SENEGAL: CHIEF OF DEFENSE ON GUINEA-BISSAU AND THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DAKAR 000436

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF/W AND AF/RSA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/02/2019
TAGS: KOCI PGOV PREL PU XY SG
SUBJECT: SENEGAL: CHIEF OF DEFENSE ON GUINEA-BISSAU AND THE
CASAMANCE

REF: A. A) PRAIA 57

B. B) PRAIA 63

Classified By: Classified by AMB Marcia Bernicat for reasons 1.5 (b) an
d (d).


1. (U) This is an action request: See paragraph 10.


2. (C) Summary: Although the situation in the Casamance
region of Senegal is calm at the moment, the Senegalese Chief
of Defense General Abdoulaye Fall expressed concern about the
potential for recent events in Guinea-Bissau to destabilize
the region, including the possibility of rebels being
co-opted by narcotics traffickers. The Chief of Defense said
the independence war veterans and the tendency of
Bissau-Guinean defense chiefs to interfere in politics are
the source of instability in the country. To stop the trend,
Fall said a group of senior West African military officers
should be sent to Guinea-Bissau in the lead up to
presidential elections. The presence of the officers would
help to ensure that civilian authorities are able to select
the next armed forces chief of staff without undue pressure
from the Balanta military officers who make up the military
commission currently in command of the armed forces. This
monitoring group could also increase the likelihood for
successful implementation of security sector reform. End
summary.


3. (C) On March 12, the Ambassador, DATT Madden and Security
Cooperation Chief Clemmons met with Fall to discuss the
recent events in Guinea-Bissau and security in the Casamance
region. In addition, Fall raised Senegal's participation in
the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic
and Chad (see paragraph 9).

The Casamance Region is Calm for the Time Being
-------------- --


4. (C) While acknowledging the potential for recent events
in bordering Guinea-Bissau to destabilize the Casamance, Fall
described the security situation in the southern Senegalese
region as stable at the moment. He indicated that the army
was heavily deployed towards the north and also deployed
towards the south and the east where efforts were ongoing in
Zone 5 (Ziguinchor) and Zone 6 (Kolda). Fall commented that
recent Senegalese army efforts had focused on protecting
traffic on the national highway from banditry. Fall did
note that the military was having some trouble securing the
western littoral area of the Casamance; asserting this was
largely due to a lack of means to patrol the coastal bayous
and inlets (Note: The Senegalese have requested boats and
support to build naval infrastructure. End note). Fall said
operating in this area was a challenge for them and that they
needed to upgrade their efforts there. While describing the
situation in the region as largely under control, he
acknowledged the potential for the Movement of Democratic
Forces in the Casamance (MFDC) to be infiltrated and suborned
by narcotics and arms traffickers.


5. (C) At one point, Fall started to contend that the
solution for the crisis is for the MFDC to simply disarm, but
then he paused, reflected and commented that it would be
necessary for someone to start a process to discuss a
political resolution as well with the MFDC. Waiving aside
the possibility of any potential Senegalese concerns about UN
interference in internal matters, he strongly asserted that a
U.S. initiative to assist in the demobilization of the
remaining MFDC armed elements would likely be a welcome
offer. Fall shared his belief that there were only between
200 and 1,000 armed militants remaining. He thought that
many of those were turning to banditry.

Independence Veterans Source of Troubles in Guinea-Bissau
-------------- --------------


6. (C) Segueing to Guinea-Bissau, Fall indicated that he
shared the Ambassador,s perception of events there. He
opined that problems in Bissau will continue until a strong
executive is in place. He argued that the Bissau-Guinean
military must restrict themselves to management of the armed
forces and stay out of the political domain. Fall maintained
that the generation of former liberation fighters still in
uniform was the root of the problem. He said that these old
guerillas should follow the example of their former
comrades-in-arms from Cape Verde. Those fighters have left
the armed forces to make way for the younger generation, whom
they trained well, to take the reins. Whatever influence
those old guerillas may continue to wield, it is exerted from
outside of the military. According to him, former

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Bissau-Guinean Armed Forces Chief of Staff General Tagme Na
Wai and his predecessors Ansumane Man and Verissimo Correia
Seabray had all exceeded their proper military roles by
intervening inappropriately in the political arena. As a
result, each of them was killed in the resultant instability.
Fall opined the same will occur to Captain Zamora Induta,
leader of the military commission commanding the armed forces
at present and the likely successor to Na Wai, unless he
changes course and submits to the authority of the
constitutionally elected leaders. Worse yet, Fall lamented,
this lack of control by the civilians has exacerbated the
infiltration of the government by narcotics traffickers.

