GEORGIA/ABKHAZIA: MFA EXPLAINS FM MOELLER'S VISIT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COPENHAGEN 000454

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/CAC, EUR/RPM, EUR/NB, EUR/RUS, EUR/UMB

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/13/2019
TAGS: PREL GG RU UP TU DA
SUBJECT: GEORGIA/ABKHAZIA: MFA EXPLAINS FM MOELLER'S VISIT

REF: A. COPENHAGEN 445 (NOTAL)

B. TBILISI 1881

Classified By: (U) Ambassador Laurie S. Fulton; reason 1.4 (b, d)


1. (C) This message contains an action request regarding
Georgia/Abkhazia and NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine;
please see paragraph 7.


2. (C) SUMMARY: FM Moeller's October 6 visit to Abkhazia
was coordinated with and supported by the Georgian
Government. It came at his own initiative and was intended
to "demonstrate strong political commitment to keep the
Abkhaz issue high on the EU agenda as well as help prepare
the ground for confidence-building measures," not/not to
undercut EU unity on non-recognition of Abkhazia. Moeller
got a "surprisingly cool reception" in Sukhumi; the de facto
authorities were annoyed that the Danish Government had had
no direct contact with them in arranging the visit, and may
have been posturing ahead of elections. MFA shared the text
of a COP COREU report that is included at paragraph 6. END
SUMMARY.


3. (C) William Boe, Deputy Head of MFA's Department of
European Neighborhood and Russia, gave Pol-EconCouns a
readout October 13 of FM Moeller's trip to Georgia and
Abkhazia, in which he himself had participated. This was the
first vsit to Abkhazia by an EU Foreign Minister since it
declared independence from Georgia. Boe shared COP COREU
report on the visit (see paragraph 6 elow) and explained
that the trip was at Moellers own initiative, stemming from
his prior involvement: when the war broke out in August
2008, the-Secretary of State Rice called Moeller to ask if
he could help, knowing that he had visited Georgia the month
before. Denmark does not want the Abkhaz issue to become
frozen for the long term as has happened with northern
Cyprus, Boe remarked.


4. (C) While Moeller's 2008 trip was arranged through the
United Nations, this time the UN declined, apparently for
fear of being seen to legitimize the de facto authorities of
Abkhazia. Taking care not to have any direct contact with
the de facto authorities in organizing the visit, the
Government of Denmark worked through the Danish Refugee
Council. The de facto authorities were miffed and gave
Moeller a "surprisingly cool reception," which may have been
due partly to posturing ahead of upcoming elections. They
did not greet Moeller on arrival at their "foreign ministry,"
though the cameras were waiting at de facto FM Shamba's
office. Moeller pressed the authorities to allow the
European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) access; their reply
was that access would be subject to the condition that while
in Abkhazia, the EUMM not purport to be in Georgia.


5. (C) Boe stressed that prior to Moeller's trip, the
Danish embassies in Washington and the EU-3 capitals (Paris,
London and Berlin) had sounded out their hosts, and
Washington had raised no objection. In Boe's view, Moeller's
visit had accomplished its purpose of "breaking the ice"
(i.e., showing that it is possible to engage with the de
facto authorities of Abkhazia without undercutting the
principle of non-recognition) and demonstrating that the
Abkhaz issue remains high on the EU agenda. Boe alluded to
fears that the issue could fall off the USG agenda; he noted
that on two occasions, EUR A/S Gordon had been expected to
participate in the Geneva Process but had been kept away by
other commitments.


6. (C) There follows the text of the COP COREU report
shared by MFA:

QUOTE:
RESTREINT UE
FM COP COREU
INFO ALL COREU NORMAL
CFSP/COP/0121/09
091009 1059Z
ACRONYM COEST
SUBJECT: COEST - Visit by Danish Foreign Minister Moeller to
Georgia 5-7 October 2009

FM Per Stig Moeller visited Georgia 5-7 October 2009 and met
i.a. with President Saakashvili, FM Vashadze, Head of NSC
Tkeshelashvili, State Minister for Reintegration

COPENHAGEN 00000454 002 OF 003


Yakobashvili, Speaker of Parliament Bakradze, representatives
of the parliamentary opposition and Head of the Abkhaz
government-in-exile Baramia. During a visit to Abkhazia FM
Moeller met de facto President Bagapsh and de facto FM
Shamba. FM Moeller had a briefing at EUMM Tbilisi
headquarter and at the Zugdidi field office.

