Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09DAMASCUS106
2009-02-03 16:37:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Damascus
Cable title:  

RE-ENGAGING SYRIA: SYRIA AND HAMAS

Tags:  PREL KPAL IR SY 
pdf how-to read a cable
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 DAMASCUS 000106 

SIPDIS

DEPT PLS PASS TO SPECIAL ENVOY MITCHELL
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ELA, NEA/IPA
NSC FOR SHAPIRO/MCDERMOTT
PARIS FOR WALLER
LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/2/2019
TAGS: PREL KPAL IR SY
SUBJECT: RE-ENGAGING SYRIA: SYRIA AND HAMAS

REF: A. DAMASCUS 94

B. DAMASCUS 92

C. DAMASCUS 89

D. DAMASCUS 88

E. DAMASCUS 82

F. DAMASCUS 75

Classified By: CDA Maura Connelly for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 DAMASCUS 000106

SIPDIS

DEPT PLS PASS TO SPECIAL ENVOY MITCHELL
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ELA, NEA/IPA
NSC FOR SHAPIRO/MCDERMOTT
PARIS FOR WALLER
LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/2/2019
TAGS: PREL KPAL IR SY
SUBJECT: RE-ENGAGING SYRIA: SYRIA AND HAMAS

REF: A. DAMASCUS 94

B. DAMASCUS 92

C. DAMASCUS 89

D. DAMASCUS 88

E. DAMASCUS 82

F. DAMASCUS 75

Classified By: CDA Maura Connelly for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: Consensus is lacking on the extent of Syrian
influence over Hamas; some believe the landlord-tenant
relationship gives Syria decisive leverage. Others see a
Syrian-Iranian rivalry and give Iran with its financial
resources an advantage. SARG officials argue that they deal
with Hamas as one of the region's "realities," and there
would be no need for Hamas, i.e., armed resistance, after a
comprehensive peace deal with Israel. Though Syria does not
share Hamas's religious ideology, the SARG finds its
association with the group useful in enhancing Syria's
position in the Arab context, as a card in future
negotiations with Israel, and in placating the majority Sunni
Syrian population. If, in re-engaging with the SARG, the USG
wants to establish markers for judging what Syria is willing
to offer in exchange for better relations with the U.S., it
may be that Syrian anxiety on its own issues (Tribunal and
IAEA) may translate into readiness to press Hamas on
Palestinian reconciliation. The chief drawback, however, to
using the Syria-Hamas relationship as a gauge of Syrian
intent vis--vis the U.S., however, is the continuing lack of
clarity as to how much control the SARG enjoys over Hamas.
End Summary.


2. (C) The SARG's relationship with Hamas is yet another of
Syria's associations based on short-term objectives and
long-term contradictions. With Hamas claiming victory after
the December-January military operation in Gaza, and Syria
pretending to agree, both parties have seen their regional
positions dramatically improve, putting the moderate Arab
leaders on the defensive. Though Syria reportedly counseled
Hamas not to end the six-month tahdiya that expired in
mid-December, when the bombing started, Syria's support for
Hamas was not in question. Syria correctly calculated that
Hamas's threshold for victory ) mere survival ) was a much
easier bar to cross that Israel's stated goal of destroying

Hamas's capability to launch rockets into Israel. The SARG
in general, and President Bashar al-Asad in particular,
calibrated their public reaction in terms that captured the
sentiments on the Arab street, lending legitimacy to Syria's
support for resistance at the expense of moderates in Egypt,
Saudi Arabia, and Jordan.

--------------
Competing for Influence over Hamas
--------------


3. (C) The often troublesome relationship with Hamas proved
to be useful in several ways during the Gaza crisis. In
addition to burnishing the SARG's pro-resistance credentials,
the regime's ties to Hamas brought several international
visitors to Damascus to ask for SARG help in establishing a
cease-fire. Despite indications that Syria responded to
early French calls to influence Hamas into accepting a
cease-fire, Hamas held firm against Syrian pressure until
after Israel announced its January 18 unilateral cease-fire.
Egyptian Ambassador Shawky Ismail told Charge that Syria had
insisted to Hamas at that point that it must also declare a
cease-fire and, this time, Hamas responded.


