Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09DAMASCUS426
2009-06-21 13:37:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Damascus
Cable title:  

BORDER SECURITY: U.S. DELEGATION TAKES FIRST STEP

Tags:  PREL PBTS PINR PTER MARR MCAP MOPS IZ SY 
pdf how-to read a cable
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DE RUEHDM #0426/01 1721337
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 211337Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6492
INFO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 7630
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 5796
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 1101
RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY 5174
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0600
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0569
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L DAMASCUS 000426 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ELA
LONDON FOR TSOU, PARIS FOR WALLER
NSC FOR MCDERMOTT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/21/2019
TAGS: PREL PBTS PINR PTER MARR MCAP MOPS IZ SY
SUBJECT: BORDER SECURITY: U.S. DELEGATION TAKES FIRST STEP
WITH SARG

REF: DAMASCUS 00196

Classified By: CDA Maura Connelly for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L DAMASCUS 000426

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ELA
LONDON FOR TSOU, PARIS FOR WALLER
NSC FOR MCDERMOTT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/21/2019
TAGS: PREL PBTS PINR PTER MARR MCAP MOPS IZ SY
SUBJECT: BORDER SECURITY: U.S. DELEGATION TAKES FIRST STEP
WITH SARG

REF: DAMASCUS 00196

Classified By: CDA Maura Connelly for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: In a one-hour meeting between the U.S. and
Syrian Arab Republic Government (SARG) delegations on June
12, both sides focused on border security and their
respective efforts to stem the flow of foreign fighters
crossing the Syrian-Iraqi border. Both sides concurred a
secure and stable Iraq was in their mutual interests and
essential for increased regional economic development and
prosperity. The U.S. side proposed to assist Syria with
enhancing border security and emphasized that working
together in a regional, collaborative framework could produce
long-term security and economic benefits for all countries
involved. The specific mechanism would be a joint assessment
(once Iraqi agreement was received) of several Syria-Iraq
border crossing points to evaluate possible areas of
cooperation. The SARG welcomed the U.S. interest in regional
security, pointed out that it had long been involved in the
fight against terrorism, had already improved its border
security, and was currently working with the Government of
Iraq (GOI) to intensify the level of security cooperation.
The SARG side promised to convey the U.S. proposal for a
joint assessment and potential cooperation to its political
leadership for review. END SUMMARY.

--------------
SARG BORDER SECURITY MEASURES
--------------


2. (C) After welcoming the U.S. delegation and expressing
his desire for the meeting to be "fruitful and in the best
interest of both parties," Deputy Foreign Minister Ahmad
Arnous (DFM),the only person who spoke for the SARG side
(composed of seven military officers and Arnous),reviewed
Syria's current efforts to combat terrorism and control its
borders. First and foremost, the DFM reported, the SARG had

mobilized between six and seven thousand troops, including
border guards, along Syria's 640 kilometer border with Iraq,
in what he described as very difficult terrain conditions.
He maintained these forces had been removed from other areas
where there was a greater need, and that their presence along
the border demanded support from "a large portion of other
forces." He also noted the financial burden such operations
represented for Syria and listed key SARG actions at exerting
greater control of its borders.


3. (C) Along various parts of the border, the DFM explained,
the SARG had (1) erected and repaired three-meter high
barriers; (2) maintained and repaired barbed-wire fencing,
which was frequently cut by smugglers; (3) paved roads along
the border; (4) increased the number of border security posts
to 557, with a distance between each of one to three
kilometers; (5) assigned between eight to 10 guards at each
post in order to prevent "infiltration from Iraq;" (6) sent
regular patrols along the border to apprehend infiltrators;
and (7) instituted more rigorous airport checks and
investigations of arrivals. The DFM argued Syria, despite
lacking the proper technical equipment, was doing its best.

--------------
STABILITY IN IRAQ
--------------


4. (C) "Syria is fundamentally concerned about stability in
Iraq, in regional stability," the DFM affirmed. Alluding to
on-going SARG-GOI security undertakings within the framework
of a Joint Security Committee (ref A),he said the SARG had
appointed liaison officers to cooperate with their Iraqi
counterparts on border security. "Our information shows," he
elaborated, "the cooperation is not optimal" because the
Iraqis were sometimes slow to react to information shared by

the Syrians.


