GUINEA POST-COUP: AN ANALYSIS AND POLICY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 CONAKRY 000341

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/03/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PMIL EAID KDEM ASEC GV
SUBJECT: GUINEA POST-COUP: AN ANALYSIS AND POLICY
DISCUSSION, PART II

Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES ELIZABETH RASPOLIC FOR REASON 1.4 B AN
D D


1. (S) In assessing Guinea's post-coup environment (septel),
Embassy's reporting team has also been looking at the
potential longer term implications of our current bilateral
foreign policy towards Guinea. Embassy fully supports the
condemnation of the December 23 coup and the subsequent
suspension of all but humanitarian and election-related
assistance. We recognize and support the idea that our
policy will not change until Guinea successfully organizes
legislative elections. At the same time, there is some
concern that we may be backing ourselves into a corner and
limiting our ability to influence the principal players.
While we are not advocating a shift in our overall policy
approach, we do feel it is important to highlight certain
concerns and discuss implications. This policy discussion
looks both at the immediate, pre-election period as well as
the post-election period.

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STRATEGIC ENGAGEMENT
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2. (S) It is increasingly clear that both legislative and
presidential elections will be delayed into 2010, and
possibly even longer. As this period draws out, the USG will
continue to push for elections while withholding aid. If the
situation were to deteriorate further, we anticipate that the
USG would take an even tougher stance. At the same time,
given the fragile nature of the Guinean state and the
distinct possibility that democracy will ultimately fail to
take root, Embassy recommends that we consider engaging more
strategically with the GOG while being sensitive to the need
to avoid undermining our stated policy.


3. (S) Our principal concern is that we are dealing with a
military junta that may very well evolve into some kind of
permanent government, despite all efforts to the contrary.
By limiting our engagement, we increase the likelihood that
Guinea will seek out other international partners, such as
China, Libya, and Iran. We also lose the opportunity to try
to influence key decisions. Although the CNDD seems to be
making itself comfortable, there is still an opportunity to
encourage its members to move in a different direction. They
like the U.S. and they are desperate for guidance.


4. (S) Our current engagement with the GoG is limited.
While this sends an important public message, it also means
that we lack opportunities to articulate and explain our
policy position. We have done this repeatedly in the press
and with lower level contacts, but information from sources
indicates that the GoG is either not getting the message or
is not understanding its implications. We have also been
labeled "naive" in the sense that we do not truly understand
the Guinean reality, and as a result, have instituted an
unrealistic policy response that many Guineans do not
support.


5. (S) We are not proposing open engagement with the CNDD.
We do not need to meet with Dadis and we can continue our low
profile interactions with lower-level CNDD members. However,
we do recommend that the Embassy be granted more flexibility
so that we can strategically engage at higher levels. The
Charge currently does not meet with anyone at the cabinet
level. Since Guinea is a protocol conscious country,
messages at higher levels carry more weight. The USG's
refusal to engage at the principal officer level limits how
effective we can be in articulating our message and
influencing decisions. This is not to say that the
Charge/Ambassador would automatically start meeting routinely
with ministers, but rather, that we should be able to target
key ministers who we think could play a prominent role.
These ministers include Justice, High Crimes and Banditry,
Finance, Security, and Information. Four of these ministers
are military officers directly linked to the CNDD.


6. (S) During meetings with interlocutors since the coup,
Embassy has observed that the CNDD-led government seems
desperate for guidance, especially within the security
sector. While we certainly get asked for money, it is clear
that contacts are also looking for us to explain our policy
and suggest ways that the military can extricate itself from
the current situation. Some CNDD members are seeking to stay
in power, but others are trying to gracefully fade into the
background. Outside the government, there is a second tier
of advisors that are not necessarily publicly connected to
the CNDD, but who have access to key decision makers. These
contacts are within the security sector and are interested in

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everything from anti-narcotics efforts to security sector
reform. We already engage with these invidividuals,
primarily as sources of information, as many of them are
long-time contacts who pre-date the coup. The USG may want
to consider ways we can use these contacts as conduits to
advance our policy agenda. Embassy recognizes that such
engagement would need to be handled carefully, but also sees
the potential for success in such interactions. At this
point, it might be useful to have a broader discussion of how
we could strategically engage with these contacts.


7. (S) It is increasingly likely that we will be dealing
with the CNDD for at least another year, if not longer. We
need to think about ways we can engage with them more
directly, without undermining our overall policy position, so
that we can advance our interests.

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GETTING TO ELECTIONS
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8. (S) Elections do not represent a perfect solution to
Guinea's political crisis, but Embassy believes that they
represent the best democratic solution. With that said,
there appear to be significant hurdles to overcome in order
to get them to take place in a free, fair, and transparent
manner.


9. (S) Before the coup, the USG maintained that the GoG
needed to contribute some funding to elections as a
demonstration of political will and vested interest. Embassy
continues to advance this argument, but we question whether
the goal at this point should be trying to make the GoG
contribute, or whether we should be looking to do what it
takes to simply make the elections happen. The international
community is already footing much of the bill and some of our
partners have started looking at how they can help further
close the gap (currently $19 to $20 million). A number of
civil society contacts have questioned how the USG can
publicly call for elections but then refuse to provide the
necessary financing that would ultimately force the CNDD's
hand. If we are calling for elections, we need to consider
putting more money into them in order to negate at least one
of the CNDD's delay tactics. Additional funds would be
programmed to support such things as the purchase of supplies
and equipment, and salaries for poll workers.

