Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09DAMASCUS132
2009-02-12 14:26:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Damascus
Cable title:  

SCENESETTER FOR CODELS CARDIN, BERMAN, AND KERRY

Tags:  PREL ETRD ECON PTER PREF PAUM PARM KWBG LE 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO0348
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHDM #0132/01 0431426
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 121426Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5977
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 7513
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 5699
RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY 5065
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 2309
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY 1641
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 DAMASCUS 000132 

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H PASS FOR MACDERMOTT AND RICH//DEPARTMENT FOR
NEA/ELA//PARIS FOR WALLER//LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2019
TAGS: PREL ETRD ECON PTER PREF PAUM PARM KWBG LE
IZ, SY
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR CODELS CARDIN, BERMAN, AND KERRY
VISITS TO DAMASCUS

Classified By: CDA Maura Connelly for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 DAMASCUS 000132

H PASS
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H PASS FOR MACDERMOTT AND RICH//DEPARTMENT FOR
NEA/ELA//PARIS FOR WALLER//LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2019
TAGS: PREL ETRD ECON PTER PREF PAUM PARM KWBG LE
IZ, SY
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR CODELS CARDIN, BERMAN, AND KERRY
VISITS TO DAMASCUS

Classified By: CDA Maura Connelly for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Chairman Cardin, Chairman Berman, and
Chairman Kerry, Embassy Damascus is looking forward to your
mid-February visits. You should expect an enthusiastic
reception by government officials of the Syrian Arab Republic
(SARG) and from the media, who will interpret your presence
as a signal that the USG is ready for enhanced U.S.-Syrian
relations. Your visits over the course of February 17 - 22
form a trifecta that Syrians will spin as evidence of the new
Administration's recognition of Syria's regional importance.
The Syrians will look for your assessments on the possibility
of reversing U.S. sanctions policy, and they will gauge your
views on the probability of returning a U.S. ambassador to
Damascus. The SARG may also seek your views on a U.S. role
in the Golan track with Israel. While we hope the SARG might
reveal a tangible side to their positions, our recent
experience (and that of the French) has shown that the Syrian
government's positive rhetoric yields little result over
time. Already, the SARG has begun to link potential movement
on issues of operational importance to the Embassy -- like
identifying a plot of land for a new Embassy compound -- to
major bilateral issues, including their fervent desire to see
U.S. economic sanctions lifted. On Syria's relationship with
Hizballah, Hamas, and Iran, we expect President Asad to
defend the necessity of ties to these actors because of
Israel's continuing occupation of Arab land. We view your
visits as an opportunity to educate senior Syrian leaders on
Washington priorities in the region and how Congress views
Syria in the context of the United States Government's new
policy of engagement. (They are not always clear on the

difference between Congress and the Administration.) End
summary.


--------------
What Syrians Want
--------------


2. (C) We anticipate that the Syrian public, to the extent
that they focus on these things, will greet your visits with
enthusiasm. Indeed, many will interpret your engagement as a
tacit admission that USG isolation of Syria has not worked,
and the SARG will seek to reinforce this perception. We
expect the regime-controlled media to spin your visits as
evidence of a clear break with past USG policies and
vindication of Asad's defiance of the previous
administration. Led by Syrian Ambassador to the U.S.
Moustapha, the SARG has been inviting members of Congress to
visit Syria. In fact, your visits represent something of a
personal coup for Moustapha, who is, from time to time,
rumored to be on the outs with the Syrian leadership and in
jeopardy of losing his job.


3. (C) The SARG endeavors to leverage contacts with Congress
to jump-start Syrian-U.S. relations. Given your respective
positions as Chairman of the Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe, Chairman of the House Committee on
Foreign Relations, and Chairman of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, you can expect intense interest from
Syria's state-controlled media about Congressional readiness
to re-visit the terms of the Syria Accountability Act (SAA).
Additionally, the SARG will want to gauge your views on the
possibility of the USG sending an Ambassador to Damascus.
(As you may already know, the Syrian media is rife with
speculation that an appointment is imminent.) Prior to the
Gaza incursion, the Syrians had been vocal in their call for
Americans to engage on the Golan track with the Israelis, and
they may attempt to use your visit to send further signals to
the Administration to this end.

