ASAD TELLS CODEL BERMAN SYRIA READY FOR PEACE,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 DAMASCUS 000147

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DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/21/2029
TAGS: PREL KPAL PGOV PTER PHUM IR IS IZ SY
SUBJECT: ASAD TELLS CODEL BERMAN SYRIA READY FOR PEACE,
U.S. INVOLVEMENT NECESSARY FOR SUCCESS

Classified By: CDA Maura Connelly for reasons 1.4 b, d.


1. (C) Summary: President Asad's February 21 meeting with
CODEL Berman focused on the need for frank dialogue between
the two countries, U.S. concerns about Syria's relations with
Hamas, Iran, and Hizballah, and Syria's desire for an
American umbrella in a comprehensive regional peace process.
Asad said Syria and the U.S. shared common interests in a
secure and stable Iraq, real peace between Israel and its
neighbors, and in the fight against terrorism. Chairman
Berman stressed Asad had an opportunity to affect U.S. and
Israeli public opinion positively through gestures that
signaled Syria's interest in real peace. Berman praised
Syria's establishment of diplomatic relations with Lebanon
and said the U.S. looked forward to Syria's follow-up on its
commitments to send an Ambassador and demarcate the border.
Americans, he said, saw a contradiction between Hamas's
publicly expressed desire for Israel's destruction and
Syria's willingness to host the group's leadership while
maintaining Syria's interest in peace. Berman argued
Americans also viewed as hostile Syria's role in facilitating
the flow of foreign fighters. Bashar said Syria had pushed
Hamas to clarify its stance on peace with Israel and believed
Hamas could reach a reconciliation agreement with the
Palestinian Authority and adapt its position regarding peace
with Israel under the right circumstances. Asad said
Israel's Gaza incursion had disrupted indirect Israeli-Syrian
peace talks, but Syria was ready to re-engage if the next
Israeli government showed interested in resuming negotiations
and the U.S. was ready to provide an umbrella. Asad
dismissed U.S. concerns about human rights in Syria, saying
the U.S. lacked credibility on this subject. Asad touched
briefly on Syria's relations with Saudi Arabia, noting King
Abdullah was a "good man" surrounded by corrupt advisors.
End Summary


2. (C) Congressman Howard Berman, accompanied by Charge,
HFAC Chief of Staff Alan Makovsky, and Pol/Econ Chief
(notetaker),met February 21 for 90 minutes with President
Asad, who was flanked by FM Walid Muallim, Advisor Bouthaina
Shaaban, and Syrian Ambassador to the U.S. Imad Moustafa.
This was Berman's first meeting with Asad.


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How to Re-Engage
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3. (C) Asad opened by emphasizing the importance of frank
and candid dialogue without preconditions. There were
positive and negative issues between the U.S. and Syria that
would require frequent discussions at short intervals. The
development of better relations would require some
complementarity, but not identical overlap between the two
countries. Syria could help inform the United States about
the regional challenges involved in peace discussions and
fighting extremism and terrorism. In the Middle East, Asad
continued, one could not talk about a comprehensive peace
without considering all the factors, including Israeli
conflicts with Lebanon, Palestine, and Syria, in addition to
the conflict in Iraq. "We have to be able to move in
parallel," Asad suggested, even while each problem posed
different challenges and affected different interests. It
was impossible to solve one problem without considering how
they all overlapped, said Asad.


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Asad: Need Comprehensive Approach to Regional Issues
-------------- --------------


4. (C) Berman noted the Syrian President's analysis
contradicted those who said that peace agreements between
Israel and the Palestinians and Syria and Israel would solve
all the region's major problems, including terrorism. The
reality was far more complicated, he said. Asad replied that
terrorists were working to influence other issues; for
example, Bin Laden had claimed the Palestinian issue as
justification for al Qaeda's existence when he had no ties to
Palestinians whatsoever. Yet people in the region had
naively believed him. The point, Asad suggested, was that
solving the Arab-Israeli conflict would require progress on
many fronts.

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5. (C) Berman asked whether a peace agreement between
Israel and the Palestinians was necessary for peace between
Syria and Israel. Asad stressed the need to distinguish
between real peace and a peace treaty. It might be possible
for Syria to sign a peace agreement with Israel, but a
bilateral accord would not address the 400,000 Palestinian
refugees living in Syria. Even if Israel opened an embassy
in Damascus, Asad continued, there would not be real peace
until both sides resolved a wide range of local and regional
issues. A peace agreement represented a necessary beginning
but did not meet all the necessary conditions for peace,
emphasized Asad. Berman replied this discussion was akin to
which came first, the chicken or the egg? Berman stressed
the U.S. and Syria seemed to share the same objectives in
pursuing peace, but wondered whether the U.S. and Syria could
agree on how to solve any problems if it were necessary to
solve them all at once.


