REFORMATTED COPY OF DAMASCUS 125 - RE-ENGAGING

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 DAMASCUS 000126

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA
NSC FOR SHAPIRO/MCDERMOTT
PARIS FOR WALLER
LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/10/2019
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV LE IS IR SY
SUBJECT: REFORMATTED COPY OF DAMASCUS 125 - RE-ENGAGING
SYRIA: SYRIA AND LEBANON

REF: A. DAMASCUS 94

B. PARIS 135

C. 08 DAMASCUS 526

D. 08 BEIRUT 1542

E. BEIRUT 129

F. DAMASCUS 77

G. BEIRUT 155

Classified By: CDA Maura Connelly, reasons 1.5 b and d.


1. (S/NF) Summary: Direct U.S. engagement with Syria is
unlikely to yield near-term breakthroughs in Syrian-Lebanese
relations, but a U.S.-Syrian dialogue provides an opportunity
to cooperate with France and other European countries to
ensure Syria hears a more consistent message on the
importance of taking concrete steps to improve relations with
Lebanon. From a Syrian perspective, the last 12 months
produced watershed advances in relations with Lebanon; to
take one example, the once unthinkable existence of a Syrian
Embassy in Beirut is now a reality. Syrian contacts urge
Washington to recognize this step as positive, even if the
appointment of Syria's ambassador remains pending. Doing so,
they argue, would help to create an atmosphere that would
make it easier for the SARG to take additional steps. While
a constructive U.S. tone might be useful, we should
understand that the SARG will almost certainly spin any
positive U.S. message on Lebanon to downplay differences
between Washington and Damascus, probably to the detriment of
March 14's electoral campaign.


2. (S/NF) Summary continued: At least initially, the U.S.
should expect Syrian counterparts to deny claims that
Damascus is slow-rolling normalization of diplomatic
relations, reject accusations of Syrian interference in
Lebanon's internal affairs, and assert Syria's sovereign
legal jurisdiction over any of its citizens asked to deal
with the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. "We are out of
Lebanon," FM Muallim recently told Codel Smith, as if to say
there was little left to discuss (Ref A). At the end of the
day, we assess Syrian decision-makers view Lebanon
principally as a security issue. Syria's relationship with
Hizballah provides a deterrent to Israeli military action and
gives Syria bargaining leverage in any future talks on the
Golan. Syrian officials also remain concerned about ensuring
the security and influence of Lebanese Alawites, countering
the threat from extremist groups in Lebanon, and containing
internal Lebanese political volatility. There are also
personal animosities at work, as Bashar and his inner circle
continue to harbor grudges against March 14 leaders for
urging the USG to increase pressure on the Syrian regime.
End Summary.


--------------
Give us Credit for What We've Done
--------------



3. (S/NF) Current SARG thinking about Lebanon, like Syrian
thinking on most subjects, remains opaque at best. A number
of Embassy contacts have indicated recently that Damascus is
actively pursuing discussions with France and Turkey on
proceeding with formalizing diplomatic relations with its
western neighbor. "The thinking here has changed
significantly in the past year," contends Dr. Hassan
al-Nouri, a former Minister who runs one of Syria's only
private business schools and told us he was short-listed as a
candidate to be Syria's Ambassador to Lebanon. Nouri claims
the decision to open an embassy was a "psychological
milestone" for the Syrian government and public. "A year
ago, diplomatic relations with Lebanon would have been
impossible to imagine," al-Nouri asserted.



4. (S/NF) The difference now, Nouri continued, was that
French influence on the SARG had empowered regime "moderates"
to argue against "the old tactics" of aggressive
intimidation, and in favor of influencing Lebanon through

DAMASCUS 00000126 002 OF 005


normal government-to-government channels. In this vein,
Syria had hosted a number of Lebanese officials and would
continue doing so. Asked why there had been no reciprocal
visits by Syrian officials to Beirut, Nouri replied he had
heard of no problems on the Syrian side and wondered whether
there were standing Lebanese invitations. There may be
sensitivities among some Lebanese politicians about the optic
of Syrians, particularly security service officials, coming
to Beirut, Nouri speculated.


5. (S/NF) Nouri acknowledged Syria's past relationship with
Lebanon had created a dark cloud of distrust between the two
governments. Nonetheless, he argued, "the direction is
positive for the first time in decades." Presidents Asad and
Sleiman had established a very positive working relationship
and set a constructive tone for their two governments. Nouri
urged Washington to "learn a lesson from the French" and
praise the Syrian regime when it did something positive.
"For the last eight years," Nouri observed, "Damascus has
heard nothing but negative messages" from Washington. Syria
had opened an embassy in Beirut, and what was Washington's
response? "Not good enough," he answered.


