Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09DAMASCUS149
2009-02-25 15:51:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Damascus
Cable title:  

SYRIA - SAUDI ARABIA: MOVING TOWARD NORMALIZATION?

Tags:  PREL SA SY 
pdf how-to read a cable
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ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 251551Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6019
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0573
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUCQSAB/USSOCOM INTEL MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 000149 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ELA, NEA/NGA
NSC FOR SHAPIRO/MCDERMOTT
PARIS FOR WALLER
LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/25/2019
TAGS: PREL SA SY
SUBJECT: SYRIA - SAUDI ARABIA: MOVING TOWARD NORMALIZATION?

Classified By: CDA Maura Connelly for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 000149

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ELA, NEA/NGA
NSC FOR SHAPIRO/MCDERMOTT
PARIS FOR WALLER
LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/25/2019
TAGS: PREL SA SY
SUBJECT: SYRIA - SAUDI ARABIA: MOVING TOWARD NORMALIZATION?

Classified By: CDA Maura Connelly for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: The Algerian ambassador provided his
understanding February 25 of the sequencing of a
normalization in ties between Syria and Saudi Arabia.
Initiated by joint concern over Saudi jihadists on the loose,
renewed contacts between the two have been expanded from the
counter-terrorism domain to a larger political context on the
insistence of the Syrians. The Saudis were reportedly
amenable in part in order to stem Syria's facilitation of
Turkish and Iranian "interference" in intra-Arab affairs.
Saudi FM Saud al-Faisal may come to Damascus as part of an
Arab League Troika to prepare for the late March summit in
Doha. Movement in the relationship with Saudi Arabia is
reportedly partly responsible for the SARG's reversal of its
decision not to attend the March 2 Arab League meeting on
Gaza reconstruction in Sharm el-Sheikh. The new relationship
between Syria and Saudi Arabia, while still nascent, will be
tested by the pre-elections period in Lebanon, where the two
are seen to have conflicting interests. End Summary.

--------------
Joint Concerns re Counter-Terrorism
--------------


2. (C) Algerian Ambassador Salah Boucha told Charge February
25 that SARG FM Walid al-Muallim's visit to Riyadh the
previous day had been part of a joint effort to relieve
tensions in the bilateral relations. According to Boucha
(protect),after the September 28 2008 bombing in Damascus,
the SARG sent the Saudis a "very precise" list of Saudi
jihadists on the loose that created great concern in Riyadh.
Contacts between the two governments ensued, with SARG
General Intelligence Directorate (GID) chief Ali Mamluk
visiting Riyadh. Saudi Interior Minister Prince Muqrin's
February 16 visit to Damascus followed up on those initial
contacts.


3. (C) The Algerian Ambassador said that the Saudis had
wanted to restrict renewed contacts with the Syrians to the
counter-terrorism sphere. The SARG, however, had rejected
that restriction and insisted that the counter-terrorism
cooperation could only proceed in the context of improved
political relations. To facilitate the resumption of a

political bilateral relationship, Arab League (AL) SYG Amre
Moussa visited Damascus February 17 and got Syrian agreement
to send Muallim to Riyadh February 24.

--------------
AL Troika in Damascus March 15?
--------------


4. (C) The next step, according to Boucha, is for the Saudis
to send FM Saud al-Faisal to Damascus, a step that the Saudis
are not particularly keen to take. The Syrians want him to
visit in a bilateral context but, according to Boucha, it
seems more likely that he would come as part of the AL
Troika, on or about March 15, in order to prepare for the AL
Summit in Doha later in the month. (Note: The Troika
currently comprises Syria as current AL president, Qatar as
the next president, and Saudi Arabia as the preceding
president. End Note) The Syrians ultimately aim for a visit
to Damascus by Saudi King Abdullah but recognize the time is
not yet ripe for that step. Asad reportedly believes he
should not take the first step by going to Riyadh (he was
invited during the January Arab Economic Forum in Kuwait)
because he last visited Saudi Arabia in 2007, a visit that
has not yet been reciprocated by Abdullah.

--------------
Muallim to Sharm el-Sheikh
--------------


5. (C) Another positive sign in intra-Arab reconciliation,
the Ambassador said, was the Syrian reversal in position on
participating in the March 2 AL meeting in Sharm el-Sheikh on
Gaza reconstruction. The Syrians had refused to attend,
based on their unhappiness with the projected role for Hamas
and Egypt's continued "monopolization" of the Palestinian
reconciliation process. Amre Moussa's visit and the trend
toward rapprochement with the Saudis had made the SARG decide

DAMASCUS 00000149 002 OF 002


to send Muallim to the meeting after all. (Note: Muallim
confirmed his plan to attend during a February 21 meeting
with Codel Kerry. End Note)


6. (C) Asked if the Saudi-Syrian rapprochement was not
leaving Egypt out in the cold, Boucha said that the Saudis
have their "own calculations." They were unnerved by recent
Shia rioting in Medina and unrest in Bahrain and found
themselves "under great pressure" during the Gaza conflict.
Moreover, the Saudis are unhappy with the cleavage in the AL
that is providing opportunities for Turkey and Iran to
interfere in Arab affairs; they want to bring Syria (which so
far has actively facilitated Turkish and Iranian
participation) back into the fold. Egypt, he noted, "had
lost something" during the Gaza conflict, with the criticism
over the closed borders in particular causing Egypt to lose
prestige among the Arabs. As a partner, Egypt's value, he
implied, had been diminished, at least in the eyes of the
Saudis.


7. (C) Comment: Syria and Saudi Arabia are clearly on a
track towards some degree of normalization, a process that
will be tested, however, by the pre-election period in
Lebanon where Syria's and Saudi Arabia's interests are
generally seen to be in opposition. There has been no
indication publicly, nor privately in the recent series of
Codel meetings with Asad, that Syria is toning down its
criticism of what it sees as dangerous Saudi meddling in
Lebanon on behalf of Saad Harriri. As much as the Saudis may
be concerned by the list of jihadists, the Syrians were also
rattled by the September bombing, enough it seems to reassess
the cold war with the Saudis. It is interesting to note,
however, that the SARG reportedly refused to engage in a
relationship ) no matter how potentially useful ) purely
founded on mutual counter-terrorism concerns without a
political relationship as an umbrella.
CONNELLY