Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09DAMASCUS431
2009-06-22 13:11:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Damascus
Cable title:  

SARG CAUTIOUSLY SUPPORTS AHMEDINEJAD VICTORY IN

Tags:  PREL IR LE IS SY 
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 DAMASCUS 000431 

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ELA, NEA/I
NSC FOR SHAPIRO/MCDERMOTT
PARIS FOR WALLER
LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/21/2029
TAGS: PREL IR LE IS SY
SUBJECT: SARG CAUTIOUSLY SUPPORTS AHMEDINEJAD VICTORY IN
IRANIAN ELECTIONS

REF: DAMASCUS 364

Classified By: CDA Maura Connelly for reasons 1.4 b and d.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 DAMASCUS 000431

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ELA, NEA/I
NSC FOR SHAPIRO/MCDERMOTT
PARIS FOR WALLER
LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/21/2029
TAGS: PREL IR LE IS SY
SUBJECT: SARG CAUTIOUSLY SUPPORTS AHMEDINEJAD VICTORY IN
IRANIAN ELECTIONS

REF: DAMASCUS 364

Classified By: CDA Maura Connelly for reasons 1.4 b and d.


1. (S/NF) The Syrian government (SARG) appeared pleased by
the initial tally of Iranian votes overwhelmingly in favor of
incumbent President Ahmedinejad. President Asad sent a
letter of congratulations to his Iranian counterpart and the
official Syrian press lauded the high voter turnout as a win
for Iranian democracy and Syrian-Iranian relations. After
the beginning of almost a week of large-scale Iranian
protests, however, Syrian officials and press refrained from
public comment through President Asad's June 17-18 trip to
Armenia. Embassy sources suggested Syrian officials were
viewing unrest in Iran in the context of Israeli PM
Netanyahu's June 12 speech. Privately, SARG advisors were
also criticizing Western interference in Iran, a theme which
has become more prominent in the Syrian press since Asad's
return to Damascus. Most of our sources doubted whether
electing Mousavi or Ahmedinejad would make a difference in
reforming the policies of the Iranian regime, but some
suggested the ongoing power struggle might transform into a
popular movement against the Ayatollah. A Sunni business
contact suggested that the protests, taken together with
Hizballah's electoral disappointment in Lebanon, had
momentarily undercut Shia influence in Syria and the region
more broadly. End Summary.


--------------
Initial Reactions Positive
--------------


2. (S/NF) Syrian officials and press reacted positively to
reports that Iranian President Ahmedinejad had garnered 65
percent of some 40 million votes during the June 12 Iranian
Presidential elections. President Asad reportedly sent
Ahmedinejad a June 13 note of congratulations, and
government-owned dailies al-Tishreen, al-Baath, and al-Thawra
hailed the Iranian results as an affirmation of Iranian
democracy and a guarantee that Iran would continue to support
Arab resistance against Israeli occupation of Arab lands.


--------------
Followed by Suspicion of Western Motives
--------------



3. (S/NF) As widespread claims of fraud by Iranian
opposition candidates led by Mir Hussein Mousavi coincided
with week-long public protests in Tehran, Syrian officials
and press remained quiet. SARG advisors and officials,
however, privately expressed deep concern and frustration
over the coverage by Western media (CNN and BBC, in
particular) which they believed to be fomenting unrest and
acting as an instrument of Western interference in Iran's
internal affairs. American scholar Joshua Landis (strictly
protect),an expert on Syria in country for a short stay with
his Syrian (Alawite) wife's family, told us June 21 that
Presidential Media and Political Advisor Bouthaina Shaaban
(also an Alawite) had complained to him that day about "overt
Western interference in Iran's internal affairs." An
agitated Shaaban parroted Khamenei's June 19 sermon to the
Iranian people by arguing it would have been impossible to
forge 11 million Iranian votes. Shaaban questioned what
might have happened had similar demonstrations by the
opposition occurred in Lebanon after the June 7 Parliamentary
elections there. "We would have been denounced for

DAMASCUS 00000431 002 OF 003


interfering," Shaaban reportedly claimed to Landis.


4. (S/NF) Landis assessed that regime officials shared
similar views and that most of the Alawite community stood
solidly behind Ahmedinejad. (Note: The Iranian religious
authorities years ago granted the Alawites status as a sect
of Shia Islam. End Note.) "Nothing is more important for the
Syrian regime than stability, and this (the week's events in
Iran) has threatened stability," Landis said. According to
regime figures with whom he had spoken over the last week,
Landis said there were deep suspicions that Western countries
were actively "fanning the flames" inside Iran in order to
undercut the Iranian regime and Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. The
Syrian government strongly supported Khamenei's use of force
to re-establish control. One unidentified Syrian military
contact, Landis relayed, reportedly said that Syrian
officials "would not have hesitated to rig the elections" or
"to put down" an opposition-led popular uprising.