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MULTILATERALISM
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10. (S) Policy cohesion among key multilateral partners will
be critical to advancing the electoral agenda. A number of
our Western partners, particularly France, Germany, and the
EU, initially opted to work under the auspices of the ICG-G
as an effective mechanism for presenting a united
multilateral position. However, support for the ICG-G is
waning. ECOWAS and the AU have soft-pedaled the multilateral
message, often excluding key ICG-G members from participating
in meetings with the junta-led government. Embassy
recommends reconsidering the utility of the ICG-G as
currently structured, which increasingly seems to be at cross
purposes with our stated policy objectives.


11. (S) We are beginning to sense a growing frustration
among some of our key donor partners, which indicates that
individual countries may be more willing to adopt a harsher
bilateral policy position towards Guinea. At the same time,
ECOWAS and the AU may be going in the opposite direction.
The USG needs to capitalize on partners' frustration to
foster a stronger, more cohesive multi-lateral approach to
the coup, which would hopefully include new announcements of
suspension of aid packages. Greater cohesion among the donor
countries could help keep ECOWAS and the AU from sliding
towards leniency. For our policy to be effective, Dadis
needs to understand that the international community is
united and unwilling to budge, something that has not been
well demonstrated to date. To advance this objective,
Embassy plans to reinvigorate our engagement with key
partners over the coming months.


12. (S) Finally, Embassy is concerned that the IMF and the
World Bank may ultimately waver in their approach to Guinea.
The GOG may make the decision easy by failing to pay its debt
service, but in the meantime, the international financial
institutions may be considering a more tolerant engagement
with Guinea, including reinstatement of suspended programs.
Policy unity within the broader international community will
help reinforce the WB/IMF's initial response. It is

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important that these institutions not backslide six months
post-coup to provide much needed financial relief. Not only
would such actions prop up the GOG, they could also be viewed
as legitimizing the junta.

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PUBLIC DIPLOMACY
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13. (S) In addition to government-to-government engagement,
we should not overlook the importance of increasing our
influence by directly engaging the Guinean people through our
public diplomacy efforts. Currently all public diplomacy
programs that are not directly related to promoting democracy
and elections have been suspended. While supporting
democracy and elections is the number one priority of the
public diplomacy program, as it is for the entire Mission,
other PD programs should not be ignored, as they enhance our
image and increase our influence among the Guinean people.
Programs such as the Ambassador,s Fund for Cultural
Preservation, promotion of English teaching, and other
cultural programs are not assistance to the government of
Guinea, but are designed to increase goodwill towards the
United States among the Guinean people. At a time when
Guineans may perceive the United States as abandoning them or
not understanding the situation in Guinea, these programs can
have a multiplier effect on democracy-related programs by
showing the United States in a positive light and make an
excellent platform for directly engaging the Guinean people
about democracy issues. Post recommends considering
restoring certain, select public diplomacy programs.

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AFTER ELECTIONS
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14. (S) Although elections are of immediate concern, Embassy
is also looking at the challenges of a post-election Guinea.
Assuming that the elections are relatively free and fair, the
country will have a brand new legislature (hopefully followed
shortly by a president) comprised of largely inexperienced,
politically underdeveloped members of several major political
parties. At the same time, the military will be waiting in
the wings to step in at the first sign of trouble. The
fledgling government is going to require significant amounts
of technical assistance and reinforcement if it is to survive.


15. (S) The Mission typically receives between $2 and $4
million annually for democracy promotion efforts through
USAID. If Guinea is able to successfully organize elections,
we should be prepared to capitalize on that success and
immediately increase engagement so as to avoid backsliding.
Significantly higher funding levels will be needed to achieve
this goal.


16. (S) Similarly, the military is going to require
attention. Through past Mission Strategic Plans, we have
highlighted the importance of working to professionalize
Guinea's military forces. This goal will become of paramount
importance in a post-election environment. We anticipate
needing to flood the Embassy's security assistance program
with funds in order to support professionalization programs,
including Guinean participation in ACOTA. A detailed
analysis of the current situation within the military and a
recommended post-election response is being submitted
separately through the DAO.

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THE WAY FORWARD
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17. (S) The situation in Guinea is complicated and there are
no perfect solutions. Embassy fully supports our current
policy position. At the same time, we are concerned that we
may be witnessing the evolution of a new dictatorial regime.
Our current strategy of limited engagement may mean that we
are missing an opportunity to influence events and encourage
democracy. We have repeatedly stated our policy and made it
clear that we will not resume normal bilateral relations
until elections are held. However, we have not put forward
enough funds to support our position. We also have refrained
from engaging with the CNDD, which has limited our ability to
facilitate their departure.


18. (S) Six months post-coup, it seems like a worthwhile
exercise to evaluate where we are at, where Guinea is headed,
and how we might influence events. In the immediate term, we
should consider a more flexible engagement with the CNDD
while at the same time ensuring that we do not undermine our

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underlying policy message. We also need to consider
increasing our funding for elections. Finally, it is time to
ramp up our engagement with our multilateral partners. Once
elections happen, we need to be ready to step in with
significant packages of assistance, both for the military and
the civilian sectors.


19. (S) Guinea is a fragile state at risk of quickly
becoming a failed state, a development that could set off a
wave of problems in a fragile region. At the same time, it
is a country with enormous economic and political potential.
USG objectives in Guinea have traditionally focused on
democracy and good governance, economic development, and
security. Our current policy position reinforces these
objectives, but it may also ultimately cause us to lose
ground. Embassy appreciates the opportunity to share this
policy discussion and looks forward to continued discussions
with the Department.
RASPOLIC