Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09DAKAR477
2009-04-14 19:24:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Dakar
Cable title:  

GUINEA-BISSAU DEFENSE CHIEF DEFENDS ACTIONS AND

Tags:  PU XY PGOV PREL SNAR KDEM KCRM 
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P 141924Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY DAKAR
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2233
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0423
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
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RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 DAKAR 000477 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF/W, AF/RSA, AND INR/AA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/13/2019
TAGS: PU XY PGOV PREL SNAR KDEM KCRM
SUBJECT: GUINEA-BISSAU DEFENSE CHIEF DEFENDS ACTIONS AND
ASKS FOR U.S. ASSISTANCE

REF: DAKAR 470

Classified By: Ambassador Marcia S. Bernicat for reasons 1.5 B/D.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 DAKAR 000477

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF/W, AF/RSA, AND INR/AA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/13/2019
TAGS: PU XY PGOV PREL SNAR KDEM KCRM
SUBJECT: GUINEA-BISSAU DEFENSE CHIEF DEFENDS ACTIONS AND
ASKS FOR U.S. ASSISTANCE

REF: DAKAR 470

Classified By: Ambassador Marcia S. Bernicat for reasons 1.5 B/D.


1. (C) Summary: On April 2, PolCouns met with Naval Captain
Jose Zamora Induta, the de facto head of the armed forces of
Guinea-Bissau. PolCouns expressed U.S. concern regarding the
apparently unconstitutional designation of Induta as chief of
the armed forces, the recent political violence carried out
by military members against critics of the armed forces and
the government, as well as the military's failure to
cooperate with the inter-ministerial commission established
to investigate the assassinations of former President
Bernardo Vieira and former Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces
General Batista Tagme Na Wai. Like the Prime Minister,
Induta insisted that the country's constitution and laws
regarding the nomination of the armed forces chief of staff
were being respected and he defended the military's actions
in the recent arrest of the defense attorney of the former
chief of staff of the Navy (reftel). He denied that the
members of the armed forces had beaten the audit court chief
justice and argued that someone is conducting a campaign to
denigrate the military.


2. (C) Induta told PolCouns that he needs the assistance of
the United States to fight drug traffickers. He claimed that
traffickers had contacted him to ask for authorization to
continue transiting through Guinea-Bissau and offered him
1,000 euros per ton transshipped. He said he would be unable
to fight the traffickers without assistance from the United
States because the traffickers are better armed and prepared.
Polcouns assured him the U.S. could only provide assistance
to credible, reliable partners. End summary.

Induta: The Constitution Is Being Respected
--------------


3. (C) PolCouns conveyed USG concern regarding the apparent
constitutional and legal violations with regard to Induta's
creation of a military commission to manage the crisis
following the death of Na Wai and his subsequent nomination

to be chief of the armed forces. Induta denied that there
was anything unconstitutional or improper in the process that
resulted in his nomination. He reiterated what he told
PolCouns and DATT in the week following the assassinations:
he and the other members of the military's crisis management
commission stepped in to fill a void that the service chiefs
had failed to fill. He criticized the service chiefs for not
taking the necessary initiative and said that he and his
fellow commission members had done what was necessary.


4. (C) As for his nomination as chief of the armed forces,
Induta argued that the military had behaved appropriately
with regard to the law. In fact, he said the armed forces
had gone beyond what was required in the law to ensure that
there was a consensus of support within the officer corps.
According to Induta, the law calls for the armed forces to
convene a panel to select and provide a name for the chief of
the armed forces nomination to the Minister of Defense. This
is exactly what the armed forces did on March 6; a meeting
was convened with all the senior officers in attendance
including the battalion commanders of the various zones.
(Comment: It is Post,s understanding that the meeting was
attended by only senior Balanta officers not seen as close to
Vieira. For example, the colonel serving as director of
national defense policy in the office of the Minister of
Defense was not invited to participate because, according to
him, because he is only half-Balanta. Moreover, in all
likelihood, he is viewed as having been too close Vieira. End
comment.)


