MAY 7 FELTMAN-SHAPIRO MEETING IN DAMASCUS: HAMAS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DAMASCUS 000360

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ELA, NEA/IPA
NSC FOR SHAPIRO/MCDERMOTT
PARIS FOR WALLER
LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/20/2029
TAGS: PREL PTER KPAL KWBG IS SY
SUBJECT: MAY 7 FELTMAN-SHAPIRO MEETING IN DAMASCUS: HAMAS
AND PALESTINIAN RECONCILIATION

DAMASCUS 00000360 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: CDA Maura Connelly for reasons 1.4 b, d.


1. (S/NF) Summary: In a wide-ranging May 7 discussion, NEA
Acting A/S Feltman and NSC/NENA Senior Director Shapiro
argued that, while recent Hamas statements suggested the
organization could recognize a two-state solution, Hamas
needed to renounce violence, recognize Israel, and abide by
previous agreements between Israel and the Palestinian
Authority before the international community would be ready
to deal with the group as a legitimate representative of the
Palestinian people. Feltman and Shapiro also pressed the
Syrian regime to use its influence to convince Hamas to
release detained Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit, or at the very
least, allow Shalit to communicate with his family as a
humanitarian gesture. The Syrian side led by FM Muallim took
credit for positively influencing Hamas to make constructive
statements toward the West and to end rocket fire in Gaza.
Muallim stressed the need for lifting the Israeli blockade on
humanitarian assistance to Gaza and reaching a durable
ceasefire between Hamas and Israel. On Shalit, Muallim
blamed Israel for torpedoing a prisoner exchange deal that
would have won the Israeli soldier's freedom. End Summary.


2. (S/NF) (S/NF) Returning to Damascus two months after
their March 7 visit, NEA Acting Assistant Secretary Jeffrey
Feltman and NSC Senior Director for the Middle East and North
Africa Dan Shapiro met May 7 for four-and-a-half hours with
Syrian Foreign Minister Walid al-Muallim, Vice Foreign
Minister Faisal Miqdad, and President Asad's Political and
Media Advisor Bouthaina Shaaban. Charge and Pol-Econ Chief
(notetaker) accompanied Feltman and Shapiro. Muallim's Chief
of Staff Bassam Sabbagh joined the Syrian side. This cable
provides a recap of their discussion on Hamas and Palestinian
reconciliation. It should be read in conjunction with septel
reports on the U.S.-Syrian re-engagement process, Iraq,
sanctions, Syrian-Israeli peace issues, Iran, Lebanon, and
human rights.

--------------
Syria Responsible for Moderating Hamas
--------------


3. (S/NF) Syrian Presidential Advisor Shaaban, commenting
on the contradiction between President Obama's positive
rhetoric and support of comprehensive regional peace and the
imminent decision to renew E.O. 13338, argued that the U.S.
was ignoring Syria's positive influence on Hamas and the
Palestinian reconciliation process. Meshaal had given a May
5 interview to the New York Times in which he stated his
readiness to accept a two-state solution based on 1967
borders and to be "part of the solution." U.S. Special Envoy
Mitchell had traveled to the Gulf states and northern Africa,
and had met in the past with the IRA, but he had yet to visit
Damascus, which was more relevant to resolving the
Arab-Israeli dispute than Egypt, Saudi Arabia, or Jordan.
"Do you think Hamas would accept 1967 borders without Syrian
influence?" asked Shaaban. "We want this to be acknowledged
as a great step forward for our role in promoting
comprehensive peace."


4. (S/NF) NSC Senior Director Shapiro responded
Washington's reading of Meshaal's comments remained somewhat
different. Meshaal's recent remarks represented, in fact, a
re-hash of Hamas's willingness to recognized a Palestinian
state within 1967 borders in exchange for a long-term truce.
Israel was unlikely to accept this formula. The U.S.
recognized Syria's role, but Hamas still must take more
significant steps to work with the Palestinian Authority (PA)
and abide by PA commitments that can produce a Palestinian
state. The U.S. welcomed the decrease in the number of
rockets being fired in Gaza; to the degree that Syria was
responsible for this trend, the U.S. welcomed this
contribution. The current circumstances offered Syria an
opportunity to continue using its influence positively.

--------------
Muallim on Shalit: Ask the Egyptians
--------------


DAMASCUS 00000360 002.2 OF 003



5. (S/NF) Shapiro raised the case of detained Israeli
soldier Gilad Shalit, saying he had recently met with his
father, Noam. Noam was a shy man, and not a politician, who
had embarked on a campaign to save his son. The U.S.
continued to call for Shalit's unconditional release. In the
interim, however, the U.S. hoped Syria would use its
influence to convince Hamas to agree to allow Shalit to
communicate with his parents to assure them he was still
alive. It had been over a year since the last time a
sign-of-life message had been received. Because Hamas
refused access by the International Committee for the
International Red Cross (ICRC),the U.S. hoped Syria would
support this request on humanitarian grounds.


6. (S/NF) Shaaban, shaking her head back and forth,
chastised Israel for having detained some 11,000 Palestinians
and using them as "political pawns." Shapiro responded that
the U.S. continued to raise Israeli treatment of Palestinian
detainees, noting that the Palestinian prisoners at least
enjoyed ICRC access. "You devalue the lives of
Palestinians," Shabaan alleged. Muallim responded that the
U.S. should raise the Shalit issue with Egypt, since Cairo
had the lead in negotiating a prisoner exchange agreement
between Hamas and Israel.