5. (C) Overall Syrian-Iraqi relations, the DFM said, had
improved greatly. FM Muallim's March visit to Baghdad had
enhanced cooperation between the two countries and resulted
in new agreements between their respective Ministries of the
Interior.

-------------- --------------
U.S. DELEGATION OFFERS STEPS TOWARD GREATER COOPERATION
-------------- --------------


6. (C) Major General Allardice, CENTCOM J5, thanked the DFM
for his hospitality, acknowledged Syria's work in managing
its borders, and described the U.S. delegation's mission as
being part of a new direction in U.S.-Syria relations in
keeping with the substance and tenor of President Obama's
June 4 Cairo speech. Regional security and economic
opportunity, he added, were also integral to the dialogue on
establishing stronger border controls. "We see stability in
Iraq as essential to economic opportunity in this region, and
this is in both our interests."


7. (C) Maj Gen Allardice noted the U.S. wanted to enhance
regional stability, but recognized any lasting achievements
in this area necessitated working regionally at an
operational level and addressing border issues. After
explaining the functional and complimentary roles of CENTCOM
and MNF-I, and how the U.S. shared with Syria a desire to
repress violent extremist elements, Maj Gen Allardice stated
the U.S. could potentially assist Syria on some of its "key
vulnerabilities, especially those issues that would help stem
the flow of extremists." He maintained extremists targeted
Iraq from bases in Syria, and so destroying their operations
represented a mutual U.S.-Syrian interest. "While a great
deal has been accomplished," the Maj Gen confirmed, referring
to the DFM's earlier comments on SARG border security
achievements, "there is still much to do."

--------------
COOPERATION ON FOREIGN FIGHTERS
--------------


8. (C) Stanching the flow of foreign fighters (FF) from
Syria into Iraq was a difficult objective, Maj Gen Allardice
admitted, but it could be achieved by (1) bolstering regional
security in a broader context; (2) enhancing internal
stability in Iraq; (3) mitigating potential threats; and (4)
preventing spillover of extremists from one area of operation
to another. The Maj Gen explained there was consensus in

most Arab capitals on the importance of halting the flow of
FFs. He emphasized collaboration in areas of mutual
interest, including stability and security for Iraq and the
region, presented one opportunity to foster broader USG-SARG
security cooperation.


9. (C) Major General Allardice continued, "General Petraeus
has received informal invitations from President al-Asad to
visit . . . we hope that today's meeting will lay the
foundation for such a meeting." A positive "foundation," the
Maj Gen proposed to the SARG delegation, would be if this
(the June 12) meeting could produce a tacit agreement on the
need for a "joint technical assessment" of a small number of
border crossings. The Maj Gen expressed his delegation's
hope for a discussion of the proposal and that the two
delegations could form a "working group" for continuing the
dialogue into subsequent meetings.

--------------
MNF-I EFFORTS IN IRAQ
--------------


10. (C) To put into context the U.S. position on future

border security cooperation, Major General Swan, Chief of
Staff for MNF-I, provided the SARG side with a "progress
report on Iraq." Overall, he said, security in Iraq had
improved over the last year and violent actions by al-Qaida
in Iraq (AQI) and other Sunni extremists had decreased,
though there remained a concern about a recent "tactical
surge" in attacks and a resurgence of militant Sunni
nationalists. Still, the Maj Gen continued, "we are
encouraged, especially regarding AQI." He argued leadership
attrition and the disruption of extremists' financial
networks continued to succeed. In the main regions of AQI
operations -- Ninewah, Baghdad, and Diyala -- the number of
attacks were down. "We've had similar success in south and
central Iraq against Iranian-backed Shi'a groups; we see them
as less capable of destabilizing the country," he said.


11. (C) The present concern, Maj Gen Swan continued, was
that AQI would attempt to increase the FF flow into areas
where MNF-I was succeeding. At present, the Maj Gen noted,
the FF flow had decreased from 50-60 FFs a month to between
six and ten. In the last ten weeks, however, there had been a
spate of high profile attacks in Iraq and this greatly
concerned General Odierno and Prime Minister Maliki. The Maj
Gen expressed appreciation for the SARG delegation's report
on their border-control measures and affirmed the USG's
willingness to work with Iraqis and Syrians to stop the FF
flow permanently. In terms of the U.S. partnership with
Iraq, Maj Gen Swan described how the U.S. had (1) spent $200
million on infrastructure and new roads along the border; (2)
assisted Iraqi border forces in building an additional
brigade along the western border, bringing the total number
of brigades to 14; (3) assisted with technology improvements
at border crossings; and (4) established a partnership
between Iraqi border forces and the Department of Homeland
Security.

