would
not settle for a ceasefire if it did not come with
recognition of its legitimacy. "Like Israel, Hamas needs
something it can show the Palestinian people," he said. Abd
al-Rabo added that Syria viewed its relationship with Hamas
in very pragmatic terms. "The enemy of my enemy is useful so
long as it doesn't threat me," he explained. "This how the
Syrian government views Iran, Hamas, and Hizballah."


6. (C) Syria, meanwhile, would not be content to allow
Egypt to sell out the Palestinians so that Israel could
perpetuate its control of the occupied territories. "Hamas
and Syria view this as a regional issue and believe Arab
public opinion is on their side," al-Rabo argued. Israel had
blundered by invading and naively believing Hamas "would fold
and disappear." The opposite was happening, Abd al-Rabo
asserted. Even if Israel continued the fighting and killed

DAMASCUS 00000048 002 OF 002


thousands more Hamas loyalists, the Arab world would view
Hamas as standing up to Israel. "All Hamas has do to is
survive. Eventually the Israelis will stop, and when they
do, millions of Arabs will claim Hamas as the victor," he
said. "Yes," he acknowledged, "more Palestinians will die
tragically." But the blame, he continued, "lies with
Israel. No self-respecting Arab accepts Israel's claim that
its destruction of Gaza is justified by intermittent rocket
attacks." He added that, judging by large protests in major
European capitals, many Westerners shared this view.


7. (C) Comment: Syria's primary objectives throughout the
Gaza crisis have been to expand its regional influence at the
expense of Egypt and Saudi Arabia and to assert Hamas's
legitimacy. It is noteworthy that Abd al-Rabo, a media-savvy
Syrian who operates in close coordination with the Syrian
government, freely admits that Syrian diplomacy aims to
exploit regional and world public opinion to counter Israel's
military superiority. We suspect Bashar will work with
Qatar, Algeria, Libya, and others to adopt Hamas's demands
(refs A and B) as the position of Arab leaders attending the
January 16 summit.

NOVINGER