6. (S/NF) In response to arguments that Syria had yet to
take concrete steps (e.g., assigning an ambassador to
Lebanon, beginning the process of delineating borders,
releasing Lebanese detainees, enhancing security cooperation,
ending arms supplies to Hizballah) to suggest that the Syrian
government now viewed Lebanon as a sovereign and independent
entity, Nouri conceded that Bashar had not fulfilled his
pledge to appoint an ambassador to Lebanon by the end of

2008. But French President Sarkozy was not publicly scolding
the Syrian regime; instead France remained focused on the
"seventy percent" of commitments it claimed the SARG had
implemented. (Note: Ref B, "Why Sarkozy Thinks Engaging
Syria is Working," provides a French assessment of Syrian
deliverables that include, inter alia, Syrian support for the
conclusion of the Doha Accord that facilitated the election
of President Sleiman; the release of one or more Syrian
political prisoners; the establishment of formal
Syrian-Lebanese diplomatic relations during President
Sleiman's August 14 visit to Damascus; an improved tone in
high level meetings between SARG and GOL officials; and a
Syrian invitation to France and the U.S. to co-sponsor direct
Syrian-Israeli peace talks when both parties are ready.)


7. (S/NF) Moreover, Nouri said, the French recognized that
not all of the blame lay with Syria. The GOL's inability to
reach the necessary consensus in its Council of Ministers
regarding some policy issues involving Syria was also a
factor in explaining why there had not been more progress in
deepening bilateral relations. Washington, he concluded,
could better advance its objectives if it took positive note
of Syria's willingness to recognize Lebanon's sovereignty.
"You can push us to do more, but no one here wants to listen
unless we get credit for what we've already done," he
declared.


--------------
The Syrian-Lebanese Higher Council
--------------


8. (S/NF) Nasri al-Khoury, Secretary General of the
Syrian-Lebanese Higher Council, told us this week that there
had been substantial progress by both sides since President
Sleiman's "historic" August 2008 visit to Damascus,
particularly in security cooperation. Khoury reported that
Lebanese Defense Minister Elias Murr's January 28 visit had
produced agreement on the establishment of nearly 400 border
monitoring posts, with 300 to be manned by Syrian security
personnel and the remainder to be staffed by Lebanese. (This
information tracks with Embassy Beirut's reporting in Ref E).


9. (S/NF) In addition, Khoury reported plans for additional
ministerial-level meetings to address security, cultural,
economic, educational, and other issues affecting bilateral
issues. Khoury acknowledged there had been little progress

DAMASCUS 00000126 003 OF 005


on border delineation. Syria's position, he said, gave
priority to border demarcation with Jordan, which had been
under discussion for a long time. Syria had rejected the
idea of starting with delineation of the border around Shebba
Farms, arguing that the area remained under Israeli
occupation. Meanwhile, the re-constitution of the bilateral
committee created originally in the 1940s to discuss border
delineation had been hopelessly mired on both sides by trying
to find suitable replacements for the members who had died or
were unable to resume their work. (Note: We understand the
GOL has nominated its commission members and has formally
informed the SARG of its readiness to begin work. Vice FM
Miqdad told President Carter in December that he was the
designated representative to the bilateral committee.
However, because Syria had already begun to delineate the
Syrian/Jordanian border, a shortage of experts would prevent
Syria from turning its attention to the Syrian/Lebanese
border "anytime soon." End Note.)


10. (S/NF) Khoury argued on balance that Syria had made
important gestures during 2008 that signaled its desire for
moving toward more normal relations with Lebanon. "Last year,
Lebanon lacked a President, its Parliament was chained shut,
and Hizballah nearly took over the whole country," he
observed. "Would you prefer then to now?" he mused.


11. (C) BACKGROUND NOTE ON THE HIGHER COUNCIL: Refs C and D
provide background on the controversial Syrian-Lebanese
Higher Council, whose future remains uncertain. Khoury is a
Lebanese national whom many Lebanese, particularly March 14
supporters, view as "pro-Syrian." He heads an organization
that oversees the implementation of some 22 bilateral
agreements, some of which date back to the early 1990s,
covering trade, energy, water, education, agriculture, labor,
customs, migration, and cultural relations, among other
subjects. As Ref G notes, many Lebanese view the Council as
mechanism of Syrian patronage over Lebanon, but there is
general agreement in Lebanon and Syria that now is not the
time to address the Council's future. Syrians, by
comparison, point out that the Council's agreements on water,
electricity, and other subjects benefit Lebanon far more than
Syria; they would favorably view restructuring or replacing
the Council in a way that produced more equitable agreements
in these areas. END BACKGROUND NOTE.


--------------
"We're Out of Lebanon"
--------------



12. (S/NF) Samir al-Taqi, informal MFA advisor and Director
of the Orient Center, told us in late January (ref F) Syrian
FM Muallim was walking a fine line between advancing Syria's
diplomatic relationship with Lebanon and fending off concerns
from security service advisors and VP Shara'a, who were
complaining that Syria had humiliated itself by going "too
far" in bowing to Lebanese demands. Muallim was the
principal SARG official responsible for the Lebanon file, but
he had encountered significant resistance from Shara'a in
positively responding to French and Lebanese complaints that
the Syrians were blocking the normalization of diplomatic
relations. At the moment, French officials had shifted their
focus from Lebanon to Gaza-related issues, al-Taqi reported.
Muallim was using this lull to tout Syria's accomplishments
in improving ties to Lebanon while working to resolve the
internal SARG deadlock over naming an ambassador to Lebanon.
The issues related to Lebanese detainees fell primarily under
the purview of the security services, al-Taqi reported,
noting there were claims by Syrian officials that Lebanon, in
fact, held more Syrian detainees than vice-versa. Asked why
Syria would not open a dialogue on the issue, al-Taqi replied
the SARG was in all likelihood holding up this discussion and
any further deliverables until it could better gauge
Washington's seriousness in re-establishing dialogue.