--------------
Towards Security Cooperation
--------------


12. (C) In response to Maj Gens Allardice's and Swan's
overviews and proposals of working in tandem on areas of
mutual interest, DFM Arnous stressed the SARG's disquiet over
security in Syria, Iraq, and the region. "Any threat affects
Syrian interests. For this reason we are doing our best" in
combating such threats, he said, agreeing with Maj Gen Swan's
point that the U.S. and SARG had overlapping interests on
this topic. The DFM was quick to note, however, that the
SARG could not "consider this meeting as the beginning of new
security cooperation." At the current stage, the Syrian
delegation could only report the proceedings to its political
leadership for review.


13. (C) In a general sense, the Syrians were already
invested in security cooperation, Arnous continued. The SARG
had joined a number of international agreements against
terrorism and at the beginning of the war in Iraq it had
provided the USG with important intelligence. "However," the
DFM complained wryly, "the previous administration did not
take note of that (sharing of intelligence) and took notice
only of its own interests."

--------------
"PEACE IS OUR FOCUS"
--------------


14. (C) "Peace is also our focus, which is why we look
forward to future cooperation," the DFM said. He affirmed
Syria's long-time opposition to al-Qaeda -- "you know we are
opposed to it" -- and argued Syria had suffered greatly from
terrorist attacks since the 1980s, often originating in safe
havens created by other countries. This had been a
long-standing concern, the DFM pointed out, noting President


Hafez al-Asad's proposal in the 1980s to convene an
international conference on terrorism. Concerning
infiltrators crossing Syria's border into Iraq, the DFM
argued both countries had a responsibility to exert control.
Syria, he said, had taken all the necessary steps on its side
of the border and quoted Maj Gen Swan's figures on the
decreased FF flow into Iraq as evidence of Syrian
achievements. The DFM also concurred with Maj Gen
Allardice's earlier statement that peace was conducive to
prosperity, but reasoned regional security needed to be
pursued in the framework of the Arab League. The DFM then
reiterated the idea that future meetings between the two
delegations would be submitted to the political leadership,
as would General Petraeus's "willingness to come to Syria."

--------------
LET'S LOOK FORWARD, NOT BACK
--------------


15. (C) Major General Allardice expressed his understanding
that Syria and the U.S. were not "beginning" cooperation
since it had been there, at some level, in the past, as the
DFM had noted. With regard to the previous administration,
though, the Maj Gen suggested the two sides look forward, not
backward, for new opportunities presented by a new
administration. He added it was in the spirit of President
Obama's Cairo speech that the U.S. delegation had come to
Damascus looking for a new relationship.

--------------
BORDER ISSUES ARE COMPLEX
--------------


16. (C) The Maj Gen recognized Syria's attention to border
security issues, adding that the complexity inherent in such
operations necessitated great expertise and cooperation to
ensure success. Returning to his earlier proposal to conduct
trilateral assessments and evaluating them, the Maj Gen
suggested the U.S. and Syria would be better positioned to
stop the FF flow if there were exchanges in "understandings
and situation assessments."


17. (C) Picking up on the DFM's argument that Syria had
suffered from terrorism, Maj Gen Allardice stated al-Qaeda
had inflicted more damage and pain on the Arab world than
anywhere else. He asserted the elusiveness of violent
extremists required pressure against the "whole network"
simultaneously. Without coordinated action and the
simultaneity of pressure, terrorists would simply move from
one place to another. Progress on this front, the Maj Gen
offered, would require the mutual efforts of many nations.
Not just to stop groups like al-Qaeda, he said, but also to
understand how their networks operated.

--------------
COOPERATION REQUIRES POLITICAL UMBRELLA
--------------


18. (C) The DFM remarked "mutual cooperation" was not one
sided and, echoing a talking point that had come up in
previous meetings between U.S. and SARG officials (ref A),
stated such cooperation would require a political "umbrella"
covering a range of other issues." Maj Gen Allardice then
asked, "Do you believe we can reach an agreement on doing a
border assessment?" The DFM, speaking in English for the
first time since the meeting had begun, responded by asking
the General whether he meant "bilaterally or trilaterally?"
Maj Gen Allardice said the U.S. would certainly consult the
Iraqis on the issue in the interest of existing relations,
and observed the border was clearly a Syria-Iraq issue which
should be addressed trilaterally.

