Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09DAMASCUS3
2009-01-04 12:24:00
SECRET
Embassy Damascus
Cable title:  

ASAD DISCUSSES IRAN AND GAZA WITH CODEL SPECTER

Tags:  IAEA KPAL PGOV PREL PTER IR IS SY 
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O 041224Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5741
INFO RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 5675
RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY 5046
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 3789
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 2272
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
S E C R E T DAMASCUS 000003 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/ELA, NEA/IR, NEA/IPA; NSC FOR MCDERMOTT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2018
TAGS: IAEA KPAL PGOV PREL PTER IR IS SY
SUBJECT: ASAD DISCUSSES IRAN AND GAZA WITH CODEL SPECTER

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Maura Connelly for reasons 1.4(b,d)

-------
Summary
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S E C R E T DAMASCUS 000003

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/ELA, NEA/IR, NEA/IPA; NSC FOR MCDERMOTT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2018
TAGS: IAEA KPAL PGOV PREL PTER IR IS SY
SUBJECT: ASAD DISCUSSES IRAN AND GAZA WITH CODEL SPECTER

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Maura Connelly for reasons 1.4(b,d)

--------------
Summary
--------------


1. (C) In a December 30 meeting with CODEL Specter, a relaxed
President Bashar al-Asad dismissed Israeli concerns that Iran
might use a nuclear weapon against the Jewish state and
explained why he could not abandon his political alliance
with Tehran. Asad argued that the international discussion
must change from a debate about Iran's "right" to pursue a
nuclear program to a discussion of appropriate monitoring
mechanisms, coupled with incentives from the P5 1 countries.
On Syrian-Israeli peace talks, Asad characterized the
cessation of indirect negotiations as an "unfortunate reverse
for both sides," but said, "we have to deal with this (Gaza)
first." Asad was hopeful that a way could be found to resume
negotiations after the upcoming Israeli elections and
expressed optimism that the Obama administration might be
helpful. On Gaza, Bashar said Syria would push for a
humanitarian cease-fire at the Arab League Ministerial
conference. He claimed that Hamas had become more moderate
over the last two years and described Khalid Mesha'al as a
centrist because he had publicly stated that Hamas would
accept a return to the 1967 borders. Regarding a new U.S.
embassy compound in Damascus, Bashar said, "We will help you
find the land. We want a new embassy and we want a new
ambassador." End Summary

--------------
Iran "Could Not" Nuke Israel
--------------


2. (S) Recalling the Israeli attack on al-Kibar in 2007 and
on Iraq's nuclear reactor in 1981, Senator Arlen Specter
(R-PA) told President Bashar al-Asad on December 30 that many
Israeli politicians feel pressure to soon act militarily
against Iran's nuclear program. The Senator pointed to
Iranian President Ahmadinejad's continuing rhetoric about
wiping Israel off the earth and asked Asad what he would
recommend to try to avoid a war between Israel and Iran.
Asad replied that, "Ahmadinejad is not the ruler of Iran.

The ruler is Khamanei." Dismissing the Israeli concerns, he
said, "Khamanei could not use nuclear weapons (against
Israel) because (such weapons) would also kill Palestinians."

--------------
I Can't Turn My Back on Iran
--------------


3. (S) President Asad told Senator Specter that he "could not
turn my back to Iran." Asad explained, "Iran supported my
cause when the U.S. was against me, when France was against
me . . . how can I say no?" He continued, "Iran is an
influential country . . . whether we like it or not. If
Syria is also to be an influential country, it can't be
isolated. That is why we are deepening our ties with Turkey
and others." "That doesn't mean we support any nuclear
program," he clarified. "We just don't want to deny any
country's right (to enrich uranium). Iran has the right . .
. I have the right . . . nobody can take the right away from
us. We support monitoring."