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U.S. Role is Key
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6. (C) Asad contended a Syrian-Israeli peace treaty would
be the first necessary step, but this agreement would prove
durable only if there was a "shared vision of peace." Egypt
and Jordan both had peace treaties with Israel, he said, but
it was difficult to argue there was real peace. Berman asked
Asad to describe his vision of peace. Bashar responded there
had to be an environment conducive to a robust process.
There had been some U.S. efforts in the region in 2008, but
they were inconsistent and limited to the process only. It
was important to have the U.S. play the role of arbiter and
guarantor, but the U.S. must come to this role based on an
assessment of its interests. Syrian and U.S. interests
overlapped a great deal (70-to-80 percent, claimed Asad),but
the devil was in the details. Syria and the U.S. shared an
interest in fighting terrorism, achieving peace, and seeing a
unified Iraq. It would be necessary for the two countries to
continue their dialogue to identify each government's
preferred approach, identify issues that required resolution,
and find ways to coordinate.


7. (C) Syria saw the U.S. role as key, Asad reiterated.
U.S. involvement could have made a difference in Syria's
indirect peace talks with Israel, as both sides were close to
moving to direct talks. The U.S. role would be essential to
establishing a diplomatic umbrella to achieve a deal and
arrangements to ensure its implementation, Asad said
adamantly. But first it would be necessary for the U.S. and
Syria to invest in a bilateral dialogue to lay the groundwork
for such an endeavor. Berman said he agreed with the need
for dialogue but worried that talking would become a
substitute for real problem solving in the region. We can
review the "headlines" for the main subjects to discuss and
stop the dialogue if we cannot reach agreement, Asad
answered. If both sides want to continue, they can.


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Berman: Time For a Grand Syrian Gesture?
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8. (C) Berman observed the lack of dialogue between the two
countries for the last eight years had not changed the
substance of the issues facing them. "There are a series of
issues, and we know them well," he said. It was fair to say
the previous U.S. administration had applied a strategy of
sanctions and isolation, but there had been no real progress
in confronting the problems in the region. So long as
re-starting U.S.-Syrian dialogue led to problem solving, "I'm
for it," Berman said. But there should not be dialogue just
for the sake of talking. President Obama had made a clear
commitment to engaging the Middle East and establishing a
process; he had appointed Special Envoy George Mitchell and
dispatched him to the region immediately after taking office.
There was now a quick policy review which was necessary to
help establish clear and achievable objectives. As Chairman
of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Berman said he
represented a separate branch of government. He would go
back to Washington for discussions with the Administration
and hoped to see a policy change. But, continued Berman,

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many Americans viewed SARG policies as contrary to U.S.
interests, and this perception was not just that of the
previous Administration. Syria could help by making a
positive and unmistakable gesture, as it did when it turned
over PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan to Turkey in 1998. That
decision, Burman explained, had led to a decade of positive
relations between the two countries and had advanced Syria's
interests in the region.


9. (C) Turkey was not occupying Syrian land, replied Asad,
so making a gesture in that context was possible. Though
Turkey had engineered a fraudulent election to regain the
province of Iskenderun, the circumstances were different from
Israeli occupation of the Golan. Returning to U.S.-Syrian
relations, Asad said the U.S. government system was complex
and many lacked an understanding of how U.S. policies were
formulated. The most important priority for deciding what
actions the U.S. and Syria might undertake together was to
reach an eye-to-eye understanding on their mutual interests.
Berman agreed, saying President Asad sounded like an American
when he expressed Syria's interest in a stable and unified
Iraq. At the same time, Americans cared about the threat
their soldiers faced from foreign fighters entering Iraq from
Syria and wanted to see if more could be done to stop this
flow. Berman said his personal view was that Syria's
establishment of diplomatic relations with Lebanon had been
very positive. The U.S. wanted to see more progress and
looked forward to Syria's fulfillment of its commitments to
send an ambassador to Beirut and delineate Syria's borders
with Lebanon.


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Iran
--------------


10. (C) Berman shifted to U.S. concerns regarding Iran,
saying there was bi-partisan agreement that Iran should not
be allowed to develop and deploy nuclear weapons. Berman
said whatever one's views about Israel's nuclear program, it
was hard to argue credibly that regional stability would be
enhanced by an Iranian nuclear weapons capability. A lot of
U.S. policy would flow from this premise, and many Americans
were not sure that Syria shared the same view. Bashar
expressed Syria's opposition to any new nuclear weapons
states in the region, referring Berman to Syria's draft UNSCR
on a nuclear weapons free zone for the Middle East. Asad
said there was a P5 1 process with Iran that was flawed
because it sought to negate Iran's right as an NPT signatory
to pursue a civilian nuclear program. Suspending Iran's
program as a condition for engaging in direct negotiations
with it was in fact a violation of NPT principles, Asad
maintained. Iran did not have a problem addressing issues in
the IAEA, but it did have an issue with UN Security Council
sanctions. Berman replied that he agreed Iran's suspension
of its enrichment program should not be a condition for
dialogue with it, because such an approach clearly had not
convinced Iran to cease its enrichment activities. However,
Iran's nuclear program remained a deep source of concern for
the American people, he said.


