CORRECTED COPY: MFA REQUESTS EMBASSY HELP FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DAMASCUS 000288

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA, EEB/ESC/TFS; NSC FOR
SHAPIRO/MCDERMOTT; COMMERCE FOR BIS/CHRISTINO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/16/2019
TAGS: EAIR ECON ETRD ETTC PGOV PREL GE SP SY
SUBJECT: CORRECTED COPY: MFA REQUESTS EMBASSY HELP FOR
SYRIAN AIR

REF: A. DAMASCUS 279

B. DAMASCUS 192

C. DAMASCUS 188

D. 08 DAMASCUS 661

E. 08 DAMASCUS 599

F. 08 DAMASCUS 438

G. 07 DAMASCUS 950

DAMASCUS 00000288 001.3 OF 003


Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Maura Connelly for reasons 1.4(b,d)

(C) Due to a technical error occurring in transmission,
DAMASCUS 286 contained only eight paragraphs of a
twelve-paragraph cable. This corrected copy of DAMASCUS 286
should have twelve paragraphs.

--------------
Summary
--------------


1. (C) In an April 15 meeting requested by Vice Foreign
Minister Faisal Miqdad, the Director General of Syrian Air
asked for the Embassy's help in obtaining export licenses for
maintenance on 17 aircraft engines and three auxilliary power
units. Two Airbus A320 engines are involved in a contractual
dispute with Lufthansa Technik of Germany, while 15 V2500
engines (also for the A320) need maintenance and service
bulletins from the Connecticut-based company IAE. One
Honeywell-brand APU is currently stuck in Spain, while two
others in Damascus await major repairs. Further down the
airline's wish-list, the Syrian Air executive expressed her
desire to purchase new aircraft from either Airbus or Boeing.
Charge advised the Director General and Vice Foreign
Minister that the purchase of new aircraft should be
addressed as a political, rather than a humanitarian, issue.
End summary.

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MFA Follows Up on Syrian Air
--------------


2. (C) After the March 7 meeting in which FM Walid al-Muallim
raised the issue of an export license for a Syrian Air Airbus
engine with NEA A/S-designate Feltman and NSC Senior Director
Shapiro (ref B),Post sent a dipnote offering to brief MFA
officials on the subject of trade sanctions and export
licenses, particularly relating to civil aviation. In
response to our dip note, Vice Foreign Minister (VFM) Faisal
Miqdad requested a meeting on April 15 with Charge, Econoff,
Miqdad's Chef de Cabinet Husam Ala'a, Director General and
CEO of Syrian Arab Airlines (Syrian Air) Ghaida Abdullatif
and Syrian Air Technical Director Mohiedin Issa.


3. (C) VFM Miqdad opened the meeting by saying the Syrian
government had "welcomed" A/S-designate Feltman's remarks in
the March 7 meeting that the Obama administration considered
civil aviation safety to be a humanitarian issue, and the MFA
appreciated the Embassy's efforts to follow up. Miqdad said
these steps were indicative that the U.S. genuinely wanted a
"new approach" towards its relations with Syria, as were
A/S-designate Feltman's meetings in Washington with Syrian
Ambassador Imad Mustafa. "This," Miqdad offered, "is the
correct approach." Arriving at the point of the meeting,
Miqdad concluded that the first issue that "we must address"
is Syrian Airlines.

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Syrian's Air's Wish List
--------------


4. (C) Painting a grim picture of Syrian Air's current

DAMASCUS 00000288 002.4 OF 003


condition, Abdullatif enumerated the airline's "top three
priorities." First, she said, was convincing Lufthansa
Technik to re-export an Airbus A320 engine that Syrian Air
had paid to have reconditioned in Germany (ref A, B). She
claimed that Syrian Air had contracted with Lufthansa Technik
in 2004 to overhaul two A320 engines. (Note: Based on past
conversations with Issa, we believe Syrian Air only shipped
one of the two engines to Germany and the other remains in
Damascus. End note.) Abdullatif claimed that any financial
dispute between Lufthansa Technik and Syrian Air had been
resolved (ref A),but Lufthansa Technik was now "afraid" of
applying for an export license for fear of exposing itself to
U.S. government legal action for performing the overhaul
without first obtaining a license -- which Lufthansa
Technik's attorneys evidently believe may have violated U.S.
sanctions.


