Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09DAMASCUS410
2009-06-11 10:10:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Damascus
Cable title:  

ITALIAN/G-8 DEMARCHE TO SARG ON IAEA REPORT

Tags:  NP PGOV PREL SY 
pdf how-to read a cable
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 000410 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/10/2029
TAGS: NP PGOV PREL SY
SUBJECT: ITALIAN/G-8 DEMARCHE TO SARG ON IAEA REPORT

Classified By: CDA Maura Connelly for reasons 1.4 b and d.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 000410

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/10/2029
TAGS: NP PGOV PREL SY
SUBJECT: ITALIAN/G-8 DEMARCHE TO SARG ON IAEA REPORT

Classified By: CDA Maura Connelly for reasons 1.4 b and d.


1. (C) Summary: The Italian Ambassador informed us June 3
that he delivered a demarche in his capacity as G-8
representative on the latest IAEA report regarding Syria. The
Ambassador wrote encouraging the Syrians to sign the
Additional Protocol of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT),citing the high risk of proliferation in the region.
Without agreeing to sign the Additional Protocol, Syrian
officials responded saying they are committed to the rules of
the NPT, that they call on Israel to sign the NPT as well,
and that signing the Additional Protocol remains voluntary.
This reflects no change in Syria's stance on the Additional
Protocol. End Summary


2. (C) Points for G-8 demarche on the IAEA Additional Protocol
General points

- The risk of proliferation of nuclear weapons represents a
serious challenge to our global security. The Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the international nuclear
safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) are fundamental pillars of the international
non-proliferation regime.
- It is important that all NPT parties adopt the highest
standards for IAEA safeguards by adopting the Additional
Protocol. The action will give the IAEA the critical tools it
needs to monitor effectively the non-proliferation
commitments embodied in the NPT. THe Group of Eight (G-8) is
committed to universalizing the Additional Protocol. All G-8
members have ratified the Additional Protocol as well as a
majority of IAEA members.
- Since 2001, the G-8 has been pursuing efforts to strengthen
international and multilateral mechanisms to combat the
spread of weapons of mass destruction, including their
possible acquisition by terrorist groups.
- In particular, we call attention to the G-8 Hokkaido-Toyako
Summit Leaders Declaration of 2008, which states: "We further
stress the importance of...strengthening the IAEA safeguards
and the universalization of the IAEA Additional Protocol."
- This initiative is a part of efforts aimed at strengthening
the NPT and IAEA verification system.
- Your country (Syria) is a party to teh NPT. You have agreed
not to acquire or seek assistance in producing nuclear
weapons, and in doing so you have helped make the NPT the
most widely accepted treaty controlling nuclear weapons.
- It is important for all NPT parties to work together to
strengthen the NPT and ensure that it continues to advance
our common security interests.
- We also note that the United Nations Security Council
approved resolution 1540 in April 2004. This resolution
identifies nuclear proliferation as a threat to international
peace and security, and calls on states to adopt and enforce
effective laws to prohibit efforts by non-state actors to
acquire nuclear weapons.
- Implementation of the IAEA safeguards, including the
Additional Protocol, is one important way you can contribute
to this effort, by making it harder for nuclear material and
equipment to fall into the wrong hands.

Points on the Additional Protocol

- One critical step is to adopt the highest standards for
verifying your non-proliferation commitments by acceptign the
IAEA's strengthened safeguards system, which will enable the
IAEA to draw conclusions with greater confidence.
- In 1997 the IAEA Board of Governors adopted the Model
Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540). This is a model for
agreements between states and the IAEA that would provide a
strengthened safeguard system and grant the IAEA the
necessary expanded right of access to information and sites.
A principal aim is to build confidence that states are
abiding by their international commitments.
- According to the IAEA Director General El Baradei's
definition, the Additional Protocol is the "sine qua non" of

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effective verification. Without it, the IAEA cannot fully
meet the expectations of the international community that it
provide an assurance that states are meeting their nuclear
non-proliferation obligations.
- Universal adoption of the Additional Protocol is in the
interest of the whole international community.
- That is why the G-8 and the European Union are committed to
making the Additional Protocol the universal standard.
- We urge you to sign the Protocol as soon as possible and
promptly complete the steps necessary under your national
legislation to bring it into force.
- The G-8 stands ready to provide any assistance you may need
as you undertake this important responsibility.
CONNELLY