Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09DAMASCUS142
2009-02-19 16:11:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Damascus
Cable title:  

RE-ENGAGING SYRIA: ENTERING THE SYRIAN SPIN MACHINE

Tags:  PREL KPAO IZ IS SY 
pdf how-to read a cable
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DE RUEHDM #0142/01 0501611
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 191611Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6003
INFO RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI PRIORITY 1487
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 7521
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 5704
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0994
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 3821
RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA PRIORITY 0527
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0490
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0461
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 2315
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY 1646
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L DAMASCUS 000142 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ELA, NEA/PPD, AND PA
LONDON FOR SREENBY AND TSOU
PARIS FOR WALLER
ABU DHABI FOR PELLETIER AND ESCROGIMA
TREASURY FOR HAJJAR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/18/2029
TAGS: PREL, KPAO, IZ, IS, SY
SUBJECT: RE-ENGAGING SYRIA: ENTERING THE SYRIAN SPIN
MACHINE

REF: A. 08 DAMASCUS 890
B. 08 DAMASCUS 445
C. DAMASCUS 125
D. DAMASCUS 124
E. DAMASCUS 120
F. DAMASCUS 129
G. DAMASCUS 94
H. DAMASCUS 61

Classified By: CDA Maura Connelly for reasons 1.4 b and d.

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Maura Connelly for reasons
1.4 b and d.

C O N F I D E N T I A L DAMASCUS 000142

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ELA, NEA/PPD, AND PA
LONDON FOR SREENBY AND TSOU
PARIS FOR WALLER
ABU DHABI FOR PELLETIER AND ESCROGIMA
TREASURY FOR HAJJAR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/18/2029
TAGS: PREL, KPAO, IZ, IS, SY
SUBJECT: RE-ENGAGING SYRIA: ENTERING THE SYRIAN SPIN
MACHINE

REF: A. 08 DAMASCUS 890
B. 08 DAMASCUS 445
C. DAMASCUS 125
D. DAMASCUS 124
E. DAMASCUS 120
F. DAMASCUS 129
G. DAMASCUS 94
H. DAMASCUS 61

Classified By: CDA Maura Connelly for reasons 1.4 b and d.

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Maura Connelly for reasons
1.4 b and d.

1. (C) SUMMARY: Washington's answer on Syria
related questions -- our policy remains under review -- has
all but ceded public discussion of our policy to the Syrian
government. As the Department proceeds with its review of
U.S. policy toward Syria, the Syrian government's media
manipulation of Congressional travel and the recently
issued export licenses for civil aviation serve as a useful
primer on how the Syrian government will seek to portray
such decisions as changes in Administration policy and as
victories for the Syrian regime. Our roll-out strategy on
our new Syria policy should exploit the U.S.'s considerable
advantage in the international and regional media. While
the SARG's control over media inside Syria is near total
and limits us locally, we will use all available resources,
particularly Syria's only private newspaper al-Watan, to
amplify Washington's message. We suggest talking points to
put the ongoing review in the context of continuing
day-to-day USG decisions regarding Syria. Messages
directed at the Syrian people should be a component of any
strategy. End Summary.

--------------
That Was Then . . .
--------------

2. (U) Until recently, the SARG has had few opportunities
to manipulate positive U.S. policy pronouncements about
it. A steady stream of critical statements from the White
House and the State Department, coupled with cutting
personal remarks by then-President Bush about President
Asad, prompted the Syrians either to ignore Washington
completely or indulge in revisionist history to deflect
criticism. This was particularly true when Washington
criticized the SARG for its human rights record. Those
statements went completely unreported locally. When asked
to comm
ent on the dearth of media attention, Syrian media
contacts made it clear the SARG viewed the statements as an
irritant. Those same contacts, however, were swift to
point out that the SARG viewed an absence of tough
statements as a net positive. As three years of isolation
came to a close, Syria's only privately owned newspaper,
al-Watan, reflected the government's growing optimism that
change was coming with a countdown to the inauguration in
the upper left hand corner of the paper. It ran for more
than 60 consecutive days and featured an unflattering photo
of President Bush.

