KERRY - ASAD: IMPROVING THE U.S. - SYRIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DAMASCUS 000160

H PASS
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2019
TAGS: PREL SY
SUBJECT: KERRY - ASAD: IMPROVING THE U.S. - SYRIA
RELATIONSHIP

Classified By: CDA Maura Connelly for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: Syrian President Bashar al-Asad told
Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Senator
John Kerry that the U.S. position on the Middle East peace
process is Syria's most important concern. Kerry said there
was consensus among President Obama, Secretary Clinton, APNSA
Jones and himself on their hopes for the Middle East. The
U.S. needs to talk respectfully and frankly with the parties
in the Middle East. Kerry then advised Asad that the
perception he got from other regional leaders is "Bashar
al-Asad says one thing and does another . . or he says he
will do something and then doesn't do it." Asad demanded
specific examples: "I need to know this," he said.
Absolving himself of credibility gaps, Asad said he wanted
better relations with the U.S. He cited counter-terrorism,
a unified Iraq, and peace with Israel as areas where the U.S.
and Syria have common interests. Senator Kerry asked Asad
what he could take back to Washington as an indicator of
Asad's good will. Asad deflected the question by asking what
is the U.S. willing to do? Is it willing to revive the peace
process, for example? And that seems to be the main
stumbling block in restoring a U.S. ) Syrian dialogue: the
Syrians are unwilling to make concessions, convinced as they
are that they were ill-used and unappreciated by the Bush
Administration. Having apparently made a tactical decision
against it, the SARG did not raise the Syria Accountability
Act. End Summary.



2. (C) Senator John Kerry emphasized a new U.S. approach to
diplomacy in the Middle East during a February 21 meeting
with Syrian President Bashar al-Asad that lasted more than
two hours. Also attending the meeting were Syrian FM Walid
al-Muallim, Presidential Advisor for Political and Media
Affairs Bouthaina Shaaban, and Syrian Ambassador to the U.S.
Imad Mustafa. Kerry was accompanied by Charge as well as
SFRC staffers Frank Lowenstein and Perry Cammack. This cable
reports on the discussion of the U.S. ) Syria bilateral
relationship. Other subjects are reported septels.

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Changing Times
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3. (C) Asad opened the meeting with Senator Kerry by noting
that the position of the U.S. on the Middle East peace
process is the most important concern for Syria. Senator
Kerry, noting their previous meetings under the Bush
Administration, said the approach of the Obama Administration
would be different. Kerry said there was consensus among
President Obama, Secretary Clinton, APNSA Jones and himself
on their hopes for the Middle East. The U.S. needs to talk
respectfully and frankly with the parties in the Middle East.
Asad, he said, would of course have a vision of where he
hoped Syria would be in the next five to ten years; Kerry
posited Turkey's foreign policy as a useful model of
respectful engagement with a variety of partners in the
region and in Europe and as an example of a good balance
between security concerns and regional relationships. Noting
there are "big changes" ahead in how the U.S. will be dealing
with Syria, Iran, and the region, Kerry cited the concerns of
regional players like Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and
Saudi King Abdullah and other powers like Russia and China
over Iran's behavior. "People who think Iran is in the
ascendancy," he said, are making a mistake." The U.S. will
offer genuine choices that make sense to parties with whom we
want to reach agreement. The U.S. will also take strong
positions on issues such as nuclear weapons. "I've
recommended the U.S. reduce its nuclear arsenal to 1,000
warheads," Kerry said, adding that he will also try to get
Senate ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty (CTBT),to push the nuclear fissile material control
treaty, and to strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT). Iran will see a different climate and its
window for making choices and decisions is moving.

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"Asad says one thing and does another . . . "
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4. (C) Kerry then advised Asad that the perception he got
from other regional leaders is "Bashar al-Asad says one thing
and does another . . or he says he will do something and then
doesn't do it." Recognizing that Asad would like to change
some things, Kerry said the U.S. would like to be helpful.
"We both need to take steps to change the atmospherics . . .

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You have the opportunity to help us take mutual steps."
Kerry cited sending a Syrian ambassador to Lebanon and
expressing support for the Arab Peace Initiative as examples
of ways in which Syria could be helpful.