--------------
U.S. Sanctions and Syria's Economic Woes
--------------


4. (C) While the SARG's public line has been that USG
sanctions are easily circumvented and have no real effect on
the Syrian economy, individual interlocutors readily refute
this claim. The truth is that the Syrian economy does suffer
as Syrian businesses and the SARG itself are unable to obtain

DAMASCUS 00000132 002 OF 005


critical software upgrades, spare parts for aviation and
industrial machinery, and other durable and consumable
products. What's more, USG sanctions deter foreign
investments, tarnish the prestige of the regime, and on this
point the SARG remains vulnerable.


5. (C) Additionally, the effects of the global economic
downturn on Syria's economy are building. The SARG recently
announced a series of measures to bolster the Syrian
industrial sector, which has been hard hit by the declining
purchasing power of Syrian consumers, slowing demand for
Syrian exports, and by an influx of inexpensive, Chinese
goods trans-shipped through Gulf states under the GAFTA. A
number of high-profile bankruptcies, particularly in the
textile industry, have left the Syrian commercial sector on
edge. Though difficult to quantify, rumors abound that
Gulf-state investors are putting large construction and
development projects throughout Syria on hold. The Office of
the Prime Minister has commissioned a group of Syrians,
including well-known economist Samir Seifan, to analyze the
effect of a prospective mass-repatriation of Syrian workers
from abroad, including both white collar workers and
laborers, on the Syrian economy and social stability.


6. (C) Last week, Syria's Deputy Prime Minister responsible
for economic development, Abdallah al-Dardari, admitted that
the sharp decrease in Syria's 2007 oil export revenues (the
SARG figures put it at 8.7 percent) exceeded government
projections. Inflation is rampant in Syria; even
upper-middle class Syrians are having trouble putting food on
the table and paying rising utility and fuel bills. The true
rate of inflation, which we estimate at over 30 percent in
2007, is never acknowledged by the Syrian government.
According to Dardari himself, however, the average Syrian is
now spending 42 percent of his income on food. Syrians are
feeling the pinch, and this puts pressure on the SARG to
address the issue of U.S. economic engagement.

--------------
Spinning the Sanctions
--------------


7. (C) You will find Syrians somewhat uninformed in their
understanding of U.S. sanctions policy. There is little
comprehension, even among educated Syrians and European
observers in Damascus, of the broad spectrum of measures that
are currently in place. A case in point is the recent
issuance of export licenses that will allow Boeing to
overhaul the airframes of Syrian Air's two aging 747s. While
issuance of these licenses for safety of flight reasons
followed an established procedure and had been in the works
for some time, Syrian state-run media (and some international
stories) have effectively portrayed license issuance as both
an early overture by the Obama administration and proof that
the USG can arbitrarily change the terms of our economic
sanctions policy. (Comment: Because the Boeing licenses
were the first Safety-of-Flight exemptions granted in several
years, we are hoping to see positive gestures from the SARG
to show its readiness to establish better relations.)


8. (C) The difference between acts of Congress, executive
orders against individual entities, and Department of
Commerce export control functions will be, for the most part,
lost on most Syrians and on some of your interlocutors. Even
among SARG representatives with a more sophisticated
understanding of our multi-pronged sanctions policy, you will
encounter a firm belief that the SAA can be quickly
"reversed". Ambassador Moustapha has not helped his
government to understand the political process in Washington.
Your visits present an excellent opportunity to educate
President Asad and the Syrian leadership on USG concerns, and
on how the Washington decision-making process works.

--------------
Engaging Syria
--------------


9. (C) The SARG are adept at renegotiating any terms of
engagement. The recent French experience in Damascus is
instructive. President Asad has yet to honor his personal

DAMASCUS 00000132 003 OF 005


commitment to Sarkozy to dispatch an Ambassador to Lebanon
before the end of 2008. At the same time, they have greatly
benefited from their initial engagement with the French: The
Syrians have achieved some forward movement on the EU
Association Agreement, and are enjoying the optics of EU
officials lining up to visit Asad and his advisors.