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Hamas
--------------


11. (C) Turning to Hamas, Berman said Americans in general
were deeply committed to Israel's survival and security. As
an American Jew, Berman said he firmly supported a Jewish
homeland that was democratic. He added that Israel's
occupation of Arab lands might one day lead to a Palestinian
majority under Israeli control. Hamas, he said, remained
committed to Israel's destruction. Though certain Hamas
officials had discussed the possibility of a Palestinian
state reached in phases and stages, Hamas had yet to come to
terms with Israel as a permanent reality in the region.
Syria defended Hamas as a legitimate resistance group and
hosted its leadership while Iran provided financial support.
The U.S. had designated Hamas as a terrorist organization
because its goal was to destroy Israel. Until it was clear
that Hamas had changed its position, what kind of peace would
be possible, particularly given Syria's important
relationship in hosting and defending Hamas? asked Berman.

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12. (C) Asad replied he understood Berman's commitment to
Israel. Syria had lived 60 years in conflict with the
reality of Israel and now believed peace was the best option.
Hamas originated as a Palestinian off-shoot of the Muslim
Brotherhood, a group with which the Syrian Government fought
during the 1980s. Hamas used to seek Israel's destruction,
Asad continued, but the "picture needs expanding." Hamas
leader Khaled Mesha'al had announced "three years ago" Hamas
could accept a two state solution; this was tantamount to
recognizing Israel "indirectly." Mesha'al also said in 2008
Hamas would accept a peace agreement if the Palestinian
people supported it in a referendum, Asad argued. "You have
to deal with reality," Asad said. "We host Hamas, yes. But
Hamas won the (2006 Palestinian) elections and we have to
work with it to change its ideology." Asad reiterated that
Hamas's religious ideology still "came from God," but he said
that the group's position had changed. Syria dealt with
Hamas because it had no choice. "If you want peace, then why
Hamas? Because without them, it won't work," he said. Syria
had pushed the Hamas leadership in the last several weeks to
define its position on a peace agreement with Israel. "They
said yes," to the idea of accepting a two-state solution,
Asad claimed, arguing this position had support at the grass
roots level. "If we move to peace, they will too. If not,
they will fall (from power)," Asad said. Fatah was losing
support because the Palestinian people opposed its policies.


13. (C) Berman told Asad Syria could be helpful if Hamas
was ready for peace. Neither the U.S. nor Israel sensed a
the kind of shift Asad was talking about. Asad replied Syria
could definitely play a role, but the U.S. needed to do its
part. Syria had worked hard to "bring Hamas along," but it
needed the U.S. to act constructively. Syria did not expect
the U.S. or Israel to deal directly with Hamas for now, but
the Europeans were doing so. Asad likened Hamas to the PLO
prior to U.S. willingness to deal with it. Berman replied
the PLO was a terrorist organization when he arrived in
Congress and U.S. policy changed only after the PLO changed
its policy. Bashar argued Hamas would be more flexible in
its views the more governments dealt with it. Not dealing
with it would ultimately fail and might prompt Hamas leaders
to walk back their views. The issue facing the new
administration was how it defined its position toward the
"new peace." There was a window of opportunity now that
would not stay open forever. The region faced a new
generation that was increasingly vulnerable to extremists and
it was time to make up for missed opportunities.


14. (C) In an aside, Berman noted that he had visited the
Syrian National Museum and been surprised to see a cartoon
exhibit on Gaza inside the front lobby. The cartoons went
beyond attacking Israel and evoked anti-Semitic themes that
usually were reserved for the worst of the Arab press. Asad
said the exhibit reflected the public's mood and how hard the
region had been hit by the Gaza crisis. "But it (the
exhibit) doesn't matter if we move toward peace," argued
Asad, who contended public opinion needed a release. "But
you have a responsibility to shape public opinion," Berman
shot back. Asad said the public's feelings were real, noting
"I was affected by the Gaza footage. This is a normal
reaction." Again, he reiterated, reviving a viable peace
process would re-focus the public's attention, and it was
important to seize the initiative now.


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Brief Exchange on Human Rights
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15. (C) Berman replied that reaching U.S. and Israeli public
opinion was also important, and one would always find
Americans defending basic decency and human rights,
regardless of whether bilateral relations with a given
country are up or down. The U.S. enjoyed close relations
with Egypt but nonetheless made human rights a priority.
"The U.S. can't speak with credibility as long as you occupy
Iraq and continue to operate Guantanamo," argued Asad.


