SARG MESSAGING ON SANCTIONS RENEWAL AND FOREIGN

S E C R E T DAMASCUS 000346

SIPDIS
NOFORN

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA
NSC FOR SHAPIRO/MCDERMOTT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/14/2019
TAGS: ETRD ETTC PGOV PREL PTER UNDP IZ SY
SUBJECT: SARG MESSAGING ON SANCTIONS RENEWAL AND FOREIGN
FIGHTERS ARTICLE

Classified By: Pol/Econ Counselor Tim Pounds for reasons 1.4(b,d)

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Summary
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1. (C) The Syrian government's spin machine is in high gear
following the May 7 renewal of E.O. 13338 and the May 11
Washington Post article describing a Syria-based foreign
fighter pipeline. On E.O. 13338, Syrian Vice Foreign
Minister Miqdad told a visiting UN Special Envoy to Iraq that
the SARG had not publicly reacted to the story in recognition
of the renewal's routine nature. This message was echoed in
a May 11 op-ed by a pro-regime analyst entitled, "Sanctions
Renewed But Syria Understands." When the UN Special Envoy
suggested the SARG could do more to help improve Iraq's
security situation by cracking down on foreign fighters, the
Syrian diplomat blamed the U.S. and Iraqi governments for not
providing actionable intelligence. In response to the
Washington Post's detailed account of the foreign fighter
pipeline in Syria, "informed Syrian sources" told al-Watan,
Syria's only privately-owned daily, that the article had been
planted by the "Israeli lobby" in an effort to sabotage the
improving U.S.-Syrian relationship. End summary.

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SARG Emphasizing Routine Nature of Sanctions Renewal
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2. (C) UNDP Resident Representative Ismail Ould Sheikh Ahmed
provided the Charge with a readout of UN Special Envoy to
Iraq Stefan di Mistura's May 12 meeting with Vice Foreign
Minister Faisal Miqdad in Damascus. When di Mistura asked
for Syria's reaction to U.S. sanctions being renewed for
another year, Miqdad answered that the SARG had made a
conscience decision not to make a public statement as a way
of signaling SARG recognition of the renewal's routine
nature. The SARG also delivered this message through regime
mouthpiece Sami Moubayed's May 11 editorial, "Sanctions
Renewed but Syria Understands." In a piece riddled with
inaccuracies, Moubayed wrote that the Syrian regime had
anticipated the sanctions would be renewed and assumed the
Obama Administration would gradually reduce them over time as
bilateral relations improved.

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MFA Blames FF on Lack of Actionable Intelligence
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3. (C) According to Ahmed, Vice FM Miqdad revealed to di
Mistura that Iraqi PM Nouri al-Maliki would soon be visiting
Damascus for talks with Syrian President Bashar al-Asad. Di
Mistura agreed that this was a positive gesture, but
suggested the SARG could do more to help improve Iraq's
security situation -- particularly in light of the recent
uptick in violence. Miqdad pointed out that the Syrian
Ambassador to Baghdad was from a Deir Ezzor tribe with family
in both eastern Syrian and western Iraq, so he had a personal
stake in helping the GOI prevent foreign suicide bombers from
killing Iraqis. Shifting the blame back on the U.S., Miqdad
complained that the SARG would be willing to act if only the
U.S. and GOI would provide names and locations of foreign
fighters before they carried out their deadly missions.
Unfortunately, Miqdad postured, Syria only learned about
foreign fighters after the fact.

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SARG attributes WaPo article to an Israeli conspiracy
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4. (U) SARG messaging on foreign fighters continued in a May
13 article in the privately-owned, pro-government daily
al-Watan. In response to the May 11 Washington Post article,
"Terrorist Traffic Via Syria Again Inching Up," so-called
"informed Syrian sources" characterized the article's
allegation of increased foreign fighter activity through
Syria as "unfounded." The article further blamed the Israeli
lobby for planting the article in an effort to sabotage
Washington's improving relations with Damascus. The Syrian

sources said the timing of the article was "suspicious," as
it coincided with (1) U.S. forces' failure to control
escalating violence in Iraq; (2) the elevation of the
Syrian-Iraqi relationship to the "strategic level" resulting
from PM Utri's recent visit to Baghdad; and (3) the positive
"atmosphere" of dialogue in the U.S.-Syrian relationship.

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Comment
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5. (S/NF) Despite their efforts to downplay their
disappointment, many SARG officials and the Syrian "street"
hoped the Obama Administration would at least ameliorate, if
not entirely rescind, the executive order implementing U.S.
economic sanctions as an early confidence-building measure in
our policy of sustained engagement. Our contacts have also
been seized by the lack of any official U.S. language
suggesting the Administration might review sanctions at some
time in the future. The SARG's public comments on
U.S.-Syrian relations have encouraged a perception that
bilateral ties are stronger than may actually be the case.
The SARG's subdued reaction to E.O. 13338's renewal may be
attributed to a fear of being seen as having been openly
humiliated by the Obama Administration. The fact that
Moubayed writes for an English-speaking audience suggests
that they are also trying to limit any escalation of the
sanctions rhetoric with us.

6. (S/NF) On foreign fighters, the SARG has predictably
deployed two defensive postures. To the Syrian public, the
SARG blames an Israeli conspiracy. To more sophisticated
audiences, they blame the lack of U.S. or Iraqi intelligence
sharing. As we increase pressure on this issue, Washington
can anticipate the SARG to re-employ these disingenuous
arguments.
CONNELLY