GUINEA BISSAU ELECTION DATE SET AMID MILITARY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 DAKAR 000460

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/W, AF/RSA
PARIS FOR DEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2019
TAGS: KOCI PGOV PREL PU XY
SUBJECT: GUINEA BISSAU ELECTION DATE SET AMID MILITARY
VIOLENCE

REF: DAKAR 274

Classified By: Classified by AMB Marcia Bernicat for reasons 1.5 (b) an
d (d).


1. (C) Summary: As Bissau-Guinean de facto Armed Forces Chief
of Staff Zamora Induta seeks to transform his (questionable)
legal authority into effective control of the military, armed
forces personnel have embarked on a violent, extra-judicial
campaign of silencing dissent among the population. While
embracing security sector reform to facilitate his efforts to
consolidate control over the armed forces, the military under
Induta,s command has failed to cooperate with the
investigation into the dual assassinations of March 1 and 2.
The government scheduled presidential elections for June 28.
Divisions within the ruling party could open a door for the
return of Kumba Yala to the presidency. An international
stabilization force proposed by West African and
Portuguese-speaking countries may be the best solution for
short-term stability. End summary.

BACKGROUND
--------------


2. (SBU) On March 2, 2009, following the dual assassinations
of Armed Forces Chief of Staff General Tagme Na Wai and
President Joao Bernardo Vieira, the Armed Forces convened an
ad hoc committee, presided by Navy Captain Zamora Induta.
The committee excluded the more senior armed forces service
chiefs and ignored President Vieira,s designation of the
Army Chief as interim Chief of Staff. On March 6, several
hundred members of the armed forces, reportedly nearly all
from the Balanta (largest) ethnic group, met to nominate
Induta as the new Armed Forces Chief of Staff and to tap
Antonio Indjai, whose battalion led the assault against
President Vieira, as the Armed Forces Deputy Chief of Staff,
a position that had long remained vacant.

INDUTA TAKES CONTROL
--------------


3. (SBU) In accordance with standard Bissau-Guinean
procedures, the military forwarded Induta,s nomination to
the Minister of Defense on March 6. The Minister in turn
transmitted Induta,s name to Prime Minister Carlos Gomes
Junior, who forwarded the nomination to the Council of
Ministers. On March 14, the Council of Ministers named
Induta and Indjai to be the chief of staff and deputy,
respectively, of the armed forces. The decree formalizing
the appointments was then forwarded to interim President
Raimundo Pereira. However, as interim President, Pereira
lacks the constitutional authority to appoint a new Armed
Forces Chief of Staff. In several press reports in the
latter half of March, Gomes stated that the government,
nevertheless, recognizes Induta as the new Armed Forces Chief
of Staff. On March 20, Pereira repeated to the press that he
lacks the authority to sign the presidential decree
formalizing the appointment.


4. (SBU) A small number of observers criticized Induta,s de
facto appointment by Gomes, the president of the ruling
African Independence Party for Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde
(PAIGC). On March 16, a spokesman for the opposition Party
of Social Renewal (PRS) -- the party of former president
Kumba Yala -- complained publicly that Induta,s appointment
was a violation of the constitution. From exile in the
Gambia, former Navy Chief of Staff, Rear Admiral Jose America
Bubo Na Tchute, also objected that Induta,s appointment did
not follow the normal order of succession. (N.B. ) Bubo Na
Tchute went into exile after being accused of leading a coup
attempt against Vieira in August 2008.)


5. (C) Despite the ambiguous nature of their appointments,
Induta and Indjai have attempted to assert their authority
over the military. Nevertheless, according to various
observers, including General Esteban Veastegui, head of the
European Union,s (EU) security sector reform (SSR) mission
to Guinea-Bissau, Induta,s authority in particular has yet
to translate into full operational control or the loyalty of
the troops. Many members of the military, unlike Induta, are
veterans of either the 1973 war of independence or the 1998
coup. There are reported tensions between Induta and Indjai,
who is a war veteran an apparently remains in command of the
Mansoa battalion. Induta, therefore, is actively seeking to
establish himself as the legitimate leader, firmly in
control, of a fractured, aged, military, according to

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Veastegui.


