Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09DAMASCUS411
2009-06-11 10:24:00
SECRET
Embassy Damascus
Cable title:  

SYRIAN REACTIONS TO JUNE 2009 LEBANESE ELECTIONS

Tags:  PREL PGOV PHUM LE SY 
pdf how-to read a cable
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 DAMASCUS 000411 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ELA
NSC FOR SHAPIRO/MCDERMOTT
PARIS FOR WALLER
LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/09/2029
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM LE SY
SUBJECT: SYRIAN REACTIONS TO JUNE 2009 LEBANESE ELECTIONS

REF: A. DAMASCUS 194

B. DAMASCUS 252

C. DAMASCUS 363

D. DAMASCUS 377

DAMASCUS 00000411 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: CDA Maura Connelly for reasons 1.4 b and d.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 DAMASCUS 000411

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ELA
NSC FOR SHAPIRO/MCDERMOTT
PARIS FOR WALLER
LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/09/2029
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM LE SY
SUBJECT: SYRIAN REACTIONS TO JUNE 2009 LEBANESE ELECTIONS

REF: A. DAMASCUS 194

B. DAMASCUS 252

C. DAMASCUS 363

D. DAMASCUS 377

DAMASCUS 00000411 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: CDA Maura Connelly for reasons 1.4 b and d.


1. (S) Summary: Many of our contacts were surprised by the
margin of March 14's impressive electoral victory over March

8. Press reporting prior to the election had fed
expectations of a much closer race, and most Syrian observers
were predicting a March 8 win. President Asad reportedly
called his Lebanese counterpart on June 10 to congratulate
him and praise Lebanese consensus that would be "necessary to
face and deal with the forthcoming challenges." On June 8,
Presidential Advisor Bouthaina Shaaban expressed "relief"
that the elections had taken a "safe and stable course," and
she encouraged a "spirit of reconciliation" among Lebanese
parties. Our contacts suggested that the Syrian government
privately supports Hizballah's claim that the Doha Accord
requires a national consensus government with a blocking
third of seats in the Council of Ministers. A few Embassy
sources suggested many Syrians would view the elections as a
blow to Syria's prestige while others would see positive
elements. Syria's "restraint" would help to improve
Syrian-Saudi and Syrian-Lebanese relations, for example. As
one well-connected Syrian journalist put it, the West could
no longer accuse Syria with interfering in Lebanon; in that
light, the March 14 victory offered an "opportunity" for
Western powers to publicly acknowledge Syria's hands-off
policy toward Lebanon. End Summary.

--------------
Official and Media Reactions
--------------


2. (SBU) Official Syrian reactions to Lebanon's June 7
parliamentary elections have been limited thus far to a terse
statement by Presidential Advisor Bouthaina Shaaban and a
brief public statement derived from President Asad's June 10
call to Lebanese President Sleiman. Asad reportedly
congratulated Sleiman and praised the spirit of Lebanese
consensus that "is necessary to face and deal with the

forthcoming challenges." On June 8, Shaaban convoked
reporters and told them Lebanon's June 7 elections were "an
internal matter." She expressed "relief" the elections had
taken a "safe and stable course" and encouraged Lebanese
parties to exercise a "spirit of reconciliation."


3. (SBU) A day earlier, the Syrian government's message was
more provocative. An editorial in government-owned daily "Al
Baath" reported that U.S.-backed March 14 "has been accused
of having bought votes and using bribery," adding that "this
could pave the way to large-scale falsification of the
elections." Similarly, Syrian daily "al-Watan," the
country's only privately owned newspaper, characterized the
elections as "The most important political ballot in
Lebanon's history . . . and politically-tainted money has had
the last word." Al-Watan claimed "Election cash played a
decisive role in the election result, because March 14
loyalists allocated a huge budget for vote-buying, for
spending money in the polling booths . . . and in bringing
expatriates (to Lebanon) to vote." The paper concluded these
measures had fundamentally altered election day results when
compared to opinion poll predictions a few days before the
vote.


--------------
Surprise over Margin of Victory
--------------

DAMASCUS 00000411 002.2 OF 003




4. (S) A wide range of Embassy contacts with whom we spoke
expressed surprise not just over the election's outcome, but
over the wide margin of the March 14 coalition's victory.
Basil Hamwi (strictly protect),head of Audi Bank operations
in Syria and a well-connected businessman with political ties
in both Syria and Lebanon, explained that many Syrian elites
had expected the elections to be decided by a margin of a
seat or two, and the most recently polling had predicted
March 8 would win. "We went to bed with March 8 clinging to
a narrow lead and woke up to a March 14 landslide," he
commented. Hamwi discounted Syrian press accounts claiming
vote buying, saying "that's Lebanon." Like many other
contacts, however, he noted that the unprecedented voter
turnout was a key factor in determining the outcome. "It
means March 14's machinery was better oiled than March 8's
was," Hamwi commented in front of a small, informal group of
private Syrian and Lebanese businessmen. Heads nodded in
agreement.