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Iraq

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16. (C) Berman replied Obama had announced GTMO's closure
and had signed a SOFA to withdraw U.S. forces from Iraq. The
U.S. people understood the credibility gap inherent in the
previous administration's policies and had voted to change
it. Obama campaigned on the necessity of withdrawing from
Iraq, and the SOFA was the pathway to achieving this
objective. "It's not enough to say 'we'll do it,'" Asad
replied without any indication of irony. Occupation was
occupation. The U.S. had to leave Iraq, but how it did so
was more important. The political process had moved forward,
but the country remained "on the brink of civil war." A
disintegrated Iraq would affect the region and the world "for
another 400 years." The U.S. needed to use its influence to
support a "real political process" that started with a
national reconciliation conference and included all Iraqi
elements except those aligned with al Qaeda. "Maliki is
better than Saddam," Asad conceded, but he needs to extend a
hand to all Iraqis, including former regime elements. "End
de-Baathification once and for all," he urged. Such a
process would be complicated and would require the U.S. to
coordinate with international organizations, regional powers,
and other players. "This doesn't mean you have to be
humiliated," he added. Iraq wants its sovereignty and will
thank the U.S. for getting rid of Saddam if the political
process becomes more inclusive. Asad agreed with Berman that
things were moving in a positive direction but warned that it
could "get much worse." Al Qaeda was weak but could revive
and mount a surge. "There are sleeper cells everywhere,
including in Syria," he said.


17. (C) Berman replied that Iraq represented a potentially
fruitful collaboration between Syria and the U.S. Asad
agreed, noting that a security liaison had worked to both
countries' benefit, "without us always seeing eye-to-eye,"
until 2004. This liaison had "failed because of the mistake
you made in invading Iraq," Asad maintained. Berman noted
the U.S. viewed Syria's position with suspicion because al
Qaeda was entering Iraq through Syria, and it appeared as
though Syria was helping them. In response, Bashar likened
terrorists to scorpions. They were impossible "to put in
one's pocket or use as a card" without getting stung. The
terrorists, mostly Saudis, crossed into Iraq from Jordan,
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Syria, but the U.S. focused on
those coming from Syria. Syria had quietly been fighting
them inside its borders, but there were many sleeper cells,
he warned. The September 2008 attack against a Syrian
security force facility was only one example of how such
groups would operate and were reacting to Syria's efforts to
clamp down on their operations.


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Saudi-Syrian Relations
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18. (C) Berman asked Asad whether reports about Syrian-Saudi
reconciliation were accurate. "The King is a good man,"
replied Asad, "but others in the family are corrupt and
extremists." Asad faulted the influence of the Wahhabi tribe
for exporting an extremism that was at odds with Syria's
secular society. The Saudis now better understood the bad
influence of the Wahabis, but "it's too late," argued Asad.
Just as Jordan's King Hussein supported the Muslim
Brotherhood that had "returned to Jordan and threatened the
regime," the extremists in Saudi Arabia were now a threat to
Saudi rulers. Nonetheless, Syria was working to improve
relations with Saudi Arabia and would deal with political
realities. "This is how we succeed," Asad concluded.


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Comment
--------------


19. (C) FM Muallim, Ambassador Moustafa, and Bouthaina
Shaaban were visibly relieved to hear Berman express his
interest in "a problem solving approach," as opposed to the
more direct line of discussion taken by CODEL Cardin members
a few days earlier. When Berman remarked to Asad, "You could
have been an American talking when you said we shared an
interest in a unified, stable Iraq," Bouthaina whispered

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"yes" under her breath and Ambassador Moustafa nodded
vigorously and was then more able to control his fidgeting.
Still, Berman's softer tone did not gloss over the
substantive differences between the U.S. and Syria. The
Congressman's push for solid Syrian gestures to influence
American and Israeli public opinion took the conversation in
a direction different from what we have seen between Asad and
other CODELs. To be sure, Asad demonstrated little
willingness to make any commitments or respond with anything
other than increasingly familiar bromides, platitudes, and
international relations jargon. But Asad's remarks on
Syria's efforts to probe Hamas regarding Palestinian
reconciliation and eventual participation in peace talks
suggest an evolution in Syrian thinking about the
relationship between the Palestinian and Golan tracks that is
worth pursuing. Asad's preference to pursue both tracks
under a U.S. umbrella and his acknowledgment that peace
agreements won't solve everything suggests that Syria's
behavior toward Lebanon, Iraq, and Palestinian issues will
depend to a great extent on whether and how the U.S. engages
on the Golan and Palestinian tracks.


20. (SBU) CODEL Berman did not have an opportunity to clear
this cable.
CONNELLY