--------------
Asad Offers His Solution
--------------


4. (S) Senator Specter countered that if monitoring was the
key, why was Iran not allowing the IAEA access to conduct
such monitoring? Asad answered that the current political
stalemate with Iran stems from the UNSC's involvement, which
had offended Iranian "national pride" and provided the
Iranians an "excuse to be stubborn." Asad suggested that any
monitoring process should be made to be "professional,"
rather than "political" in order to gain Iranian acceptance.
Next, he said that Iran should be given "incentives" by "the
six countries," such as a removing economic sanctions and
offering a non-aggression agreement. "You can't discuss
Iran's right (to enrich uranium),you must talk about
monitoring their program . . . with incentives," he
concluded. Senator Specter asked Asad how the West can trust
the Iranians when they seem to be so secretive? Asad
responded that the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) contained
technical and verification requirements that removed the need
to rely on trust.


5. (S) Bashar claimed that French President Sarkozy's "two
advisors" (Levitte and Gueant) had accepted his advice that
the West would not achieve anything with Iran by arguing over
Iran's "right" to pursue nuclear energy. He revealed that
Syria had been facilitating a direct meeting between the
French and Iranians, but said that Sarkozy's recent "negative
declaration" against Iran had caused the Iranians to cancel
the meeting. Despite this setback, Asad was confident that
he had persuaded the French to change the discussion from
arguing about Iran's "right" to a discussion about IAEA
monitoring options and incentive packages from the P5 1
countries. "This," he claimed, "is the solution."


6. (S) The Senator asked Asad why Iran would want the P5 1
countries involved, if Iran was unwilling to abide by UNSC
resolutions, since the UNSC contained five of the same
countries. Asad answered that Iran's problem was not with
the countries involved, but with the political stigma
attached to the UNSC, which Iran perceives is "just used for
sanctions." Asad said that during his summer trip to Tehran,
the Iranians had told him that they would not change their
position until the issue is out of the UNSC and the U.S.
"stops playing political games." (Comment: Bashar wasn't
clear on the P5 1 composition and never used that term. He
referred to it as the Europeans with Russia until FM Muallim
corrected him. The notable aspect here is that previous
visitors (including Sarkozy and Miliband) reported that
Bashar seemed not to have focused on the Iran nuclear issue
and was uninformed. It is unclear whether his proposal is
his own, Muallim's, or someone else's. End comment.)

--------------
Syrian-Israeli Peace Negotiations
--------------


7. (S/NF) Bashar said that the Turks had announced they had
stopped their involvement in the Israeli-Syrian peace talks
as a result of the situation in Gaza, and that Syria had
agreed with the Turkish move. Asad characterized the
cessation of indirect negotiations as an "unfortunate reverse
for both sides," but said, "we have to deal with this (Gaza)
first." Asad claimed that the indirect negotiations with
Israel had so far "gone perfectly" and said that he had been
"very optimistic." He said he was hopeful that a way could
be found to resume negotiations after the upcoming Israeli
elections and expressed optimism that the Obama
administration might be helpful.


8. (S/NF) Asad said, "We expected (Israeli Prime Minister)
Olmert to do something dramatic after he told (Turkish Prime
Minister) Erdogan Israel would give up the Golan," but that
subsequent Israeli foot-dragging had been disappointing.
According to Bashar, the Syrians had attempted to "probe" for
a sign of Israeli seriousness by starting with three baseline
geographical points. "If they accept these three," Asad
said, "then we know they are serious. So far," he
added,"they haven't accepted." (Comment: Asad did not
explain the apparent contradiction between this statement and
his earlier contention that the negotiations had "gone
perfectly." End comment.)


9. (S/NF) Asad looked to his Foreign Minister, and Muallim
described Syria's "three points" as dealing with the "line of
June 4, 1967: the north, the south and the middle." In
return, Muallim said, the Israelis had posed five questions
to the Syrians regarding security, or "what will happen after
the peace," as he put it. Muallim said that Syria had
prepared its answers to the five questions and deposited them
with the Turks, whose role Bashar described as a "bank." The
Turks (and Syria),he claimed, were waiting on the Israelis
to deposit their answers to Syria's three points before
sharing Syria's answers with the Israelis. Bashar concluded,
"Once we get (Israeli) agreement on these three points, we
can begin direct negotiations on more technical subjects,
such as water, positioning of military forces, access to the
land, etc." Olmert, said Bashar, ought to be a strong leader
and provide a response to the Syrians but is instead more
interested in the election of "his friends."