All Georgian interlocutors focused on the war in August 2008
and argued that the Tagliavini report proved that Russia was
responsible. They were all strongly interested in
strengthening relations to the EU and hoped that visa
facilitation and negotiations on the SA-agreement would move
forward soon.

President Saakashvili briefed on Georgian principles for
engaging with the populations of Abkhazia and South Ossetia,
as well as the de facto authorities. Tbilisi would continue
its policy of people-to-people contacts and was ready to be
pragmatic as long as the principle of non-recognition was not
compromised. A solution on the ships seized by Georgian
authorities en route to Abkhazia was expected soon in the
context of bilateral talks with Turkey with the aim of
finding a general "modus vivendi" concerning Turkish maritime
transport.

The visit to Abkhazia was carried out in agreement with the
Georgian authorities and messages were thoroughly discussed
with FM Vashadze. The aim was to demonstrate strong
political commitment to keep the Abkhaz issue high on the EU
agenda as well as help prepare the ground for
confidence-building measures.

The reception in Sukhumi was cool, because the de facto
authorities were annoyed that direct contacts had been
avoided in preparations for the visit which had been arranged
through a Danish NGO. During the discussions the mistrust of
Georgia was as noticeable as was the perceived need to rely
on Russia in the current phase. FM Moeller made it clear
that the EU line on non-recognition was not up for discussion
and that Abkhazia faced continued international isolation.
He encouraged the de facto authorities to engage in
confidence-building measures and seek pragmatic ways to let
the EU contribute to improve the economic and social
situation of the population, especially returned IDPs. He
also raised the question of the return of Georgian IDP's
north of Gali. The response was not enthusiastic but Bagapsh
was ready to look at confidence-building in a broad range of
fields (incl. transport, energy and infrastructure) if the
status issue would not be jeopardized. The key message of FM
Moeller of looking beyond the issue of recognition in order
to find pragmatic solutions to the concerns of the people and
build confidence with the rest of Georgia was, as expected,
difficult for the Abkhaz side to work with at this stage.
However, the Abkhaz side appreciated the level of political
commitment to help identify solutions in the short and medium
term, and expressed a willingness to learn from other
conflicts over status issues in order to move forward.
Bagapsh firmly rejected any return of Georgian IDP's north of
Gali. He warned that this would lead to a new war.

The Abkhaz side repeated its grievances concerning the EU
policy, incl. on visa policy and investments. If the EU was
sincere in wishing to avoid isolation at least it could give
Abkhaz students the possibility to study in Europe. Although
Sukhumi pretended to downplay the importance of the EU
non-recognition policy, a clear frustration was palpable.
Also, a frustration that the visit of FM Moeller provided no
pretext to undermine EU policy (nor during planning neither
during execution) seemed to cause a certain frustration.
(NOTE: Sentence as received. END NOTE.)

FM Moeller underlined the need to continue the Geneva Process
and to give the EUMM access to Abkhazia. Sukhumi was willing
to accept EUMM in Abkhazia if it was made clear, that in this
case the EUMM did not operate in Georgia.

FM Moeller debriefed the Georgian authorities on the visit
and discussed the feasibility of some of the concrete
proposals by Sukhumi. A more detailed debrief was given by
State Secretary Zilmer-Johns to deputy FM's Bokeria and
Nalbandov. Tbilisi agreed with FM Moeller on the need to
intensify efforts to avoid having the status issue block the
expressed will by both sides to engage. Tbilisi would
include the concrete information in its current work on a way

COPENHAGEN 00000454 003 OF 003


forward on possible confidence-building measures including
trade, transport and education. FM Moeller undertook to
continue to work closely with EU partners to look for ways
forward, and FM Moeller has already been in contact with HR
Solana to debrief on the visit.

END QUOTE.


7. (C) ACTION REQUESTED: Post would appreciate any
information from the Department that we can share with MFA
(at Boe's request) regarding USG thoughts on:

- next steps on Georgia/Abkhazia;

- NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine.
FULTON