Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09DAKAR25
2009-01-08 11:55:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Dakar
Cable title:  

GUINEA-BISSAU: 2008 INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS

Tags:  PGOV PREL PU SNAR XY 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO2148
PP RUEHMA RUEHPA
DE RUEHDK #0025/01 0081155
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 081155Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY DAKAR
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1668
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 1174
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 DAKAR 000025 

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR INL, PARIS FOR DEA

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL PU SNAR XY
SUBJECT: GUINEA-BISSAU: 2008 INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS
CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT (INCSR),PART I, DRUGS AND CHEMICAL
CONTROL

REF: STATE 100970


I. SUMMARY
-----------
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 DAKAR 000025

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR INL, PARIS FOR DEA

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL PU SNAR XY
SUBJECT: GUINEA-BISSAU: 2008 INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS
CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT (INCSR),PART I, DRUGS AND CHEMICAL
CONTROL

REF: STATE 100970


I. SUMMARY
--------------

1. Below is Part I, Drugs and Chemical Control, of the 2008
INSCR for Guinea-Bissau. The text is keyed to the format
provided in reftel.


2. Guinea-Bissau, a tiny impoverished country in West
Africa, has evolved into a major transit hub for narcotics
trafficking from South America to Europe. The country, a
party to the 1988 United Nations (UN) Drug Convention,
provides an opportune environment for traffickers because of
its location in relation to Europe, South America and
neighboring West African transit points, its lack of
enforcement capabilities, its susceptibility to corruption,
its porous borders and its linguistic connections to Brazil,
Portugal and Cape Verde. The un-policed islands off the
coast of Bissau are alleged hubs for the associated problems
of arms trafficking and illegal immigration. Corruption,
specifically the complicity of government officials at all
levels, inhibits both a complete assessment and resolution of
the problem. Degeneration of Guinea-Bissau into a narco
state is a possibility. END SUMMARY.

II. STATUS OF COUNTRY
--------------

3. Approximately three times the size of Connecticut,
Guinea-Bissau has a population of fewer than 1.8 million
persons. The country is also one of the poorest in the
world, placing 175th out of 177 countries on the United
Nation,s Human Development Index. Security forces lack the
most basic resources. The country possesses no adequate
detention facilities, and civil servants are often not paid
for months at a time. Guinea-Bissau's history since
independence from Portugal in 1974 has been plagued by
political instability and civil unrest. The U.S. embassy in
Bissau closed in June 1998 due to civil unrest; however, U.S.
engagement with the Government of Guinea-Bissau (GOGB) has
increased since parliamentary elections in 2004 and 2008 and
presidential elections in 2005 were deemed free and fair by
the international community. Guinea-Bissau,s fragility was
underscored, however, by two apparent coup attempts, the
first in August and the second in November, 2008.


4. In January, 2008, the United Nations Office for West

Africa stated that Guinea-Bissau was on the brink of becoming
Africa,s first narco state. In his September 29 report to
the Security Council, United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki
Moon warned that the country was evolving from a narcotics
transit hub into a &major marketplace in the drug trade.8
The Secretary General proposed the formation of a panel of
experts that would investigate narcotics trafficking in
Guinea-Bissau with the possible outcome of the imposition of
targeted UN sanctions.


5. In July, 2008, authorities attempted to seize a grounded
plane, originating from Venezuela and believed to have been
transporting 500 kilograms of cocaine. The plane,s cargo,
however, was unloaded before military personnel allowed
judicial police officers to investigate the scene.
Authorities successfully interdicted four smaller quantities
of cocaine throughout the year. The traffickers were
arrested. In general, GOGB drug enforcement efforts remain
under-funded and undermanned, allowing international
trafficking and the illegal cannabis trade to continue
unabated.


6. The UN Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) views Guinea
Bissau and Cape Verde -- a former Portuguese colony off the
coast of Senegal -- as part of a Lusophone Atlantic network
with links to Brazil and Portugal. Due to cultural links and
existing air and sea connections, Guinea-Bissau and Cape
Verde are serving as transshipment and possibly processing
points for drugs originating in Brazil that are destined for
the European market. UNODC,s October 2008 report suggests
that traffickers continue to use Guinea-Bissau as a hub for
narcotics from South America. Once large shipments of
cocaine are off-loaded from planes and boats in
Guinea-Bissau, the drugs are disbursed in smaller quantities
throughout the region before being shipped out on commercial
air flights and other means to Europe.

III.COUNTRY ACTIONS AGAINST DRUGS IN 2008
--------------

7. Policy Initiatives. The GOGB continues to adhere to its
2007 Anti-Narcotics Emergency Plan. The GOGB further has

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welcomed the European Union,s Security Sector Reform
Mission, launched in March, 2008. In collaboration with GB
officials, the EU mission seeks to restructure and reform the
armed forces, the police and the judiciary. The objective is
to make the security forces more efficient and accountable.
In 2008, representatives from Guinea-Bissau participated in
the Economic Community of West African States, (ECOWAS)
counter-narcotics conference in Praia, Cape Verde, and was a
signatory to the political declaration that came out of the
conference.


8. Accomplishments. During 2008, a number of seizures were
made. On August 13, three Nigerian nationals were arrested in
the Militar neighborhood of Bissau in possession of 160
capsules of cocaine sealed in latex. On September 23, at
Osvaldo Vieira International Airport in Bissau, officials
seized two belts containing two kilograms of cocaine and
arrested a Bissau-Guinean national. On September 25, again
at Bissau,s airport, officials seized 180 capsules of
cocaine, sealed in latex, and arrested a Bissau-Guinean
national. In October, autopsy officials removed 58 capsules
of cocaine, sealed in latex, from the interior of a
Bissau-Guinean national. The courier died when one or more
of the capsules burst open inside of him.


