GUINEA-BISSAU: POST-ELECTION CHALLENGES REMAIN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DAKAR 001018

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/W, AF/RSA, DRL/AE, AND INR/AA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/04/2019
TAGS: ECON KDEM PGOV PINR PINS PREL PU SG
SUBJECT: GUINEA-BISSAU: POST-ELECTION CHALLENGES REMAIN

REF: A. DAKAR 994

B. DAKAR 945

Classified By: Classified By: CHARGE JAY T. SMITH FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) A
ND (D)


1. (C) SUMMARY: In the days immediately before and after
the second-round presidential election in Guinea-Bissau,
PolCouns held a number of meetings to discuss the country,s
post-election future. President-elect Malam Bacai Sanha
stressed the need for increased economic growth and
development, arguing Guinea-Bissau,s instabilities will
continue without development. Sanha also argued that
international assistance should be increased and better
coordinated. Sanha identified the need to work with
defeated presidential candidate Kumba Yala, who in a
separate meeting with PolCouns espoused some of his many
grievances, which must be dealt with for any political
progress to occur. In meetings with members of the
military, including acting deputy chief of defense staff
Colonel Antonio Indjai, the need for military
non-interference in politics was stressed. All parties
agreed that Security Sector Reform (SSR) is urgently
necessary in Guinea-Bissau. END SUMMARY.

PRESIDENT-ELECT SANHA,S PRIORITIES
--------------


2. (C) On July 25, PolCouns met Malam Bacai Sanha at his
home in Bissau. Exhausted after a long electoral campaign,
Sanha spoke about his priorities for Guinea-Bissau. He
argued that his task is to give a tired populace hope and
courage. He acknowledged Guinea-Bissau,s current &grave
situation8 and admitted that the country has been barely
functioning since the 1998 civil war. In Sanha,s opinion,
the President must give the people hope, listen to them,
and provide good governance. He stressed that the
President has no right to govern for himself and that it
will be necessary to involve all Bissau-Guineans in the
process.


3. (C) While Sanha believes that SSR is important he
understands that it will be difficult. However, he sees
general public sector reform as a more important task for
Guinea-Bissau. The key to this, he argued, is a
functioning economy. The government needs to have enough
money to pay its workers, which is necessary for services
to function. In Sanha,s opinion, only (increased)
international aid can help Guinea-Bissau, in its current
state, to pay salaries. In his opinion, what is needed for
prosperity and stability in Guinea-Bissau is a &
comprehensive project8 with the international community.
Sanha emphasized that while Guinea-Bissau has recently and
historically worked with donors on isolated projects such
as the Chinese construction of a new ministerial complex or
the European Union,s SSR mission, there has been no
comprehensive strategy. Sanha underscored the necessity of
Guinea-Bissau having a leader who can lead these efforts
and coordinate donors to increase aid effectiveness. Sanha
stressed that without development, Guinea-Bissau,s problems
will remain intractable.

DEALING WITH KUMBA YALA,S GRIEVANCES
--------------


4. (C) On July 24, PolCouns met Kumba Yala and his campaign
manager, Baltazar Cardoso, in the town of Bula. According
to Yala, the heads of the African Party for the
Independence of Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau (PAIGC) are
irresponsible leaders who have not accomplished anything in
their many years of rule in Guinea-Bissau and have stolen
elections to keep themselves in power. As he sees it, the
PAIGC controls everything and has stacked the deck against
him. He claims that Portugal was responsible for the coup
d,etat that removed him from power in 2003 and that the
PAIGC is &in bed with8 the Portuguese. Additionally, he
claims that the PAIGC stole the massive majority that they
currently hold in the national legislature during the
November 2008 legislative elections.


5. (C) Yala emphasized that in spite of this majority, his
support and that of his party, the Party of Social Renewal
(PRS),was instrumental in seeing Prime Minister Carlos
Gomes Junior,s candidate, Raimundo Perreira, elected as
speaker of the national assembly. Additionally, his
support was also instrumental in approving Gomes,s national
program. In Yala,s view, he and the PRS were able to do
this because Gomes is a &broken8 politician with no support
in his own party and cannot effectively govern. Yala added
that Gomes is a corrupt politician who only fell out of
favor with former president Joao Bernardo &Nino8 Vieira

DAKAR 00001018 002 OF 003


because of a dispute over ill-gotten gains. In Yala,s
view, it is thanks to him that the situation in
Guinea-Bissau has not been as bad as it could have been.
He has managed to prevent conflict, he argued, because his
is the &way of peace.8 (NOTE: While many of Yala,s claims
lack merit, he is correct in asserting that the PAIGC is
fractured. END NOTE.)


6. (C) During his meeting with PolCouns, Sanha maintained
that, as President, he will be open to dialogue with Kumba
Yala. He expressed hope that he would be able to sit down
with Kumba Yala and resolve their differences in a
civilized, respectful manner. He stressed that Kumba Yala
cannot be excluded from a new government and that to
exclude him would be ¬ smart.8 In Sanha,s opinion,
Yala
is an influential figure who needs to be given &hope8 and a
role in the new government. However, Sanha added, if his
overtures are unsuccessful and Yala remains intransigent,
he would appeal to other countries in the region, and
especially ECOWAS, to assist with facilitation and
arbitration.