--------------
Upcoming U.S. Discussions with Israel
--------------


7. (S/NF) Acting Assistant Secretary Feltman asserted that
the U.S. was moving rapidly on advancing its regional peace
agenda. President Obama had clearly conveyed his views on
the necessity of a two-state solution and he would be meeting
May 18 with Israeli PM Netanyahu to explain why this policy
would advance both U.S. and Israeli interests. The President
felt the same way about reviving the Golan track, and
Washington expected to dispatch Mitchell to Damascus in the
coming weeks. Mitchell's deputy Fred Hof was expected to
seek a meeting with Syrian Ambassador to Washington Imad
Mustafa. The current plan was to see how the meeting with PM
Netanyahu and move from there, Feltman explained. It would
be important to have a Palestinian partner with whom Israel
could be convinced to work, and to have a partner that could
take on the attributes of Palestinian statehood. This
priority explained why accepting PA commitments represented
such an important condition -- a state, Feltman emphasized,
complied with its commitments, like Syria had done with
Israel.


8. (S/NF) President Obama, continued Feltman, would raise
Gaza and the necessity of allowing humanitarian supplies.
But the ability to convince Israel to agree to these demands
would increase if there was a willing Palestinian partner to
engage with the U.S. and Israel. Washington believed there
was a window of opportunity, but it remained unclear how long
it would last. The U.S. could not succeed without supportive
partners in the Arab world. And Washington had an ambitious,
busy foreign policy agenda that included Pakistan and
Afghanistan. Achieving a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace
would require traction and momentum.


9. (S/NF) Muallim agreed, affirming Syria's support of
comprehensive peace. The problem remained not knowing
Israel's intentions. Thus the May 18 meeting between
President Obama and PM Netanyahu would be important. Thus
far, declarations from PM Netanyahu and FM Lieberman had not
been promising. To place a higher priority on Iran's nuclear
program than on achieving a two-state solution was
"unbelievable," Muallim said. Equally disturbing were the
statements of Israeli officials suggesting there could be
peace with Syria without returning the Golan. Syria
supported a two-state solution, but it wanted to ensure it
was based on terms of reference contained in UN Security
Council resolutions 242 and 338, the Madrid Conference
principles, assurances from former Secretary of State Baker,
and the Arab Peace Initiative.



DAMASCUS 00000360 003.2 OF 003


--------------
U.S. Concerns About Hamas
--------------



10. (S/NF) Feltman responded that Washington understood
Syria's needs but may have questions about some of the
details. The U.S. wanted to ensure that movement on a
Syria-Israel track would not undermine the Palestinian track.
"If we're working as partners with you, we don't want Hamas
to undermine Palestinian-Israeli negotiations," he said.
Muallim replied he understood and explained Syria had
stipulated during its indirect talks with Israel that Israel
would not be able to use the Golan track to subvert
negotiations with the Palestinians. "We don't believe real
peace is possible without a comprehensive agreement," Muallim
maintained.


11. (S/NF) Shapiro answered the Palestinians agreed there
needed to be complementarity between the two tracks.
Washington's concern, however, remained that Hamas activity
could undermine the Palestinian track. Muallim replied this
was an important issue. When Israel and Hamas announced
mutual unilateral cease-fires after the Gaza crisis, Syria
worked with Turkey and other parties to convince Hamas to
accept a durable, sustainable ceasefire. Hamas then spoke
with Egypt and reached a separate agreement, and the Israelis
introduced new conditions related to a prisoner exchange.
France and Qatar worked to broker a deal that would have
freed Shalit; Egypt, however, expressed its anger at Qatar's
interference by starting the prisoner exchange negotiations
again. Now Netanyahu was not interested in a ceasefire or a
prisoner exchange deal, Muallim argued. Syria believed a
ceasefire remained the key to achieving constructive progress
on Palestinian reconciliation, he said.


12. (S/NF) Presidential Advisor Shaaban interjected that
the U.S. had rejected working with Hamas after the 2006
Palestinian elections, event though only 15 percent of the
legislators elected were Hamas party members. "We hope you
are willing to accept the representatives chosen by the
Palestinian people. If you work with a Palestinian
government that doesn't represent the people, you won't
succeed," she said.


13. (S/NF) Shapiro said the U.S. agreed that a sustainable
ceasefire was important. The U.S., moreover, would welcome
any national unity Palestinian government (NUG) that
respected commitments made by the PLO. Feltman added that
the U.S. might not be able to meet with Hamas party officials
in the government, but that would not be a deal-breaker.
What was important was to convince the Palestinians to
endorse a two-state solution. All the Palestinian groups had
expressed support for a two-state solution, replied Shaaban.
Muallim suggested the Palestinians needed to see whether
Israel was committed as well and on what terms such a
solution would be based. It remained unclear whether Israel
was willing to engage to achieve a two-state solution based
internationally recognized terms of reference.


14. (S/NF) Shapiro affirmed President Obama's upcoming
meetings in Washington would stress the U.S. commitment to a
two-state solution. He stressed Washington's desire to
achieve this concrete goal. The U.S. recognized its
responsibilities to reaching this objective, but it believed
other partners had responsibilities as well. Feltman said
that the U.S. could not speak for Israel, but the Obama
administration's position on a two-state solution was clear.



15. (SBU) Acting A/S Feltman and NSC Senior Director cleared
this message.
CONNELLY