Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09DAKAR793
2009-06-23 18:25:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Dakar
Cable title:  

DAKAR ACCORD: THINGS MAY FALL APART

Tags:  PGOV MR SL KDEM 
pdf how-to read a cable
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DE RUEHDK #0793/01 1760920
ZNY CCCCC ZZH (CCY ADX07F47DD MSI8964 611)
P 231825Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY DAKAR
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2632
INFO RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT 5167
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0400
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1229
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 0178
RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0035
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0070
RUEHPG/AMEMBASSY PRAGUE 0012
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 0095
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEHDS/USMISSION USAU ADDIS ABABA
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0439
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 0059
RHMFISS/COMSOCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
C O N F I D E N T I A L DAKAR 000793 

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (DECL)

SIPDIS

NOUAKCHOTT FOR AMBASSADOR BOULWARE AND DCM DENNIS HANKINS

E.O. 12958: DECL 06/23/2019
TAGS: PGOV MR SL KDEM
SUBJECT: DAKAR ACCORD: THINGS MAY FALL APART

REF: DAKAR 792

CLASSIFIED BY: AMBASSADOR MARCIA S. BERNICAT FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND
(D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L DAKAR 000793

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (DECL)

SIPDIS

NOUAKCHOTT FOR AMBASSADOR BOULWARE AND DCM DENNIS HANKINS

E.O. 12958: DECL 06/23/2019
TAGS: PGOV MR SL KDEM
SUBJECT: DAKAR ACCORD: THINGS MAY FALL APART

REF: DAKAR 792

CLASSIFIED BY: AMBASSADOR MARCIA S. BERNICAT FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND
(D)


1. (C) Summary: The Mauritanians claim they are still committed to
the Dakar Accord. Nevertheless, after four days of intense
negotiations, consensus over the wording of the High State Council
(HSC) communiqueQ remains elusive. Sharp divisions are emerging within
the International Contact Group (ICG),with the French representative
questioning the need for President Abdallahi's resignation and
asserting the election will suffice to bring Mauritania back to
constitutional rule. The United States, Russia, and the United Kingdom
representatives will not accept anything short of a consensual
solution. Senegalese facilitator Foreign Minister Gadio, while tempted
by the French proposal to move forward with elections and barely hiding
his exasperation with President Abdallahi, remained, for the moment,
strongly committed to saving the Dakar Accord in its consensual nature.

Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade will travel to Nouakchott on June
24 for a last high-level negotiation.

--------------
NOBODY HAS WALKED OUT, YET
--------------


2. (C) ICG members met with Senegalese Foreign Minister Cheikh
Tidiane Gadio late in the evening of June 22 to discuss next steps
(Reftel). Gadio explained the negotiations were still at a standstill
and intimated he suspected the parties had reached the end of their
negotiating authority. As a result, he decided against inviting them
to participate in the ICG meeting. While noting all the parties
remained committed to saving the agreement, he stated he was afraid
that, as time runs out, they might be tempted to engage in unilateral
actions. Mauritanian press published reports saying that Aziz's
delegation had decided to walk away from the negotiations and was
traveling back to Nouakchott that evening. The same sources stated
Aziz's campaign director and Dakar Accord negotiator Ould Raiss was
organizing a press conference to mark their return. These reports
caused anguish among Mauritanians present at the Meridien Hotel. When

Ambassador Bernicat and PolOff Sola-Rotger arrived a man frantically
approached the Ambassador pleading with her "not to let the delegation
go." Ironically, flights to Mauritania were cancelled that evening due
to a massive dust storm in Nouakchott. The delegation remained in
Dakar, leaving everybody wondering whether reports were false or
whether they were forced to stay due to flight cancellations.