CONTAINING YALA
--------------


7. (C) During his meeting with PolCouns, Yala said that he
would never surreptitiously try to undermine or overthrow
the newly elected government. Instead, he declared, &If I
want to overthrow the government, I,ll do it during the
day,8 a point he claims to have made to the African Union
(AU). He strongly implied that he wields so much power and
influence within the military that nobody would be able to
stop him if he chose to overthrow Sanha,s government.
However, in Sanha,s view, Yala is not a major threat.
According to Sanha, Yala does indeed want to use violent
means to undermine the electoral and transition process,
but does not have the means. Even within the army, Sanha
stressed, Yala does not have the same degree of influence
he used to. The army,s senior leadership has changed and,
Sanha added, the current leadership has said that it wants
and needs to become a true republican army. Additionally,
Sanha noted, the military that Yala claims to have
influence over is the same military that deposed him in

2003.


8. (C) In a brief meeting with PolCouns on July 25,
Ministry of Defense Director for International Cooperation
Colonel Malam Camara echoed Sanha,s sentiments. He agreed
that Yala will most likely try to disrupt the electoral and
transition process, but that he does not have the support
of key elements in the military, notably the Chief of
Defense, Naval Captain Zamora Induta, and his deputy,
Colonel Antonio Indjai. Camara claimed that Induta and
Indjai are more united than they had been in the past and
argued that it is in Indjai,s interest to side with
Induta. Camara added that in a recent military meeting,
Induta stressed that the military should not interfere in
politics; this sentiment was passed around the military
leadership and down the military,s ranks. In Camara,s
opinion, the military,s senior leadership understands that
any coup attempt will increase the likelihood of ECOWAS
sending in an intervention force. Additionally, a coup
attempt would abruptly bring any SSR assistance to an end.
(COMMENT: In the past, Camara thought Guinea-Bissau,s
situation was dire and recommended the United States to
maintain a hard line against the military leadership. His
current assessment is a significant change of tone.
Although he might not be privy to all of the pertinent
information within the military, his new found optimism
might indicate that Induta and Indjai are beginning to
consolidate their control over the armed forces. END
COMMENT.)


9. (C) On July 27, immediately after the election, PolCouns
met with Colonel Antonio Indjai. Indjai expressed his
appreciation for PolCouns,s meeting request. PolCouns
strongly urged Indjai to work to ensure that members of the
armed forces remain in their barracks and do not interfere
with the post-election and transition process. PolCouns
noted a previous statement from members of the armed forces
to the effect that politicians have sought in the past to
manipulate and take advantage of the armed forces.
PolCouns encouraged Indjai to resist these efforts from
politicians. Indjai agreed, stressing that he and the
armed forces are aware of their proper role and will not
allow any politicians to manipulate them. In addition,
Indjai affirmed that he will respect civilian authority
concerning the legitimate, constitutional role of
Guinea-Bissau,s armed forces.


DAKAR 00001018 003 OF 003


SECURITY SECTOR REFORM AND PEACEKEEPING
--------------


10. (C) Yala,s tenure as President was marked by the &
Balanta8-ization of the military, in which the military
became full of ethnic Balantas (Yala,s ethnic group, who
number approximately 30-35 percent of the population and
now number over 80 percent of the military). During the
conversation, Yala argued that attempting to remove large
numbers Balantas in the military would cause problems.
According to Yala, he is not against SSR per se, and he is
in favor of proportional representation in the military,
but he stressed that any changes must be done &carefully
and slowly.8 He argued that the civilian government must
gain the trust of the Balanta officers in the military and
that they should not feel that SSR is a pretext to get rid
of them. (COMMENT: Yala,s concerns, while self-serving,
are not without merit. SSR must be done carefully so that
it does not alienate the Balanta officer corps and provoke
their opposition. This will be difficult for Sanha, but as
long as Yala does not actively oppose reform and impede the
newly elected government, it is not impossible. END
COMMENT.)


11. (C) In his meeting with PolCouns, Sanha briefly touched
on the topic of SSR. He pointed out that the military
needs to become more professional, and that he will weed
out independence fighters who don,t have proper military
training. However, he argued that many of the military,s
problems are due to Guinea-Bissau,s poor development and
nonexistent economy. He emphasized that soldiers stay in
uniform because they have no other options or
opportunities. In his opinion, the &DDR8 (Demobilization,
disarmament, and reintegration) aspect of SSR is vital,
especially the &R8 portion of it. However, he and the
military are aware of the need for SSR. Speaking to
PolCouns, Colonel Indjai agreed that SSR is necessary for
Guinea-Bissau,s stability and should be undertaken quickly
following the government transition.


13. (C) Sanha opined that a peacekeeping and stabilization
force for the country would be needed only in an extreme
situation and that Guinea-Bissau is not in an extreme
situation. He added that without a local mandate, the
military will interpret the force as an aggressive force,
which could exacerbate the situation. Additionally, the
Bissau-Guinean public will see the force as an occupation
force. Sanha questioned the wisdom of such a course of
action and, while he did not express any adamant
opposition, he believes that any international force should
only be used in an extreme situation. He added that he is
an &optimist8 and that he doesn,t foresee the situation in
Guinea-Bissau deteriorating to such an extreme extent.


14. (C) COMMENT: With the election of Sanha the
international community needs to move quickly to strengthen
the civilian government's authority over the armed forces
while insisting that certain confidence-building measures
be taken, such as vigorously investigating the March
assassinations. END COMMENT.

SMITH
SMITH