--------------
Potential Syrian Interests At Stake in Iran
--------------


5. (S/NF) Al-Hayat Bureau Chief Ibrahim Hamidi (strictly
protect) also emphasized the SARG's deep mistrust of Western
motives in criticizing Khamenei's handling of the disputed
election results. Hamidi, who traveled June 17-18 with
President Asad to Armenia, reported that events in Iran "were
on everyone's mind." Several Syrian MFA officials with whom
Ibrahim spoke confided that Mousavi's open challenge to the
Iranian regime could distract Tehran at a time when Israel
was openly "thumbing its nose" at the Arab world, he said.
Though the focus of the trip had little to do with the
Arab-Israeli conflict, Hamidi commented, "most of the Syrian
focus was on how (Israeli PM) Netanyahu's (June 14) speech
had left little hope for real peace negotiations and how
events in Iran might weaken Syria's position."


6. (S/NF) Hamidi added that Syrian officials remained
unworried about U.S.-Iranian relations, but they had
expressed concerns that continued unrest would "distract" the
Iranian regime just as Israel had adopted a more
confrontational posture. Syrian officials were agitated by
BBC and CNN coverage giving undue air-time to the Iranian
opposition and putting pressure on Western leaders to
criticize Iran. Hamidi suggested that Syrian officials were
"not upset" by the U.S. Administration's public reactions,
though Congressional resolutions and "comments by neo-cons"
raised doubts about whether the White House was effectively
managing its message.


--------------
Syrian Sunnis Rooting For Mousavi?
--------------



7. (S/NF) Not all Syrians were upset with the images of
unrest in Tehran, argued Ihsan Sanker (strictly protect),a
former Syrian MP and a prominent Sunni businessman. Sunni
elites in Syria had been very pleased to see Turkish
President Abdullah Gul's successful May 16-18 visit to Syria,
which followed on a "very weak and hasty" May 6 visit to
Damascus by Iranian President Ahmedinejad (reftel.) Sanker
reported he had heard complaints from a wide range of Sunni
friends and contacts that the SARG had become "too close to
Iran," and the Gul visit had helped to establish a

DAMASCUS 00000431 003 OF 003


counterweight to Tehran's influence. Sanker said many
Syrians were "ecstatic" over March 14's victory in Lebanon's
June 7 elections, primarily because "it put Hizballah back in
its box." Sanker suggested that even top Syrian officials
would have been "uncomfortable" with a strong March 8 showing
because it would have diminished Syria's influence in its
relations with Hizballah and Iran.


8. (S/NF) The large protests in Iran against flawed
elections, Sanker continued, had the potential to transform
into a popular movement against the Ayatollah. "Many Syrian
Sunnis see a reduction of Iran's influence in Syria and the
region as a positive," he argued, "because Iran doesn't want
Syria to pursue peace with Israel." From a business vantage,
Sanker surmised, "the most positive thing Bashar could do to
help the economy would be to sign a peace deal with Israel."
The Israeli Government, he added, "was stupid" for not
recognizing the opportunity to engage Syria at a time when
Iran was torn by internal divisions. "All Arab governments
are now in a defensive posture after Bibi's (June 14)
speech," he insisted. Sanker warned that Israeli's posture
could help Khamenei "turn the tables" by isolating Mousavi
and other opposition figures and by portraying them as
villains disloyal to the Iranian revolution.


--------------
Syria Media Breaks Silence
--------------



9. (S/NF) After a week of virtual public silence, Syria's
government-owned press has begun to decry foreign
interference in Iran and to question the motives of Western
countries criticizing the Iranian regime. "Al-Thawra" ran a
June 21 op-ed decrying Western interference in Iranian
affairs and pointed to (along the same lines as Bouthaina
Shaaban did with Josh Landis) the lack of any apparent
Western concerns about vote buying in Lebanon. In an rare
Syria media event, privately owned TV station al-Dunya
interviewed Sayyid Mojtaba al-Hosseini (identified as
"Khamenei's representative to Syria") on June 20. Hosseini
decried the role of Western media and officials who were
exerting pressure on Iran "behind the scenes."


10. (S/NF) Comment: While it is difficult to tell with
confidence how President Asad and his close circle of
advisors are viewing events in Tehran, we judge their main
priority will be to ensure continued Iranian military support
of Syria and Hizballah. Lacking any near-term indicators the
Israelis will be ready to resume peace talks on acceptable
terms (i.e., an Israeli commitment to withdraw to the June 4,
1967 borders and return the Golan),the SARG will almost
certainly seek to protect its strategic life line to Tehran
by publicly defending Iran's elections and the government's
efforts to restore order and by denouncing Western criticism
of the Iranian regime. We also expect Syria to leverage its
improved relations with Saudi Arabia and Lebanon to push a
defiant Arab response to Netanyahu's June 14 speech.
CONNELLY