HAMAS WARY OF, BUT PARTICIPATING IN, CAIRO TALKS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DAMASCUS 000042

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA, NEA/IPA
NSC FOR ABRAMS
LONDON FOR TSOU, PARIS FOR WALLER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2018
TAGS: PREL KPAL KWBG PTER IS SY
SUBJECT: HAMAS WARY OF, BUT PARTICIPATING IN, CAIRO TALKS
ON GAZA

REF: A. DAMASCUS24

B. DAMASCUS 31

C. DAMASCUS 32

Classified By: A/DCM George Novinger, American Embassy Damascus, Reason
s 1.4 b and d.


1. (C) Summary: Hamas Politburo Chief Khaled Mesha'al
delivered a regionally televised harangue late January 10
criticizing the international community's response to Gaza,
calling on Israel to cease hostilities, withdraw its forces,
and lift the siege, and dismissing the possibility of a
"permanent" cease-fire. Some observers in Damascus were
quick to conclude Mesha'al had rejected Egyptian-brokered
talks mentioned in UNSCR 1860, while others pointed to the
arrival of a Hamas delegation in Cairo on January 10 as a
sign that Mesha'al was setting parameters for a future
agreement without rejecting anything. The Egyptian Embassy
here noted discussions in Cairo had thus far struck a cordial
tone, and a source told us EGIS chief Omar Soleiman was
intent on addressing Israeli concerns about arms smuggling.
French President Sarkozy, meanwhile, planned to travel to
Cairo as soon as a ceasefire was at hand, according to a
French non-paper passed to the Egyptian Embassy in Paris.
Though France's notional timetable for the trip has slipped,
the French have proposed that a ceasefire be followed by an
international conference in Paris to negotiate the details.
End Summary.

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Mesha'al Responds to UNSCR 1860
--------------


2. (SBU) Local Syrian TV aired a taped version of
Mesha'al's January 10 speech at 2145 local and that was
replayed on regional cable stations. The speech praised the
resistance of Gazans and heckled Israel for having failed to
achieve its aim of wiping out or weakening Hamas and for
having lost international support, increasing Palestinian
resistance, and "shortening the life of your state."
Regarding UNSCR 1860, Mesha'al commented this resolution
could have been passed with U.S. support "a week ago," but
"they wanted to give (Israel) more time to get rid of the
resistance." The absence of Chapter VII provisions suggested
it was "not meant to be implemented." Mesha'al argued Israel
alone bore the burden of implementation and demanded it cease
"aggression," withdraw its troops, end the siege, and open
all crossing points, beginning with Rafah. "We deal with an
open mind on the basis of these fair demands, which are not
subject to compromise," he said. "Once these issues are
determined, we can discuss the truce."


3. (SBU) Mesha'al added other demands to a potential
agreement. First, he said, the truce would "always be
temporary. We will not exchange resistance for food and
relief." Second, Hamas would not accept international
forces. "If imposed upon us, they will be treated as
occupation forces." Third, Hamas rejected any restrictions
on "importing weapons as long as the occupation and
aggression continues." Fourth, he noted, Hamas had sent a
delegation to Cairo. Mesha'al then called on PA President
Mahmoud Abbas to review the 2005 Rafah agreement, release
Hamas prisoners in the West Bank, lift restrictions on
demonstrations in the West Bank, and "not only suspend, but
end" security cooperation and negotiations with Israel.
Mesha'al repeated his call for a third intifada, an Arab
League summit, and continued resistance.

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Local Observers Put Hamas Views in Context
--------------


4. (C) Diplomats and other observers in Damascus were
divided on whether Mesha'al's speech signified the rejection
of UNSCR 1860 and Egyptian mediation. The Norwegian
Ambassador confirmed January 11 that Norway understood
Hamas's four conditions, as outlined by
Mesha,al, to be the group's current position, with the
proviso that Israel must meet its side of a cease-fire deal
before Hamas stops sending rockets into Israel. Hamas also
viewed a renewed Egyptian reconciliation effort with almost

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no enthusiasm and wanted more Arab parties involved,
including Egypt and Saudi Arabia from among the "moderates"
as well as Syria, Qatar, Algeria, and Sudan from among those
countries friendly to Hamas. Hamas did not appear to mind a
Turkish role but was currently focused on an Arab line-up.
Although Hamas believed Abu Mazen's term ended on January 9,
they were not making an issue of rejecting Abu Mazen publicly
right now; they would deal with him during this crisis.
(Note: The Norwegians did not say it directly, but we
understood them as being prepared to deal now with Abu Mazen
as the head of Fatah, not the Palestinian Authority).