6. (C) In a March 25 meeting with EmbOffs in Bissau,
Veastegui said that his SSR mission had accomplished more in
the previous ten days of work than it had during the previous
12 months under Na Wai. Veastegui speculated that Induta, an
educated 43-year-old, has an incentive to see SSR succeed as
it would allow him to purge the military of the older
generation of veterans and those loyal to Vieira and Na
Tchute. Veastegui commented that if Induta could retire the
outgoing soldiers and sailors with an internationally
financed pension, he could reshape the military to his liking
while forging the loyalty and control that he currently
lacks. Noting that Induta and the EU have a common interest
in the success of SSR, Veastegui repeated that Induta is
someone the EU &can work with.8

CAMPAIGN OF TERROR
--------------


7. (SBU) On March 23, the Bissau-resident lawyer for Na
Tchute, Pedro Infanda, noted in a radio interview that the
normal order of succession within the military would not have
resulted in Induta,s ascension. The following day, members
of the armed forces arrested Infanda, beat him and tortured
him before releasing him on March 27. In a radio interview
on March 26, Induta justified the detention by saying it was
done for &preventive8 reasons. The military was forced to
intervene, he insisted, because the Attorney General, Luis
Manuel Cabral, was not &doing his job8 in arresting alleged
threats to public order. Induta said that people may be
shocked by the military,s actions, but that this surprise
would change, suggesting more extra-judicial arrests to come.


8. (SBU) In the early morning hours of April 1, uniformed
soldiers reportedly went to the home of the Chief Justice of
the Audit Court (and potential presidential candidate)
Francisco Jose Fadul, beat him and his wife, and stole many
of their possessions. Fadul, who is a former prime minister
and current president of the Party for Development, Democracy
and Citizenship (PADEC),had recently stated publicly that
the dual assassinations resulted in a de facto coup d,etat,
despite the veneer of a constitutional change of power.
(Comment: Fadul reportedly suffered brain injuries that will
require treatment outside of the country. End Comment)


9. (SBU) In the late afternoon of April 1, soldiers, armed
but out of uniform, reportedly visited the office of the
Human Rights League of Bissau in search of the
organization,s president and vice-president. Earlier that
day, the organization had issued a statement condemning the
beating of Fadul. The extra-judicial actions heightened fear
among the population of indiscriminate military attacks on
civilians. A copy of the Embassy,s statement condemning
these acts was provided by email to AF/W.

THE INVESTIGATION
--------------


10. (SBU) The government has established an inter-ministerial
commission of inquiry to investigate the killings. The
commission did not begin its work until March 11 due to
delays by the military in appointing their members. From
March 12-21, the FBI, supported by PolOff and Assistant RSO,
provided extensive technical support, collecting and securing
physical evidence from the three principle crime scenes.
Both the LEGATT, Assistant LEGATT, as well as explosives and
evidence recovery technicians provided assistance to the
GOGB's efforts.


11. (C) Following the departure of the FBI agents on March
21, the investigation stalled. According to the Attorney
General, the military has subsequently refused to allow
members of the commission to interview the military personnel
present at the headquarters the night of the attack on Na
Wai. Civilian witnesses to the murder of Vieira are
reluctant to cooperate with the investigation out of fear of
potential military reprisals.


12. (SBU) In early March, the military established a
parallel investigative committee designed to look into the
assassination of Na Wai. By March 8, the military had
arrested several people. In an April 2 meeting with
PolCouns, Induta said that the military commission will
conclude its investigation in the coming days and is prepared
to release its findings. Representatives from Angola,

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Senegal, and the African Union have called for an
international investigation/oversight into the killings.

THE ELECTION
--------------


13. (SBU) According to the Bissau-Guinean constitution,
elections are to be held within 60 days of the death of the
head of state. After weeks of delay and extensive
consultations with the political parties, the government set
the date for the next presidential elections for June 28,
2009 (120 days after the interim president took office).
According to the government, the delay will allow time to
raise the necessary funding from the international community
for the poll and to put the necessary logistical measures in
place to ensure a smooth election. At a March 30 meeting
between the government and representatives of the
international community, donors pledged technical assistance
and roughly USD 2.5 million of the necessary USD 5 million
needed for the election (Note: Post requested funds to
contribute to the election in Guinea-Bissau. See reftel. End
note.)


14. (C) Despite a landslide victory in the November
legislative elections, the PAIGC now finds itself in
disarray. In recent months, Gomes has alienated many party
stalwarts with what observers call an authoritarian approach
to internal party decisions. Gomes has repeatedly denied any
intention of running for president himself. On March 24,
however, he suggested that Gomes loyalist, Interim President
Pereira, would be the &ideal8 candidate for president.
(Note: In a March 9 meeting with the Ambassador, Pereira
strongly disavowed any intention or desire to run for
President. End note.) Many observers, including the French
ambassador to Guinea-Bissau, believe that Gomes supports
Pereira because he wants a pliable puppet as head of state to
enable him to consolidate his hold on power. Gomes has a
long-held conviction that the prime minister should hold
primacy with regard to political power (one of the subjects
of dispute between Gomes and Vieira).