3. (C) With three government-owned daily newspapers,
two-state owned TV channels and several radio stations at
its disposal, the SARG deploys its coordinated policy
themes early every morning. While the Ministry of
Information plays a role in this message formulation, it is
the multiple branches of the intelligence services that
ensure coordination of the SARG's public message. Inside
Syria, al-Jazeera, the local favorite, and al-Arabiya are
readily available via satellite. The SARG currently
prohibits Sharq al-Awsat and al-Hayat from distributing
their papers locally and their websites are blocked
internally, though both maintain correspondents in
Damascus. Journalists are constantly adapting to the
SARG's shifting red lines, forcing even the most seasoned
journalists to comment that reporting "was much simpler
under Hafez al-Asad: we always knew where the red lines
were." As a result, savvy journalists have become adept at
self-censoring. Syria's internal repression of the IAEA
investigation into Syrian nuclear activity is perhaps the
best example of internal controls. As noted in ref A,
prior to the IAEA's June visit to Syria,
journalists were enjoined from reporting on the story
locally and foreign journalists were not given visas to
Syria during the period. In January 2009, U.S. Ambassador
to UNVIE Schulte's blitzkrieg with the pan-Arab media went
completely unreported inside Syria.

--------------
. . . This is now
--------------

4. (C) Six months into the tenure of Presidential advisor
Bouthaina Shaaban, Post has witnessed a remarkable up-tick in
the amount and sophistication of Asad's interaction with
western media outlets. During the Gaza crisis, Bouthaina
masterminded the President's interviews with CNN and the
BBC. The President's message, while consistent with his
rhetoric in the Arab world, was made more palatable for
western audiences. The 2/18 Guardian interview was published
to coincide with the first of three successive Congressional
delegations visiting Damascus. Wisely anticipating that
visiting delegations might attach a cost to engagement with
the U.S., the interview ensured that major headlines
focused on Asad's openness to U.S. diplomatic re-engagement
and not actions by the Syrians.

5. (C) With a Syrian Ambassador to Washington who is
desperate to remake his image with the new Administration
and against the backdrop of a continuing U.S. policy review
process, the SARG has capitalized by portraying the Obama
Administration as actively pursuing engagement with the
SARG. Ambassador Mustapha has wasted no time in leaking
the travel of every Congressional delegation to Damascus in
an effort to show the Legislative branch is actively
courting the SARG. CODEL Smith, the first visit of the new
Administration, traveled to Damascus January 30-31 and was
heralded by local media as a "delegation dispatched by
President Obama." Within hours of the CODEL's meeting with
President Asad, SANA was already disseminating the Syrian
version of events -- namely, that Congressman Smith had
reaffirmed Syria's important role in the region and the new
Administration's desire to develop U.S.-Syrian relations.
With the CODEL continuing its schedule and therefore
unavailable for comment, SANA's release was immediately
picked up by local media. Smith's departure statement to
international wires allowed him to emphasize the CODEL's
message, but the SARG version, namely, that Smith was sent
by President Obama, lingered in media reporting long after
the CODEL departed Damascus. Smith corrected the record
from Brussels, but the SARG's message went unchallenged for
several days.