4. (C) Observers in Damascus do not agree on the extent of
Syrian influence over Hamas; some believe Syria's ability to
interrupt the external leadership's activities forces Hamas
to accommodate Syrian preferences. Others see a rivalry
between Syria and Iran for control of Hamas. In that
context, Iran's financial support for Hamas gives it an
advantage. Following the Gaza conflict, Hamas's list of
regional patrons expanded beyond Syria, Iran, and Qatar to
apparently also include Turkey, although according to Ismail,
Turkey stipulates its relationship is only with the political

DAMASCUS 00000106 002 OF 004


wing of the organization. Syria's success in championing
Hamas during the conflict may now mean it has to compete with
others, as well as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, for the
ear of Hamas.

--------------
Qualified Support for a Strange Bedfellow
--------------


5. (C) Politburo chief Khalid Mesha'al's ear is the one that
everyone seeks. Mesha'al meets frequently with FM Walid
al-Muallim and his chief of staff, Bassam Sabbagh, and
intermittently with Asad. Mesha'al's relationship with the
SARG is not always an easy one. Reportedly his high profile
around Damascus (he travels in a motorcade with a phalanx of
bodyguards) and his efforts to build Hamas constituencies in
the Palestinian refugee camps in Syria have caused friction
in the landlord-tenant relationship.


6. (C) When discussing Hamas with Codel Smith January 31
(ref A),Asad defended the group as a resistance movement but
was clearly unsympathetic to its religious agenda: "Hamas is
the Muslim Brotherhood . . . we outlawed the Muslim
Brotherhood here . . . technically, Hamas should be outlawed
in Syria." Arguing he was forced to deal with Hamas because
of "regional realities," Asad trotted out his standard line
that when comprehensive peace was reached in the region,
Hamas (and Hizballah) "would no longer be necessary."
Tellingly, during the Gaza conflict, Palestinians from the
camps were not allowed to join public demonstrations in
Damascus and some restrictions were placed on pro-Hamas
events even in the camps. Banners still on display around
Damascus emphasize the suffering of Gazans but the green flag
of Hamas is conspicuously absent.

--------------
Mesha'al's Political Immaturity
--------------


7. (C) Ismail, who used to meet with Mesha'al and others
prior to the Gaza conflict (he refuses to do so now because
of the anti-Egyptian line taken by Hamas during the crisis)
says that Mesha'al is politically immature. His decision to
abandon the tahdiya in December demonstrated his immaturity
as did his rejection of cease-fire initiatives during the
conflict. The same lack of judgment was behind Mesha'al's
announcement in Qatar January 28 that he was forming a new
front as an alternative to the PLO, recognized by the Arabs
since the 1980s as the "sole, legitimate representative of
the Palestinian people." According to Ismail, the SARG told
Mesha'al they didn't object to his announcement but he could
not make it from Damascus. Confirming reports from Cairo
that the GoE believes Hamas's internal leadership is more
flexible on resuming the tahdiya, Ismail contrasted the
internal leadership's understanding of the toll of another
Israeli attack on the Palestinian population with Mesha'al's
apparent insouciance, a lack of concern that was reflected in
the external leadership's more rigid positions on a
cease-fire. Though he thought Hamas was on the brink of
accepting a new 18-month tahdiya, he bemoaned the fact that
Mesha'al was currently visiting Tehran where he would
probably be pushed to take a more confrontational line.
(Comment: Ismail's remarks must be taken in the context of
Egypt's unhappiness with Hamas but his comments on Mesha'al's
immaturity track with the puzzled reactions of Europeans who
met with Mesha'al during the conflict and wondered at his
incongruously buoyant mood. End Comment.)

--------------
Too Big for Egypt
--------------


8. (C) Waddah Abd Rabbo, editor of Syria's only
privately-owned and (comparatively) independent Al-Watan told
Charge and IO that Hamas does indeed juggle many patrons, but
the four capitals (Damascus, Doha, Tehran, and Ankara) enjoy
"perfect communication" on Hamas ) "talking to one (about
Hamas) is talking to them all." Despite his efforts to

DAMASCUS 00000106 003 OF 004


establish an independent journalistic voice in Syria, the
well-connected Abd Rabbo generally reflects Bashar al-Asad's
views when discussing regional political developments.
Speaking in supportive terms of Mesha'al's newly declared
front, Abd Rabbo was disparaging of Palestinian Authority
(PA) and chairman of the PLO executive committee Mahmoud
Abbas: "he is discredited on all the Arab streets, including
his own." Abd Rabbo was equally negative about Egypt,
allowing that Egypt might be able to negotiate the cease-fire
but would not succeed on Palestinian reconciliation because
the problem is "too big for them (Egypt) now." He said Syria
could play a role in working with other governments to move
forward a process that would need another two-to-three months
to show results. Abd Rabbo also confirmed that Hamas now
views Turkey as necessary to the reconciliation negotiations
and wants to make sure it is included.

