Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09DAMASCUS344
2009-05-14 11:13:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Damascus
Cable title:  

MAY 7 FELTMAN-SHAPIRO MEETING IN DAMASCUS: SYRIA

Tags:  EAIR ECON ETRD GE SP SY 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO4275
OO RUEHDE
DE RUEHDM #0344/01 1341113
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 141113Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6359
INFO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 7615
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 5765
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 1074
RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY 5158
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 3909
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0566
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY 0296
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0796
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0535
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH PRIORITY 8079
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 2394
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI PRIORITY 0247
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY 1697
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 DAMASCUS 000344 

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ELA, EEB/ESC/TFC
NSC FOR SHAPIRO/MCDERMOTT
COMMERCE FOR BIS/CHRISTINO
PARIS FOR WALLER
LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/11/2028
TAGS: EAIR ECON ETRD GE SP SY
SUBJECT: MAY 7 FELTMAN-SHAPIRO MEETING IN DAMASCUS: SYRIA
WANTS HELP WITH CIVIL AVIATION WAIVERS

REF: A. DAMASCUS 192

B. DAMASCUS 286

Classified By: CDA Maura Connelly, Reasons 1.4 b and d.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 DAMASCUS 000344

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ELA, EEB/ESC/TFC
NSC FOR SHAPIRO/MCDERMOTT
COMMERCE FOR BIS/CHRISTINO
PARIS FOR WALLER
LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/11/2028
TAGS: EAIR ECON ETRD GE SP SY
SUBJECT: MAY 7 FELTMAN-SHAPIRO MEETING IN DAMASCUS: SYRIA
WANTS HELP WITH CIVIL AVIATION WAIVERS

REF: A. DAMASCUS 192

B. DAMASCUS 286

Classified By: CDA Maura Connelly, Reasons 1.4 b and d.


1. (S/NF) Summary: In a lengthy May 7 discussion on
differing U.S. and Syrian approaches to re-engagement, NEA
Acting Assistant Secretary Feltman and NSC/NENA Senior
Director Shapiro explained the routine, technical nature of
USG's renewal of Executive Order 13338 and agreed to look for
possible ways to help Syria acquire civil aviation spare
parts and maintenance services allowed under U.S. sanctions
law. The Syrian side led by FM Muallim complained repeatedly
that the re-certification of E.O. 13338 would send a negative
political and economic message at a time when Syria had
clearly demonstrated its desire to establish better relations
with the U.S. Muallim acknowledged that lifting sanctions
was Washington's decision, but he argued Syrians would read
it as a decision to extend the confrontational policies of
previous administrations. Muallim pushed for U.S. assistance
in convincing French, German, and Spanish aerospace firms
that the U.S. had no objection to their applying for export
licenses that would allow them to service Airbus and Dassault
planes. End Summary


2. (S/NF) Returning to Damascus two months after their March
7 visit, NEA Acting Assistant Secretary Jeffrey Feltman and
NSC Senior Director for the Middle East and North Africa Dan
Shapiro met May 7 for four hours with Syrian Foreign Minister
Walid al-Muallim, Vice Foreign Minister Faisal Miqdad, and
the President Asad's Political and Media Advisor Bouthayna
Shaaban. This cable focuses on their discussions on
sanctions. It should be read with septel reports on general
views of re-engagement, Iraq, Palestinian reconciliation,
Syrian-Israeli peace discussions, Iran, and human rights.

--------------
Renewal of E.O. 13338
--------------


3. (S/NF) Acting A/S Feltman told Muallim he and NSC Senior

Director Shapiro had sought to schedule their visit the
previous week to discuss the pending renewal of E.O. 13338
with the Syrian government directly, not through the media.
President Asad's travel to Europe had, however, precluded
this possibility. The President would be informing Congress
on his decision to renew E.O. 13338. Syrian officials were
transparent about their support of armed Arab "resistance" to
Israeli occupation, and the U.S. was equally transparent
about its concerns about Syria's support of Hizballah and
Hamas. The Syria Accountability Act was U.S. law, and the
Executive Branch was required to implement this law. Feltman
said he understood this decision would be unwelcome in Syria,
but the decision was at the heart of issues still dividing
the two countries. The decision did not preclude the
possibility of more flexible interpretations in the future or
treating civil aviation issues differently.