9. With support from UNODC, a new headquarters is nearly
complete for the judicial police. UNODC, with support from
Portugal, also supported the training of 50 new judicial
police officers specialized in counter-narcotics. The
officers are currently being trained in Brazil.


10. In August, authorities reported that they had uncovered
an attempted coup d,etat, allegedly organized by the Navy
Chief of Staff, Rear Admiral Jose Americo Bubo Na Tchuto. Na
Tchuto, long suspected of being a major facilitator of
narcotics trafficking in Guinea-Bissau, eventually fled to
the Gambia where officials arrested him then later released
him. He remained in exile in the Gambia at year,s end.



11. Law Enforcement Efforts. On July 12, a plane from
Venezuela landed at the Bissau airport without the requisite
permission. Upon landing, it immediately was cordoned off by
Bissau-Guinean military officials and its cargo unloaded.
Due to mechanical difficulties, the plane could not again
take off. On July 17, the Minister of Justice reportedly
learned of the unauthorized plane and ordered the arrest of
the crew, who were taken into custody on July 19. Military
officials refused to allow the judicial police and
international investigators to remove the black box and
Global Positioning System apparatus from the plane. On
August 19, a judge set bail and released the crew of the
plane from custody, despite the issuance of an international
arrest warrant against one member and protests by the
Minister of Justice and the Prosecutor General. The pilot
subsequently disappeared, and the judge was later suspended
pending an investigation into possible corruption.


12. Given limitations on funding, training, and policy,
there is only limited ability to guard against the transit of
drugs through Guinea-Bissau. Due to weak enforcement efforts
and inadequate record keeping, it is difficult to assess
accurately the scope of the drug problem. Police lack the
training and equipment to detect drug smuggling. Once
arrests are made, there are no adequate detention facilities
to hold suspects. There are furthermore no secured vehicles
with which to transport suspects.


13. Corruption. Corruption is a problem for narcotics law
enforcement all over Africa, and Guinea-Bissau is
particularly susceptible. The Government does not, as a
matter of policy, encourage or facilitate illicit production
or distribution of narcotic or psychotropic drugs or other
controlled substances, nor the laundering of proceeds from
illegal drug transactions. However, anecdotal stories of
corruption at the highest levels are common. Observers noted
the apparent complicity of military personnel in the July
plane incident, and the judge,s release of the suspects
despite the existence of an international warrant. As of
December 31, 2008, the government was four months in arrears
in paying civil servant salaries, making law enforcement and
security officials further susceptible to bribery.


14. Agreements and Treaties. Guinea-Bissau is a party to
the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and has signed but not ratified
the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and
the UN Convention against Corruption. The status of the 1999

DAKAR 00000025 003 OF 003


UN International Convention for the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism and the African Union Convention on
Terrorism Finance is not known.


15. Cultivation/Production. The extent of cannabis
cultivation in the country is unknown. Cannabis cultivation
is quite common in the Senegal's southern Casamance region
and linked to a more that 20-year-old separatist movement,
the Movement of Democratic Forces
in the Casamance (MFDC). As elements of the MFDC frequently
find sanctuary on the Guinea-Bissau side of the border with
Senegal, it can be assumed that cannabis is cultivated to
some degree. There are no/no known efforts to determine the
scope of the cultivation or eradicate it.


16. Drug Flow/Transit. The U.S. is not believed to be a
destination point for these drugs.


17. Domestic Programs. There is no comprehensive GOGB
policy for systematic destruction of seized drugs or domestic
cannabis nor for the prevention of the transshipment of
harder drugs. Enforcement efforts are sporadic and
uncoordinated. According to the UN, local drug abuse is a
growing problem in Guinea-Bissau, as traffickers occasionally
pay their local accomplices with drugs in kind. There are no
GOGB efforts targeted specifically to reduce local drug
consumption. There are also no GOGB drug treatment programs,
although private organizations have established drug
rehabilitation centers.

IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs
--------------

18. The U.S. Embassy in Bissau closed in June 1998. The
U.S. Ambassador to Senegal is accredited there and one U.S.
officer assigned to the Embassy in Dakar monitors events
there. The U.S. Embassy liaison office opened in Bissau in
2008 and is staffed by two foreign service nationals. During
2008, DEA and FBI representatives visited Bissau to assist in
the investigation surrounding the July seizure of the plane
from Venezuela. Representatives from AFRICOM and the FBI
made frequent visits to Bissau in 2008 to provide technical
assistance and to conduct needs assessments.


19. The Road Ahead. The USG will continue to work closely
with the GOGB to improve the capacity of its narcotics law
enforcement officers to investigate and prosecute narcotics
crimes. The USG also will seek to identify credible partners
within the Bissau-Guinean security forces and will seek to
build their capacity to respond to the threat of narcotics
trafficking. In recognition of the importance of
strengthening broader institutional capacity, the USG will
support the EU,s efforts to reform the judiciary, and will
seek to strengthen the legislative and oversight capacity of
the National Assembly. Furthermore, in recognition of the
broad role that socio-economic factors play in narcotics
trafficking, the USG will seek to promote economic
development and political stability.


V. STATISTICAL TABLES
--------------

20. No statistics available

VI. CHEMICAL CONTROL
--------------

21. There are no grounds for adding Guinea-Bissau to the
list of chemical control countries at this time.

BERNICAT