Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09DAMASCUS335
2009-05-12 14:54:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Damascus
Cable title:  

MAY 7 FELTMAN-SHAPIRO MEETING IN DAMASCUS: FM

Tags:  PREL PTER KPAL IZ LE IS SY 
pdf how-to read a cable
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DE RUEHDM #0335/01 1321454
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FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6342
INFO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 7609
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 5759
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 1068
RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY 5151
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 3903
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0558
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0527
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 2388
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY 1691
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0609
S E C R E T DAMASCUS 000335 

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ELA, NEA/I, NEA/IPA, DRL, EB
NSC FOR SHAPIRO/MCDERMOTT
PARIS FOR WALLER
LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/11/2029
TAGS: PREL PTER KPAL IZ LE IS SY
SUBJECT: MAY 7 FELTMAN-SHAPIRO MEETING IN DAMASCUS: FM
MUALLIM QUESTIONS U.S. COMMITMENT TO REAL ENGAGEMENT

Classified By: CDA Maura Connelly, reasons 1.4 b and d.

S E C R E T DAMASCUS 000335

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ELA, NEA/I, NEA/IPA, DRL, EB
NSC FOR SHAPIRO/MCDERMOTT
PARIS FOR WALLER
LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/11/2029
TAGS: PREL PTER KPAL IZ LE IS SY
SUBJECT: MAY 7 FELTMAN-SHAPIRO MEETING IN DAMASCUS: FM
MUALLIM QUESTIONS U.S. COMMITMENT TO REAL ENGAGEMENT

Classified By: CDA Maura Connelly, reasons 1.4 b and d.


1. (S/NF) Summary: In a wide-ranging May 7 discussion, NEA
Acting A/S Feltman and NSC/NENA Senior Director Shapiro heard
a litany of complaints from the Syrian side led by FM Muallim
over Syria's designation as a state sponsor of terrorism,
renewal of U.S. sanctions, and the lack of serious engagement
with Syria on Middle East peace issues. The Syrians took
credit for advancing positive relations with Iraq,
restraining March 8 forces in Lebanon, constructively
influencing Hamas, and facilitating the Embassy's search for
a new compound site. Feltman and Shapiro argued that
Washington had expanded access for Syria's Ambassador to
Washington, was serious about engaging Syria, and remained
committed to pursuing comprehensive peace (including between
Syria and Israel). Feltman and Shapiro emphasized the U.S.
priority of stopping foreign fighters entering Iraq form
Syria and proposed a U.S.-Syrian-Iraqi security cooperation
dialogue as a way advancing mutual interests and validating
both sides' ability to work together. They also urged Syria
use its influence constructively in Lebanon and with Hamas.
Demonstrating no give, the Syrian side insisted bilateral
cooperation would be "unnatural" until the U.S. better
demonstrated its intentions for more normal relations.
Cooperation on Iraqi security first required establishment of
a "political umbrella," Muallim insisted. End Summary


2. (S/NF) Returning to Damascus two months after their March
7 visit, NEA Acting Assistant Secretary Jeffrey Feltman and
NSC Senior Director for the Middle East and North Africa Dan
Shapiro met May 7 for four-and-a-half hours with Syrian
Foreign Minister Walid al-Muallim, Vice Foreign Minister
Faisal Miqdad, and the President Asad's Political and Media
Advisor Bouthayna Shaaban. Charge and Pol-Econ Chief
(notetaker) accompanied Feltman and Shapiro. Muallim's Chief
of Staff Bassam Sabagh joined the Syrian side. This cable

provides an overview of both sides' views on the
re-engagement process. It should be read with septel reports
on Iraq, sanctions, Palestinian issues, Syrian-Israeli peace
talks, Iran, Lebanon, and human rights.


--------------
Review of Positive Steps
--------------


3. (S/NF) Acting A/S Feltman opened the meeting by noting
the positive steps the U.S. and Syria had taken since his
March 7 visit to Damascus. Consistent with the President's
commitment, U.S. officials were publicly pursuing a
comprehensive peace between Israel and its neighbors that
included two-state solution between Israel and the
Palestinians and between Syria and Israel. The U.S. had
dispatched several recent high-level official visits to
Damascus, in addition to the travel of six Congressional
delegations since January 2009. The State Department had
rescinded restrictions on the access to Executive Branch
officials for Syrian Ambassador Imad Moustafa; Moustafa had
met with State Department and NSC officials several times
before and since March 7. Feltman and other U.S. officials,
including Special Envoy Mitchell's deputy Fred Hof, had
attended the Syrian Embassy's April 17 National Day reception
in Washington, the first in four years. The U.S. had passed
threat information regarding a potential threat to a Syrian
official through Ambassador Moustafa. Though no official
decisions had been taken, Washington was looking favorably at
sending additional U.S. visitors to Damascus, including
Special Envoy George Mitchell, to discuss comprehensive peace
issues.