5. (C) The Jordanian Ambassador here voiced deep suspicion
of Mesha'al, observing that Hamas, as an offshoot of Muslim
Brotherhood international, took some of its instruction from
the "guidance office" (maktab al-irshad) in Cairo. He argued
the Egyptian Government remained very concerned about what
the MB was telling Hamas to do because the GOE believed the
MB wanted eventually to use Hamas as a political weapon
against Mubarak. He also suggested that in addition to
Iranian financial inducements and Syrian moral support, Hamas
was receiving guidance from the MB continue firing the
rockets and reject a cease-fire. In that sense, Mesha'al and
company were sacrificing Palestinian lives for the MB
international agenda, he said.


6. (C) By comparison, an Egyptian Embassy contact told us
January 11 that Mesha'al's speech primarily sought to boost
morale in Gaza. Mesha'al's demands for a cease-fire did not
reject any proposals outright. The five Hamas
representatives (two from Damascus and three from Gaza) in
Cairo engaged in "cordial" talks with EGIS Director Omar
Sulayman, in stark contrast to the shouting match that had
occurred between Hamas and EGIS reps a week earlier. EGIS
Director Omar Soleiman was committed to responding to Israeli
concerns about combatting weapons smuggling, our contact
reported. The Egyptian Embassy here believed UNSCR 1860
underscored the importance of Egypt's mediation role despite
Syrian, Iranian, and other countries' attempts to sabotage
Egypt's regional image. Even the Egyptian Embassy's Syrian
contacts were now acknowledging Egypt's unavoidable central
role, our contact reported. "They know the bulk of Gaza's
food, medicine, and weapons come through Egypt. They were
stupid to try to marginalize us."

--------------
What are the French Up to Now?
--------------


7. (C) Our Egyptian contact was cautiously optimistic that
Egyptian mediation, in concert with continuing French
involvement, would ultimately convince Israel and Hamas to
agree on a ceasefire. According to the Egyptians here, the
Egyptian Embassy in Paris had received a non-paper from the
Lysee working out a timeline for diplomatic activity: (1) By
January 11, Egypt and Israel would agree on measures to
interdict weapons smuggling and strengthen border security,
including the possibly of "technical training" by the Germans
on the Egyptian side of the border; (2) On the basis of its
agreement with Egypt, Israel would announce a cessation to
hostilities and open its crossings into Gaza for goods and
fuel and Egypt would open the Rafah crossing with EU monitors
in Gaza on/about January 13, after which Hamas would announce
its cessation of rocket attacks; (3) Sarkozy and German
Chancellor Merkel would travel to Cairo and announce plans
for further discussions to resolve remaining issues at an
international conference that would convene in Paris 10 days
later. The agenda would include "everything," including
reopening crossings, ending weapons smuggling and rocket
attacks, and resuming talks on Palestinian reconciliation.
Participants would be likely to include Israel, Egypt,
France, Russia, the U.S., Turkey, Syria, Qatar, the UK,
Germany, and informal representation of Hamas.


8. (C) With Israel's ground campaign continuing, the
Egyptian diplomat thought the timeline would slip, possibly
another five-to-seven days. He remained encouraged by
Hamas's continuing presence in Cairo but had not received a
detailed readout of the groups meetings with EGIS. Much
would depend on decisions made by the GOI on whether to
extend the fighting or move toward a ceasefire, he suggested.

DAMASCUS 00000042 003 OF 003


France continued to push Syria to use its influence with
Hamas, and Egypt was expecting Amos Gilad to return January
12 for continued talks on border security. Egyptian
mediation may be a "weak reed" for reconciling Hamas's desire
for political survival and Israel's desire for a decisive
military victory, he explained, "but right now, we're the
best and only option there is. Neither Hamas nor Syria can
ignore this."


9. (C) Comment: Several factors may help to explain the
contrast between Mesha'al's defiant rhetoric and his
willingness to continue discussions in Cairo. Externally,
Mesha'al is receiving advice from Iran, Qatar, Egypt,
Algeria, Sudan and Syria and may be trying to strike a
balance that keeps all doors open. Inside Hamas, we are
hearing the group's Damascus-based leadership is increasingly
sensitive to suffering in Gaza and wants to avoid being
blamed for blocking an agreement that would bring relief. At
the same time, Hamas craves regional and Western acceptance
as a legitimate, democratically-elected representative of the
Palestinian people. The absence of any mention of Hamas in
UNSCR 1860 could not have escaped the attention of Hamas
leaders, who are loathe to be excluded as recognized players
and would be likely to support Mesha'al's fiery rhetoric. Of
all of Mesha'al's conditions and demands, the rejection of a
"permanent ceasefire" seems the most important because
accepting such a formula might imply Hamas's acceptance of
Israel and an end to its armed resistance. Whether Israeli
military operations in Gaza can soften this position, or
whether Hamas and Israel could agree to a ceasefire without
any specified time limits, remains to be seen.
NOVINGER