Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09DAKAR563
2009-05-05 17:58:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Dakar
Cable title:  

AMBASSADOR AND DCMA PRESS BISSAU-GUINEAN OFFICIALS

Tags:  PGOV PREL PINS SOCI SNAR PU XY 
pdf how-to read a cable
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O 051758Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY DAKAR
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2347
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DAKAR 000563 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/W AND AF/RSA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/04/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINS SOCI SNAR PU XY
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR AND DCMA PRESS BISSAU-GUINEAN OFFICIALS
FOR REFORM

REF: A)DAKAR 562 B)DAKAR 477 C)DAKAR 460

Classified By: Classified by AMB Marcia Bernicat for reasons 1.5 (b) an
d (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DAKAR 000563

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/W AND AF/RSA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/04/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINS SOCI SNAR PU XY
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR AND DCMA PRESS BISSAU-GUINEAN OFFICIALS
FOR REFORM

REF: A)DAKAR 562 B)DAKAR 477 C)DAKAR 460

Classified By: Classified by AMB Marcia Bernicat for reasons 1.5 (b) an
d (d).


1. (U) This cable was cleared by U.S. Africa Command Deputy
Commander for Civil-Military Activities Mary Carlin Yates.


2. (C) SUMMARY: On April 23, 2009, U.S. Africa Command
(AFRICOM) Deputy Commander for Civil-Military Activities
(DCMA) and Ambassador Bernicat led a nine-person delegation
to Bissau to meet with the interim President and other
Bissau-Guinean government leaders and international
representatives. The Ambassador and DCMA pressed for an end
to human rights abuses by the military, early demobilization
as part of security sector reform, and continued vigilance on
counter-narcotics. In a roundtable with representatives from
the international community, participants agreed on the need
for an end to abuse of civilians by the military, and
wide-scale retirement as part of any force-structure
reorganization. END SUMMARY.


3. (C) On April 23, 2009, U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM)
Deputy Commander for Civil-Military Activities (DCMA) Mary
Carlin Yates, Ambassador Bernicat, OSC Chief, PolCouns,
EmbOffs, and AFRICOMOffs traveled to Bissau for meetings with
interim President Raimundo Pereira, Minister of Interior
Lucio Soares, and Navy Captain Zamora Induta (ref A),as well
as a roundtable discussion with the United Nations Secretary
General,s Special Representative to Guinea-Bissau, the head
of the European Union,s security sector reform (SSR)
mission, the ambassadors from the European Commission,
Portugal, and Senegalese charg. Following the meetings, the
Ambassador and DCMA held a press conference (septel to
follow).

INTERIM PRESIDENT TAKING STEPS TO PROMOTE STABILITY
-------------- --------------


4. (C) In the meeting with interim President Raimundo
Pereira, the Ambassador praised the budding strategic
collaboration between the USG and GOGB, citing U.S. support
for the investigation into the assassinations and for

counter-narcotics efforts as examples of the growing
relationship. She emphasized the importance of subordination
of the military to civilian authority, an end to abuses by
members of the armed forces, and a demonstration of political
will to begin demobilization and security sector reform as
well as to complete the investigation into the assassinations
of former President Bernardo Vieira and former defense chief
General Batista Tagme Na Wai. She also urged an end the to
impunity that has kept the country locked in a cycle of
violence for decades.


5. (C) Pereira concurred that dialogue and ending impunity
were essential elements for national stability and encouraged
continued USG assistance for the investigation into the
assassinations. The interim President described an April 21
multi-sector dialogue he chaired in which politicians,
members of civil society, and representatives from the armed
forces came together to express their grievances. According
to Pereira, members of civil society pressed for an end to
human rights abuses, the politicians called for the
subordination of the military, while the representatives of
the armed forces decried the political exploitation and
manipulation of the military.


6. (C) Concerning the abuse of civilians by members of the
armed forces, Pereira said that his office intervened in the
case of the military's unlawful arrest of defense attorney
Pedro Infanda (ref C),instructing the military to turn
Infanda over to the Attorney General. In the case of the
beating Audit Court Chief Justice Francisco Fadul, allegedly
by members of the armed forces, the military assured Pereira
that they were not involved, he said. Nevertheless, the
interim President ordered the formation of a commission to
investigate the beating of Fadul and his wife by men in
military uniforms.


7. (C) The DCMA reiterated the U.S. call for the
subordination of the military and an end to human rights
abuses. She discussed military-to-military cooperation and
cited AFRICOM,s collaboration with the coast guard of Cape
Verde as an example of the assistance the USG can provide in
the fight against drug traffickers. In response, Pereira
lamented that Guinea-Bissau security forces lack the means,

DAKAR 00000563 002 OF 003


such as boats and vehicles, to adequately respond to the
problem. The interim President said that when the National
Assembly reconvenes in May, the parliamentarians will
consider legislation designed to create an asset forfeiture
law that would allow authorities to sell the suspected
Venezuelan drug plane, grounded at Bissau,s airport since
July, 2008.

MINISTER OF INTERIOR SEEKS U.S. SUPPORT
--------------


8. (C) In the meeting with Interior Minister Soares, the
Ambassador explained that the USG would like to increase
assistance to Guinea-Bissau to support counter-narcotics
efforts and SSR. That assistance, however, will depend upon
the steps taken first by Guinea-Bissau to build confidence,
she said. Rapidly demobilizing a significant percentage of
the armed forces would demonstrate the government of
Guinea-Bissau,s (GOGB) commitment to meaningful SSR, she
noted. For example, the Ambassador further suggested, the
government should proceed with plans to create a unit within
one of the civilian law enforcement and security forces that
would provide security to top GOGB officials, eliminating the
leaders, dependence on the military for personal security.