13. (S/NF) Al-Taqi was more upbeat about the overall SARG
outlook toward Lebanon. While Syria's 2005 military

DAMASCUS 00000126 004 OF 005


withdrawal had been "humiliating" for Bashar, Syria had
recovered and had benefited from the experience. The
development and growth of Syria's private banking sector was
one positive consequence, he said. Now, there were few if
any Syrians who advocated a return of Syrian troops into
Lebanon. In fact, he added, one consequence of President
Sleiman's ongoing communication with President Asad was
better counter-terrorism and security cooperation.



14. (S/NF) Elaborating on how Bashar's inner circle tended
to define Syria's interests in Lebanon, al-Taqi explained
that Syrian security officials viewed Lebanon principally in
terms of preventing Israel from using Lebanon as a platform
to attack Syria. Almost all of Asad's advisors agreed on the
potential danger stemming from the proliferation of al-Qaeda
affiliated groups that pose a threat to Syria as well as
Lebanon. Syria had shifted some 200 border guards to the
Lebanese border in October 2008 and there had been close
coordination between the Lebanese and Syrian security
services since then, al-Taqi claimed. In addition, the SARG
continued to view protecting Lebanon's Alawite minority as an
important objective.


15. (S/NF) Still, warned al-Taqi, many Syrian officials
looked suspiciously at March 14 leaders, particularly those
who had sought to influence the U.S. to increase pressure on
Syria. Some senior advisors believed the March 14 majority
government "uses you (the U.S.) as a weapon against us,"
al-Taqi groused. The "political cement" that unified March
14 was antipathy towards Syria, al-Taqi observed.
Consequently, there would be "few tears shed" in Damascus if
March 14 failed to win another majority in the June 2009
elections. At the same time, some players inside the Syrian
regime were now more acutely aware that any sudden shifts of
power within Lebanon could result in instability. Given
Syria's interest in avoiding a "confessional implosion" or a
sudden surge by one party, as occurred in May 2008, when
Hizballah briefly took control of large parts of Beirut,
there was growing recognition within the SARG that the
election of a strong March 8 majority could produce Lebanese
and international backlash against Syria, al-Taqi claimed.
"Lebanese politics is always complicated," al-Taqi said,
arguing a convincing victory by either March 8 or March 14
could produce more problems for Lebanon's neighbors.


16. (S/NF) In any future U.S.-Syrian discussions on
Lebanon, Al-Taqi predicted President Asad and FM Muallim
would claim Syria's responsibilities for the state of
Lebanese internal affairs ended when Syrian troops withdrew
in 2005. Al-Taqi advised that sensitive issues, such as
Lebanese detainees, will require time; border demarcation,
especially around the Israeli-occupied territories of Shebba
Farms, will have to wait for significant progress in
Syrian-Israel peace negotiations before Syria would feel
confident enough to address this issue seriously.



--------------
Comment
--------------



17. (S/NF) We concur with Embassy Beirut's Ref G assessment
that Syria has failed to deliver on significant issues such
as assigning an ambassador, demarcating borders, and
addressing Lebanese detainees. On the other hand, the
current situation represents a marked improvement over that
of a year ago and offers a basis on which we can build.
Though U.S. engagement with Damascus on Lebanon and other
issues is unlikely to alter Syria's propensity for dispensing
deliverables with an eyedropper, we can use such a dialogue
to register our concerns and convey our expectations clearly.
Coordinating with France and other countries offers an
opportunity to close ranks and prevent Syria from playing
different parties off one another. A joint approach may also
increase chances for developing a widely-supported package of

DAMASCUS 00000126 005 OF 005


incentives and disincentives linked to specific Syrian
behavior, which over time should be more effective than
simply talking to Syria on our own.


18. (S/NF) Damascus will almost certainly seek to spin any
U.S. engagement policy as vindication of the Syrian regime's
policies. While our acknowledgment of positive Syrian
behavior toward Lebanon, such as establishing diplomatic
relations, opening an embassy, and expanding security
cooperation, could soften Syrian objections to taking more
difficult steps over time, we expect the SARG would seek to
pocket such a gesture and use it at March 14's expense. As a
result, careful coordination of our public and private
messaging to Syria, Lebanon, allies, and other audiences will
be essential. While we will have a hard time penetrating the
SARG-controlled media, we can use our overwhelming advantage
in the international arena to ensure regional media have the
right message.

CONNELLY