International Assistance Needed for Guinea-Bissau
-------------- --------------


7. (C) Fall then discussed his views on the way forward for
the international community vis--vis Guinea-Bissau outlining
three tasks. First, he argued for international assistance
with the upcoming presidential elections and shared the
opinion expressed by other observers that the main objective
would be to hold them before the rainy season began in June
vice a potentially limiting insistence on the 60-day
schedule, as called for by the constitution. Next he called
for assistance to restore economic growth. (FYI - Fall noted
that the Senegalese Armed Forces had evacuated a team from
the International Monetary Fund that was in Bissau to
negotiate an Emergency Post-Conflict Assistance(EPCA) package
in the wake of the assassinations). He concluded by
underlining the overarching importance of Security Sector
Reform (SSR) to obtaining political stability in the country.
An essential first step of SSR would be to Disarm, Demobilize
and Re-integrate (DDR) the Independence era fighters.
Pointing to an overwhelming consensus on this point, he noted
that Brazil had offered to assist with the reinsertion of 30
senior Bissau-Guinean officers and added that ECOWAS had also
pronounced on the need for SSR. Fall agreed that the
selection of Navy Captain Zamora Induta as interim armed
forces chief of staff by the self-appointed ad hoc military
committee currently acting in place of the official chain of
command (which he described as little more than a clique of
influential Balanta officers) was entirely inappropriate. To
limit the political interference of Zamora and the Balanta
officers supporting him, Fall opined that it would be best if
a handful of senior military officers, including a general
officer, from the Economic Community of West Africa States
(ECOWAS) could be on the ground in the run-up to the upcoming
election. (Note: Subsequently, the Community of Portuguese
Speaking Countries (CPLP) has expressed support for the
provision of a stabilization force with a mandate from the
United Nations and the African Union. End noted.)

MINURCAT
--------------


8. (C) Separately, Fall expressed his gratitude for the
strong USG support for Senegal,s peacekeeping efforts. He
specifically thanked the Ambassador for the ACOTA training
and equipment support and for the vehicles provided to their
African Union/United Nations Hybrid Mission in Darfur
(UNAMID) battalion in 2008. After noting a laundry list of
other U.S. military bilateral programs with Senegal, he
reiterated a comment he made in summer 2008 that the United
States is now Senegal,s most important strategic partner.
Noting that France and Morocco had at previous times been
their lead partner, he said he was pleased to see the United
States surpass their levels of support. The Ambassador
praised Senegal,s dedication to the peacekeeping mission and
stated military cooperation is one of the pillars of the
bilateral relationship.


9. (C) With regard to peacekeeping operations, Fall reported
that Senegal would be providing the Force Commander position
for the United Nations Mission in the Central African
Republic and Chad (MINURCAT). However, this was awkward for
Senegal, he commented, because Senegal had not been able to
meet the requirements for the UN,s request for a rotary wing
unit to serve in MINURCAT. (Note: The Senegalese Armed
forces possess two Mi8 HIP and two Mi35 HIND helicopters.
End Note.) Fall indicated that Senegal could not support the
level of troops requested either. However, he concluded by
saying that Senegal would find a way to provide a unit to
MINURCAT, given their Force Commander position.


11. (C) COMMENT: Fall had just returned from the ECOWAS
Chiefs of Defense conference in Praia, consequently post
believes his perceptions of the way ahead in Guinea-Bissau
may be shared by other key military leaders in ECOWAS.
Moreover, Post sees merit in a senior ECOWAS presence in

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Bissau as the election nears and especially during the
implementation of security sector reform. This would be a
welcome first step for West Africa to take to influence the
Bissau-Guinean military to recognize the authority of duly
elected leaders. Specifically, a senior ECOWAS/CPLP military
presence could be an ideal vehicle for delivering the message
to Induta that the military should not impose a candidate for
armed forces chief of staff on the newly-elected president.


12. (C) ACTION REQUEST: Post recommends that the United
States engage with ECOWAS, the CPLP, and key member states to
build support for an eventual ECOWAS/CPLP role in Bissau, and
that the USG provide financial support for sending a mission
consisting of a small number of senior ECOWAS and CPLP
officers. Enabling the elected leaders of Guinea-Bissau to
select the armed forces chief of staff is an absolutely
critical step for an eventual demobilization and baseline
reform of this corrupt and ethnically divisive military. Post
also recommends the Department explore with USAID and the
Department of Defense the possibility of obtaining 1207 funds
to support directly the SSR, and in particular, the DDR
process.
BERNICAT