9. (C) The DCMA highlighted the subordinate yet collaborative
role that the U.S. military has with civilian authorities, as
well as its work with international partners, citing AFRICOM
training of security officials in Cape Verde as a prime
example. The DCMA noted, however, that U.S. law
circumscribes potential U.S. support for militaries with
records of human rights violations, alluding to the March
attacks on civilians by members of the armed forces (ref C).


10. (C) In response, Soares expressed appreciation for the
team from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) that
deployed to Bissau to assist with the official investigation
into the March dual assassinations of Armed Forces Chief of
Staff General Tagme Na Wai and President Joao Bernardo Vieira
(ref C). Soares expressed interest in the possibility of
U.S. training for a civilian protection detail for the
country's senior leadership. He was confident that the June
28 presidential election would take place, and called for
greater collaboration with the USG on counter-narcotics. He
also pressed for the re-opening of the U.S. Embassy in
Bissau, closed since the civil war in 1998.

TIME TO MOVE FORWARD ON SSR
--------------


11. (C) While in Bissau, the Ambassador and the DCMA hosted a
lunch attended by Joseph Mutaboba, the United Nations
Secretary General,s Special Representative to Guinea-Bissau;
General Juan Esteban Verastegui, Chief of Mission for the
European Union,s SSR mission; Frank Nulli, Ambassador from
the European Commission; Antonio Manuel Ricoca Freire,
Ambassador from Portugal; and General Abdoulaye Dieng, Charg
from Senegal. The objective of the lunch was to discuss
candidly the status of SSR efforts in Guinea-Bissau and to
formulate a basic consensus concerning the way forward.


12. (C) Verastegui, in Bissau since May, 2008, confirmed that
the military was thoroughly consulted prior to the National
Assembly,s approval of the SSR strategy two and a half years
ago (in spite of recent statements by the Bissau-Guinean
Minister of Defense and others that the military had not been
consulted). He expressed frustration that the GOGB military
and officials now want to tinker with not only the
agreed-upon numerical targets of soldiers and sailors, but
also fundamentally alter the kind of armed forces envisioned
in the strategy. He concurred that the strategy can be
modified, but that it should be altered by an act of
parliament and not on an ad hoc basis by leaders motivated by
self-interest. Verastegui insisted, however, that the time
for deliberation on the nature of SSR had ended, and that the
international community must pressure GOGB officials to act,
even if the immediate result was not the &ideal8 defense
force envisioned by the current leadership.


13. (C) Verastegui noted that the envisioned structure and
composition of the Bissau-Guinean armed forces are not based
on any threat assessment, and suggested his agreement with
Vieira,s supposed observation that the country does not need
a military. However, the politics and history of
Guinea-Bissau oblige the existence of a military. Therefore,
the best hope, he said, is to right-size the troops in

DAKAR 00000563 003 OF 003


relation to the funding and equipment at their disposal. He
emphasized that the key to demobilizing was a credible
pension system managed by the international community.
Noting that there are several active members of the armed
forces in their eighties, Verastegui suggested that every
member of the military over 50 years old be retired, and that
those who want to return to active duty must first pass the
requisite physical exam.


14. (C) Portuguese Ambassador Freire expressed his strong
opinion that the international community should fight
impunity in Bissau not by criticizing and undermining the
credibility of the investigation into the assassinations, but
rather by supporting the investigative commission and by the
use of quiet diplomacy. Responding to Freire,s suggestion
that the lunch participants identify areas of agreement,
Mutaboba posited that unanimity existed on the insistence
that the military end abuse of civilians. Verastegui
concurred, noting that Brussels will not extend his
mission,s mandate beyond November 2009, if the abuses
continue. Participants also agreed that there was a need for
retirement of military personnel in order to facilitate a
force-structure reorganization. In forging a consensus on
terminology, Verastegui objected to the word
&demobilization,8 which implies a post-conflict
environment, and insisted on the use of &retirement8
instead.


15. (C) EC Chief of Delegation Nulli noted that the GOGB must
possess the political will to transform the SSR strategy into
an action plan. He speculated that the civilian leadership
of the GOGB is committed to reform, but is currently in a
weak position vis--vis the military, which is satisfied with
its current position of power without responsibility. Nulli
reminded the participants that in addition to SSR, the GOGB
also needs to reform the justice sector, public
administration, and public finance. Concerning next steps,
Mutaboba expressed his support for a more
politically-acceptable team of ECOWAS experts to be deployed
to Bissau to provide guidance on SSR and other security
issues. Verastegui cautioned, however, that the
international community must avoid sending more advisors than
the GOGB can effectively use.

COMMENT
--------------


16. (C) Interim President Pereira never expected or intended
to become president and is not a dominant political figure.
However, Pereira, the number two of the ruling party and a
close confidant of Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Junior (who
was in Cape Verde on April 23 following the international
roundtable of SSR in Guinea-Bissau) will undoubtedly pass the
firm and unambiguous U.S. message to the Prime Minister. It
is very possible that no civilian leader is capable of
countering or limiting the military,s dominance of the
country at this time. However, if it can be done, Gomes
could very well be the only one capable of doing it, given
his close relationship with Induta and his resounding
electoral victory last fall. As the international spotlight
turns from the brutal murders to the need for urgent reform,
Gomes will need to try to forge a consensus on SSR and wider
public sector reform. Unfortunately, since taking office,
Gomes has squandered much of his political capital earned in
his party's landslide victory in the November 2009
legislative elections. He has been in conflict with a large
minority of his own party in the National Assembly. If Gomes
is to successfully implement reform, the international
community, including ECOWAS and donor countries will have to
apply pressure as well as provide support.
BERNICAT