15. (SBU) The candidacy of independent businessman Henrique
Rosa has attracted significant support within the PAIGC,
which has the ability to support numerous candidates for the
presidency. Rosa made his candidacy official on April 1
after visiting Fadul at his bedside as he recovered from the
beating meted out by armed forces personnel. A third likely
candidate is perennial PAIGC campaigner Malam Bacai, who is
favored by many Muslims within the PAIGC.


16. (SBU) Political spectators speculate that Pereira could
capture ten to fifteen percent of the vote based solely on
support from Gomes. Malam Bacai could get ten percent of the
vote, leaving Henrique Rosa with 25 percent. This split in
the PAIGC could leave the door open for former President Yala
(PRS) to capture the presidency with 30 to 35 percent of the
vote based on presumed unified support from his Balanta
ethnic group, which is the largest ethnic group in
Guinea-Bissau. (Comment: Yala was not able to capture more
than 25 percent of the vote in the November elections,
suggesting his base among the Balanta may have eroded
somewhat. The question remains whether ethnic considerations
would dominate voters, choices in the presidential vote.
End Comment)

GOMES AND INDUTA
--------------


17. (C) According to Linda de Souza, a political specialist
with the United Nations Peace-Building Support Office in
Guinea-Bissau (UNOGBIS),Gomes may well be accepting
Induta,s heavy-fisted approach out of fear, characterizing
Gomes as a &hostage.8 Other observers point out that Gomes
currently needs Induta,s support; isolated within the PAIGC,
Gomes is embracing an ally in the armed forces he began
cultivating during last fall,s electoral campaign to give
him a base of support. Conversely, Induta needs the
legitimacy that Gomes can provide him by recognizing him as
the official head of the armed forces, observers note.

INTERNATIONAL STABILIZATION FORCE
--------------


18. (SBU) Representatives from the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS),the Community of Portuguese-Speaking
Countries (CPLP),and the African Union (AU) have called for

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the deployment of an international stabilization force.
There is confusion regarding the level of GOGB support for
such a contingent. The Foreign Minister indicated to the
diplomatic corps support for such a force. However, on April
2 Prime Minister Gomes told PolCouns he does not favor the
deployment of a stabilization force because he believes their
presence could be the source of instability. However, he
left open the possibility of such a force, simply saying it
would have to be approved by the African Union and the
General Assembly of the United Nations (sic).
Representatives from ECOWAS and the CPLP are scheduled to
meet in Praia, Cape Verde, on April 20 to discuss the
proposed stabilization force and security sector reform in
Guinea-Bissau.

COMMENT
--------------


19. (C) Induta,s embrace of illegal and brutish tactics
represents a stark departure from his previous pretense of
constitutional deference. While the abuse of Infanda may be
attributable to the personal enmity between Induta and Na
Tchute, the subsequent attacks and threats by members of the
military are either a troubling sign of Induta's contempt for
the rule of law and human rights or a result of Induta,s
lack of effective command and control over his troops.
Regardless, the silence of Gomes in the wake of these abuses
has been deafening. Riding the proverbial tiger, Gomes is
attempting to advance politically while tenuously avoiding
losing his balance. His perplexing suggestion of Pereira, a
bureaucrat and party hack with no political base of support,
as a presidential candidate, however, is a sign that his
political ambition might outstrip his desire to do what is
right for his country.


20. (C) The prospect of the official investigation into the
assassinations resulting in the guilty being held accountable
is looking increasingly dim. Without the constant support
and physical presence of USG (or potentially other
international community) representatives, the inquiry likely
will rest moribund due to a lack of political will, active
military obstructionism, and a palpable fear of the armed
forces which currently permeates the streets of Bissau.
Moreover, it seems clear that Induta has embraced SSR because
it is politically expedient to do so. If he gets his way,
Induta could refashion the armed forces with troops loyal to
him and freeze out the older independence fighters who view
him with suspicion.


21. (C) Guinea-Bissau,s best hope may lie in the proposed
deployment of a stabilization force that will act as a check
on an out-of-control military. If done properly, the force
could provide security for the presidential elections (Induta
has stated he needs at least 1,000 additional troops for this
purpose),the investigation into the assassinations, and the
contentious decommissioning and demobilization necessary for
security sector reform. Without such a force,
Guinea-Bissau,s bloated, fractured military likely will
continue with its ham-fisted control of country and its
illicit narco-trafficking activities on the side.

BERNICAT