10. (S/NF) Senator Specter told Asad that PM Olmert had told
him that some day he would like to stay at the Damascus Four
Seasons Hotel. Laughing politely, Asad replied, "After
peace, okay," and then quipped, "but he will pay the bill . .
. not me." Growing serious, Asad said, "The line of 1967 is
the key to the Four Seasons. The Golan is . . . everything."

--------------
Discussion of Israeli Politics
--------------


11. (S/NF) Asad said his "people" were telling him that it
looked increasingly likely that Likud Chairman Benyamin
Netanyahu would soon again be Israeli Prime Minister, and
asked the Senator what Netanyahu had told him regarding peace
negotiations with Syria. The Senator responded that Bibi
remained cautious about the subject for now, perhaps because
he was still gauging the Israeli electorate's desire for
peace with Syria. Asad asked the Senator to "advise the
Israeli politicians that they should not make peace wait for
elections or it would never happen." The Senator responded
that Israeli politicians would never have the power to make
peace if they couldn't first get themselves elected.

--------------
On Gaza and Hamas
--------------


12. (S/NF) FM Muallim asked Senator Specter, "How can we
convince the Israelis that what they are doing (in Gaza) is
against their interests? They can't finish Hamas. Hamas is
stronger now than ever before. They can't make air strikes
without killing civilians. Can you ask the Israelis for a
humanitarian truce, to bring medicine into Gaza and allow the
wounded to be evacuated?" Asad suggested, "The word
'humanitarian' is an . . . easy approach . . . to a political
desire for a cease fire." Senator Specter said that he would
support a humanitarian cease-fire, and hoped that both
parties might use such a cease-fire to try to build a more
lasting peace. Bashar said that he had asked FM Muallim to
propose a humanitarian cease-fire during the December 31
emergency Arab League Ministerial meeting in Cairo, and that
he would be discussing it with Turkish PM Erdogan in Damascus.


13. (S/NF) When Senator Specter pressed Asad on Hamas'
insistence on Israel's destruction, Asad said Khalid Mesha'al
had stated publicly that Hamas would accept a return to the
pre-war 1967 border demarcation of Israel. Asad said this
statement had implied acceptance of Israel's existence, but
"nobody had encouraged (praised) Hamas for saying this."
Asad said Mesha'al had also stated publicly that Hamas would
accept whatever final peace agreement with Israel the
Palestinian people accepted. When Senator Specter asked how
the Palestinian people's voices could be measured, Asad
suggested by referendum.


14. (S/NF) Asad claimed Hamas had changed over the last two
years, and mused that living in Syria had had a moderating
effect on Khalid Mesha'al. (Note: Asad often said "Hamas"
when he seemed to be referring to Mesha'al. End note.)
Bashar characterized Hamas as similar to any political
movement in that it had its own "right wing, left wing and
middle." He described Mesha'al as a centrist because he had
said -- more than once -- that Hamas would accept a return to
the 1967 borders. "You need dynamism in politics and a
desire to seize even the smallest opportunity," he explained,
suggesting that Israel and the West had missed such an
opportunity by not praising Hamas for Mesha'al's conciliatory
statement.

--------------
On Lebanon and Hizballah
--------------


15. (S/NF) In response to a question from Senator Specter,
Bashar said Israel could not be concerned about Lebanese
independence after occupying it and destroying it several
times. Becoming defensive, Asad described the
Syrian-Lebanese conflict as a "bilateral issue," and said
"you can't tell me to leave Lebanon and then ask me to
control it." Regarding internal Lebanese political
conflicts, Asad said, "We helped them solve their problems at
Doha, and so did the Qataris." Since then, he continued,
Syria has made two of three steps towards normalizing
relations with Lebanon. The first, he said, was the public
announcement of Syria's intention to establish diplomatic
relations with Lebanon. The second step was sending Syrian
diplomats the previous week to open the Syrian Embassy in
Beirut. The final step will be sending an ambassador, but
the key was establishing diplomatic relations and opening the
embassy. Shrugging resignedly, he said "Our process is
slow." Chuckling slightly, he added, "Syria moves slowly."