5. (C) Asad, honing in on the accusations regarding his
credibility, demanded specific examples of when he had said
one thing and done another. "I need to know this," he said.
"It is important to have trust." Former Secretary of State
Colin Powell "started this problem about what is said and
done . . . Egypt and Syria have a conflict, with Egypt
accusing Syria of making problems over the Palestinian
issue," said Asad, assuming one source of the accusations
was Egypt. And, clearly running through other examples in
his mind, Asad said, "When (Former NEA Assistant
Secretary/current Undersecretary for Political Affairs) Bill
Burns came here with a list of demands, I was very stubborn
with him ) I am like George Bush in this way."

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The Nature of Influence
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6. (C) Evidently absolving himself of credibility gaps, Asad
said he wanted better relations with the U.S. There were
issues on which Syria and the U.S. had common interests; he
cited counter-terrorism, a unified Iraq, and peace with
Israel as examples. "I've never had a detailed dialogue
(with any American) but you and some Europeans . . . the U.S.
tried isolation but what did it gain? . . . And what did
American support of Israel gain it (the U.S.) in the last
decades?" "If you want big goals," Asad advised, "you should
work with every influential player." Syria has very good
relations with Turkey, he noted, and Iran supports Syria,
even on its pursuit of peace with Israel. "Don't put me in
(Iran's) nuclear basket," Asad said, implying that Iran's
pursuit of a nuclear program had nothing to do with Syria.
Hamas, he argued, is influential; 15 percent of its vote in
2006 came from its core base but the rest of the vote won by
Hamas came from secular voters. "How am I influential? . . .
through the number of parties I can influence," he said.


7. (C) Kerry responded that nobody was suggesting that Syria
and Iran would not have a relationship, but there was a
perception that Iran is sending funds and weapons to
Hizballah. There are more weapons there now than before 2006
and there are missiles in Hizballah's stocks, as well as
Syria's, that have changed the peace process with Israel.
The long range goal for the U.S., he said, was not to have
Hizballah sitting with 40,000 rockets and missiles. The U.S.
has the will now to engage in order to resolve these issues.
That is why your ambassador (Imad Mustafa) has been called
into the State Department next week. "That is what has been
absent before . . Powell and (former Deputy Secretary
Richard) Armitage told you things to do but you got no credit
for it." The key is for us to establish a relationship up
front so that we both agree that you are proceeding along the
path we've agreed.


8. (C) Comment: Senator Kerry asked Asad what he could
take back to Washington as an indicator of Asad's good will.
Asad deflected the question by asking what is the U.S.
willing to do? Is it willing to revive the peace process,
for example? And that seems to be the main stumbling block
in restoring a U.S. ) Syrian dialogue: the Syrians are
unwilling to make any concessions, convinced as they are that
they were ill-used and unappreciated by the Bush
Administration. The unanswered question is whether dangling
the carrot of a Golan track will be an effective incentive
for Syria to change its behavior in Lebanon, Iraq, and with
the Palestinians. Our sense is that it will take a
considerable investment on our part to find out.


9. (C) Comment continued: In the meantime, we expect the
early phases of re-engagement to be frustrating, even if both
sides make efforts to create a positive atmosphere. Asad's
expectation that the Obama Administration will provide
recompense infuses the regime's thinking about next steps and
manifests itself in the erratic and erroneous media spin
engineered by Imad Mustafa. Conspicuously absent from
Kerry's discussion with Asad, and indeed any of the other
February codels' meetings with the SARG, was the subject of
U.S. sanctions. A remark attributed to Imad Mustafa )
"Syria did not and will not negotiate for the Syria
Accountability Act" ) appears to sum up the SARG's attitude
and tactical approach to getting sanctions lifted. Rather
than exploit the successive codel visits to build support for

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lifting sanctions, Syrian pride kept Asad from raising the
subject at all. Perhaps the Syrians expect that sanctions
will disappear if a peace deal with Israel is reached. The
SARG clearly has a long way to go before it understands
Washington dynamics but, given their misconceptions, the
prospect for finding common ground to move forward on shared
goals becomes all the more challenging.


10. (U) Codel Kerry has cleared this cable.
CONNELLY