5. (C) Technical Director Mohiedin Issa added that Syrian Air
faced a similar situation with respect to three Honeywell
auxilliary power units (APU) that were in need of overhaul.
Syrian Air sent one APU to Spain to be overhauled by a
company affiliated with Iberia airlines. The company had
previously received an export license to install a navigation
system for Syrian Air, and was surprised when its application
for a license to overhaul the APU had been denied. According
to Issa, the company now fears that it may be in violation of
sanctions for having performed the overhaul and refuses to
ship the APU back to Syria. Abdullatif argued that the APUs,
which provide electrical power to the aircraft while on the
ground, are essential to the safe operation of the aircraft
by powering the lights and communication systems while the
plane is at the gate and passengers are on-board.


6. (C) After explaining our understanding of the trade
sanctions and the export license application process, we
suggested that Syrian Air might encourage Lufthansa Technik
to seek an advisory opinion from BIS if it wanted an official
USG opinion of its legal position with respect to sanctions.


7. (C) The airline's next priority, according to Abdullatif,
was obtaining maintenance service from International Aero
Engines (IAE). She said that Syrian Air had purchased 15
V2500 engines from the Connecticut-based company prior to the
imposition of U.S. sanctions to operate on its fleet of six
A320s. She claimed that after sanctions had been imposed,
IAE had received an export license in 2004 to maintain its
service contract on the 15 engines. IAE's subsequent
application to renew its license in 2006, however, had been
denied. Since that decision, IAE had ceased providing any
spare parts or daily service bulletins for the 15 engines.
Other companies that were capable of providing similar
services -- Pratt and Whitney, Rolls Royce, Japanese Aero
Engines and MTU Aero Engine (Germany) -- had all refused to
work with Syrian Air based on the USG's refusal to renew
IAE's export license in 2006. Abdullatif said that Syrian
Air's inability to receive spare parts and daily bulletins
from IAE significantly degraded the safety of Syrian Air's
A320 fleet, which currently numbered just four operational
aircraft.

--------------
We Need New Planes
--------------


8. (C) Syrian Air's third priority, according to Abdullatif,
is purchasing new aircraft. She explained that Syrian Air
had signed an MOU with Airbus to purchase eight narrow-body
aircraft from the A320 family, but said the MOU contained a
clause that made the purchase dependent upon Airbus' receipt
of an export license from the U.S. government. She described

DAMASCUS 00000288 003 OF 003


her recent meeting with Boeing Commercial Director for the
Middle East and Africa Donald Galvanin (ref A) as
"excellent," and said that Syrian Air hoped to sign a similar
MOU with Boeing to purchase 737 and 777s.


9. (C) Charge advised Miqdad and Abdullatif that it was
unlikely that Syrian Air's desire for new aircraft could be
justified on humanitarian grounds, and would be better
addressed as a political issue. She suggested that the
Syrians should raise this issue with Washington visitors who
want to have political discussions in Damascus, and reminded
them that Ambassador Mustafa is also in position to raise it
in his meetings in Washington.


10. (C) Miqdad acknowledged the Charge's point, and said he
would raise it with FM Muallim. He also asked the Charge to
convey the Syrians' desire to purchase new aircraft in her
report on this meeting to Washington in order to start the
discussion as soon as possible. "It's good to have these
kinds of frank discussions," Miqdad said. "We hope this
meeting will facilitate a good beginning."

--------------
Conveying a Request to Meet Again
--------------


11. (C) The Charge next informed Miqdad of the proposed visit
A/S-designate Feltman and NSC Senior Director Shapiro to
Syria on April 27. Miqdad responded that the proposal was
"excellent news," but expressed concern that "no one" would
be available to meet with the delegation on April 27. (Note:
FM Muallim may be accompanying President Asad to Austria for
meetings on April 27-28. End note.) He promised to convey
the request to FM Muallim and respond by April 16 with an
alternative date if April 27 is, in fact, not possible.

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Comment
--------------


12. (C) Abdullatif's frank description of Syrian Air's
"priorities" paints an even grimmer picture of the airline's
desperate condition than our internal assessments had
indicated. Although we were aware of the two engines
requiring maintenance from Lufthansa Technik, this was the
first we had heard of the 15 engines needing service from IAE
or the three Honeywell APUs. Notably absent from Syrian
Air's presentation was any discussion of the two export
licenses to recondition the Boeing 747-SPs. Laying their
cards on the table, the Syrian regime has
uncharacteristically acknowledged its need for our help.
They will see our response as a metric by which to guage the
seriousness of our desire to engage them.
CONNELLY