4. (S/NF) On the Syrian side, Feltman continued, the U.S.
had taken positive note of the Syrian government's (SARG's)
decision to allow the American Language Center to reopen.
Washington was also pleased to see constructive SARG
engagement on facilitating the U.S. Embassy's efforts to
identify potential sites for a new embassy compound (NEC).
The Syrian government had received a visit by A/S for
Diplomatic Security, Eric Boswell. And the Syrian Embassy in
Washington had issued many visas to U.S. personnel going to
Syria, including Department of Homeland Security circuit
riders conducting admission interviews for Iraqi refugees in
Syria. The U.S. hoped for more Syrian gestures, such as
agrement for the Embassy's Defense Attache and his deputy; it
also hoped the Syrian government would grant wider access to
Embassy officials. While there remained significant
differences between the two countries, both sides were taking
steps to signal their interest in building mutual confidence.
We hoped the Syrian side viewed the progress of relations
positively, Feltman said.


5. (S/NF) Muallim acknowledged the symbolic importance of
U.S. officials attending Syria's national day reception in
Washington and joked Ambassador Moustafa's increased access
to U.S. officials had generated more reporting from the
Syrian Embassy and a lot more work for the MFA. The Syrian
government believed it had taken positive steps by
facilitating the U.S. Embassy's bid to find an NEC site and
granting permission to reopen the American Language Center.

--------------
Syria Skeptical of U.S. Intentions
--------------


6. (S/NF) Strike 1: Terrorism Report. Muallim mentioned
that Ambassador Moustafa had conveyed Acting A/S Feltman's
desire to meet with President Asad. The SARG was not
discriminating against him by withholding a meeting at that
level; Asad had received former NEA A/S William Burns in the
past. The difference, however, was that U.S.-Syrian relations
had not moved beyond a confidence building mode. The U.S.
had issued its annual report on terrorism the previous week,
suggesting that deep differences between the two countries
remained. Unlike Iran, Syria had chosen not to contest the
report's conclusions publicly. But Damascus had interpreted
the report as an indicator of Washington's view of the
relationship. Muallim added that Syria did not hide its
support of groups resisting Israeli occupation of Arab lands;
this support would continue until Syria recovered the
occupied Golan. The fact that the U.S. defined Syria's
support of "legitimate resistance" as terrorism was not a
good sign, Muallim asserted.


7. (S/NF) Strike 2: Sanctions. The U.S. President's
upcoming re-certification of E.O. 13338 and the continuation
of the Syrian Accountability Act was another sign that the
U.S. was not ready for "natural relations" with Syria,
continued Muallim. While both sides had taken steps, they
faced a choice. "Either you go gradually and miss an
opportunity, or you go directly. We have instructions to
pursue normal relations, but it seems that parts of the U.S.
government are still reluctant," Muallim said. Vice Minister
Miqdad interjected that the U.S. administration's hesitation
to advance the civil aviation and spare parts issue signaled
another sign of U.S. reluctance to engage fully. Muallim
pushed for U.S. assistance in convincing European companies
that the U.S. Government would not punish them for working
with Syrian Air. "Imagine how these companies will view the
White House statement on the Syrian Accountability Act," he
said, arguing that the U.S. administration needed to send
them a message that it was acceptable to work with Syria on

civil aviation. Feltman and Shapiro explained they had
sought to time their visit well in advance of the White
House's notification on E.O. 13338 to discuss the action
privately rather than through the media. President Asad's
travel to Europe, however, had precluded this possibility.
Feltman and Shapiro added the SARG should urge European
countries to consult the Department of Commerce, but pledged
to examine whether there might be a way to accommodate
Syria's request. (Note: more detailed discussion on
sanctions-related issues is reported septel.)