--------------
Conflicting Aims for the Future
--------------


9. (C) Abd Rabbo acknowledged that the Syrian public's
sympathies were with Gazan civilians and that questions had
arisen over the relatively low number of Hamas causalities.
(Note: Even Presidential Advisor Bouthaina Shaaban is quoted
around town as having asked how only "48 Hamas fighters" had
been killed out of a total of over 1,300 fatalities. End
Note) Maintaining the line that Syria's support for Hamas is
purely about resistance, when pushed to consider the logical
consequences of Syria's policy ) that Hamas would prevail
politically in a Palestinian state ) Abd Rabbo said that
Syria had no interest in seeing the emergence of an "Islamic
Republic of Palestine." Nor, he added, would Syria tolerate
Hizballah domination in Lebanon. "We'd send in our troops
again" if Hizballah took over in Lebanon, he said, but noted
that Syria maintains relations with Christian groups as a
means of offsetting that possibility. Asked why Khalid
Mesha'al should trust Syria and follow its guidance if it was
obvious Syria was opposed to Hamas ever coming to power, Abd
Rabbo ) in a rare display of unsheathed Syrian claws )
growled, "Mesha'al will listen to Syria ) he has no choice."


--------------
Keeping Syrian Sunnis in Line
--------------


10. (C) Other observers have told us that the minority
Alawite regime needs Hamas as a means of placating the Sunni
majority in the country, particularly given its alliances
with Shia Iran and Hizballah. Though confessional tensions,
if they exist, seldom rise to the surface in Syria, Sunni
pietism is a visible and evidently increasing force, enough
to prompt the SARG last autumn to initiate a governmental
clamp-down on foreign imams, preachers, and ideologies that
was aimed at eliminating sources of religious radicalization.
But in a country where the slaughter of some 40,000 Muslim
Brotherhood members in Hama in 1982 is still not spoken of,
the Alawite regime walks a fine line between promoting Hamas
as a resistance movement and ensuring that its religious
ideology is downplayed. According to Egyptian Ambassador
Ismail, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood (in exile) announced
during the Gaza crisis that it was suspending opposition
activities during the conflict in light of the SARG's support
for Hamas, a gesture that was largely empty but no doubt
gratifying to the regime nonetheless.

--------------
Can Syria Help on Palestinian Reconciliation?
--------------


11. (C) As the USG considers whether to re-engage with
Syria, the SARG's ability to contribute positively to our
efforts on Israeli-Palestinian peace will be a key
consideration. Norwegian diplomats in Damascus, who talk to
both the SARG and Hamas, assess that the SARG generally
supports Hamas's positions on substance but that the two may
disagree over tactics. Given the multiplicity of regional

DAMASCUS 00000106 004 OF 004


parties who vie for influence over Hamas, Syria, even with
the advantages of the landlord-tenant relationship, has not
been able to "deliver" Hamas consistently, on the few
occasions it has tried to. But Syria has nonetheless
provided Hamas with key Arab cover for its antagonistic
positions vis--vis Fatah; withdrawal of that cover would
leave Hamas looking outside the Arab circle to the Iranians
(or now the Turks) for regional political support. (Note:
Qatar is not seen here as carrying sufficient weight within
the Arab context to fill a void left by Syria. End Note)


12. (C) The SARG is reportedly satisfied that the Gaza
crisis ended with an apparent up-tick in prestige for both
Hamas and Syria. We have repeatedly heard that the SARG is
concerned about the opening on March 1 of the Special
Tribunal on the assassination of Rafiq Hariri and resumed
consideration of the Syria on the IAEA Board of Governors
agenda. Ismail thinks that Syria believes the increased
value of its Hamas card strengthens Syria as it approaches
those two challenges, but it is difficult to perceive a clear
trade-off. If, in re-engaging with the SARG, the USG wants
to establish markers for judging what Syria is willing to
offer in exchange for better relations with the U.S., it may
be that Syrian anxiety on its own issues (Tribunal and IAEA)
may translate into readiness to press Hamas on Palestinian
reconciliation. The chief drawback to using the Syria-Hamas
relationship as a gauge of Syrian intent vis--vis the U.S.,
however, is the continuing lack of clarity as to how much
control the SARG enjoys over Hamas.

CONNELLY