10. (C) To take another example of how the Syrian government
negotiates, in December meetings with visiting U.S.
delegations, President Asad suggested that he was considering
authorizing the re-opening of the American School and the
construction of a new Embassy compound. In a subsequent
meeting with a visiting U.S. delegation in late January,
President Asad and FM Muallim suggested that the re-opening
of the American School should be linked to a repeal of the
Syria Accountability Act. Clearly, for us, the bar is
already rising.

--------------
Iran, Hizballah, and Hamas
--------------


11. (C) Syria's central geographic location and its potential
as a spoiler in the region continue to threaten Israel's
security and Lebanon's fledgling democracy. Through
dangerous liaisons with Iran, Hizballah, and
Hamas/PIJ/PFLP-GC, Syria compensates for its relative
political-economic-military weakness by supporting surrogate
militias that it plays as cards to block U.S. regional
initiatives. President Asad has grown fond of saying "Better
relations with Washington cannot mean bad relations with
Tehran", and appears smugly confident that his regime's
strategy -- maintaining ties to Iran, Hizballah, and Hamas
while attracting European engagement with low-cost gestures
toward Israel and Lebanon -- has worked to erode Syria's
isolation and bolster the regime's prestige and credibility.


12. (C) Syria would like to be viewed by Western governments
as a regional power broker, and to this end it increasingly
acts as a conduit for Iranian influence in the region. In
recent meetings with CODELs and other visiting Americans,
Asad defended Syria's ties to Iran, Hizballah, and Hamas as
necessary responses to Israel's continuing occupation of Arab
land. Syria and Israel were "words away" from moving to
direct negotiation before Gaza, and Syria remains interested
in returning to peace talks with Israel once an Israeli
government is formed, he asserted. You can press him to
recognize the strategic opportunities that lie before him.
U.S. engagement with Syria can bring greater economic
prosperity to the Syrian people, a chance to heal Syria's
rifts with Arab countries, and an opportunity to regain the
Golan. But achieving these objectives will require Syria to
demonstrate that it is willing to be a credible partner in
peace and can deliver changes to its policies that currently
are undermining peace and stability in the region.

--------------
Lebanon
--------------


13. (C) We are carefully watching Syrian actions in relation
to both the upcoming Lebanese elections, and to the upcoming
tribunal on the Hariri assassination. As we noted earlier,
Syria has yet to fulfill its commitment to Sarkozy to send an
Ambassador to Lebanon by the end of 2008. Lebanese observers
are carefully watching the pace and level of USG contacts
with the SARG, and there is some concern on their part that
Syria will use a re-engagement with the U.S. to undermine
U.S. support for Lebanon's sovereignty.

--------------
Gaza
--------------


14. (C) During the Gaza conflict and current recent efforts
to consolidate the fragile unilateral cease-fires, Asad has
used his regime's relationship with Hamas to promote Syria as
the leading voice of Palestinian resistance, often at the
expense of more moderate Arab regimes in Egypt and Jordan.
The Syrian leadership defends its relationship with Hamas by

DAMASCUS 00000132 004 OF 005


pointing to the group's 2005 electoral victory and its
popularity among Palestinians. Yet, even prior to the most
recent Israeli incursion, Syria helped Hamas undermine the
Palestinian Authority's legitimacy by providing Hamas
Politburo leader Khaled Mesha'al a platform to denounce the
PA's negotiations with Israel. In a meeting with CODEL
Smith, Asad acknowledged the contradiction between Syria's
secular society and the long-term, theocratic ambitions of
Hamas. He maintained, however, that such disagreements
should not prevent dealing with them. In truth, Syria's
relative weakness had made the SARG dependent on these
groups. Our objective is to press Syria to use its influence
to promote reconciliation and stability rather than
confrontation.