8. (S/NF) Strike 3: Secretary's Trip to Iraq and Lebanon.
Syria's skepticism had also increased after recent statements
by Secretary Clinton in Iraq and Lebanon regarding Hizballah
and the increase in foreign fighters coming from Syria, said
Muallim, who disputed the accuracy of such statements.
Feltman replied that the Secretary's remarks had come in
response to pointed questions after their recent April 28
visit to Iraq; her prepared statement had taken care to avoid
any recriminations, he said. Just as the U.S. knew it had an
unwelcome reputation in many parts of the Arab world, Syria
had a negative image in the U.S. Congress. Though Syria was
trying to improve this image, the Secretary's remarks
reflected concerns about Hizballah and Hamas and support for
armed resistance, which the USG viewed as supporting
terrorism. Syrian officials should not be surprised that
their U.S. counterparts are as transparent about these
concerns as Syrians are about their views about the
legitimacy of resistance. Muallim responded he was not
surprised.


9. (S/NF) Strike 4: No Movement on Peace Discussions.
Muallim and Presidential Advisor Shaaban argued Syria had
expressed its desire for peace talks with Israel, even as
Israeli PM Netanyahu backtracked from previous Israeli
government commitments. "Where was the U.S.?" asked Shaaban.
Special Envoy Mitchell had met with the IRA, and "everyone
knows the IRA killed more people than either Hizballah or
Hamas," she claimed. What was Mitchell doing in Morocco, when
Syria was the key to achieving comprehensive peace? she
asked. Feltman responded that the President would be holding
in-depth discussions on peace issues with PM Netanyahu,
Egyptian President Mubarak, and PA President Mahmoud Abbas.
Washington expected Mitchell to visit Syria in the coming
weeks; his deputy Fred Hof would be seeking a meeting with
Ambassador Moustafa the coming week, he said. (Septel
provides discussion on discussions on Syrian-Israeli peace
discussions.)

--------------
Debate over Who's Really Serious
--------------



10. (S/NF) Senior Director Shapiro urged Muallim to
recognize the real opportunity available to both sides.
President Obama had articulated a broad vision for productive
relations with Syria and other states in the region. The
U.S. recognized it had a role in achieving this vision, but
others need to recognize their responsibilities as well.
Syria's stated desire to move to more natural relations
should include some acknowledgment of its role in making it
happen. The U.S. had publicly recognized its mistakes, e.g.,
use of torture methods, and would continue to take steps.
But others needed to reciprocate to ensure that the
opportunity did not pass.


11. (S/NF) Acting A/S Feltman commented that the President's
decision to close Guantanamo, withdraw from Iraq, and make
clear decrees on torture had given opponents ammunition to

criticize the administration. In this context, there was
growing vocal opposition on Capitol Hill and from other
quarters to the decision to engage Syria. The U.S. President
had repeatedly stated his desire to pursue comprehensive
peace on all tracks, including between Syria and Israel, even
as his critics argued his policies were weakening U.S.
national security. The administration was clear in its
desire for change, but that change was not going to occur
overnight.


12. (S/NF) Syria wanted changes in substance, not words,
responded Muallim. If U.S.-Syrian relations were normal,
then "we'll listen to you as a partner," he said. Even in
Iraq, where the two countries had compelling mutual interests
in cooperating, it would first be necessary to "remove the
obstacles in our bilateral relations." Feltman and Shapiro
emphasized Washington placed a high priority on stopping the
flow of foreign fighters from Syria into Iraq and proposed a
U.S.-Syrian-Iraqi security dialogue as a way to make tangible
progress in the relationship on an issue of mutual interest.
(Note: Detailed discussion on the U.S. proposal to establish
a U.S.-Syrian-Iraqi security provided septel.)


--------------
Syria: We're Taking Tangible Steps
--------------


13. (S/NF) Presidential Advisor Shaaban opined there was no
doubt that President Obama's positive language had created a
real opportunity; realizing its full potential depended on
how both sides responded. Syrian officials believed that
Syria should have a say in the U.S. vision for the region.
Syria was influencing Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal to play a
more constructive role; who else would the U.S. credit for
Meshaal's recent statement that Hamas was seeking to be "part
of the solution," and for Hamas's decision to suspend rocket
fire in Gaza? The U.S. needed to recognize these
contributions instead of focusing only on the negatives,
Shaaban asserted. Shapiro replied the U.S. recognized
Syria's role but believed Hamas still had a long way to go
before it would be ready to work constructively with the
Palestinian Authority and be a responsible partner in a
Palestinian state. He also urged Syria to use its influence
to help win the release of Israeli captive Gilad Shalit.
(Note: More detailed discussion on Palestinian issues
covered septel.)


