FELTMAN-SHAPIRO MARCH 7 DISCUSSIONS WITH SYRIAN FM

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 000193

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA
NSC FOR SHAPIRO/MCDERMOTT
PARIS FOR WALLER, LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/12/2029
TAGS: PREL IS SY
SUBJECT: FELTMAN-SHAPIRO MARCH 7 DISCUSSIONS WITH SYRIAN FM
MUALLIM ON COMPREHENSIVE PEACE, GOLAN TRACK

Classified By: CDA Maura Connelly for reasons 1.4 b, d.


1. (S/NF) Summary: Acting NEA A/S Feltman and NSC NENA
Senior Director Shapiro stressed the strong U.S. commitment
to achieving a two-state solution between Israel and the
Palestinians and a comprehensive regional peace between
Israel and its other neighbors. The U.S. emphasis was no
longer on "process" but rather on concrete agreements, they
said. Muallim noted Syria and Israel had made progress in
indirect peace talks brokered by Turkey between May-October
2008; the parties had come very close in December 2008 to
moving to direct negotiations, but Israel,s Gaza incursion
led to a suspension. Now Syria was waiting to see whether
and how Israel would act once a new government was formed.
Feltman said that it would be difficult to imagine the U.S.
saying no if Syria and Israel asked for it to help advance a
peace agreement. Muallim affirmed the importance of a
constructive U.S. role in the region and reported Syria had
agreed to support 2009 Arab League Summit language that would
keep the Arab Peace Initiative on the table, albeit not
forever. End Summary


2. (S/NF) Acting NEA A/S Jeffrey Feltman and NSC Senior
Director for the Near East and North Africa Dan Shapiro met
for three-and-a-half hours on March 7 with Syrian Foreign
Minister Walid Muallim, Vice FM Faisal Miqdad, and
Presidential Advisor for Political and Media Affairs
Bouthaina Shaaban. Feltman's delegation was accompanied by
Charge and Pol/Econ Chief (notetaker.) Feltman and Shapiro's
central message was that the U.S. administration was pursuing
sustained and principled engagement with Syria and other
countries as a matter of policy. The President and Secretary
did not view engagement as a reward, but rather as a tool for
achieving concrete objectives. This cable reports on the
parts of the discussion that dealt with comprehensive peace
and Syrian-Israeli issues. It should be read in conjunction
with septels on discussions regarding Palestinian issues,
Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, and Embassy Damascus operations.


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U.S. Role in Comprehensive Peace Essential
--------------


3. (S/NF) In a lengthy review of regional peace efforts
since 1990, Muallim stressed U.S. involvement and political
will were necessary to achieve an agreement. With intense
U.S. involvement, Syrian and Israeli negotiators had
completed roughly 75-80 percent of the work before talks
broke down in 2000. In the end, the key issue was the June
4, 1967 line of withdrawal, which had been Syria's sine qua
non issue on which there could be no concession. Muallim
said there had been back channel discussion mediated by Ron
Lauder which had brought the parties closer to an agreement.
Beginning roughly two years ago, Turkey began mediating
between Israel and Syria to draw them closer to resuming
talks. To avoid another failure, Bashar decided in May 2008
to participate in indirect talks with Israel under Turkish
auspices in order to test whether Israel was serious about
reaching a deal.

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Review of Indirect Israeli-Syrian Talks
--------------


4. (S/NF) Muallim said Syria and Israel had made
significant progress in the 2008 indirect peace talks, but
the U.S. government had shown little real interest and seemed
to oppose the indirect negotiations. Muallim said the U.S.
was mistaken not to see value in the talks because their mere
existence had helped to calm the region and had raised
significant doubts about Syria's commitment to its relations
with Iran, Hizballah, and Hamas. The Syrian regime remained
aware that four rounds of indirect talks would in the end not
produce tangible results without American involvement. Syria
nonetheless reacted positively to Turkish overtures to
consider a fifth round aimed at moving to direct talks.
Muallim reported the parties had come very close in December
2008 ("a few words away") to moving to direct negotiations,
but Israeli PM Olmert had asked on December 24 for a few days
to consult with his coalition partners. Israel,s Gaza

DAMASCUS 00000193 002 OF 002


incursion on December 27 led to a suspension of the talks and
a sense in Turkey and Syria that the Israeli government had
used the promise of another round as a distraction from its
real military aims. Now Syria was waiting to see whether and
how Israel would act once a new government was formed.


5. (S/NF) The important factor for Syria was reaching
agreement of any direct talks on a "description" of the June
4 line of withdrawal. Syria, he said, had deposited with the
Turks a document with six geographical reference points, to
which the Israelis had never formally responded. Israel, for
its part, had deposited a draft paper on security aims and
principles with the Turks, to which the Syrians had
responded, but the response had not been shared with Israel
because of Israel's pending response to Syria's paper.
Agreement on a "description" of the June 4 line would be
necessary before direct negotiations on a "definition" of the
border could begin, Muallim stipulated.

-------------- --------------
Arab Peace Initiative: Still Alive, Not Forever
-------------- --------------


6. (S/NF) Muallim said he had recently chaired a meeting of
Arab League ministers in Cairo and had agreed to support
keeping the Arab Peace Initiative on the table, "but not
forever." He had worked closely with the Saudis to ensure
this position would be adopted by the March 2009 Arab League
Summit in Doha. Muallim urged the U.S. to convince the new
Israeli government to take advantage of this opportunity,
adding that Syrian officials were confident they could deal
with whomever led the new Israeli government.

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Syrian-Israel Agreement Not "Real" Peace
--------------


7. (S/NF) Syria, continued Muallim, was ready to sign a
peace deal with Israel without a parallel agreement on the
Palestinian track. But as President Asad had conveyed to
several recent U.S. Congressional delegations (CODELS),the
Syrian government (SARG) believed a bilateral Syrian-Israeli
treaty would not constitute real peace without a
comprehensive framework that included a two-state solution.
Welcoming the U.S. commitment to achieving comprehensive
peace (and putting emphasis on tangible results instead of
process),Muallim said Syria viewed U.S. involvement as
important.


8. (S/NF) Feltman welcomed Muallim's positive message and
stressed the U.S. commitment to a two-state solution and
comprehensive peace. He said the U.S. administration
believed the peace process had continued too long without
concrete results. The President had appointed Special Envoy
Mitchell on his second day in office and the Secretary had
announced a comprehensive Middle East peace as a high
priority in her first meeting with senior State Department
staff. The Secretary, moreover, had put a new emphasis on
achieving peace, vice a "peace process." It had taken some
adjustment within the U.S. bureaucracy, but now there was a
new emphasis on achieving concrete peace. Against this
backdrop, Feltman said, it would be difficult to imagine the
U.S. saying no if Syria and Israel asked for it to help
advance these objectives. Muallim welcomed this message and
said a U.S. role would be essential for achieving a
comprehensive peace in the region.


9. (SBU) Acting NEA A/S Feltman and NSC NENA Senior
Director Shapiro cleared this cable.


CONNELLY