5. (C) Following the meeting of senior officers, the armed
forces proposed Induta as the chief of staff of the armed
forces and the battalion commander of the Northern Zone based
in Mansoa, Colonel Antonio Indjai, to be the vice chief.
Induta said, as far as he is concerned, the military has done
its part and the matter of military command had been settled.
PolCouns pointed out that the constitution bars the interim
president from acting on the nomination. Induta replied that
the question of confirmation of the nominations was a
civilian matter. When asked if he should be referred to as
"chief of staff," "ad interim chief of staff," or "chair of
the military crisis management commission," Induta hesitated
and then said, "I suppose chair of the military commission,
because the president hasn't confirmed my nomination yet."
(Note: Nevertheless, Induta provided PolCouns with several

DAKAR 00000477 002 OF 004


documents he had signed as chief of staff and in which he is
addressed as chief of staff by the offices of the prime
minister, minister of defense, attorney general, and director
of the Judicial Police. End note.) Induta grudgingly
acknowledged that the next president would have the authority
to dismiss him, but he said he assumed that the elected
president would do so only if he had a good reason and that
the president would not want to "fight with the armed forces."

Defends and Denies Military Actions
--------------


6. (C) PolCouns told Induta that the USG is troubled by the
extrajudicial arrests and violence being carried out by the
military. Induta said the military is a victim of an active
campaign to denigrate it and its members. In the case of the
arrest of Pedro Infanda, the defense attorney of former naval
chief of staff ex-Admiral Bubo Na Tchuta, Induta insisted
that the armed forces had taken the necessary actions to
ensure stability. He accused Infanda of incitement and
disturbance of the peace. He said the military acted because
the attorney general's office had failed to do so. On April
1 he met with Attorney General Louis Manuel Cabral to urge
him to take action in the future, so the military would not
have to do so in the future. When asked on what legal basis
the military had arrested Infanda and why Infanda had been
beaten, Induta said it was the armed forces, responsibility
to maintain stability and guarantee the peace. He did not
address the beating of Infanda.


7. (C) With regard to the assault of Francisco Fadul, the
chief justice of the audit court and head of a political
party, Induta denied that the armed forces were involved. He
said had the armed forces been involved, it would have
happened during the day, as had been the case of Infanda,
because the military has nothing to hide. He noted that all
of the security forces use the same uniforms and suggested
that someone was impersonating the military. Induta claimed
there was a campaign to make the armed forces look bad.

Induta: We Are Cooperating with Inquiry; Ours Almost Done
-------------- --------------


8. (C) Induta denied that the armed forces had failed to
cooperate with the inter-ministerial commission of inquiry.
He noted that the armed forces were represented in the
inter-ministerial commission of inquiry and argued that no
other group was more interested than the military in
establishing who is responsible for the assassinations. He
called the people who are accusing the armed forces of
failing to cooperate "liars, who do not want to work." He
said the military's internal commission of inquiry had
already determined who was responsible, the suspects were in
custody and that the report would be finalized soon. Asked
if the report would be shared with the inter-ministerial
commission of inquiry, Induta said, "Yes, if they ask for
it." He also said that the suspects would be handed over to
civilian authorities. PolCouns asked why the armed forces
were investigating the death of Na Wai, but not that of
Vieira. Induta replied that the death of the chief of staff
of the armed forces in a military installation, ostensibly at
the hands of or in cooperation with members of the armed
forces, was a military matter, but the same was not
(entirely) true in the case of the death of the president.
However, the military would be happy to conduct an
investigation into the death of Vieira, if asked to do so by
the government, he said.

Induta: We Need Resources to Fight Narcotics Traffickers
-------------- --------------


9. (C) Induta told PolCouns that the Bissau-Guinean armed
forces needed U.S. assistance to fight narcotics traffickers.
The de facto chief of defense said he was reforming the
armed forces to be able to take on the traffickers and to
ensure stability. To that end, he said he would be
recruiting 1,000 new troops. According to him, this is
necessary because 80 percent of the current armed forces
personnel are officers. He emphasized that he would be
recruiting people who had at a minimum completed high school,
"so they can resist influence and manipulation from
politicians." This would only be the first phase in the
reforms. He claimed he needed at least 1,500 additional new
troops, beyond the initial 1,000, to maintain stability and
fight the traffickers. Ideally, he needed a total of 3,000
new troops, he said. Asked how he would reconcile adding

DAKAR 00000477 003 OF 004


3,000 troops to the current 4,500 troops given the 3,500
total force limit called for in the country's National
Assembly-approved national defense strategy, Induta said
there was some confusion regarding the total number of troops
the country is supposed to have and that the total number is
still under discussion. According to him, Na Wai wanted
6,000, but Induta believes that a total force of 4,500 would
be sufficient in the long term. In the interim, he added, it
would be necessary to simply add forces without
decommissioning and demobilizing current troops.