14. (S/NF) Muallim added that Syria had followed through on
its commitment to improve relations with Iraq and Lebanon.
Muallim recounted his positive late-March trip to Baghdad and
Asad's productive meeting with Iraqi PM Maliki at the Arab
League Summit in Doha. Syrian PM Utri had traveled with over
a dozen ministers to Baghdad for high-level discussions and
to sign agreements on economic and security cooperation.
Later, in a one-on-one with Acting A/S Feltman, Muallim
reported plans for PM Maliki and President Asad to attend a
reconciliation conference for all Iraqi factions, either in
Damascus or Baghdad.


15. (S/NF) In Lebanon, continued Muallim, Syria had
refrained from interfering in the upcoming elections. There
had been almost no commentary from the Syrian press on the
release of the four Lebanese generals, reflecting the Syrian
regime's desire to avoid increasing electoral tensions. The
fact that UN investigators had been able to hold these
Lebanese officials for four years without charging them was a
grave injustice, Muallim said. But Syria continued to
exercise restraint and was urging its friQds in Lebanon to
do the same.


--------------
Impetus Lies with U.S.
--------------


16. (S/NF) Sparked by Acting A/S Feltman's suggestion that
Syria could improve its image in the U.S. by taking positive
steps on human rights (septel),Presidential Advisor Shabaan
replied, "Nothing we do will help our image in the U.S." FM
Muallim commented that "only positive statements by your
government will help our image; if you want better relations,
it is your responsibility to help." NSC Senior Director
Shapiro responded that Syria also had a responsibility --
what was it willing to do to improve relations? he asked.
Muallim blamed the previous administration's policies for
severely damaging U.S.-Syrian relations. "Obama didn't
create these problems, but he has to fix them if we're going
to move forward." Syria, he claimed, "was ready" to move
forward in cooperating in all fields.


17. (S/NF) Shapiro and Feltman argued that President Obama
had taken great steps in his first 100 days in office and
could not be held responsible for the previous
administration's policies. Feltman asked whether Muallim was
suggesting that no progress was possible without U.S.
gestures first. "No," replied Muallim, "we should move
together." He reiterated, however, that convincing the
Syrian regime to take concrete steps would require the U.S.
to signal its readiness for a "normal" relationship. "You
can't do this if you're continuing the sanctions policy of
the previous regime," he said. Feltman and Shapiro
reiterated the administration's strong support for
comprehensive peace in the region and its belief in engaging
all countries to solve problems and promote common interests.



--------------
Review of the Bidding
--------------


18. (S/NF) Acting A/S Feltman and NSC Senior Director
Shapiro proposed Syrian steps on:

-- Iraq: Muallim responded "neither yes nor no" to Feltman's
pitch to facilitate a U.S.-Syrian-Iraqi security dialogue,
saying he would have to consult "his leadership." Muallim
said he had no further response to U.S. information regarding
foreign fighter facilitator Abu Khalaf al Shamari. Feltman
passed tear-line information on four additional foreign
fighter facilitators; Muallim accepted the list, but made no
commitments to follow up.

-- Hamas: Shapiro and Feltman pushed Muallim on Hamas's
acceptance of Quartet principles. They also pressed Muallim
to use Syria's influence to win Gilad Shalit's release, or at
least allow Shalit to communicate with his family. Muallim
responded Hamas had issued positive statements recently in
support of a two-state solution. Priority should be given to
a ceasefire and Palestinian reconciliation, he said.

-- Human Rights: Arguing that showing more leniency to
political prisoners would be the right thing to do and help
Syria's image in the U.S. and Europe, Feltman pressed Muallim
on releasing democracy activists Riad Seif and Michel Kilo.
Muallim bristled, mentioned the "human rights issues"
regarding some 1300 al-Qaeda-linked Salafists in Syrian jails
("should we release them, too?"),defended the Syrian
judicial process, and rejected interference in Syria's
sovereign affairs.


-- Lebanon: Feltman urged Muallim to continue exercising
restraint on Syria's allies in Lebanon during the final month
of the Parliamentary election campaign. Muallim reaffirmed
Syria's desire for peaceful elections and argued that a
national unity government represented the most stable
solution for Lebanon, but stated that the formation of a
government was a Lebanese matter.


19. (SBU) Acting A/S Feltman and NSC Senior Director Shapiro
cleared this message.



CONNELLY