6. (C) The export licenses recently issued by the
Department of Commerce to Boeing to overhaul Syrian Air's
two aging 747s provide another example of how the SARG is
actively spinning technical level decisions into a broader
policy narrative. After the U.S. Embassy confirmed to the
Syrian MFA that the licenses had been issued, Deputy Prime
Minister for Economic Affairs Abdullah Dardari linked the
lifting of sanctions to normalizing relations in a February
4 interview with Reuters. Absent any official comment from
the Department on the licenses or on Dardari's assertions,
the SARG continued to define the story. The Minister of
Transportation held a press conference on February 9 to
announce the licenses in which he asserted that the Obama
Administration was softening the sanctions against the
SARG. Presidential Advisor Shaaban continued the
SARG's spin campaign from Doha on February 16 when she said
"All sanctions levied against Syria are illegal under
Syrian law." From Washington's perspective, the story was
put to rest on February 13 during the press briefing, but
it remains alive and well in Syria. The SARG actively
encouraged the press to interpret the U.S. decision as an
indicator of its consideration of lifting U.S. trade
sanctions. For the next several days, members of the
diplomatic and business community sought verification from
Post of the change in policy. Most were genuinely
surprised to learn that the export licenses had been issued
within the provisions of existing U.S. legislation.

-------------- --------------
Tempering the Spin Cycle: Getting Our Message Out
-------------- --------------

7. (C) Our public talking points on re-engagement with
Syria should not cede the larger policy narrative to the
SARG. In the absence of decisions about what our policies
will entail, we believe it would be helpful to underscore
areas of policy continuity between the two Administrations
to make it clear to the Syrians what has changed, and more
importantly, what has not. For example, in the context of
engagement, we could point out that 264 export licenses
were approved by the Department of Commerce in 2008. Each
license issued was congruent with our existing sanctions
policy. At the same time, we must clearly articulate that
the review is a comprehensive one that will be made based
on an assessment of whether any gestures from our side have
prompted constructive steps by Syria. We might also make
clear that our constitution establishes a separation of
powers among the different branches of government. While
the Administration is cognizant of the legislative branch's
ongoing familiarization visits to Syria, the important
point is that any overarching changes to U.S. policy will
take place in the context of close coordination with
Congress as we move forward.

8. (S) A roll-out strategy could draw on statements from
the podium, backgrounders and/or on-the-record interviews
with international and pan-Arab media by senior officials
in Washington, London or Dubai, interviews with VOA and
al-Hurra, lines in public remarks by the Secretary, and
cleared talking points for the regional media hubs, PAOs in
the field, and other missions. A more detailed suggested
strategy for a policy roll-out will be provided Septel.
In the interim, Washington may wish to consider drawing on
the following general suggested themes:

-- There is an ongoing review of our policy with Syria. We
are not ready to make a pronouncement, but both the
Secretary and the President have said engagement will be a
part of that policy. Decisions that have been taken
recently are a part of routine business -- they do not
necessarily reflect changes now or in the future.

-- Congressional delegations travel in order to inform
themselves about world affairs, not because the
Administration has dispatched them. Congress represents a
separate, independent branch of government.

-- Sanctions imposed under the Syrian Accountability Act
allow for licenses in several categories including medical
devices and supplies, parts and components for civil
aviation safety of flight, and telecommunications
equipment.

-- Even as we take specific steps - such as
calling in the Syrian Ambassador, executive branch travel,
engaging Syria at a higher level, or the return of a U.S.
Ambassador -- we will continue to have ongoing
concerns about Syrian behavior that have not gone away
because of a change in administrations. Those concerns
include Lebanon and the need for the SARG to fully
implement UNSCRs 1559 and 1701 and to cooperate fully with
the Special Tribunal for Lebanon; Iraq and the continued
flow of foreign fighters; and Syria's relationship with
Hamas and Hizballah and other rejectionist groups that
undermine international efforts to stabilize the Middle
East.

-- As we look at a new engagement with Syria, these
issue will be important parts of our ongoing dialogue.

9. (C) Locally, we will reinforce these themes message
with key contacts on background. We can do some
on-the-record work, but need Washington to clearly
elucidate our policy in order to amplify it here locally.

10. (C) Comment: The coming weeks present a unique
opportunity to re-frame our narrative with Syria in U.S.
terms. Not doing so will only continue to raise SARG
expectations and be harmful to U.S. policy interests over
the long term. We must be clear in our message and use all
available resources to amplify it from the field if we are
to counter the Syrian version of events.
CONNELLY