10. (C) Induta said the armed forces had identified 15
different networks of narcotics traffickers operating in
Guinea-Bissau. According to him, representatives of the
traffickers met with him at their request to seek
authorization to continue using the country as a transit
point. Induta said that these representatives offered to pay
him 1,000 euros per ton of product transshipped through
Guinea-Bissau. He claimed that the armed forces had seized a
suspect ship off the coast of the country because it was
neither a fishing vessel nor a passenger vessel, but it was
making regular visits to different islands for some undefined
purpose, which he assumed was related to trafficking. Asked
if the armed forces had recovered any narcotics on the ship,
he replied no. Induta also claimed to have information about
airfields being prepared in different parts of the country
for use by traffickers.


11. (C) Unfortunately, he said "I am not in a position to
tell the traffickers I will fight them because the
traffickers are better armed and prepared." Induta asserted
that he is ready and willing to fight the traffickers,
provided the United States and other donors provide him with
the resources to do so. Until that time there is nothing he
can do. He acknowledged that the armed forces had been
involved in trafficking in the past, but claimed that was no
longer the case. While he said he had no desire to
investigate people for their past activities,)
narcotics-related corruption would no longer be tolerated.
However, he emphasized, that without outside assistance he
would not be in a position to combat the traffickers,
"because they are better armed and better prepared."
Therefore, "We will only start the fight when you give us
resources." Induta stressed that the matter is urgent and
said that he had discussed the problem of narcotics
trafficking with President Yahya Jammeh during his recent
trip to The Gambia. PolCouns assured the de facto chief of
defense that he would transmit the message, but explained
that the United States would not be able to provide any
assistance unless it had credible and reliable partners with
which to work.

Comment
--------------


12. (C) Induta comes across as cocky, completely sure of
himself and utterly unconcerned about any questions regarding
his legitimacy. Having trained in the United States on three
occasions, he behaved as though he thinks he knows and
understands Americans. Induta said repeatedly during the
meeting with PolCouns that his goal is to make Guinea-Bissau
"just like the United States," yet during a previous meeting
with PolCouns and DATT, when challenged about his apparent
usurping of command, Induta explained, "This is Africa.
Things are done differently here." While he has stated
publicly on numerous occasions that he and his fellow
officers are not interested in taking over the government,
his actions belie any claim that he seeks to head a military
that is subject to civilian authority. Induta also displays
a disdain for the political/intellectual classes of
Guinea-Bissau, repeatedly referring to the "lawyers and other
people with degrees and the politicians who are not willing
to work" or do what is necessary to develop Guinea-Bissau.
This attitude may reflect inter-ethnic prejudices rather than
political differences. Non-Balanta elites speak of the
Balanta in patronizing terms saying they make good fighters
but are not good for other things, a sentiment that no doubt
grates on Induta and his fellow Balanta officers, who regard
themselves as the guardians of Bissau-Guinean freedom.
Finally, Induta's clumsy claim that he is ready to combat the
narcotics traffickers only if the United States provides
assistance managed to include "official" confirmation that
members of the military have been involved in trafficking.


13. (C) Post believes Induta regards security sector reform
(SSR) as a means to consolidate his hold on power within the

DAKAR 00000477 004 OF 004


armed forces. Lacking combat experience, he is regarded by
informed local observers as having limited support within the
military. This probably explains why he has teamed with
Indjai, an independence fighter and reported nephew of Na
Wai, as his vice chief, although no such position existed
during Na Wai's time as chief of defense. Induta's desire to
recruit additional forces -- before he is willing to risk
antagonizing any of the current military with demobilization
-- underlines his precarious situation.


14. (C) Induta's somewhat precarious grip on power ironically
offers the international community an opportunity to
counterbalance his ambition to continue the cycle of wielding
political power from the defense chief's office.
Demobilization and SSR are the essential prerequisites to
political stability in Guinea-Bissau and an effective
counter-narcotics strategy for the country (and are key to
any successful regional counter-narcotics strategy as well as
efforts to prevent Guinea-Bissau from becoming a source of
political instability for the region). While there is risk
involved, donor countries can make use of Induta's argument
for additional resources both to persuade the government to
request some formal ECOWAS/CPLP force presence and to compel
certain security sector reforms. End comment.
BERNICAT