--------------
Iraq
--------------


15. (S/NF) Syria has maintained relations with former Iraqi
regime elements and sought to deepen ties to Jaysh al-Mahdi
leader Muqtada Sadr and Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council chief,
Abdul al-Hakim. At the same time, Damascus has signaled to
PM Maliki's government a desire to improve ties.
Nonetheless, Syria remains an outspoken critic of the
recently ratified SOFA/SFA, calling the accords "instruments
to legitimize the illegal U.S. occupation of Iraq." Syria
denies any collusion with foreign fighters transiting its
territory en route to Iraq, even as senior security officials
confide to UK and French counterparts that some foreign
fighter facilitators mysteriously were released after being
arrested. Syrian officials dismiss our continuing concerns
about foreign fighters, noting (as FM Muallim told CODEL
Specter in December) "this is an old story". Syria detained
some 1,200 Al-Qaeda jihadis and is exercising greater
scrutiny of Arab males seeking entry into the country. But
Syria may be doing too little, too late, only to realize that
these extremists regard the country as more than a point of
transit. We have seen recent signs the SARG is worried about
the extremist threat, and this may be an area to explore for
future cooperation.

--------------
Refugees
--------------


16. (C) Recent cooperation with the SARG on Iraqi refugee
programs has expanded. In FY08, we were able to hit our
targets and resettle over 5,000 Iraqi refugees from Syria to
the United States. The SARG's continued issuance of visas
for visiting DHS interview teams and its cooperation on
allowing additional DHS team members into Syria mean we are
likely to reach our goal of resettling nearly 12,000 Iraqis
from Syria in FY09. Furthermore, for the first time in
Syrian history, the SARG consented to the presence of
international NGOs (including three U.S. NGOs) serving the
Iraqi refugee population. In just over a year, nearly a
dozen NGOs have been able to establish a presence here and
continue to provide much-needed support to the beleaguered
Iraqi refugee community.


--------------
Nuclear Aspirations
--------------


17. (C) Concerns linger over Syria's presumed intent to
establish a covert nuclear weapons program. Syria allowed an
IAEA inspection team to examine the al-Kibar site in June

2008. The SARG adamantly claims that soil samples that
yielded traces of enriched uranium were the result of Israeli
bombs containing depleted uranium. IAEA has sought follow-up
visits to Damascus, to no end. In the meantime, the Syrians
have waged a somewhat successful campaign within the IAEA for
preliminary assistance in establishing a civil nuclear
program, securing a Board of Governor's (BOG) decision to
more forward with technical cooperation. The Syrians read
the BOG decision as a sign that they can continue to evade
IAEA requests for further inspections. We seek to convince
them that cooperation with IAEA offers a preferable choice

DAMASCUS 00000132 005 OF 005


than following the Iranian model of denial.

--------------
Human Rights
--------------


18. (C) Syria's human rights record remains abysmal. Syrian
courts sentenced 12 leaders of the Damascus Declaration
National Council to two and a half-year terms in October

2008. While granting an early release to economist and
political reform advocate Aref Dalila, who was sentenced in
2001, Syrian courts rejected a petition on December 15 --
just one day after the EU Association Agreement's initialing
ceremony -- to grant early release to prominent Syrian
journalist Michel Kilo. Of equal concern is the case of
Kamal Labwani, who was sentenced to 12 years in prison after
returning from a 2005 trip abroad that included meetings with
White House officials. Syria's security services launched a
widespread crackdown earlier this year and rounded up
hundreds of would-be activists, many of whom were Kurds.
Meanwhile, severe overcrowding, mistreatment of prisoners and
perceived regime persecution of Syrian Islamists led to at
least two uprisings at the maximum-security Seidnaya prison
in 2008, one with prisoner fatalities estimated as high as

50.

--------------
Conclusion
--------------


19. (C) In summary, your CODELs will be the second, third,
and fourth of four Congressional delegations to visit
Damascus over a three-week period. Syrian officials and
opinion-makers are eager to hear your thoughts on the new
administration's foreign policy approach and whether Syria
can expect any near-term deliverables. President Asad and
Foreign Minister Muallim will be ready to parry U.S. concern
about Syria's relationship with bad actors with
well-rehearsed talking points. Embassy Damascus looks
forward to your visits.
CONNELLY