-------------- --------------
Different Interpretations over Elections' Significance
-------------- --------------



5. (S) Perceptions differed over how this outcome reflected
on the Syrian government and its policies. Al-Hayat Bureau
Chief Ibrahim Hamidi (strictly protect) depicted a wide range
of Syrian equities at stake. The security services had the
most to lose because a strong March 14 showing would suggest
a reduction of Syrian national prestige and influence in
Lebanon. Politically, it was too soon to tell whether March
14's victory would translate into results that might alter
the Syrian regime's standing, he said.


6. (C) The elections, whatever the flaws, represented a
message from the Lebanese Christian community to Hizballah,
assessed Hamidi. Many Syrians -- Sunnis included -- quietly
held similar concerns about Hizballah's aggressive posture,
especially at a time when the Syrian regime was trying to
improve relations with the West. Hamidi believed that
Hizballah Secretary General Nasrallah's concession of defeat
had been a positive move that should make it easier for
reconciliation inside Lebanon. The Syrian regime favored
such a process, he said, because it allowed Syria to remain
"disengaged" from Lebanese internal affairs. Hamidi warned,
however, that the appointment of March 14 leader Saad Hariri
as Prime Minister would motivate Syrian hard-liners to adopt
a more confrontational posture. "Because Hariri has made
direct accusations against the Asad regime for the
assassination of his father (Rafiq),many in Damascus would
view his ascent to the Prime Ministry as a direct challenge
to Asad," Hamidi cautioned.


7. (S) Syrian daily "al-Watan" Editor-in-Chief Waddah abd
Rabo (strictly protect) said there had been a range of
reactions within the Syrian regime. While no one was happy
that March 14 had won by such a large margin, the prevailing
view appeared to be that the elections themselves would do
little to change political dynamics in Lebanon. Even
considering March 14's impressive electoral victory, no March
14-led government could afford to ignore the fact that
Hizballah's political strength had grown in recent years. In
the end, there would be very tough negotiations ahead between
Lebanon's two major political coalitions. Hizballah was now
insisting on adherence to the Doha Accord's stipulation of a
blocking third in the Lebanese Council of Ministers, while
March 18 leader Saad Hariri was arguing against it. (Note:
Syrian journalists have pointed out to us that subsequent
press remarks on June 10 by Nasrallah's deputy, Sheik Naim

DAMASCUS 00000411 003.2 OF 003


Qasim, omitted any mention of a blocking third and focused on
the need for a consensus, unity government. Some observers
in Damascus are suggesting this line may represent a
moderation of Nasrallah's earlier demands.)


8. (S) Presidential Advisor Shaaban, abd Rabo reported, had
called in Syrian reporters on June 7 to brief them on Syria's
reaction to the Lebanese election. Her tone had been
measured, but it belied her personal views that the outcome
in Lebanon "had been a PR disaster for Syria," abd Rabo said.
Her reaction contrasted with the view of the MFA and others
that, despite March 14's lop-sided victory, the election
would actually benefit Syria in two specific ways.


9. (S) First, it would allow Syria to demonstrate it had
made good on its bargain with Saudi Arabia not to "grossly
interfere" in the elections. Indeed, abd Rabo observed,
President Asad had called Saudi King Abdullah the day after
the elections to talk about the elections and bilateral
relations. Second, March 14's convincing win provided
"irrefutable evidence" against Western claims that Syria was
interfering in Lebanese politics. "Now, the West can't
accuse Syria of interfering in Lebanon any more," he claimed.
Syria's restraint during the elections, abd Rabo added,
should help Syria in its efforts to improve relations with
the U.S. "The U.S. could score major points with Syria if
someone like Mitchell pointed publicly to Syria's positive
behavior," he suggested.


10. (S) Comment: President Asad and FM Muallim have
emphasized in recent meetings with U.S. officials that Syria
supported a free and fair election in Lebanon, but they also
argued that a consensus Lebanese government would be the only
way to preserve Lebanese stability (refs A-D). Since March
14's decisive victory, Syrian officials and the official
media have stopped short of insisting on the Doha Accord's
provision for a blocking third minority in the Lebanese
Council of Ministers. We sense, however, that the Syrian
government will seek to preserve the Doha Accord's
arrangements for a blocking third as a way to restrain the
next March 14-led government. At the same time, Syrian
officials will not hesitate to make the case that Syria's
"hands-off" posture made good on its pledge not to interfere
in the elections and represented another (and still publicly
unrecognized) Syrian deliverable to the West.


11. (S) Comment continued: Internally, Syrian regime
hard-liners, particularly the security services, are licking
their wounds over the June 7 results. Regime loyalists can
claim the SARG held up its part of the bargain with the
Saudis by not interfering to Syria's full potential, but
conservative elements believe the lop-sided election results
represented a loss of face. As a result, there may be
pressure on the security services to increase their efforts
to influence Lebanon's government formation process in the
short-term. For regime moderates, the pressure will be on to
demonstrate the tangible benefits of appearing to be more
restrained in Lebanon. Sitting above the internal fray,
Bashar appears ready to make the best of the situation by
mending fences with Saudi Arabia and by hoping Washington
will give Damascus some credit for not obstructing the will
of the Lebanese people.
CONNELLY