16. (S/NF) Bashar denied that Syria was providing arms to
Hamas, saying that Syria couldn't deliver arms overland
through Jordan nor by sea to Gaza. Asad shifted the blame to
Egypt for allowing arms smuggling into Gaza, saying, "We do
not allow arms shipments to go through Syria . . . for my
security, and not because we are Israel's bodyguards."
Regarding Hizballah, Asad protested, "I can't talk about
Hamas and Hizballah. Hizballah is in Lebanon, Hamas is in
Palestine. A comprehensive peace is necessary to solve these
issues."

--------------
Heated Exchange on New Embassy
--------------


17. (C) Senator Specter raised the request for a new U.S.
Embassy compound (NEC) in Damascus, and Asad said that he had
recently spoken about this issue with former President Jimmy
Carter. Asad asked if anyone from the Embassy was present in
the meeting and the Charge d'Affaires identified herself. FM
Muallim said that the Damascus Community School (DCS) site
was not an acceptable alternative for a NEC, arguing that the
residential neighborhood was unsuitable for an embassy.
Charge pointed out that both the Emirati and Qatari Embassies
were located on the DCS compound, so there was precedent for
another embassy in the neighborhood. Muallim then said that
the Qataris had complained about the noise of a construction
project at DCS last summer and said that building an embassy
there would be "too much," to which Asad seemed to agree.


18. (C) Regarding the original SARG plan to relocate all
embassies several kilometers outside of Damascus to an as yet
undeveloped "diplomatic quarter" in Yafour, Asad said softly,
"We are revising our plans for a diplomatic quarter." Charge
then suggested the Kfar Souseh neighborhood as a potential
site and Asad nodded non-committally, offering "or somewhere
else on the margins of Damascus." A visibly irritated
Muallim then said, "The only formal request we have from you
is for land in Yafour." Charge responded that this was
because Yafour was where the MFA had told us we must go.
Charge again stated the USG desire to consider other
locations, and asked for Syrian help in finding suitable
land. Raising his voice, Muallim said, "It's not our job to
find you land," and repeated the statement about our formal
request for Yafour. Charge suggested that perhaps Muallim
did not have accurate information, and explained that she had
recently discussed four acceptable options with the MFA Chief
of Protocol. A clearly uncomfortable Asad attempted to
regain control of the discussion by offering his assurance
that an appropriate solution could be found. Charge directly
asked Asad if he would help us obtain the land for a new
embassy, and Bashar replied, "Yes, we will help you find the
land. We want a new embassy and we want a new ambassador."
Charge thanked Asad, and told him it would be important to
resolve the new embassy issue before a new ambassador arrived.

--------------
Comment
--------------


19. (S/NF) Notably, there was no discussion of the October 26
raid on Abu Kamal and even when Senator Specter raised the
al-Kibar attack in the context of Iran, Bashar did not take
the bait. We plan to pursue Asad's promise to help us obtain
land for a NEC, although the MFA may well try to walk it
back. End comment.

--------------
Participation
--------------


20. (U) U.S.A.:
Senator Arlen Specter (R-PA)
Charge d'Affaires Maura Connelly
Legislative Director Christopher Bradish
Colonel Phillip Skuta, USMC
CAPT Ronald Smith, MC, USN
Notetaker Andrew Abell

Syrian Arab Republic:
President Bashar al-Asad
Foreign Minister Walid al-Muallim
Presidential Advisor Buthayna Shaaban
Unknown male Presidential Palace Staffer


21. (U) CODEL Specter did not clear this report.
CONNELLY