--------------

U.S. PRESSES IDEA OF ASSISTANCE ON FFs
--------------


19. (C) Major General Swan reminded the DFM of President
Obama's announcement of a responsible draw-down of U.S.
forces in Iraq. "It's important that as U.S. forces
draw-down, al-Qaeda not be allowed to re-grow in Iraq -- AQI
was not only a potential threat to the GOI, but also to
Syria." He suggested the Iraqis might be willing to
cooperate (and he was prepared to ask) on a border assessment
project focused exclusively on a few crossing points, not the
whole border. He offered MNF-I assistance in working with
the SARG and GOI on determining specific points for
examination, after which "we can report back to this group
and take the next step to review (the border) more broadly."


20. (C) "We are doing our best to control the whole border,"
the DFM responded. Without directly addressing the proposed
border assessment idea, he continued by saying, "We consider
this meeting a place for all sides to express ideas." Maj
Gen Allardice, seeking to clarify the Syrian position, asked
if it were fair to say there was general agreement a next
step was necessary, one that could include putting the idea
of a "border assessment" into the framework of a joint border
assessment project that ultimately report its findings back
to "this body." The DFM demurred, saying he would report the
proposal to the political leadership "if that's what you
want."


21. (C) Major General Allardice moved the discussion back to
a more general position of appreciation for some of the
SARG's accomplishments in halting the FF flow from Syria to
Iraq. For the draw-down of U.S. troops to be successful, he
said, close cooperation would be key. The DFM replied, Syria
and Iraq were already in cooperation, and their relationship
would only intensify as the U.S. withdrew its forces.


22. (C) Brigadier General Legere, MNF-I CJ2, offered closer
collaboration with the SARG on terrorist threat financing.
In targeting the financial networks, she stated, we can
attack terrorists on multiple fronts, "from transit, to
facilitators, to fighters." She described financial networks
as one of the substantive arenas in which the USG and GOI had
begun working on together. The USG, she continued, had
expanded the GOI's comprehension of how these networks
operated. The Brig Gen suggested increased cooperation
between Syrian and the U.S. would permit a discussion about
how best to exchange information on terrorist threat
financing.


23. (C) The DFM remarked somewhat obliquely that any talk of
cooperation "would cover all these areas." He then pointedly
remarked, "As I have stressed, we take all necessary measures
to combat terrorism."


24. (C) Major General Allardice thanked the DFM for agreeing
to the meeting, noting the discussion had been very positive.
He hoped the topics discussed would serve as a springboard
for further cooperation. The DFM concurred, adding the two
countries would need to cooperate to achieve "development and
prosperity," and further acceded to the need for more
meetings, though without specifying on what they should focus.

--------------
PARTICIPATION
--------------


25. (C) The U.S. delegation:
Major General Robert Allardice, Director CCJ5
Major General Guy Swan, C3, Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I)
Charge d'Affaires Maura Connelly, Embassy Damascus
Mr. Colin Hackett Kahl, DoD DASD for Middle East
Brigadier General Mary Legere, C2, MNF-I,


Mr. Michael Corbin, Pol-Mil Counselor, Embassy Baghdad
Ms. Gina Abercrombie-Winstanley, Deputy Coordinator, S/CT
Colonel Phillip N. Maxwell, Chief, CCJ5-SC
Ms. Melissa Dalton, OSD-P, Syria Country Director

Anthony Deaton, notetaker
Oumayma Bahloul, translator for U.S. side

--------------

The SARG delegation:
Deputy Foreign Minister Ahmad Arnous
General Jawdat Shaabo, Deputy Chief of the Operations Unit,
Army
General Ghassan al-Sheikh, Director of Planning Department,
Army
General Yahya Taher, Chief of Border Forces
Brigadier General Sayez Saqr, Office of the Ministry of
Defense (MoD)
Brigadier General Amin Sharaby, MoD, Syrian Military
Intelligence (SMI)
Brigadier General Abdul Salaam Dagestani, MoD, SMI
Colonel Munir Sulaydy, Chief of Combating Terrorism Unit, SMI

Two translators for SARG side, including Captain Mustafa.


26. (U) Maj Gen Allardice, Maj Gen Swan, Brig Gen Legere, and
Col Maxwell did not have an opportunity to clear this report.
CONNELLY