4. (S/NF) Muallim, echoed by Vice FM Miqdad and
Presidential Advisor Shaaban, argued that the sanctions
renewal represented a continuation of the previous
administration's policy and raised doubts about the new
administration's intention to engage Syria. Muallim
acknowledged that the sanctions issue was a Washington

DAMASCUS 00000344 002 OF 003


prerogative, but said continuation of sanctions would impede
establishment of a "normal" bilateral relationship. European
firms would react very negatively to the renewal of E.O.
13338, regardless of the administration's desire to be more
helpful on civil aviation, Muallim asserted.


5. (S/NF) Feltman said he understood the problem. He
pointed out that the new administration had articulated a
broad vision for a new foreign policy approach based on
principled and sustained engagement. Despite differences with
Syria over its support of Hizballah and Hamas, the President
had used a language of respect. Feltman and Shapiro said
they had explained during their March 7 meeting that the U.S.
had no intention of using civil aviation or safety-of-flight
issues as a political lever. They had agreed, at Muallim's
request, to look into Syria's problems with a German firm
(Lufthansa Techniq) contracted to perform maintenance on
Syrian Air Airbus engines (ref A). In addition, the Embassy
had met April 15 with Vice Minister Miqdad and officials from
Syrian Air to discuss several other civil aviation issues,
including Lufthansa Techniq, in greater detail (Ref B). The
common problem seemed to be that European firms contracted by
Syrian Air had not yet applied for the necessary export
licenses through the U.S. Department of Commerce. Under U.S.
regulations, these companies needed to consult Commerce.


6. (S/NF) Muallim replied that these companies were already
very reluctant to expose themselves to possible USG legal
action because of the strict policies of the previous
administration. The renewal of E.O. 13338 would make them
even more reluctant. Muallim asked several times for U.S.
assistance in communicating to these firms that the renewal
of E.O. 13338 did not mean the U.S. government would take an
unfavorable view of their desire to perform maintenance on
civilian aircraft allowed under U.S. law. Feltman and
Shapiro repeated that U.S. legal procedures required the
firms themselves to contact the Department of Commerce.
Since they had a business interest in doing so, it was
incumbent on them to request Commerce's advice on how to
proceed. "They're afraid," replied Muallim, "please help
us."

--------------
New Case: Syria's Problems with Dassault
--------------


7. (S/NF) Muallim explained that, in addition to problems
already discussed with the U.S., Syria had found it
impossible to convince the French aerospace firm Dassault to
seek the necessary licenses to perform maintenance on three
Syrian-owned Falcon aircraft used by President Asad and the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs for official travel. Muallim
said he had spoken to the French Ambassador in Damascus, who
confirmed the company's unwillingness to risk possible USG
actions against it as a consequence of seeking the necessary
export licenses. Feltman replied that the Syrian government
should encourage the French company to contact Commerce.
Though he could not give a commitment on behalf of Commerce,
the U.S. would be reasonable in considering legitimate
safety-of-flight requests. The Charge added that Dassault
could request an advisory opinion from Commerce to determine
the need for an export license. If Dassault made such a
request, Commerce could respond quickly.


DAMASCUS 00000344 003 OF 003



8. (S/NF) Muallim reviewed ongoing problems with Lufthansa
Techniq, which currently had possession of two Airbus engines
belonging to Syrian Air. The German firm worried that,
because it had accepted two engines without the necessary
permission, asking for an export license now might lead to
legal actions against it. "They are afraid," explained
Muallim. Dassault was also reluctant to make contact with
Commerce without assurances that doing so would not risk
punitive USG actions. Muallim suggested the State Department
or appropriate U.S. agency might inform these firms of the
U.S. intent not to take hostile actions against them.


9. (S/NF) Feltman and Shapiro said they would look at
possible ways to assist, subject to U.S. laws and
regulations. They reminded Muallim that the European firms
should be aware of President Obama's new approach to foreign
policy and take that into consideration. Syrian officials
should inform these companies not to assume negative answers.

CONNELLY