--------------
GADIO SAYS THE "E" WORD
--------------


3. (C) Gadio summarized all the options, which included proposing new
wording to both parties and bringing President Wade to Nouakchott to
negotiate directly with leaders as the leaders had reportedly been
requesting. Gadio highlighted how difficult it had become to negotiate
with President Abdallahi, who was perceived as "capricious". Then,
surprisingly, he revived an earlier idea of beginning election
preparations while continuing negotiations to solve the HSC issue. He
said principles were important, but with the elections only a few weeks
away, practical considerations become more pressing. Gadio suggested
that the Front National pour la Defense de la Democratie (FNDD) and
opposition leader Ahmed Ould Daddah's Rassemblement des Forces
Democratiques (RFD) wanted to participate in the elections and would
gladly distance themselves from Abdallahi's demands vis a vis the HSC.
The Spanish Ambassador to Mauritania supported this idea and said that
for the RFD the election was a clear objective. The French Ambassador
to Senegal stated Abdallahi and the FNDD were no longer one and the
same and that FNDD negotiators wanted to move forward but were being
held hostage by Abdallahi.


4. (C) The US, the UK and Russia rejected the idea of moving forward
with elections as contrary to the Accord's spirit of consensus and
potentially problematic as it would scuttle the Dakar Accord itself if
no agreement was reached before the election. They stressed the
opposition had been very consistent in their position of resolving the
HSC issue and doubted they would accept to move forward with elections
without consensus. The Russian Charge d'Affairs to Senegal pointed out
that pressuring Aziz to accept the wording that had already been
accepted by the opposition made more sense than pressuring Abdallahi.



5. (C) The French Ambassador to Senegal further argued that the crux
of legitimizing the Government of Mauritania lay in holding free and
fair elections. He dismissed President Abdallahi as an obstructionist
element and questioned the need for his resignation. He stated never
before in the history of Africa had a deposed President been brought
back to resign and that the ICG had put the bar too high as it was
obvious Mauritanians were incapable of coming to a consensus. "Maybe
it is simply not possible to bring him back," said the Ambassador,
while stressing the international community should be proud of having
gone this far in bringing opposing factions together, even if the
original plan was not feasible.

--------------
NO CONSENSUS, NO LEGITIMACY
--------------


6. (C) Ambassador Bernicat, the UK Ambassador to Senegal and the
Russian Charge pushed back vigorously, reiterating that the
international community had signed on to a consensual process with
Gadio's promise that President Abdallahi would return to power, form
the transition government and step down. Absent a consensus triggering
that event, we could not endorse elections as the sole "fix." The UK
Ambassador stressed that credible and transparent elections depended on
the dissolution of the HSC and underlined the importance of solving
this question before moving forward. The European Commissioner, while
saying he was willing to provide technical assistance to the electoral
commission and start working on the revision of electoral lists, asked
Gadio to make a last attempt to achieve consensus.

--------------
NEXT STEPS
--------------


7. (C) Gadio highlighted it was important for the ICG to remain
united to save the Dakar Accord. He stated he would "assume" president
Abdallahi was acting in good faith and would make a last attempt to
draft a suitable statement that he would provide to ICG and Mauritanian
parties to review no later than noon on June 23. He also decided to
ask
President Wade to fly to Nouakchott on June 24 for a last high-level
negotiation. The Ambassadors cautioned sending Wade to Nouakchott as
risky because it was a measure of last resort that, if unsuccessful,
would leave the international community without further options and
would mark the failure of the Accord. The US and the UK reiterated yet
again that, absent a consensus, we would not/not endorse elections.


8. (C) Comment: The Senegalese and the French seem willing to move
forward with elections if consensus is not reached soon, even if that
course of action is contrary to the Dakar Accord. They are
increasingly critical of President Abdallahi, who has become a
scapegoat of sorts, while failing at times to acknowledge that General
Aziz has also been obstructionist. The opposition, because of its
position of weakness, is expected to sacrifice the most and their
unwillingness to budge on the HSC issue, which many perceive as
irrelevant, is increasingly irritating to some. It would not be
surprising if the Senegalese and the French attempt to put the blame
for the failure of the agreements on Abdallahi, thus forcing the
opposition to take their distance from the deposed president and buy
into the election process in a frantic move to avoid exclusion. This
"divide and conquer" tactic could work, but is contrary to the spirit
of consensus and future stability in Mauritania. From a practical
point of view, Aziz's current pressing problem is really Ely Vall's
candidacy and the real threat it poses to Aziz returning to power
legitimately. If Aziz has calculated he can make no further
concessions and remain electable, the HSC issue - and the Dakar Accord
with it - will be lost. End comment.

BERNICAT