ASAD AT AL SUMMIT: ASSERTING RIGHT OF ARAB

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 000226

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ELA
NSC FOR SHAPIRO/MCDERMOTT
PARIS FOR WALLER
LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/25/2029
TAGS: PREL KPAL KWBG AL IS SU IR SY
SUBJECT: ASAD AT AL SUMMIT: ASSERTING RIGHT OF ARAB
RESISTANCE, SUPPORTING ARAB UNITY

REF: STATE 28323

Classified By: CDA Maura Connelly for reasons 1.4 b and d.


1. (S) Summary: Syria's Bashar Asad heads this week to the
Arab League Summit in Doha seeking to support Qatar's efforts
for a productive meeting and to assure moderate Arab states
of Iran's desire for better relations. Syria's position on
Sudan remains aligned with that of Qatar in support of Arab
League and African Union efforts to broker a deal among
Sudanese political factions. Syria opposes the International
Criminal Court's (ICC) indictment of President Bashir and is
for now less concerned with the current humanitarian crisis
sparked by Khartoum's decision to expel humanitarian workers.
The Syrian Government, most recently in a long interview
with Asad by Lebanese daily as-Safir, continues to tout its
strong desire for Palestinian reconciliation. Syrian
officials argue, however, that demanding Hamas compliance
with Quartet principles as a pre-condition to forming a unity
government will prevent the parties from reaching a
compromise. They also suggest the international community
should avoid the approach it adopted in 2006 toward the NUG,
while arguing the new Israeli government should be required
to endorse the same Quartet principles. On the Arab Peace
Initiative, a Syrian MFA contact suggests Arab leaders are
likely to agree on keeping the initiative on the table, but
they will link its "activation" to acceptance of the API by
the incoming Israeli government. End Summary.


2. (S) Vice Foreign Minister Faisal Miqdad's Chef Husam
Ala'a convoked Charge March 25 to discuss a follow-up issue
related to Acting NEA A/S Feltman's and NSC NENA Senior
Director Shapiro's March 7 meeting with Syrian FM Muallim
(septel). Charge took the opportunity to deliver reftel
points. Ala'a, who did not have a ready answer to Charge's
question regarding proper procedures for the U.S. Embassy to
deliver demarches, agreed to respond "indirectly." (Comment:
This was the first Embassy demarche to the Syrian MFA in
recent memory.) Ala'a said he planned to travel with the
Syrian delegation to Doha later in the week.


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Sudan, ICC, and Humanitarian Workers
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3. (S) In response to reftel's points regarding Sudanese
President Bashir's objectionable decision to expel NGO
humanitarian workers, Ala'a replied that the Arab League
viewed the ICC's course as counterproductive. First, there
was the indictment of a sitting president, which established
a negative precedent. Moreover, the ICC's indictment of
Bashir had scuttled Qatari-hosted talks between the Sudanese
government and the Justice and Equity party that were
organized under Arab League and African Union auspices.
Ala'a commented further that U.S. policy advocated selective
application of the ICC's jurisdiction, in some cases arguing
against it, and in others, favoring it. This practice
suggested the existence of a double standard, for instance,
in which the U.S. criticized international reports on alleged
Israeli crimes against humanity in Gaza, while it favored the
ICC's indictment of Bashir for alleged crimes against
humanity in Darfur. Charge argued that the important point
for Arab Leaders was not to embrace Bashir at the Summit. The
USG's most immediate concern was Bashir's expulsion of NGOs
from Sudan, a move that threatened to exacerbate an already
grave humanitarian situation.


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Arab Peace Initiative
--------------



4. (S) Ala'a reported there would probably be continued
discussion of the Arab Peace Initiative in Doha, but it
looked likely that the API would "remain on the table." He
added that the Arab Leaders still needed to reach agreement
on what Israeli actions would be necessary to "activate" the
initiative, explaining that Syria favored a proposal to
require the incoming Israeli government to announce its
acceptance of the API. The Syrian government was waiting to
see the composition of the Israeli government as well as its
platform on how it will approach peace issues.

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DAMASCUS 00000226 002 OF 002


Palestinian Reconciliation
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5. (S) Charge reported that FM Muallim had told Acting A/S
Feltman that Syria was working to moderate Hamas's position
and wanted Hamas to join the PLO. As Acting A/S Feltman had
stated March 7, the U.S. wanted any reconciliation process to
result in an endorsement of core Quartet principles. Ala'a
replied Syria had encouraged Hamas to act constructively and
attached a high importance to Palestinian reconciliation.
Syria's position, however, emphasized the need for the
international community to avoid dealing with any new
Palestinian government in the way that it did with the
short-lived 2006 unity government. Hamas's integration into
the PLO was one element of the reconciliation process, but
the terms of this process were still under discussion. In
light of the likelihood of a conservative Israeli government,
Syria urged the international community to apply the Quartet
principles not only to the Palestinians, but also to the
Israelis. Not only was there a question, he said, of the new
GOI's acceptance of previous agreements, there was also some
doubt that parties in the new coalition would accept the
two-state solution.


6. (S) Ala'a argued that the days of Hamas suicide bus
bombings aimed at scuttling peace efforts had passed. Syria
supported the right of armed Palestinian resistance so long
as "current circumstances continue." The West should expect
a strong Arab reaction against a conservative Israeli
government and "extreme" Israeli positions. If, on the other
hand, Israel moved in the direction of peace, it would be
easier to convince Hamas and other Palestinian groups to
exercise restraint. Charge replied the U.S. administration
had placed a high priority on achieving a two state solution
and comprehensive peace. Ala'a acknowledged this position,
but reiterated that moderating Hamas's position would be
increasingly difficult if Israel adopted more extreme
policies.


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Comment
--------------



7. (S) As the outgoing titular President of the Arab League,
Bashar is set to arrive in Doha this week in a considerably
stronger position than he was in 12 months ago. His
government has taken the first step toward re-engaging
Washington after having solidified ties with key EU
countries, all without granting significant concessions or
modifying Syria's positions. Bashar's talks in Riyadh with
Saudi King Abdullah and Egyptian President Mubarak in Riyadh
appeared to have established sufficient common ground to
prevent a replay of the deep Arab divisions over Lebanon that
nearly scuttled last year's AL summit hosted by Damascus.
The naming of a Syrian ambassador to Lebanon, three months
after Bashar promised the French it would be done, represents
a positive gesture toward Saudi Arabia and others in the name
of Arab unity. Syrian contacts suggest Damascus timed this
gesture to improve the Qatar's prospects for hosting a
successful summit.


8. (S) Meanwhile, Bashar's strong relations with Iran and
his support of Hamas during and after the Gaza crisis
reaffirm Syria's credentials as a key member of the
"opposition" camp, as the Arab world braces for a new
conservative government in Israel. At the same time, Syria's
engagement in indirect peace talks with Israel between May
and September 2008 gave it enough credibility as a possible
partner for regional peace to keep open the option of talks
with Israel. After eight years in power, Bashar has
solidified his position internally, inside the Arab world,
and internationally. He must feel some sense of quiet
satisfaction that, absent a premature demise, he may well
outlast the aging leaders in Saudi Arabia and Egypt who have
actively opposed him.

CONNELLY